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Life for people on many atolls is undoubtedly hard, frequently affected by droughts, rough 
seas and other adverse climatic conditions to name a few. It is little wonder then that kinship 
is the foundation of many atoll societies, traditional and even modern. This study is a 
retrospective analysis of a Pacific people living in several countries but held together as a 
diaspora through notions of kinship. The people concerned have indigenous, ancestral, 
cultural, social and continuing residential connections with Nikunau Atoll (coordinates 
1.3475°S 176.4512°E). The analysis incorporates the present diasporic circumstances of this 
people, including how these circumstances arose historically. The core idea of the paper is 
that such an analysis provides a basis for surfacing and explaining the circumstances of the 
people in question, and so a basis for improving their circumstances from a critical, better-
informed standpoint. The method of conducting the analysis relies heavily on the partisan 
stance of me, the author, whose kinship ties with I-Nikunau (= people who identify with 
Nikunau) are affinal. I identify, grapple with, articulate and interpret situations and events, 
including those I observed or experienced, or was told about, and those at least referred to or, 
in many cases, delved into by other researchers. The circumstances are analysed under 14 
themes, including geographical, demographical, economic, environmental, cultural and 
societal circumstances. As well as appealing to I-Nikunau, the analysis may be relevant to the 
growing number of studies about Nikunau and Kiribati, most of them concerned with 
prospects of climate change making Nikunau, Tarawa and other atolls where I-Nikunau 
reside uninhabitable. That the authors of many of these studies published recently make so 
many references to the matters covered in this analysis would seem to indicate how relevant 
and important the matters in question are to the future of I-Nikunau and I-Kiribati. 
Furthermore, this relevance and importance may apply to the future of other peoples still 
inhabiting the world’s atolls and facing whatever challenges this future may bring, climate-
related and otherwise. 
Keywords History matters!, Nikunau Atoll, I-Nikunau (= people who identify with 
Nikunau), Gilbert Islands, Kiribati, Diaspora, Circular labour migration, Colonialism, 





The broad scholarly value of this study lies in illuminating and stimulating interest in the 
demographical, economic, social and political dynamics of peoples associated with atolls, 
particularly in the Pacific. The study is about I-Nikunau, a people so-called because of their 
indigenous, ancestral, and continuing connections with Nikunau, a closed-lagoon atoll almost 
at the centre of the Pacific Ocean (coordinates 1.3475°S, 176.4512°E) (Goldberg, 2016). The 
study comprises a retrospective analysis of I-Nikunau: I have surveyed their present 
circumstances and analysed how and why they have arisen. The analysis was performed 
using a series of 14 themes, namely, geography, demography, economy, etc., hence “themes 
of analysis”, and is reported accordingly, that is as a series of “thematic circumstances” under 
the headings “geographical circumstances”, “demographical circumstances”, “economic 
circumstances”, etc. Much of the study’s importance stems from perceived inadequacies in 
these circumstances, individually and collectively, and a consequent desire to improve them.  
Nikunau (which otherwise has been spelt Nukunau and been charted as Byron’s Island1) is 
the life world of at least 85% of its 2,000 inhabitants; they self-identify as I-Nikunau, being 
descended from, or married to, persons of various origins associated with the atoll for up to a 
millenary or two, as supported by anthropological, archaeological, ecological, ethnographic, 
sociological and other studies and indigenous accounts (Addison & Matisoo‐Smith, 2010; 
Alaima et al., 1979; Autio, 2010; Di Piazza, 1999; Dickinson, 2003; Geddes, 1977; 
Goodenough, 1955; Grimble, 1921, 1933, 1989; Hockings, 1984; Kambati, 1992; King & 
Sigrah, 2004; Lambert, 1966; Latouche, 1983; Lewis, 1988; Lundsgaarde & Silverman, 1972; 
Macdonald, 1971, 1972, 1982a; Maude & Maude, 1994; Maude, 1963, 1977, 1991; Sabatier, 
1939/1977; Takasaka et al. 2006; Teweiariki, n.d.; Thomas, 2003; Willmott, 2007). 
Furthermore, the atoll has continuing significance for at least another 4,000 persons who, if 
not born on Nikunau themselves, are descended from someone in the last three generations or 
so who was. These 4,000 comprise a diaspora,2 which, over the past few decades, has steadily 
extended to other Pacific places and further afield (e.g., to Great Britain, because of 
Nikunau’s colonial links thereto between 1892 and 1979).  
In the global scheme of things, Nikunau and I-Nikunau are largely anonymous, let alone 
significant, and so it might be easy to dismiss this study as trivial. However, they do have a 
present claim to world fame: Nikunau, or their “home island” and other atolls on which many 
I-Nikunau presently reside, by virtue of being part of the sovereign state of the Republic of 
Kiribati,3 are enmeshed in the issues, and potentially devastating consequences of, climate 
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change, rising sea levels and the compromise of water resources, sustainability and 
environmental concerns of that ilk (see Corcoran, 2016; Kuruppu & Liverman, 2011; McIver, 
Woodward, Davies, Tebikau & Iddings, 2014; Mimura et al., 2007; Oakes, Milan & 
Campbell, 2016; Storey & Hunter, 2010; White et al., 2007). Remarkably, these issues are 
not mentioned in national plans compiled in the colonial or immediate post-colonial period 
(see Gilbert and Ellice Islands Colony, 1970; Government of Kiribati, 1983) and only 
sparked international attention as recently as 1985 (see Pernetta & Hughes, 1990). Thus, not 
least among the aforementioned inadequacies of their present circumstances is living with the 
prospect having to move to higher ground along with the rest of I-Kiribati,4 abandoning the 
islands just referred to (see Donner & Webber, 2014; Nei Tabera Ni Kai Video Unit, 2009, 
2010; Nunn, 2013; Oakes et al., 2016; Smith, 2013; Tatoa & Hogan, 2008; Thomas, 2001; 
White et al., 2007; Wyett, 2014).  
This prospect for them and many other atoll dwellers is prompting global speculation about 
all manner of things connected with emigration from the atolls, being labelled “refugees”, 
and immigration to and resettlement in other countries, including where there are already 
diasporic communities of I-Nikunau, such as New Zealand (or Nutiran) (e.g., see AJ+, 2014; 
Bedford & Bedford, 2010; Edwards, 2014; Fedor, 2012; Roman, 2013; Thompson, 2016; 
Williams, 2008). These matters are incorporated into this study, and so should probably 
broaden its appeal to its subjects and to scholars examining other peoples in similar 
circumstances. Besides, it is anticipated that other aspects of the study are valuable, including 
as an illustration of method and bringing out the interconnections among the various themes 
and the often separate, academic disciplines with which they are associated. 
For I-Nikunau in particular, the insights arising from this study are relevant in various ways. 
They can assist in evaluating how adequate their circumstances are, including by recognising 
and delving into inadequacies of the present. They can prompt discussion about likely future 
circumstances, and inform actions intended to address inadequacies and otherwise make these 
future circumstances better than they might be without having these insights. In other words, 
the insights should be valuable to I-Nikunau in addressing the future, including taking action 
to meet their needs and aspirations. 
The rest of this report is separated into five sections (S2, S3, etc.). In S2, I explain, discuss 
and evaluate the study method, including the approach taken, my own standing in relation to 
I-Nikunau, the validity of the study identity and the processes for gathering and analysing 
empirical materials. S3 and S4 comprise narratives of, respectively, I-Nikunau in the Present, 
 
5 
both on their atoll and in diaspora, I-Nikunau’s present in Retrospect. S3 is separated into 
three subsections (i.e., S3.1, S3.2, etc.), each covering I-Nikunau’s Present in particular 
places. S4 is separated into 14 subsections each relating one of the aforementioned thematic 
circumstances. In S5, I finish the paper, reflecting again on its value, giving some synthesis to 
the retrospective analysis and advancing a few conclusions. 
2 Method 
Concerned as I am to improve understanding of the demographical, economic, social, 
political and similar dynamics of I-Nikunau as a people, including in diaspora, I have made a 
detailed analysis and taken a long view. To effect this in practice, I analysed the present-day 
circumstances of I-Nikunau descriptively, as presented in S3. Then, I analysed the 
circumstances by themes and retrospectively, as presented in S4, in order to explain these 
circumstances and understand their dynamics. I wove the empirical materials at my disposal 
into a rich, chronological, socio-historical, analytic description of the physical and social 
conditions of I-Nikunau, spatially and temporally (cf. Carnegie & Napier, 2002; Pentland, 
1999). This rich narrative covers changes in I-Nikunau’s circumstances of as far back as the 
empirical materials allowed, and demonstrates connections between these circumstances and 
not only emigration and immigration (see Thompson, Howden-Chapman & Fougere, 2017) 
but also diaspora.  
The approach I have taken is predicated on the popular, if inexact, assertion that History 
matters: that is on the idea that “Placing [behaviours and events of consequence] in time—
systematically situating particular moments (including the present) in a temporal sequence of 
events and processes—can greatly enrich our understanding of complex social dynamics” 
(Pierson, 2000, p. 72), not to mention “that it is only in retrospect, after observing the 
structure and its transformations, that it is possible to know the nature of the structure [in a 
social, anthropological sense]” (Cohn, 1980, p. 219). Concomitantly, it resonates with 
contentions by several authors (e.g., Burnett, 1998; Haller, Portes & Lynch, 2011; Roman, 
2013; Thompson; 2016) that immigration and settlement are complex processes involving 
perhaps several generations at least, not just the persons who relocated geographically. 
I mention is S1 using 14 themes of analysis in carrying out retrospective analysis. I leave the 
details of these until the introduction of the presentation of the retrospective analysis in S4. 
What is important here is how the theses arose and whether they are valid. The themes were 
induced, or emerged, as I went through several iterations of working through the empirical 
materials, comparing and contrasting these materials with scholarly literature, sense making, 
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revision and interpretation, all in the name of undertaking the analysis. Figure 1 shows four 
themes I had in mind early on; it was through applying these that the others arose, through 
division in some cases and extension in others. The figure is deliberate in picturing the four 
themes as overlapping.  
Figure 1. Initial Themes of Analysis 
I appreciate that even these four themes, and certainly, the 14 into which I expanded them, 
are subjective; another researcher approaching the same challenge would probably have 
devised a different list and an alternative arrangement. Besides, the themes reflect my 
predominantly I-Matang (i.e., indigenous persons of Europe, in particular being fair-
skinned)5 culture and thinking, informed by literature mostly written by people of that ilk. 
Indeed, among I-Nikunau, traditionally at least, not only are the themes questionable but also 
the idea of division and classification is alien, just as in te mwaneaba, for example, thinking 
and activities are wholistic, rather than separated into religion, politics, business, etc. 
Nevertheless, such divisions and classifications have been common for some time in official 
documents of a development planning, island profiling and reporting nature about I-Nikunau, 
but not necessarily for or addressed to I-Nikunau and other I-Kiribati (e.g., see Government 
of Kiribati, 1983, 2016; Office of Te Beretitenti and T’Makei Services, 2012b). However, 
there is much to suggest that this perspective is external, fostered by colonial and aid 
organisation officials and consultants (e.g., see Asian Development Bank, 2009a, 2009b; 
Gilbert and Ellice Islands Colony, 1957, 1970; Macdonald, 1998). Even so, an interesting 
variant is evident in Ministry of Internal and Social Affairs (2007),6 which in departing from 
the traditional, wholistic thinking has at least a suggestion of being more I-Kiribati than I-











Matang. The variant in question is based on the motto appearing on the coat of arms of the 
Republic of Kiribati, which reads “te mauri, te raoi, ao te tabomoa” (see Figure 2).  
 
Figure 2. Coat of Arms of the Republic of Kiribati (Source: Republic of Kiribati, 2016) 
This motto seems to have been used to close speeches in mwaneaba, etc. for decades. 
Although I was not able to find it recorded as such, say in Grimble’s writings from the early 
20th Century (Grimble, 1989; Maude & Maude, 1994), Grimble does report it as part of a 
prospective magic ritual on Marakei Atoll (see Grimble, 1989, p. 175). The motto has been 
translated variously into English, including words and terms such as health, welfare, being 
alive and well, being safe and sound, prosperity, peace, justness, stability, civility, calmness, 
togetherness, conciliation, honour and respect (Grimble 1989; Trussel & Groves, 2003). In 
Ministry of Internal and Social Affairs (2007), te mauri was aligned with people, 
demography, natural resources, water, environment, health, education, housing, social 
welfare and social infrastructure. Similarly, te raoi was aligned with social capital, 
community life, local institutions, crime and the justice system, religion, political authority 
and governance. And te tabomoa was aligned with economic activities and economies, modes 
of production, transport and communications infrastructure. As detailed in S5, I try to use this 
arrangement in attempting to synthesise the analysis.  
A further, even more important issue of validity concerns my choice of I-Nikunau as the 
study identity, compared, that is, with obvious alternatives of a larger population, such as I-
Kiribati, or a geographical identity, such as Nikunau Atoll or the Kiribati Archipelago, or a 
national identity, such as the Republic of Kiribati (pop. 110,000 – National Statistics Office, 
2016). Choosing I-Nikunau or Nikunau is consistent with a trend in the Pacific literature 
away from studying island groups with European names or countries that have arisen out of 
colonies—Nikunau was part of the Gilbert and Ellice Islands Colony (hereafter, the Colony 
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or, in citing references, GEIC)—and towards studying local or sub-national identities, events 
and circumstances, including those representing the boundaries of pre-colonial polities 
(Davidson, 1966; Grimshaw, 1999; Howe, 1979)—up to the 1880s, not only was Nikunau 
politically autonomous from neighbouring islands but also it comprised six, largely 
autonomous, territorial polities that were governed as gerontocracies (Macdonald, 1982a; 
Maude, 1960, 1963).  
As for choosing I-Nikunau over Nikunau, this is consistent with engaging in the history of 
“ordinary people in their local setting” (Burke, 1991, p. 238), otherwise referred to as history 
from below (Grimshaw, 1999, p. 715), and in keeping with an argument proffered by Morrell 
(1960) in relation to the writing of history in the Pacific, that “the proper subject of history is 
not an area but a community” (p. 1). In respect of individual Kiribati islands, choosing the 
people of a single island is consistent with arguments of Macdonald (1996b) that: 
the primary identity was with the extended family household [ mwenga] and its 
landholdings [ aba], then with a larger district grouping, still linked through the male 
line by common descent [a reference to utu, kainga and boti], and then with the island. 
Intermarriage might have established linkages to other adjacent islands to which 
descent might also be traced but this was usually beyond the horizon in a political as 
well as geographic sense. (p. 39) 
Moreover, following over half a century of emigration, studying only Nikunau Atoll would 
lead to losing sight of significant demographical, economic and other circumstances around I-
Nikunau who now reside elsewhere, whether temporarily or permanently. In other words, it 
would mean omitting two significant phenomena. First, the pattern produced by I-Nikunau 
going away temporarily is circular, and so akin to a concept referred to sometimes as 
“circular labour migration” (see Bedford & Bedford, 2013; Shlomowitz & Munro, 1992). 
Second, the effect of I-Nikunau emigrating permanently and mainly to particular places likely 
gives rise to communities whose members continue to identify with Nikunau as their place of 
origin, alongside identifying with their place of settlement; in aggregate these communities 
make up an I-Nikunau diaspora (cf. Bedford & Bedford, 2013).  
Studying I-Nikunau in the context(s) of circular labour migration and diaspora opens up 
possibilities of obtaining a macrocosmic view of the Pacific, past and present (cf. Howe, 
1979). It thus aligns with Macdonald’s suggestion for studies to examine broader “‘imperial’ 
or hegemonic relationships affecting the world more generally than just the Pacific, and the 
underlying forces that drive them” (1996b, p. 30) (see also Hezel, 1988). Taking such a view 
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enables consideration of reciprocity effects arising on Nikunau through I-Nikunau 
participating in circular labour migration and diaspora (cf. Bedford & Bedford, 2013), or, as 
Page and Mercer (2012) framed it, diaspora being agents of change in their place of origin.  
Besides, studying I-Kiribati as a whole, including its diaspora, would open up too many 
possibilities because, while there are similarities among the peoples of the different islands 
(Morrell, 1960; Rennie. 1981), there are also differences. In turn, these differences have 
given rise to different ways in which these peoples have responded to similar influences 
(Geddes, Chambers, Sewell, Lawrence & Watters, 1982; King, 1996; Lawrence, 1983; 
Macdonald, 1982a), and so to different human circumstances and consequences. Indeed, 
studying I-Kiribati as a whole would overlook the interesting phenomena of I-Nikunau 
forming an urban island diasporic community on Tarawa Atoll, which is the Republic’s seat 
of government and its only large urbanised settlement, and being part of I-Kiribati diasporic 
communities in places (e.g., New Zealand’s Te Waipounamu (or South Island)), where this is 
more practical than having a separate I-Nikunau diasporic community. 
The empirical materials derive from a mix of primary and secondary sources. The primary 
sources have involved participant-observation, akin to immersion. For 30+ years, I have been 
a member by affinity of a bilateral kinship category, group and network, which I-Nikunau 
might refer to as ana utu [Name of person] ni kaan. The generic word in this term, namely 
utu, refers to persons who have “a behavioural relationship of enduring, diffuse solidarity” 
(Lundsgaarde & Silverman, 1972, p. 98 – this definition seems inspired by Burridge, 1957, 
and Eisenstadt, 1956) through either consanguinity or affinity, and so essentially embracing 
birth, tibutibu ( adoption) and marriage.7 Utu are a vital and longstanding institution of I-
Nikunau society and that of neighbouring islands, and have equivalents in other Pacific 
societies (see Geddes, 1977; Goodenough, 1955; Grimble, 1952; Macdonald, 1971; Maude, 
1963, 1977; Maude & Maude, 1931; Morrell, 1960; Ratuva, 2014).  
Being permitted to capitalise on my affinal ties to I-Nikunau and using this insider knowledge 
and experience to gather together empirical materials myself—by identifying, grappling with, 
interpreting and articulating situations and events I experienced, observed and was told 
about—and analysing and interpreting these materials in the grey space between participant 
insider and outside observer has been vital to achieve the richness of narrative I referred to 
earlier. During the 30 years referred to, I have stayed on Nikunau, lived within diasporic 
communities of I-Nikunau on Tarawa, New Zealand’s two main islands and Great Britain, 
and I have visited communities on the Solomon Islands and Nauru (Pleasant Island)—the 
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latter was defunct by 2005 because its raison d’être, that is phosphate mining, had ceased. My 
experiences have been further enriched by countless stories and anecdotes from utu ni kaan, 
koraki, expatriate I-Nikunau and I-Kiribati in diasporic communities, and I-Matang who had 
resided in Kiribati temporarily at various times between the 1960s and 2000s, some of whom 
are part of other utu affinity. 
The secondary sources are empirical materials collected and processed by others and which I 
made efforts to verify, re-interpret, question in terms of perspective—see Cohn (1980) on the 
varied approaches among anthropologists and historians, to name but a few—and apply; 
some only made slight mention of Nikunau, I-Nikunau or the situations and events I observed 
or heard and read about elsewhere. These materials range in time and attitude since the 
earliest recorded glimpse, according to Maude (1961), of I-Nikunau by I-Matang, namely by 
Officer on Board the Said Ship (1767, pp.135–138), who recollects his vessel being greeted, 
in July 1765, by over a hundred naked, male (and one scantily dressed female) “Indians”, of 
an “olive colour” with “fine long black hair” and “remarkably white” teeth, in a multitude of 
“outrigger” boats. Strangely, I can find no I-Nikunau account, oral or written, referring to this 
seemingly momentous event. 
Since, much has been written about I-Kiribati (or Gilbertese, as they were once referred to), 
and so covering some 10 generations,8 with much of it applicable in one way or another to 
Nikunau and I-Nikunau, although the atoll and its people have not always been singled out by 
name. Most of these materials have also been written by I-Matang, so bringing into play the 
issue of I-Matang writing about Pacific peoples but being largely concerned with I-Matang 
issues (see Alaima et al., 1979), despite whatever attempts the writers may have made to 
downplay their backgrounds and perspectives (see Hezel, 1988; Lal, 2007). Thus, there is a 
preponderance of literature about exploring, extracting natural resources (e.g., whale oil, 
whalebone, spermaceti, ambergris, phosphate, tuna), trading for commodities (e.g., coconut 
oil and copra), blackbirding, indenturing, conscripting and recruiting labourers and 
transporting them to various places, evangelizing, colonial governing, civilising, warring, 
economic and social developing, commercing, aiding, nation strengthening, preventing, 
treating and curing disease, illness and infirmity, conserving, protecting and reinstating the 
environment, and addressing climate change and its consequences (cf. Macdonald, 1982a; 
Routledge, 1985). This issue of being I-Matang, and being regarded and treated as such by I-
Kiribati, applies to me also, and to my writing, despite 30 years of observation and 
participation. As Sabatier (1939/1977) indicates, citing an anonymous source, “after ten years 
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in the islands you think you know the local people; after twenty-five years you doubt it and 
after forty years you are firmly convinced that you do not know them” (p. 341). 
From an I-Nikunau perspective, these matters seem to be a misunderstood mishmash of 
things that I-Matang and others (e.g., Chinese, Samoans, other I-Kiribati) did, and about 
which I-Nikunau received little by way of explanation, even when said I-Matang and others 
actually resided on or visited Nikunau (e.g., as beachcombers and castaways, traders, 
missionaries, officials of the Great Powers, aid organisation workers)—most influential 
foreigners have not visited Nikunau (or even Kiribati for that matter), having plied their 
authority, expertise, etc., from a distance (e.g., Banaba (or Ocean) Island, Beru Atoll, 
Butaritari Atoll, Honiara, London, Malua, Manila, Melbourne, New York, Rome, Suva, 
Sydney, Tarawa, Washington DC). 
A further issue about the efficacy of secondary sources stems from some historians arguing 
that primary sources are imperative, traditionally privileging them based on what Merino 
(1998) criticises as “putative objectivity” (p. 607) (see also Hezel, 1988). Concerned as I am 
to reflect I-Nikunau, a society in which writings of any sort have been considered 
unnecessary, and so are obviously rare, to privilege primary over secondary sources would be 
to silence past secondary records of I-Nikunau and other I-Kiribati voices and materials (e.g., 
Kambati, 1992; Koch, 1965/1986; Latouche, 1983) compared with official colonial records 
(e.g., GEIC, 1976; Land (Copra) Tax Register 1910–1916). 
Finally, on method, I referred at the beginning of S1 to illumination and stimulating interest, 
with the implication of there being things to be concerned about. This concern comes from 
me, as the researcher, and underpins an intention for this study to have beneficial outcomes, 
including improving I-Nikunau’s future circumstances from a critical, better-informed and 
comprehensive standpoint (cf. Smith, 2012). Having produced the study, however, there is 
some doubt in my mind as to whether it will empower I-Nikunau, in particular whether it 
addresses the sorts of questions that interest them or they see as relevant and important. 
3 I-Nikunau in the Present 
Of roughly 6,500 people presently identifying as I-Nikunau worldwide, barely half were born 
on Nikunau and no more than 1,800 normally reside there. Indeed, even though they adhere 
to the I-Nikunau identity, probably over 35% of the ≈ 6,500 have never actually set foot on 
Nikunau, a number and proportion that are increasing quickly. Furthermore, the largest 
population of I-Nikunau in one place comprises the approximately 2,600 now normally 
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resident on Tarawa Atoll, where there are possibly upwards of a further 800 persons with at 
least tentative consanguinal or affinal links to Nikunau. The rest of the diaspora, made up of 
at least another 1,900 persons, live elsewhere, either in the Republic (i.e., on either the other 
Kiribati islands (≈ 500) or the Line Islands (≈ 700)), or on other Pacific Islands (including the 
Solomon Islands (≈ 400), New Zealand (≈ 150), Australia (≈ 20), Fiji, Vanuatu, the Marshall 
Islands and Papua New Guinea), or further afield (including on Great Britain (≈ 16) and 
elsewhere in Europe, and North America) (see Figure 3) (cf. Bedford & Bedford, 2010; 
National Statistics Office, 2013, 2016; Office of Te Beretitenti and T’Makei Services, 2012b; 
Teaiwa, 2014; Thompson, 2016). 
Except as is indicated in S1, where the number of members who may identify as I-Nikunau is 
not great, in practical social terms the diasporic community they are part of is more 
accurately described as one of I-Kiribati than of I-Nikunau. This applies in the community in 
Great Britain and in the now half dozen communities in New Zealand (cf. Roman, 2013; 
Thompson, 2016), and is reflected in pan-Kiribati names adopted by the formal bodies 
established in these communities to organise events and perform other functions (e.g., 
Kiribati Tungaru Association, Christchurch Kiribati Community). It may also apply in the 
diasporic communities in the Solomon Islands because of how these came about (see Tammy, 
2011)—these communities arose through successive migrations of peoples from Nikunau and 
other Kiribati islands, first, to different islands in the Phoenix Islands, and then, barely a 
generation later, from there to different islands in the Solomon Islands. 
As outlined in S2, the material presented in this section is intended to provide descriptive 
foundations for the circumstances I analyse retrospectively under different themes of analysis 
in S4. In order to do this pragmatically, I contend that the ≈ 6,500 may be thought of as 
comprising three categories: those living traditionally, including on Nikunau and other Outer 
Islands9 in the Kiribati Archipelago and Line Islands, and on Ghizo, Alu and Wagina Islands 
in the Solomon Islands; those living in an urban island settlement, particularly Tarawa but 
also Honiara and Gizo, and perhaps Suva, Nadi and Majuro; and those in metropolitan 
countries. Furthermore, given that to describe all instances of each category was beyond my 
experience, I have used those on Nikunau to illustrate the first, those on Tarawa to illustrate 
the second, and beyond Kiribati, those in Great Britain and New Zealand to illustrate the 









The description of Nikunau in S3.1 is based on various written and oral secondary sources 
and my participant-observations during five visits between 1985 and 2009, which totalled 
four months. Where the written secondary sources are based on studies of neighbouring 
islands, I have used Nikunau informants and my participant-observations to satisfy myself of 
their relevance and validity. As my first and, to most intents and purposes, only language is 
English, and the language of Nikunau is a version of te taetae ni Kiribati—to clarify, most I-
Nikunau I met on Nikunau spoke only a few words of English—I relied on my spouse to 
interpret conversations, as well as explain many aspects of life the two of us observed and 
participated in during my visits—she was born and brought up on Nikunau before moving to 
Tarawa to complete primary school, followed by secondary and tertiary education there and, 
later, elsewhere, and working on Nikunau as a teacher for a year or so in between. 
The description of Tarawa in S3.2 is also based on various written and oral secondary sources 
and participant-observations. The latter occurred for six periods between 1985 and 2009. 
These included a two-year residence spent in a family house typically rented to a temporary 
non-I-Kiribati resident involved in an aid project or a senior government official, and, indeed, 
originally built for colonial officials, and five shorter visits, totalling six months and spent in 
several I-Nikunau mwenga. Again, I have satisfied myself of the relevance and validity of the 
written secondary sources using my participant-observations. The comments above about 
English and te taetae ni Kiribati also apply to participant-observations on Tarawa; although 
more I-Nikunau and other I-Kiribati I met there had more English, their lack of practice in 
speaking it meant there was reluctance to do so, particularly in other than one-on-one 
conversations. Roman (2013) and Thompson (2016) note this shyness among I-Kiribati in 
New Zealand; Thompson associates the word maama (or mama) with this reluctance, which 
she also perceived as applying to other situations in which shyness is accompanied by 
seemingly inappropriate smiling or laughing. In fact, the word mama makes up part of the 
word kamama which is used later in this paper as the equivalent of shame, a way of 
demeaning oneself and suffering public embarrassment, including becoming te bai n rang ( 
a laughing stock) (see Trussel & Groves, 2003). However, kamama not only applies in the 
context of answering questions that have a correct answer by giving an incorrect answer, and 
so displaying ignorance, but it also applies to showing off by giving the correct answer 
(McCreary & Boardman, 1968). 
The descriptions of Great Britain and New Zealand in S3.3 are also based on written and oral 
secondary sources and participant-observations. The latter were from inside I-Kiribati 
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metropolitan diasporic communities on Te Ika-a-Maui (New Zealand’s North Island) (1987–
1997), Great Britain (1999–2006) and Te Waipounamu (2007–). Again, I used my 
participant-observations to satisfy myself of the relevance and validity of the written 
secondary sources. The comments above about English and te taetae ni Kiribati again apply, 
particularly in New Zealand.  
3.1 On Nikunau Atoll 
Nikunau (area 19 km2, pop. 1,789 – National Statistics Office, 2016) is shaped like an 
elongated figure of eight (see Figure 4) and comprised of coral. None of the land is more than 
5m above the vast Pacific Ocean around it. Although there are obvious signs of soils being 
poor and rainfall intermittent (see Di Piazza, 2001; Ministry of Internal and Social Affairs, 
2007), the atoll is mostly covered in trees, bushes and other flora (for a list, see Fosberg & 
Sachet, 1987). Except that is for the two small lakes, one of which is an ephemeral or 
hypersaline lagoon (Goldberg, 2016; Wester, Juvik & Holthus, 1992), and various fabricated 
objects reflecting human settlement and activities. The distribution of much of the flora also 
reflects this human existence, vital to which are I-Nikunau’s activities not only on the land 
but also on the ocean, including the fringing reef that runs the length of the atoll’s western 
shore—the eastern shore lacks such a feature, the beach there falling much more steeply into 
the ocean. A satellite view is available from EarthStreetView.com (2014) and a tour video 
from Teuea (2010). 
 
 
Figure 4. Nikunau Atoll (Source: Ministry of Internal and Social Affairs, 2007, p. 15) 
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The various fabricated objects referred to above, and mostly shown as settlements, etc. on 
Figure 4, reflect past and present activities of I-Nikunau and various other types of transient 
residents and visitors. I-Nikunau mostly reside in the six kawa ( a clustered settlement or 
converged village) positioned intermittently along the south-west facing shore, and so 
adjacent to the fringing reef there. From north-west to south-east, their names and 
populations are Muribenua (pop. 250), Tabutoa (pop. 146), Rungata (pop. 847), Mwanriiki 
(pop. 184), Nikumanu (pop. 293) and Tabomatang (pop. 69) (National Statistics Office, 
2016). 
A dirt road runs through each te kawa connects them. This is the only road on the atoll, apart 
from a few narrow tracks running to the eastern side through buakonikai ( bush lands). 
Beyond Tabomatang, the road runs past that kawa’s cemetery to the atoll’s southern-most tip; 
here Taburitongoun, a highly esteemed te bakatibu (≈ an ancestor beyond the seventh 
generation), is alleged to maintain a spiritual presence (Kambati, 1992; Latouche, 1983; 
Maude, 1963), and this is symbolised by te boua-n-anti ( a spirit stone or shrine) dedicated 
to him.10 In contrast, the road to the north-west of Muribenua terminates at one of the atoll’s 
most modern features, the airport, which a group of British Royal Engineers constructed in 
the late 1960s. 
Each te kawa mostly comprises areas on which I-Nikunau dwell as households. Known as te 
mwenga, each is formed of several separate buatarawa, kiakia, okai, bareaka and other 
bata.11 These are all types of small and medium-sized huts and other shelter-like structures, 
some on stilts, built of local materials (i.e., thatch, poles, coconut binding, etc.), and having 
different functions, including sitting/eating, cooking, sleeping and storage, and canoe sheds. 
Where appropriate, these structures contain traditional furniture, which mostly takes the form 
of foot, sitting, sleeping and other mats (cf. Koch 1965/1986), although a few imported 
drawers, cabinets, etc. have come to supplement them. The spaces between these structures 
are used to dry copra, fish, pandanus pulp, etc., to wash clothes, and to accommodate an open 
fire area, sometimes a well (communal wells with solar-powered pumps are also available) 
and even a grave (cf. Hockings, 1984). Positioning graves here is a recent return to tradition, 
as each te kawa still has a cemetery, usually on its fringe, away from residential areas, as 
originally mandated under now defunct Colony Government regulations (e.g., Regulations 
for the Good, 1933).  
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These regulations also account for mwenga comprising each te kawa to be arranged still in 
two very orderly rows running parallel to the shoreline and either side of the aforementioned 
road. The regulations also applied to matters of water and sewerage, specifically the 
provision of wells and latrines in te mwenga and the actions of bathing and defecating. 
However, with little concern for maintaining latrines for various reasons (e.g., lack of 
concern about privacy and pollution, lack of technical knowledge, cultural repugnance, 
higher priority of other subsistence work), these actions are now completed on the seashore, 
by and large (cf. Hockings, 1984).  
Regarding other modern conveniences, electricity generation on the atoll is limited and 
localised, with small petrol/diesel generators, solar cells and batteries in use but only on a 
severely restricted basis because of scarcity, unreliability and cost (cf. Ministry of Internal 
and Social Affairs, 2007). This limits the use of much equipment and impairs the performing 
of many activities that on Tarawa and beyond may be taken for granted. Examples include 
lighting—pressure lamps and battery torches are common—cooling and refrigeration, 
machinery and equipment—battery-powered radios are common—(see Mala, Schläpfer & 
Pryor, 2009, about similar matters on Abemama). 
The word mwenga also translates as households, the one word having two meanings 
indicating synonymy between geographical place and social residency (Hockings, 1984). 
Thus, te mwenga comprise members of te utu (see S2) residing together, the average number 
being 5–6 persons on those that are still occupied (National Statistics Office, 2013). 
However, I say “still” because evident from even casual observation are significant numbers 
of dwelling areas in five kawa are unoccupied—Rungata is the exception. This state of affairs 
is attributable to entire mwenga emigrating from Nikunau to Tarawa, usually in a few stages 
over several years rather than all at once, for reasons discussed as the paper unfolds.  
The two or three most striking buildings in each te kawa, and indeed on the whole atoll, are 
cultural and spiritual, reflecting still what Hockings (1984) describes on neighbouring Onotoa 
Atoll as “an intense investment in cultural symbolism” (p. 458). Nikumanu is peculiar in still 
having te mwaneaba ( traditional meetinghouse);12 such mwaneaba dated from well before 
1820 and were once “masterpiece(s) of Gilbertese culture” (Sabatier, 1939/1977, p. 99); they 
served as social, political and religious centres of a “mwaneaba district” and as inns for 
visitors. While many of the Nikumanu district mwaneaba’s formal uses have ceased, that is 
more than can be said for mwaneaba in the other kawa. A few standing stones on overgrown 
sites are all that remain of them, their place having been usurped by churches. Thus, each te 
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kawa, including Nikumanu, has a church associated with the Kiribati Protestant (or Uniting) 
Church (KPC/KUC)13 and four—Tabomatang and Tabutoa are the two exceptions—have a 
Roman Catholic (RC) church. Associated with each church is a dwelling for the pastor or 
cleric, including their companions, families, etc., which are more like I-Matang house types 
than traditional ones, and a structure, almost as noticeable as the church itself, referred to, for 
obvious reasons of appearance, as the church mwaneaba, or simply te mwaneaba.14 Indeed, 
these church mwaneaba are seemingly in more frequent use than the churches themselves, for 
various administrative, social and recreational activities (Ministry of Internal and Social 
Affairs, 2007). Kawa, or parts of them, also usually have uma ( small meetinghouses) where 
community groups (e.g., kawa welfare groups, young men’s groups, women’s groups) meet 
and hold functions. 
Each kawa also boasts either a small trade store, or, failing that, a kiosk, all selling basic 
provisions, and, in the case of stores, purchasing copra from copra cutters. The concept of 
stores is of long standing, dating in at least two cases from the 1870s, and all this time they 
have represented the extremis of successive maritime trading networks, the present network 
involving trading and, mostly container, shipping companies based around the western 
Pacific Rim and Fiji. Their legal forms now vary between being branches of Te Bobotin 
Nikunau (or The Nikunau Cooperative Society) and mronron, which comprise members 
drawn from kinship groups, kawa or churches.15 The items available from these outlets 
include white rice, white flour, white sugar, oil/fat/dripping, stick tobacco, cigarettes, black 
tea, instant coffee, evaporated milk, powdered milk, corned beef, chewing gum, tomato 
ketchup, tinned vegetables and fruit, soap, toothpaste, matches, lamps, fishing lines, hooks 
and nets, bicycle parts, pots and pans, knives and spoons, tools and other metal goods, cloth, 
radio and torch batteries, kerosene and petrol, timber, cement. I observed these in 1987 and 
2009, and the extent of this list had changed little over that time, any changes because of 
more goods being manufactured worldwide being countered by incomes of I-Nikunau not 
being able to support the import of more goods (cf. Catala, 1957; Couper, 1967; Lewis, 
1981).  
Most I-Nikunau on Nikunau make their living, etc. in traditional ways, to which the goods 
available from trade stores are incidental, relatively speaking. In and around their mwenga 
and kawa, their days are perceived not in hours but in the daylight from dawn to dusk and the 
darkness of the evening. Mostly according to gender and age (see Lawrence, 1983; Rose, 
2014), they spend this six days a week performing domestic chores (e.g., fetching water, 
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cleaning, cooking, feeding the pigs), going to school, socialising, and engaging in kawa and 
church activities, fishing on the reef or the ocean and cultivating, harvesting and performing 
other work on their aba ( plots of land, some near te kawa and the rest in buakonikai nearby 
or at a distance)—McCreary and Boardman (1968) note their focus on the here and now, and 
their behaviour having a rhythm and being diurnal. Subsisting from the reef and ocean 
involves using fish traps, canoes and an array of traditional and imported equipment, to 
acquire a wide variety of fish and shellfish. On land, many of the bushes, trees, etc. have been 
propagated and cultivated to yield victuals (e.g., coconut, kamwaimwai (= coconut molasses), 
karewe or toddy,16 pandanus fruit, pawpaw, breadfruit, pumpkin, bwabwai ( swamp taro), 
pig meat, fowl, cabbage, banana, sweet potato, fig), medicines, ornaments, building materials, 
tools, fuel and fertiliser (Ministry of Internal and Social Affairs, 2007) (cf. Lawrence, 1983; 
Lewis, 1981). The resulting domestic produce is part of a subsistence and victuals 
distribution and exchange process, which is largely undercounted, or even neglected, in 
official statistics and the like, despite its importance to I-Kiribati standards of living (cf. 
Gibson & Nero, 2008). Furthermore, the coconut palms also yield the coconuts used to 
produce almost the only the cash crop, copra.17 
Daily routine life on Nikunau is punctuated each week by observance of Te Tabati (= the 
Sabbath). As well as church going, some activities are encouraged by religious (and secular) 
laws and legal decisions, and other activities are prohibited, including work, play, pastimes, 
games and sports. The prohibitions apply more so among the near half of the islanders who 
adhere to the Reformed Protestantism of the KPC/KUC—this Church grew out of the London 
Missionary Society (LMS)—rather than the similar proportion who are now RCs.  
Life is also punctuated less frequently by various other observances. These are to celebrate or 
commemorate various critical life passages (e.g., births (particularly of the first-born child), 
first birthdays, katekateka (= first menstruations (see Kutimeni Tenten, 2003) (now 
celebrated intermittently), marriages, deaths and burials) and festivals (e.g., Easter, 
Christmas, National Day); and to welcome to the atoll and to each or all te kawa various 
people (e.g., temporary non-I-Nikunau residents and short-term non-I-Nikunau visitors, I-
Nikunau who have been absent for a limited period, visiting I-Nikunau diaspora), and 
departures of same. These observances usually involve botaki ( festive or other large social 
gathering), some lasting up to several days and invariably involving a feast of victuals and 
programme of entertainment, prominent in which are batere, ruoia, kabuti, mwaie, kabure 
and other various forms of dance, along with music, songs and poems (Autio, 2010; 
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Dambiec, 2005; Grimble, 1989; Sabatier, 1939/1977; Whincup, 2005). They are held in 
church mwaneaba, or in Nikumanu’s case, its traditional mwaneaba, or in the lesser 
community buildings, or on mwenga. Participation is a matter of course, although the roles in 
which someone might be cast can vary, both according to age and gender, and according to 
being an utu member, through te kawa resident or member of a church congregation, to island 
resident (cf. Autio, 2010, pp.155–176). 
Arrangements for these events, along with oversight of kawa affairs generally, are mostly in 
the charge of kabowi ( (council) meetings) in mwaneaba of unimane ( wise, respected and 
ascendant old men), hence what I term “mwaneaba councils”. As well as being part of 
tradition, these councils are important for tradition continuing. This tradition, often referred 
to as te katei ni Nikunau ( the Nikunau Way), or just te katei, has equivalents on the other 
Kiribati islands and is oral (or unwritten) and ever-developing (cf. Rennie, 1981). It 
comprises beliefs, rules, regulations, ceremonial rituals, precedents and other practices to 
which I-Nikunau are subject, thus forming a code of customary kinship, social and 
governancial relationships. The councils are custodians of te katei, updating it and enforcing 
it, and thereby regulating conduct in te kawa. Just as tradition is dynamic and becomes 
modernised, so is the form of these bowi and how they are conducted (cf. Autio, 2010; 
Geddes, 1977; Kazama, 2001; Lawrence, 1983; Macdonald, 1971, 1972; Maude, 1963; 
Thomas, 2001).  
Nikunau has other prominent fabricated objects that, while associated with kawa and their 
residents, are outside them and may be labelled “non-traditional”. The atoll has three clinics 
and three primary schools, each positioned about midway between the two kawa they serve 
(see Figure 4). The clinics have sleeping areas for in-patients, and so are sometimes referred 
to as island hospitals, although they are staffed by a nurse or two, not by doctors, and have 
only a limited supply of medicines and dressings and the most basic amenities. The schools 
comprise classrooms, a school mwaneaba and lesser buildings, and shaded areas for outdoor 
activities. Together, the three primary schools cater for 360 pupils (Office of Te Beretitenti 
and T’Makei Services, 2012b; Republic of Kiribati, Ministry of Education, 2011).  
The primary schools feed the atoll’s junior secondary school, established only in 2001 and 
located on the southern outskirts of Rungata. Its roll is almost 200 students. Students finish 
junior secondary school at about 15 years of age, afterwards either going away to senior 
secondary schools, which are mainly on Tarawa (including North Tarawa) but also on Beru, 
Tabiteuea, Nonouti, Abemama and Abaiang Atolls, or ending their formal schooling and 
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probably becoming full-time members of their subsistence-based mwenga or spending time, 
or even making a life, elsewhere. For example, they may join utu on Tarawa, including in the 
hope of finding work there, or, they may obtain places on work schemes outside Kiribati 
(e.g., the Recognised Seasonal Employer scheme in New Zealand). 
The formal administration of the atoll is vested in the Nikunau Island Council, sometimes 
known as Te Kabowi n Abamakoro (≡ The Council of the Island). Its principal premises, also 
on the southern outskirts of Rungata and at one time referred to as the “government station”, 
includes a flagstaff, a relatively new administration building (the previous one, and the 
records it contained, were consumed by fire in the 1990s), courthouse, community 
development centre, prison, post office and guesthouse for visitors (Ministry of Internal and 
Social Affairs, 2007). Adjacent to these are several recently built, traditional-looking mwenga 
for employees of the council and of the Republic Government, or Te Tautaeka, as it and its 
predecessor, the Colony Government, is, or was, known. These mwenga and the staff and 
students of the junior secondary school account in part for the relatively recent phenomenon 
of the population of Rungata being almost equal to the populations of the other kawa put 
together. They include a disproportionate number of the atoll’s 200+ non-I-Nikunau 
residents, nearly all of whom, however, are I-Kiribati; their primary reason for being on 
Nikunau is their work with the Island Council, the Republic Government (e.g., as primary 
and junior secondary school teachers, nurses at the clinics, or financial or legal 
administrators) or churches. They also account for a proprietary trade store having been 
established nearby only within the past decade or so, and for this store seeming more 
prosperous than the stores situated in kawa. Nevertheless, besides the paid employees of the 
council, it also attracts custom from copra cutters, buying their copra just like the stores in 
nearby kawa; these customers probably find it just as convenient and probably better stocked 
than the other stores.  
Nikunau’s formal links and connections with the outside world include transport and 
communications. To reach the atoll for my five visits I flew onto the atoll’s airstrip, taking 
the usually weekly air service between Nikunau and Tarawa, a 600-kilometre flight of four 
hours’ duration, involving stops on Tabiteuea and Beru—at various times the service was 
twice weekly but only if sufficient aircraft were in service. The alternative would have been a 
voyage lasting several days on the passenger-cargo ship(s) that ply the central and southern 
islands commencing from and returning to Tarawa. These ships call intermittently, rather 
than working to a fixed schedule, and their frequency, while never having been great, is in 
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long-term decline. The ships stand off Nikunau, near a passage through the reef leading to the 
wharf at Rungata, which has operated since at least the 1880s (Sabatier, 1939/1977). The 
main store and copra shed of the once prosperous Te Bobotin Nikunau are a stone’s throw 
from this wharf. 
With aeroplane passenger and freight capacity limited and fares high (Ministry of Internal 
and Social Affairs, 2007), I-Nikunau depend on these ships, including if they need or want to 
travel to Tarawa or elsewhere. Although travel by canoe to neighbouring Beru Island is 
possible logistically, few attempt it nowadays (cf. Bedford, Macdonald & Munro, 1980). 
Most I-Nikunau resident on Nikunau visit other islands only sporadically, usually for family 
reasons or to participate in religious body events, governmental meetings and organised 
sports tournaments. Some may travel to visit the southern Kiribati Islands district hospital on 
Tabiteuea or the central hospital on Tarawa, but the reality is that I-Nikunau usually go 
without health treatment if it is not available at the rudimentary clinics on Nikunau. Longer 
absences may be for school education or relate to employment elsewhere; however, these 
longer absences have increasingly given way to the aforementioned phenomenon of I-
Nikunau leaving permanently. 
Regarding communications, some services of longstanding are available at the Island Council 
main premises, including postal and money transfer services from and to Tarawa, the other 
islands and beyond. Radio broadcasts have reached Nikunau from Tarawa since the 1960s, 
and my experience in the 1980s was for Nikunau to receive broadcasts in te taetae ni Kiribati 
for a few hours each day from Radio Kiribati, a Republic Government-owned organisation— 
Radio Kiribati also relayed the English-language news from either Radio Australia or the 
BBC World Service, but this was usually turned off to conserve the precious battery power. 
However, since then the reliability of the broadcasts has been impaired by deterioration of the 
transmission equipment on Tarawa. Since 2010, Nikunau has had satellite telephones, making 
it possible technologically if not financially, to dial direct to and from the rest of the world; 
up until then, the telephone service was limited to a radiotelephone at the Island Council main 
premises for only a few hours each week. Since the new telephone service became available, 
access to the Internet has been possible but this is severely restricted by the aforementioned 
lack of electricity and by price. Broadcast television has never been available. 
As the above indicates, Nikunau various formal public services are provided on the atoll. 
However, these are fewer in number, much less resourced and of limited volume compared to 
those on Tarawa. The services are under the auspices of the Island Council and the Republic 
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Government. The number of Island Council employees varies but around 30 non-casuals 
comprise the core (Ministry of Internal and Social Affairs, 2007), and they are the biggest 
line item of expenditure—more than the other line items combined in fact (confidential 
personal communication, 2009).  
The Island Council is dependent on the Republic Government for funds, with, formally, 80% 
of its budgeted revenue coming from the Republic Government’s appropriations to its local 
government ministry. In practice, however, this percentage is even higher, because local tax 
collection is not very effective. I-Nikunau either have difficulty in paying taxes, etc., 
especially in times of drought, or are reluctant to pay them (cf. Ortega, 2008)—the salaries 
and wages of Island Council employees is sometimes in arrears for lack of cash, and that 
means they cannot pay their local taxes either. The Republic Government also employs over 
30 persons on Nikunau (Ministry of Internal and Social Affairs, 2007), most of them posted 
there, sometimes reluctantly. They are paid out of appropriations to that government’s 
various ministries (e.g., of education, health), in the same way as such employees on Tarawa 
are. 
In contrast to the paid employees living at Rungata or adjacent to primary schools and clinics, 
and to pastors and others with private cash incomes, etc., the rest of I-Nikunau are much less 
dependent on cash as a means of acquiring their daily needs; however, they do need cash for 
certain things. I estimate it as unlikely that the mean fortnightly cash incomes of a traditional 
I-Nikunau te mwenga exceeds AU$70 (or < AU$1 per day per person). There are only a few 
sources of cash incomes. I-Nikunau over 70 years of age18 receive a monthly non-
contributory pension of AU$40 from the Republic Government. Some I-Nikunau obtain a 
little casual paid work from the Island Council or otherwise (e.g., stevedoring when a cargo 
ship arrives – see Ministry of Internal and Social Affairs, 2007), but work done for other I-
Nikunau or for the church, including repairs and maintenance, rarely results in cash income. 
Some mwenga receive cash remittances from those utu either working away temporarily or 
absent permanently, in an urban island or metropolitan country diasporic community 
(Ministry of Internal and Social Affairs, 2007). However, given the lack of kaako (literally, 
cargo, and meaning stock or inventory) for sale in stores on Nikunau, remittances in kind can 
be more useful than those in cash are. For many mwenga, the main source of cash is from 
cutting copra. However, although they can sell all the copra they can produce at a guaranteed 
price to their local trade store—the stores act as purchasing agents for the Republic 
Government,19 which presently buys all the copra and ships it to Tarawa, for onward sale—
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income from this source is not great, especially given increasing vagaries in rainfall (cf. 
Ministry of Internal and Social Affairs, 2007).  
Regarding spending, its results and related matters, purchases from a trade stores are limited 
to the foreign victuals and manufactures listed above as available in those stores; these items 
have become as an accustomed part of I-Nikunau life as traditional subsistence produce from 
land and sea. The aforementioned remittances in kind might include tools and other 
hardware, fishing equipment, radios, video and audio equipment, DVDs and similar, and 
push-bicycles and mopeds/scooters—the handful or so of other motor vehicles on the atoll 
are pickups and light trucks, which are owned by the Island Council or a church. I-Nikunau 
also use cash to pay school fees, church contributions and Island Council tax—nowadays, no 
Republic Government taxes are levied on subsistence incomes. The contributions I-Nikunau 
make in cash to their churches are used to buy materials to repair and maintain buildings, and 
to meet local and national expenses. Contributions in kind (e.g., labour, materials) are also 
made, including that mwenga take it in turns to feed KPC/KUC pastors and women produce 
handicrafts, which the churches send to Tarawa and sell there to raise funds. 
In the above and later sections, there may be places in which life on Nikunau sounds simple, 
noble, idyllic even. Such a romantic view comes easier to the observer than the participant, I 
suspect. In the cold light of day, life on Nikunau, now and in the past, was undoubtedly hard, 
frequently affected by droughts, rough seas and other adverse climatic conditions to name a 
few. Even so, I-Nikunau more than survived: they developed practices to utilise their 
environment in its totality and, of necessity, they learnt how to maintain a delicate balance 
between human and nature, as reflected in the way their culture evolved in harmony with the 
environment. Although many changes have occurred to their traditional way of living and 
making a living, some basic elements, temporal as well as spiritual, of traditional practices 
are still recognisable today in and around kawa. 
3.2 On (South) Tarawa 
Tarawa Atoll (area 31 km2, pop. 63,000 – National Statistics Office, 2016) comprises several 
coral islets around a substantial tidal lagoon (see Figure 5); nowhere are the islets more than 
5m above sea level. The atoll is less drought prone than Nikunau is, and so has more 
freshwater—the source on both islands is a subterranean freshwater lens, fed by rainwater, 
floating over seawater (see Corcoran, 2016; Storey & Hunter, 2010; White et al., 2007). 
Although this means the vegetation is potentially lusher and more productive than on 
Nikunau, this potential is compromised by the pattern of settlement, with a division, 
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demographic and administrative, between North Tarawa (pop. 6,600)—distinguished on 
Figure 5 by yellow islets—and South Tarawa (pop. 56,400)—distinguished on the inset to 
Figure 5 by red islets and in addition shown separately—and the high population density on 
South Tarawa (National Statistics Office, 2016). This density means South Tarawa is the only 
significant urbanised settlement in Kiribati.  
  
Figure 5. Map of entire Tarawa Atoll (Source: Tarawa, 2016) and a larger scale map of South 
Tarawa (Source: Office of Te Beretitenti and T’Makei Services, 2012c, p. 3) 
To put the population of South Tarawa—or just Tarawa, as it is widely referred to, including 
in this paper already and henceforth, except where it is necessary to distinguish South from 
North—in perspective, it is 25 times that of Nikunau and lives on an area of 16 km2, which is 
less than 85% of the area of Nikunau. Thus, land on Tarawa is at a premium, as are its 
freshwater reserves during the frequent short droughts. Except for shade trees and shrubs, 
Tarawa has been largely cleared of vegetation. This has occurred over the past six decades to 
make way for an almost continuous ribbon development running either side of the atoll’s only 
sealed road, which stretches some 30 km from the south-west tip of Betio to Buota in the 
east. The ribbon development comprises the road, several thousand constructions, including 
residences and premises of community, governmental, religious and commercial bodies20 
(Castalia Strategic Advisors, 2005; Office of Te Beretitenti and T’Makei Services, 2012c; 
Roman, 2013; White et al., 2007). 
Tarawa’s urbanised circumstances coincide with its present status as the Republic’s seat of 
government and, before the Republic was inaugurated, the headquarters of the Colony 
Government following colonial rule being restored after 1943.21 Some of its developed areas 
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are occupied by I-Tarawa, but most are long-leased or have been purchased from them, the 
Colony Government having legislated for and entered into many such still-standing 
agreements. Consequently, the Republic Government is probably the largest single 
landholder (Corcoran, 2016) but there are many other non-I-Tarawa with this status, many of 
them the commercial, community, religious and governmental bodies referred to above. 
Alongside land areas being cleared and developed, Tarawa’s economy and society have 
become increasingly monetised, market-based and urban; this is most obvious in the 
governmental bureaucracies, government or state-owned and private businesses, church and 
other community organisations, and in some modern residential settlements that have 
emerged, although significant numbers of more traditional mwenga are still very evident, and 
are still being erected. Tarawa’s many residents have been increasingly drawn into this 
economy and its “non-traditional modes of production, distribution and exchange,”22 as 
workers, consumers, householders, worshippers, users of public amenities and services, 
taxpayers and members of commercial and other organisations (Asian Development Bank, 
2002; Government of Kiribati, 2005; Doran, 1960; Office of Te Beretitenti and T’Makei 
Services, 2012c; Roman, 2013; cf. Wickramasinghe & Hopper, 2005).  
South Tarawa is also where 95% of the 2,600 strong I-Nikunau diasporic community lives, 
many of the other 5% making up the increasing overspill of people and mwenga northwards, 
across the as yet uncausewayed lagoon-ocean channel at Buota, onto lower North Tarawa. In 
contrast to Nikunau, their mwenga are dispersed along Tarawa, and interspersed between 
them are mwenga of I-Kiribati from other islands and the aforementioned multiplicity of 
premises of various bodies. In these circumstances, I-Nikunau are less likely to have any 
historical kinship ties with neighbouring mwenga, and so their interactions are often less 
substantial and may be insubstantial, varying with other factors, such as children playing 
together and young adults being freer to socialise and even inter-marry. 
Some mwenga (in the sense of dwelling areas) resemble those on Nikunau in terms of 
structures, wells, graves, spaces, etc. (see S3.1), although their layouts and amounts and uses 
of space reflect Tarawa’s much denser population, its water issues—rainwater tanks are 
common, to compensate for the inadequacy of wells and the intermittency of the public water 
system—and other constrictions. The structures on mwenga also reflect their attempts to 
imitate modern single and double-storey dwellings of imported designs and materials; these 
are quite common on Tarawa and many I-Nikunau live in them, being entitled to a rental 
property, if available, under their employment contracts with the Republic Government.23 
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This imitating arises from structures on mwenga incorporating timber, cement, bricks, 
corrugated metal, prefabricated items, fittings, electricity wiring and power points, and other 
imported building materials—how these are used in construction them may not be what their 
distant manufacturers intended. The use of imported materials is because traditional materials 
from Tarawa are in very short supply and from even those Outer Islands that are nearby is 
frustrated by transport and other difficulties. Besides, I-Kiribati sometimes perceive imported 
materials, and their outward appearance when constructed, as being superior, which because 
of the climate and lack of design knowledge is dubious. This perception extends to imitating 
the interiors of dwellings of imported designs occupied by I-Matang, or which were 
previously so,24 and so acquiring many items of furniture that are rarely seen on Nikunau 
(e.g., beds, tables, chairs, chests of drawers, cabinets).25  
Compared with Nikunau, their mwenga (in the sense of households) are larger, typically 
comprising between 6 and 12 persons, usually of three generations, and sometimes even four. 
As more I-Nikunau have immigrated, or grown up and had children themselves, the area of 
land occupied and the number of mwenga have increased. However, these increases have not 
kept pace with the growth in persons, and so the numbers in each te mwenga have gradually 
increased, living conditions have become increasingly crowded and strains have been put on 
incomes, the amounts of victuals available, etc. (cf. Office of Te Beretitenti and T’Makei 
Services, 2012c). These are among reasons for members of the oldest generation(s) moving 
from one te mwenga to another at infrequent intervals, and indeed for others to do so, in 
contrast to practices on Nikunau. However, other reasons for this fluidity are at least as 
important, including their adult offspring taking it in turns to look after the older generation 
according to te katei ni Nikunau, the traditional role of grandparents in teaching 
grandchildren, the modern need for unaine ( wise and respected old women), in particular, 
minding grandchildren while parents attend places of paid employment, social tensions 
between the generations and the possibility of each te mwenga sharing in the pensions of 
these old people. 
Te mwenga activities encompass choring, socialising, grand parenting, schooling, 
employment and, perhaps, storekeeping and producing victuals for sale, etc. The significance 
of these last three, which amount to generating cash to be able to purchase a high proportion 
of their needs, reflect conditions somewhat removed from the subsistence lifestyle of their 
counterparts on Nikunau; that is to say, satisfying their mwenga’s needs for victuals and 
similar is beyond what most can grow or gather/fish themselves.26 Although the shade trees 
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and shrubs among these dwellings include coconuts, breadfruit and pawpaw, these now make 
only a minority contribution to te mwenga victuals, fuel and building materials, as does the 
restricted keeping of pigs, which are usually reserved for major botaki—the rights to take 
produce from any remaining traditional aba largely rest with I-Tarawa, although some I-
Nikunau may share in these rights through marriage to or descent from I-Tarawa. 
Furthermore, with so many people using the lagoon, reef and area just beyond the reef, the 
quantities of seafood these yield, though substantial in total, are insufficient per capita to 
satisfy the potential demand (Locke, 2009; Doran, 1960; Office of Te Beretitenti and 
T’Makei Services, 2012c; Roniti, 1988; Thomas, 2002). Concomitantly, there is little fishing 
or cultivating work to occupy the time of people willing to do such work. 
To elaborate on mwenga obtaining cash from various sources, the main ones are as follows. 
Women, as well as men (see Rose, 2014), perform paid work locally of varying statuses (e.g., 
casual, part-time, full-time) and all levels of seniority, mainly with government ministries and 
departments, government businesses, public institutions and other governmental bodies, or 
with private businesses, religious organisations and non-government organisations.27 They 
share in the running of mronron stores or kiosks28 or operate more proprietorial, private 
family stores, kiosks or other micro businesses (e.g., baking bread and donuts, freezing ice 
blocks (or ice lollies), producing and vending lunchtime takeaways, catching and hawking 
fish, moneylending). Utu working and living overseas remit money and goods to them 
(Borovnik, 2006). Persons over 70 receive non-contributory monthly pensions and former 
government workers receive public service retirement benefits from the Kiribati Provident 
Fund. I estimate that fortnightly cash incomes from all sources of the substantial majority of 
mwenga on Tarawa do not yet surpass AU$750, with many being barely half that;29 
nevertheless, these amounts are substantially more (5 to 10 times) than on Nikunau.  
While notes and coins are still by far the main form of commercial transactions, formal 
income increasingly passes through bank accounts, from which it can be withdrawn either by 
visiting a bank branch or by using one of the automatic teller machines that have been 
introduced in the past decade. For those in official employment, the amount received is nett 
of deductions for income tax, and of rent in the frequent case of government and some other 
workers occupying houses tied to their employment. Much of the amount received is paid out 
quickly. Some is used to pay for items received on credit at mronron stores or is collected by 
moneylenders—the country’s only bank does not issue credit cards and only a minority of 
customers have current accounts or overdraft facilities. Further amounts are then disbursed 
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daily on basic victuals, whether locally produced (e.g., bread, doughnuts, ice blocks, fish, 
eggs, vegetables, bananas30) or imported (e.g., the list of victuals, etc. in S3.1, together with 
soft drinks, beer and other canned beverages, cordial, cereals, tinned fish, meat and dairy, 
frozen mutton flaps, boiling fowl and chicken) (cf. Catala, 1957). They are also disbursed on 
personal and domestic expenditures (e.g., bus fares, public utilities, school fees), and 
donations to various utu, Nikunau community bodies and churches (see Kuruppu, 2009, 
Ratuva, 2014).  
Occasionally, some cash can be saved temporarily, with the prospect of financing botaki for 
such family events as weddings and first birthdays, or with a view to making purchases of 
clothes, household durables, television/video equipment, music players, computers and, 
perhaps, a motor vehicle, although the latter still seems beyond the means of many, despite 
how motor vehicle numbers have increased dramatically since the 1980s. However, many 
mwenga seem under increasing financial strain as the gap increases between the cash 
available and the number of persons and possibilities for spending they see around them. An 
increasing proportion of youths who have left school can only chore around te mwenga and 
do domestic or similar work for utu, rather than perform paid employment, because the 
supply of jobs has not kept pace with the numbers wanting work (Duncan, 2014; Government 
of Kiribati, 2005).  
I-Nikunau social and community groups on Tarawa draw members from mwenga in various 
ways. In order of size, small to large, and perhaps importance (extremely to fairly), these 
groups are oriented around utu, religious denomination, kawa on Nikunau, and being I-
Nikunau (rather than I-Tarawa, I-Beru, I-Butaritari, etc.) (Office of Te Beretitenti and 
T’Makei Services, 2012c). Most of these groups retain various social and cultural practices 
reminiscent of Nikunau, including holding botaki regularly. Indeed, such botaki and other 
commitments are among several settings where social mixing occurs, including work, school, 
church and neighbouring mwenga, and so possibilitate gradual integrative changes to identity 
(cf. Berry, 1997, 2005). However, I-Nikunau have adapted their social organisation to their 
new, more densely populated and constructed surroundings in significant ways, as 
exemplified in the form and content of these botaki. Thus, compared with Nikunau and 
tradition generally, botaki are shorter, lasting between a few hours and 36 hours, rather than 
up to several days. Except for births and funerals, they are held mainly on Saturdays, and, if 
longer than a day, start on Friday evenings, rather than on the other non-Sabbath days; this is 
because attending places of employment and school are a well-established part of I-Nikunau’s 
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daily programme, even if they might still have a lower priority than te mwenga, utu and 
religious obligations. The quantity and variety of victuals served are mostly greater than on 
Nikunau, reflecting what is available on Tarawa, but purchased food will often replace 
subsistence produce.  
Botaki that te I-Nikunau and their mwenga are eligible or invited to attend on Tarawa are also 
more frequent than on Nikunau, including because groups to which te I-Nikunau has an 
affiliation are greater; for example, they may include groups from other islands to which the 
affiliation is through marriage or similar. However, whereas participating in such botaki 
would be mandatory on Nikunau, this is no longer practical on Tarawa, because they clash 
with each other and with other commitments. Another reason for not participating in te botaki 
is that te mwenga is unable to afford the contributions of victuals or cash donations expected 
from those who attend.  
In adapting their social organisation to their surroundings on Tarawa, various phenomena are 
noteworthy. I-Nikunau are engaged in te mwenga activities and other economic, social, 
cultural, religious and political pursuits, more in keeping with te katei ni Nikunau, albeit a 
much modernised version of tradition, including seeming almost as oblivious as I-Nikunau on 
Nikunau are to time as measured in hours and minutes. I-Nikunau journey along Tarawa 
frequently to visit each other and help each other in many other ways socially and 
economically—this includes being loyal member-customers of mronron, and working in 
these and on other tasks (e.g., child-minding, house construction) without receiving wages. 
Within and among mwenga, they spend much time on storytelling, maroro/winnanti ( 
informal chatting/gossiping), playing games, etc. (cf. Sabatier, 1939/1977). However, in work 
situations, particularly among I-Nikunau in full-time public service or similar formal 
employment, where working hours are set (e.g., from 8 a.m. to 4.15 p.m. on Mondays to 
Fridays, with a one-hour lunch break), they are “government personnel” or similar, grappling 
with alien structures, processes, procedures and schedules, either left behind by the Colony 
Government or recently arising from aid organisation projects of mixed consequences, etc. 
During these periods, they can seem to be different persons, even giving rise to the 
impression that some are leading a double life.  
Remarkable about continuing traditions are how utu and koraki, living and deceased, feature 
in stories I-Nikunau share repeatedly; these stories concern micro events and, parenthetically, 
life changes and matters of interest around them (see Gilkes, 2006). The various forms of 
dance, songs, etc., serve a similar function in passing on important matters of culture, etc. 
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inter-generationally. Performances, practices, etc. not only continue as a matter of cultural 
identity as much on Tarawa as on Nikunau (see S3.1) but they have become a matter of 
national pride (Teaiwa, 2014; Whincup, 2005). There is also an element of tradition in the 
extremely popular recent innovations of beauty pageants, such as take place during the four-
day National Day event on Tarawa each July. These pageants lead to the choosing of Miss 
Kiribati and Mr Kiribati, and seem to be a meld of traditions around the maturing and coming 
out of young men and young women (see Grimble, 1921; Hockings, 1984; Luomala, 1978) 
and of celebrity culture from elsewhere, reflecting the increasing availability over recent 
decades of Hollywood and other films on contemporary media (e.g., reels of film, videotapes, 
DVDs). 
Regarding contemporary media and culture on Tarawa, films, etc. on videotapes, DVDs, etc., 
whether produced legally or pirated, have been in abundant supply for over two decades—
many are brought home by seafarers and others who have been away working. A broadcast 
television service also operated on Tarawa from 2004 to 2013 but is now in abeyance. The 
Internet arrived on Tarawa in the late 1990s and access to it has grown significantly in the 
past decade, including for recreational use. These developments have given rise to a slow but 
incessant trend towards individualistic and small group pastimes, ones that are somewhat 
passive and alien; in particular, many able, and mostly young, people often seem preoccupied 
by these pastimes, alongside their engagement with mwenga and community group activities. 
Mention was made in S3.1 of the place of te katei ni Nikunau in providing for governance, 
order and control in kawa and over kawa affairs. I-Nikunau social and community groups on 
Tarawa have adopted these arrangements and adapted them to some extent; for example, 
serving in governance groups has been extended to include persons of both gender who 
exhibit knowledge and ability, rather than be restricted to men on the basis of age (i.e., to 
unimane). Similar has run right through to the top of formal institutions, with women and 
younger men occupying a significant proportion, if not the majority, of senior positions in the 
administration, control and governance of schools, hospitals, businesses, government 
ministries, etc. This includes the positions of te beretitenti (≡ president) and members of Te 
Mwaneaba ni Maungatabu (i.e., parliament—its members are usually referred to as MPs), to 
which the Constitution of Kiribati 1979 permits I-Nikunau to seek election, as well positions 
on Tarawa’s local governments—that is the equivalents of the Nikunau Island Council. Once 
elected, they may be appointed as ministers, as indeed has happened to a few over the past 
five decades (e.g., see Index of /sites/docs/hansard, 2014; Macdonald, 1982a). However, the 
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constituencies on Tarawa in which I-Nikunau cast their votes comprise a mix of island 
populations, and so other factors and associations are more important to winning elections 
than identifying as I-Nikunau. Similar applies on the Line Islands, although I-Nikunau there 
make up a greater proportion of the population than on Tarawa and have often provided their 
MPs, just as Nikunau has always elected I-Nikunau as its MPs, although this is not 
guaranteed constitutionally, only that the MPs from there must be elected by its resident 
population of registered voters.  
This last is in accordance with provisions in the Constitution casting I-Nikunau and other I-
Kiribati, regardless of gender and adult age, in the role of citizens of a single nation-state. 
These provisions also infer a right on I-Nikunau and other I-Kiribati to use the apparatus for 
governing the Republic to hold people in authority accountable; formally, at least, this 
accountability covers matters of public finance, taxation and capital investment, among many 
others, in keeping with rights, checks and balances typical of a hybrid Westminster system of 
government. However, many citizens on Tarawa still seem at least a little flummoxed by the 
technologies of government in use around them, let alone their counterparts on distant 
Nikunau, etc. The technologies concerned include ones involving written records and 
documents generally, accounting documents and information, and similar things inherited 
from I-Matang officials who ran the Colony Government and those introduced or elaborated 
since by officials and consultants of a hotchpotch of supranational, multilateral, transnational, 
international, national and non-governmental organisations, and consulting firms (hereafter 
“aid organisations”)31 (see Dixon, 2004a; Dixon & Gaffikin, 2014; Hassall, Kaitani, Mae, 
Tipu & Wainikesa, 2011; Ieremia, 1993; Macdonald, 1970, 1982a, 1996a, 1998; Mackenzie, 
2004; Smith, 2011). 
Regarding the attraction that Tarawa currently holds for I-Nikunau, while there still seems a 
predominant net inflow from Nikunau, this flow is not entirely in one direction (National 
Statistics Office, 2013). Tarawa gradually became the centre of everything most modern 
about the Colony after the restoration of the Colony Government and its decision to embark 
on social, economic and political development policies founded on the principle of 
centralisation on Tarawa, the cessation of mining on Banaba and the establishment of the 
Republic. However, the growth of Tarawa’s population has led to scarcity and over-
exploitation of the resources on which its inhabitants can subsist; this scarcity and over-
exploitation applies not only to the habitable and cultivatable space on land and to freshwater, 
but also to the lagoon and reef of the atoll and the ocean surrounding it. Now Tarawa is the 
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centre of everything most “developed” and “affluent” about the Republic, including much 
that I-Nikunau feel is undesirable. Thus, I-Nikunau, among many others, are increasingly 
coming to see Tarawa as far less attractive in certain matters than it once was. This is evident 
in observations made about Tarawa by I-Kiribati who have emigrated from there to New 
Zealand or who are keen to do so. They see Tarawa as only offering cash employment for 
some, and being short on day-to-day and lengthier economic and social opportunities, and 
otherwise generally lacking in prospects (see Fedor, 2012; Thompson, 2016). These negative 
conceptions go hand-in-hand with how Tarawa is suffering increasingly from lack of urban 
planning, overcrowding, water, sanitation and public health issues, physical degradation and 
inadequate natural food resources (Corcoran, 2016; Mackenzie, 2008; Maunaa, 1987; 
McCreary & Boardman, 1968; Office of Te Beretitenti and T’Makei Services, 2012c); for 
those with an eye on longer-term issues, it has an insecure future because of rising sea levels.  
3.3 Beyond Kiribati 
This section covers diasporic communities in the metropolitan countries of Great Britain in 
the north-east Atlantic and New Zealand in the south-west Pacific. Despite being poles apart, 
both are predominantly English speaking and part of the Anglosphere in terms of the majority 
culture and largest ethnic group. As information available about these countries is 
commonplace, I have not felt it necessary to give as much detail about them as I supplied in 
previous sections about Nikunau and Tarawa; however, I have brought some matters to 
attention where relevant. I start with Great Britain because it is the older of the two 
communities I describe and because, in its first decade or so, the community in New Zealand 
followed a similar pattern to how the community in Great Britain had developed. Another 
matter to note is that I have included more analysis of how the diasporic communities arose 
than is the case in describing Tarawa in S3.2, whereas the equivalent analysis for Tarawa is in 
S4. The main reason for this choice is that, particularly in New Zealand, the process of 
diaspora is very much still part of the present circumstances of these communities (see 
Thompson et al., 2017). 
3.3.1 On Great Britain 
The older members of the diasporic community in Great Britain comprise about 20 couples 
who met while one partner, mostly British I-Matang and male, was residing temporarily in 
the Colony or Republic, usually on Tarawa and usually from being employed, before 1979, as 
a colonial administrator or a professional or technical staff member in a colonial institution 
(e.g., school, hospital), or, since 1979, as a professional, technical or other aid organisation 
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worker. The other partner, usually the female, was I-Kiribati, possibly I-Nikunau, usually 
living on Tarawa and probably working in situations in which they met I-Matang. 
Notwithstanding any vestiges of colonial policy to discourage fraternising with the natives 
(see GEIC, 1962; Hyam, 1986, re the Crewe Circular of 1909; Ministry of Overseas 
Development, 1977; (confidential personal communication, 2001, from source based in the 
Colony in 1970s), the couples formed relationships resulting in marriage. When the 
temporary resident’s contract was completed, the couples, sometimes already with young 
children, chose to live in Britain. This movement of couples occurred in dribs and drabs 
between the 1960s and 1990s: after that, aid from Britain in the form of resident experts and 
volunteers on Tarawa has nearly stopped, and so recent new arrivals from Kiribati have been 
rare. Thus, while the present diasporic community on Great Britain still includes many of the 
original partners, they are outnumbered by their children, their children’s spouses, their 
grandchildren, etc. 
On the couples or families reaching Britain, their initial settlement and the normality aspects 
of their family’s life were facilitated by the partner of British origin, who usually possessed 
some capital (often out of savings from well-paid contracts they had through working in 
Kiribati) with which to establish a home, etc. and who proved to be something of a go-
between for the I-Kiribati partner in her (or his) entirely new environment (cf. Roman, 2013, 
re I-Kiribati immigration to the United States of America). However, although the couples 
arrived in Britain independently, and were based throughout much of England and Wales, 
and Scotland even, the I-Kiribati partner soon used her (or his) I-Kiribati utu and related 
networks to establish contacts with similar families who had preceded them, helping each 
other and engaging in maroro/winnanti and storytelling.  
As the number of families in contact increased, so they began to organise (e.g., forming the 
Kiribati Tuvalu Association, the forerunner of today’s Kiribati Tungaru Association), and so 
a diasporic community formed. The community meets frequently for various events, 
highlights of which are traditional victuals and traditional dance performances. These events 
include an annual National Day weekend, which also attracts people who have 
resided/worked in Kiribati, but have no blood or family ties there, and their offspring, etc. 
(see Kiribati Tungaru Association, 2015). Outside these events, members of the community 
of different age groups continue to maintain habitual contact face-to-face and via all manner 
of electronic and social media (e.g., see Kiribati Tungaru Association UK, n.d.). 
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Through the events, the storytelling and similar the children and grandchildren are conscious, 
by and large, of their links to Kiribati and its te katei (e.g., reciprocity around kinship, the 
ascendance of the various forms of dance, the insignificance attaching to time as measured by 
clocks), these being among the goals of the Kiribati Tungaru Association, reflecting a 
concern common among I-Kiribati diasporic communities, and I-Kiribati generally, to 
maintain, or not to lose, their culture and identity (cf. Burnett, 1999; Gheuens, 2017; Roman, 
2013; Thompson, 2016). Indeed, not only do the young know something of its culture and 
language, and maintain links with each other through identifying with Kiribati, but also many 
have visited Kiribati, usually as still young adults. These visits are facilitated through the 
regular verbal contact senior I-Kiribati in the community in particular have maintained with 
utu, etc., mostly on Tarawa but even on their home islands, including Nikunau, particularly 
since the coming about of low-cost or even free modern technology applications (e.g., Skype, 
Facebook Messenger, WhatsApp Messenger). Otherwise, in many respects the lives of most 
members of the community, particularly those brought up in Britain are generally “normal” 
for the many places they have settled in and for the socio-economic class (mostly middle, 
professional or skilled working) with which they have most to do. Thus, members of the 
community exhibit quite strongly much of what Berry (1997, 2005) labels “integration”. 
3.3.2 On Te Ika-a-Maui and Te Waipounamu (New Zealand) 
The population of I-Kiribati in New Zealand—about 2,115, according to Statistics New 
Zealand (2014)—is now the largest outside of Kiribati (see Roman, 2013; Thompson, 
2016).32 The majority of this population lives in and around urban centres, although there are 
significant groups living in rural settings. The largest concentrations are on the northern and 
southern outskirts of Auckland (e.g., the Mahurangi area, Otahuhu, Pukekohe) (see Roman, 
2013). However, numbers are also significant elsewhere on Te Ika-a-Maui, including around 
Hamilton and north of Wellington, both along the Kapiti Coast and up the Hutt Valley 
(Thompson, 2016), and on Te Waipounamu, including in Marlborough, Canterbury and 
Southland (Fedor, 2012) (see Figure 6 for a map). 
Notwithstanding being widespread geographically, these I-Kiribati are in regular contact, 
even to the extent of holding botaki two or three times a year to which households from all 
the places on one island or the other are invited (e.g., see Macintosh, 2011; Ritatitautua, 
2017). However, it is more accurate to say that, rather than only one, New Zealand now has 
several diasporic communities, as evidenced by the separate formal organisations they have 
established (e.g., Christchurch Kiribati Community, Kiribati Waipounamu Community, 
 
36 
Wellington Kiribati Community) and the frequent botaki and other gatherings for meetings, 
sports (e.g., volleyball), dance practices, pastimes, church activities, etc. they hold in each 















Figure 6. Map of New Zealand (Source: Ezilon Maps (2015) (adapted)) 
These diasporic communities differ from the one in Britain in three ways: in being mainly 
comprised of immigrants of more recent origin; in being predominantly of I-Kiribati blood; 
and in still being fuelled by continuing immigration, as well as natural growth—33% were 
born in New Zealand and the median age is 21 (Statistics New Zealand, 2014). However, the 
second was not the case originally. A small diasporic community materialised in New 
Zealand between the mid-1970s and late-1990s. Its composition, origins and forms of 
interaction were mostly similar to that in Britain, involving mixed marriages in Kiribati 
between I-Nikunau or other I-Kiribati and I-Matang, some from New Zealand and some from 
Britain, and these families then settling in New Zealand (e.g., see Betuao, 2005; Dreaver, 





the form of university or other tertiary scholarship students and members of ad hoc parties of 
labourers. The community was mostly spread around Te Ika-a-Maui, but with a handful of 
persons in Dunedin (i.e., on Te Waipounamu), largely because of its university medical 
school. 
The present contrast between the diasporic community in Britain and the several in New 
Zealand arose from subsequent developments. Instead of the previous dribs and drabs of 
mixed race families and students, increasingly more of the immigrants were I-Kiribati 
singles, couples or families, intent on settlement and work, and the rate of immigration 
increased (see data for “years since arrival” in Statistics New Zealand, 2014). As Roman 
(2013) and Thompson (2016) find, these immigrants were incented to leave Tarawa by the 
negative circumstances they were enduring, as enumerated in S3.2. What is more, they were 
attracted by the economic, social and other opportunities they perceived as on offer in New 
Zealand, including paid employment and greater income, better victuals, housing and health 
and welfare facilities, a cleaner environment, and better prospects for their children.  
Two factors combined to make most of their moves possible: the lawful possibility of 
immigrating to New Zealand, and kinship and similar relationships with members of extant 
diasporic communities. The lawful possibility arose through increased bi-lateral cooperation 
between, and encouragement by, the New Zealand and Kiribati Governments, and it paved 
the way of immigration administratively in three respects. First, it improved the immigration 
processes for I-Kiribati students who had graduated in New Zealand. Although most returned 
to Kiribati after completing their courses, some then returned to New Zealand to work (see 
Bedford, 2008), thus giving them higher incomes and other advantages from their education 
than would have been the case on Tarawa; some were motivated by other reasons too, such as 
to renew local relationships perhaps. They had little difficulty with immigrating and job 
finding because they sought work in professional areas in which skills were short (e.g., 
medicine) and their qualifications were recognised in New Zealand—this recognition 
contrasts significantly with the experience of other I-Kiribati trying to obtain work with New 
Zealand employers and finding that qualifications obtained in Kiribati are not accepted, often 
resulting in having to retrain and, in the meantime, to take jobs with lower levels of 
knowledge, skills and pay (see Gillard & Dyson, 2012; Thompson, 2016).  
Second, this bi-lateral cooperation was helpful to various I-Kiribati temporary workers who 
had successfully visited New Zealand and wished to either formalise their de facto situations 
of already residing in New Zealand, within or outside the immigration regulations (cf. Stahl 
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& Appleyard, 2007), or return there from Kiribati. Concomitantly, and more significantly, 
visits by other I-Kiribati temporary labourers were formalised, mostly under Recognised 
Seasonal Employer schemes (Ministry of Business Innovation and Employment, 2015). 
These schemes usually involve numerous groups of up to about 30 I-Kiribati labourers being 
supervised by an employer, who contracts the group to an agricultural producer. At first, 
many were contracted exclusively in the wine-producing provinces of Marlborough and 
Hawke Bay (see Figure 6) but increasingly they have been contracted for other agricultural 
work too (cf. Bailey, 2009). Each group works and lives together, often actually on 
vineyards, farms and similar settings or in remote, rural townships. Despite their remote 
locations, these groups are usually able to establish contact with the closest diasporic 
community to their base, and so join in some of its activities, including botaki to celebrate 
National Day, New Year, etc. Although, in keeping with their visas, these labourers nearly all 
return to Kiribati after nine months, increasingly they are returning to New Zealand a few 
months later, when the seasonal work they do resumes (see Maclellan, 2008), and a few may 
become residents (cf. Bedford, 2008). The returning and the contact tend towards developing 
connections to New Zealand, alongside maintaining connections to Kiribati (cf. Reilly, 2011). 
Third, this bilateral cooperation gave rise to the Pacific Access Category (which is widely 
referred to among I-Kiribati by the acronym PAC) (New Zealand Immigration, 2017b, n.d.; 
Stahl & Appleyard, 2007; Thompson, 2016). Indeed, in terms of increase in the numbers of 
immigrants (see Bedford, 2008), this has been the most significant outcome of the 
cooperation. Immigration applications are permitted from I-Kiribati who are likely to settle in 
New Zealand successfully and make a positive contribution to the economy, but who are 
unlikely to satisfy New Zealand’s two main immigration categories—these are constructed 
around skills, investors and entrepreneurship (about 60% of intending settlers), and re-uniting 
families with New Zealand and non-New Zealand citizenship (33%) (Thompson, 2016). 
Indeed, the Pacific Access Category accounts for only around 5% of all New Zealand 
permanent immigrants (see Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, 2016) but it 
accounts for the substantial majority of those who are now coming from Kiribati.  
To be eligible for the Pacific Access Category, an I-Kiribati needs their name to be drawn in 
a lottery-like ballot, which is conducted annually by the New Zealand Government and for 
which they must register and pay an entry fee (e.g., see New Zealand Government, 2016). 
The selected individuals, together with persons who, under New Zealand’s dominant Pākehā 
(white settlers, seen by I-Kiribati as I-Matang) culture, are classed as their immediate (or 
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“short” – see Black & Huygens, 2007) family, may obtain permanent residency, and 
eventually even citizenship. However, this long-term settlement is conditional on the adult 
members of the family achieving certain employment-related and income conditions within a 
specified period. These conditions result in a good many who succeed in the lottery never 
become permanent residents; these include many who change their minds about emigrating 
once they consider seriously what may be involved, or who turn out to be ineligible on 
medical or other grounds, and some who go through the trouble of travelling to New Zealand 
to try to meet the conditions but, after a few months or a few years, fail in the attempt, and so 
choose or are made to return to Kiribati. 
Kinship and similar relationships were the foundations of today’s diasporic communities and 
have been the more enduring factor in the moves of I-Kiribati families to New Zealand being 
possible and successful. In recognising this factor, Thompson (2016, p. 67) characterises the 
relationships beyond kinship as “strong ties” and Roman (2013, p. 86) as “fictive kinship 
ties”; they resemble what Geddes (1977, p. 390) calls “as if kin” from his observations of the 
cooperative behaviour of neighbouring mwenga on Tabiteuea; they can be expressed in te 
taetae ni Kiribati as baronga ( to treat as one of the family or clan) (see Trussel & Groves, 
2003; Maude & Maude, 1994). These relationships have been effected through habitual 
contacts, supplemented by frequent meetings and events organised as mentioned above under 
the auspices of formally established community organisations (i.e., Christchurch Kiribati 
Community, etc.) and church (e.g., KPC/KUC New Zealand) congregations in each 
community, and social media exchanges locally (see New Zealand Kiribati National Council, 
n.d.) and with home (see Nikunau Maneaba on Facebook, n.d.) (cf. Roman, 2013; Shuval, 
2000).  
Indications of how utu and baronga relationships have eased the physical and social aspects 
of I-Kiribati’s subsequent moves to New Zealand are intimated in observations below about 
those who have succeeded in obtaining residency and are part of one or other of the diasporic 
communities. The relationships in question have gone some way towards making up for 
being without ready access to a “native” go-between, as featured in the diasporic community 
in Britain, and the earlier one in New Zealand. However, the one has not been an exact 
substitute for the other, including that lack of the “native” go-between has meant fewer 
possibilities for the integration mentioned in characterising how I-Kiribati in Britain related 
to the native population. Indeed, as well as for new arrivals coming to join a community from 
Kiribati, these relationships have been invaluable essential support mechanisms within and 
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between each community, including helping I-Kiribati to move from one community to 
another—around 20 families each year move between communities (Statistics New Zealand, 
2014). They have also supported Recognised Seasonal Employer scheme labourers.  
Regarding the lives led by members of the diasporic communities in New Zealand, it should 
be borne in mind that before immigrating, the majority were born or raised and lived 
exclusively on Tarawa, rather than Nikunau or other Outer Islands; although so-called home 
islands can be a keen conversation topic, many have probably never have set foot on theirs. 
On Tarawa, they would have observed and, perhaps only to some extent, experienced some 
aspects of modernity but, even so, significant adjustments have been required at the 
individual, household and community levels in order to live in New Zealand. Indeed, her 
interviewees told Thompson (2016) about how much simpler life was on Tarawa compared to 
New Zealand. Thus, compared with living on Tarawa, most I-Kiribati moving to New 
Zealand seem to find almost all aspects of life require a big leap in understanding and present 
many, often unanticipated or unexpected, challenges. Here are some examples.  
Two environmental aspects present various obvious and not so obvious challenges in New 
Zealand. First, the climate comprises four seasons, all of which are generally cooler and 
wetter than Kiribati, with droughts being shorter and rarer. This has implications, for 
example, for clothing, keeping warm and heating houses, and becoming accustomed to cooler 
climate fruits, vegetables, etc., including consuming such victuals according to season. 
Second, the geology, geography and topography are completely different from those of an 
atoll. Geology gives rise to frequent earth tremors, if not earthquakes. Geography and 
topography present, and add to the challenges of, moving around and transport. In particular, 
the challenges for I-Kiribati associated with New Zealand having a network of national roads 
and, within that, networks of urban roads should not be underestimated (cf. Roman, 2013)—it 
should be recalled that only one road runs along Tarawa (see Figure 5). A further issue 
relating to travel in New Zealand is how comfortable people who have spent all their lives at 
sea level on small islands are with going up and down steep roads (e.g., Crown Range Road, 
Rimutaka Hill Road) during journeys of 600 km (Auckland to Wellington) or 1,000 km 
(Invercargill to Blenheim). 
While I-Kiribati make frequent use on Tarawa of privately-run public (mini)bus services, 
which run continuously from one end of the atoll road to the other and return, they are less 
inclined to do so in New Zealand, particularly the adults. Not only are ideas of timetables and 
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bus stops challenging but also the number of bus routes, the complexity of bus networks and 
network maps, especially when expressed in English, and transferring from one route to 
another to complete many journeys are perplexing and probably even more inhibiting. For 
these and other reasons, most journeys undertaken by I-Kiribati in New Zealand are done by 
private motor vehicle, especially in the circumstances that most households have access to at 
least one private motor vehicle (Statistics New Zealand, 2014), including through shared 
ownership among groups of households and community groups (Roman, 2013), and seem 
cheerful about sharing this resource by giving people lifts, etc. As for journeying to 
destinations, the onus for knowing what directions to take usually falls on drivers. For them, 
similar factors arise about finding their way using road directional signs and maps as those 
just mentioned about bus network maps. Although the advent of global positioning systems 
(GPS) has reduced these factors—although GPS is not unknown for sending drivers on 
narrow gravel roads across precarious terrain—provided a driver has English-language skills, 
it is still usual for a driver who is going to a destination for the first time to be allowed to 
follow immediately behind a driver who is already familiar with a route. These anecdotes are 
consistent with McCreary and Boardman (1968) claims about I-Nikunau mostly being 
concrete learners and learning by practice, rather than through concepts, process and analogy; 
however, an issue with understanding ideas through analogies, metaphors, etc. is teachers and 
learners having things in common to use as such (e.g., sheep, goats, haystacks, roller coasters, 
mountains, rivers, trains, snow, canoes, currents, winds, clouds, coconut palms, frigate birds, 
sea shells, pandanus) and my experience is that these are difficult to find if the two people in 
the teacher-learner relationship have experienced life quite differently (e.g., one from an 
equatorial atoll, in the middle of a vast ocean, on which subsistence is the norm, and the other 
from a large cool temperate island, next to a large continental land mass, on which 
industrialisation and, indeed, post-industrialisation, is several generations old) (cf. Teaiwa, 
2011).  
Notwithstanding, this method of practical demonstration of a route to take to complete a 
journey is a useful metaphor for how extant members of a diasporic community assist and 
impart their knowledge to newly arriving families. Indeed, the personal stories utu and 
baronga tell prospective I-Kiribati immigrants before they set off for New Zealand, or similar 
countries, shapes their perceptions of what is on offer (e.g., see Roman, 2013) and their 
knowledge of how to go about the journey, at least as much as other sources (e.g., school 
learning, official and other information in documents and on film), sometimes with adverse 
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consequences, because the stories omit bad experiences and the information is incomplete 
(see Thompson, 2016).  
Employment is a significant and challenging aspect of the lives of the adults in the 
communities. Not only is obtaining paid work necessary to generate income on which to live 
(i.e., victuals, rent, public utilities, transport, school and work expenses), to repay any debts 
arising from moving from Kiribati to New Zealand and to save for larger outlays (e.g., a bond 
(up to four weeks’ rent) on a rental house, to purchase a motor vehicle or a dwelling) but also 
it is a vital condition of being permitted to settle under the Pacific Access Category. To find 
this work, those successful in the ballot have usually had to travel to New Zealand on 
temporary visas, either alone or with their partner and children, and search for work. Extant 
members of diasporic communities have helped them in this, including those individuals who 
have given sponsorship undertakings to the immigration authorities for these visas (see New 
Zealand Immigration, 2017c). By implication, these undertakings can entail the sponsors 
collecting families arriving from Kiribati for the first time at the port of entry (e.g., Auckland 
or Christchurch Airport), accommodating the family or finding the family accommodation 
with another family in the community, for weeks or, possibly, months, and helping with other 
matters of acclimatisation, etc. (cf. Gillard & Dyson, 2012; Roman, 2013; Thompson, 2016). 
Sponsors or other community members often help in introducing work seekers to prospective 
employers and vouching for them to these employers. The work most have found is usually in 
occupations for which local labour is scarce, and so is one of three kinds: urban services, 
land-based activities and seafaring (see Statistics New Zealand, 2014) (cf. Callister, Badkar 
& Williams, 2009). Typical of the first are residential caregiving for the elderly, infirm, etc., 
commercial cleaning, domestic work, supermarket shelf stacking and similar, and 
construction and other labouring. The second are both close to cities and towns and in 
remoter places; they include horticulture, market gardening, cheese-making, fruit farming, 
arable cropping, dairying and vineyards. The third includes crewing the inter-island ferries 
and coastal ships (cf. Gillard & Dyson, 2012; Roman, 2013; Thompson, 2016; Williams, 
2008).  
While probably not considered as fully as might be seen as economically “rational”, the 
expectation of being able to earn wages high enough to recover the costs of immigrating is 
usually part of deciding to immigrate; this may be particularly so in the numerous cases of 
these costs being financed with help from kin on Tarawa or in New Zealand. Indeed, few I-
Kiribati arrive with as much capital or savings as more typical economic immigrants to New 
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Zealand in the skills, investors and entrepreneurship category. This is not least because 
mwenga that they were occupying in Kiribati are unlikely to be something they can sell from 
under parents and other kin they leave behind; and rarely would these kin be able to bestow 
capital on them in other ways or from other sources; if anything, their kin might be expecting 
the immigrants to remit money to Tarawa for their support or to enable them to emigrate from 
Tarawa to New Zealand themselves (cf. Thompson, 2016). 
Language is another aspect to present a major challenge, as evidenced from the research of 
Roman (2013) and Thompson (2016). The main language in New Zealand is English, and 
though less pronounced nowadays, some Anglo-centricity comes with that, as well as some 
expectations of Anglo-conformity although Te Reo Māori (i.e., the language of the 
indigenous Māori) is present, as are languages and cultures of various immigrant groups, 
from Asia (i.e., mostly Chinese but with its neighbouring countries quite well represented, 
along with people from the India sub-continent, or of its heritage, via Fiji), the Pacific, other 
parts of Europe (e.g., Scotland, Scandinavia, Ireland) and elsewhere (cf. Edens, 2017). The 
challenge of language not only arises in the early periods of settlement; want of English, 
particularly in the way English is used in New Zealand, especially its oral form (e.g., pace, 
accents, slang, etc.), hampers adults in moving from the lower paid work many accept on 
arrival to better-paid employment. 
There are several further aspects, some hinted at already, that can present challenges for both 
arriving immigrants and even I-Kiribati quite well established. They include physical aspects 
of accommodation and forms of housing, and public utilities (including sewerage systems 
and toileting), and financial or commercial aspects—most dwellings are rented from a private 
landlord, with rents of between NZ$350–600 per week in South Auckland, NZ$300–500 per 
week in Christchurch, etc. (see Ministry of Business Innovation and Employment, 2017), 
rather than either from a governmental body or being owner-occupied (see Statistics New 
Zealand, 2014). They include notions of household income, spending one’s earnings on one’s 
own household, accumulating capital to improve that household and saving for old age. They 
include victuals and manufactures, modes of production, shopping, consumerism, living with 
modern equipment and amenities, and other aspects of New Zealand’s material culture. They 
include illnesses and diseases, and accessing and using health and welfare services and 
systems. They include education systems, school enrolment and participation, and the 
relations of parents with the schools attended by their children and their roles in their 
children’s education generally (cf. Gillard & Dyson, 2012; Roman, 2013; Thompson, 2016). 
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Subsumed in the nature of the challenges these various aspects present are social expectations 
in relations between the members of diasporic communities and the general population, with 
its broad racial-ethnic spectrum and notions of racism and liberalism/individualism. All these 
can be daunting, not least when it comes to having to deal with a government bureaucracy or 
institution, for example on matters of immigration, social welfare, labour regulation and 
welfare, income tax, and motor registration and licensing. Most of these dealings involve 
formal procedures and written forms, declarations, etc. The organisations are invariably far 
more efficient and officious than I-Kiribati are used to, and they work with a mind-set and in 
languages—I refer here not only to English but also nuanced languages of government, 
bureaucracy and professional institutions—that I-Kiribati can find challenging and 
perplexing. As alluded to above, similar applies to public systems of hospitals and for 
healthcare, and of schools and for education (cf. Roman, 2013; Thompson, 2016).  
While these aspects and challenges present difficulties, many I-Kiribati have overcome them 
to varying extents, or at least coped with them. This savviness indicates changes to their lives, 
such that they are more monetised and modern than Tarawa; it also indicates that, although 
life on Tarawa shows signs of monetisation and modernity, this differs from prevalent 
behaviours in New Zealand. Indeed, many I-Kiribati probably find difficulties in overcoming 
differences entirely, including the importance of time, work routines, greater place of written 
communication, and forms and uses of money. These difficulties are apt to keep many in the 
I-Kiribati communities on the periphery of New Zealand’s supposed bicultural society (i.e., a 
distinction based Tangata Whenua ( people of the land), or Māori, and Tangata Tiriti ( 
people of the Treaty of Waitangi 1840) or non-Māori, but with the cultures associated with 
the peoples in the two categories tolerated, respected and celebrated) but, as I-Kiribati are 
inclined to see it, a society belonging to I-Matang. This is exemplified in terms under which 
I-Kiribati are employed and, more often than not, them living what many consider relative 
poverty in New Zealand, although it does not have an official poverty line (see New Zealand 
Parliament, 2011). 
It is further exemplified in social, cultural, religious and political matters generally. Indeed, 
as alluded to already, integration of New Zealand’s diasporic communities with the rest of the 
population is weaker than in Britain, and so in terms of acculturation and assimilation what 
Berry (1997, 2005) labels “separation” is far more evident. This is attributable to the how 
most families in the diasporic communities arrived as I-Kiribati families already, or as I-
Kiribati couples who have since had children, or as singles who have since married. Although 
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some of these marriages have involved non-I-Kiribati, particularly to someone from a 
similarly Pacific-oriented community, including Māori, often they have been to another I-
Kiribati. Thus, the children and even the grandchildren arising from many relationships and 
born in New Zealand have mostly been I-Kiribati, whereas had they been of mixed race, this 
could have led to mixing of grandparents and other relatives of different races. It is also 
attributable to the strong kinship ties they can maintain with people within the diaspora in 
New Zealand and even on Tarawa, and the sense of being from and belonging to their 
island(s). These links are now far easier and cheaper to participate in on a daily or other 
frequent basis through modern technology applications. 
This separation and insularity is perhaps more so among adults than youths and children, as 
the latter experience, notably at school, a great deal more of host country language and 
culture than many adults do, especially if the adults are spending most of their time at home 
and among their diasporic community. As Roman (2013) and Thompson (2016) report, in 
similar manner to Tarawa, I-Kiribati’s residential neighbours are usually of other races, 
including from other Pacific Island communities and Māori iwi, and although their 
interactions vary, they may only be slight. Indeed, Thompson also reports that, although 
working environments may present opportunities for adults to socialise outside diasporic 
communities, the nature of some work may not require, or may not afford, any social 
interaction with other workers (see also Gillard & Dyson, 2012) (cf. Berry, 2005).  
These points just made resonate with the issue of how the strength of utu or baronga 
relationships may impede social mobility. Indeed, Roman (2013) and Thompson (2016) 
suggest they may also adversely affect economic mobility and geographical mobility. For 
households that are not of mixed race, there can be sub-conscious pressure to stay close to the 
persons, households and communities who helped them become established, including 
fulfilling, out of a sense of reciprocity, obligations to help newly arriving families. I-Kiribati 
who interact with non-I-Kiribati once they are established in New Zealand might be 
perceived by other I-Kiribati as allowing such interactions to interfere with these obligations.  
Thompson (2016) bears this out in a perverse way: she reports favourable outcomes for I-
Kiribati who have established so-called weak ties, or having non-one-off interactions with 
non-I-Kiribati outside the diasporic community. Through these weak ties, some I-Kiribati 
have moved into better-paid jobs, although that has not necessarily meant they have defaulted 
on any community obligations; indeed, perhaps the contrary is true, given their higher 
incomes. However, they may have made other moves, including re-locating to distant places, 
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mostly in a southerly direction (e.g., from South Auckland to Hamilton, Rotorua or 
Invercargill – see Figure 6), and so are not so immediately available to newcomers. Indeed, 
sometimes reasons for moving geographically have included the frequency of botaki and 
other community expectations (e.g., providing transport through possessing a motor vehicle) 
absorbing too much of their time, being beyond their means and affecting their mental health 
(cf. Roman, 2013).  
4 Retrospective Analysis of I-Nikunau and Interpretation 
This analysis of I-Nikunau is historical and formative, and thematic. Covering up to 10 
generations, it discusses how I-Nikunau’s present and past connect, and how and why 
changes in their circumstances continue. Before presenting the analysis, three matters can be 
clarified: Nikunau Atoll’s de jure and de facto colonial status, the order in which the analysis 
is presented and details of the 14 thematic circumstances used to structure the analysis.  
How outsiders have recorded Nikunau’s colonial status contrasts with how I-Nikunau seem to 
have experienced it. The self-proclaimed Great Powers (e.g., see General Act of 1885) 
recognised Britain as having annexed Nikunau and the other Kiribati islands in 1892—the 
then secret Anglo-German Declaration between the Governments of 1886 was part of this 
recognition. The new political unit was accorded the status of protectorate, in which the 
Tuvaluan islands were also soon incorporated—for a description of the actual process of 
Davis consulting natives and declaring the Protectorate island by island, see Morrell (1960, p. 
274). However, on Nikunau and the other southern Kiribati Islands, this status, whether 
Protectorate or Colony—the status of Colony was formally instituted in 1916 (Gilbert and 
Ellice Islands Order in Council of 1915)33—was to most intents and purposes only de jure, 
with de facto administration conducted under the auspices of the LMS until about 1917. In 
any case, before and since, I-Nikunau and other I-Kiribati seem to have made little distinction 
between the notions of protectorate and colony, hence my choosing, for simplicity sake, to 
refer to both entities as just “the Colony”, except when using proper names. 
The analysis is presented in 14 subsections each devoted to one of I-Nikunau’s thematic 
circumstances. Their order is based on two main considerations of flow and coherence, 
namely, attempting to follow the chronological flow of history and recognising that themes 
influence one another. However, this flow and coherence have only been possible to achieve 
very roughly, particularly as the influences between thematic circumstances exhibit much 
reciprocity. Regarding the history, one way of separating this is geographically, that is by the 
differences in where I-Nikunau were living during particular periods, and so I have 
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incorporated a summary of their history in S4.1, which deals with their geographical 
circumstances. In advancing this summary, I acknowledge that this too presents a difference 
between I-Nikunau and I-Matang; that is, I-Nikunau tell their (his)stories according to the 
ancestors who were present playing a part, whereas I-Matang are apt to stress events and 
arrange them in chronological order according to years counted from AD. 
Turning now to the 14 thematic circumstances, these are listed next according to the 
subsection numbers and headings used in the rest of S4, together with a short description of 
what they cover. The 14 correspond to the themes of analysis that emerged, or were induced, 
as I undertook the several iterations of analysis. Concomitantly, as they emerged, so I used 
them to interrogate the empirical materials and my previous interpretations of them, so 
gradually lifting the narratives from the level of description to the level of analysis. I show 
the 14 together on Figure 7, which is drawn in a way to indicate that, similar to the themes I 
started with and that are depicted in Figure 1, they overlap. 
4.1 Geographical Circumstances: these incorporate questions of where the subjects, namely I-
Nikunau, have normally lived at different times (Agyemang & Lehman, 2013; Hall, 
2012). 
4.2 Demographical Circumstances: these encompass such matters as the size and composition 
of the population of I-Nikunau, and their forms of settlement and migratory patterns (cf. 
Locke, Adger & Kelly, 2000). 
4.3 Economic Circumstances: these encompass the economic entities, economic behaviours, 
subsistence, victuals exchange, income, consumption and wealth associated with I-
Nikunau, and the economic system(s) by which these phenomena are encompassed. The 
concept of an economic system embraces modes of production, employment (i.e., 
including in the broad sense of being engaged in productive activities, whether or not 
wages are received), consumption, savings and capital formation or investment, imports 
and exports, and taxation and public expenditure. Allowing for I-Nikunau contexts, the 
economic entities in such a system include individuals, mwenga, utu, cooperative, local-
private and foreign-private businesses, religious organisations, socio-environmental and 
cultural organisations, governmental bodies and aid organisations (cf. Blomberg, Hess & 
Orphanides, 2004; Johnson, 2013). Categories of occupation are dealt with as economic 
rather than demographical (cf. Locke et al., 2000). I decided that making the usual 




Figure 7. Themes of analysis  




4.4 Environmental Circumstances: these comprise climate, state of land and sea, and similar 
conditions of nature, including those induced by human behaviours (cf. Hopwood, 2009; 
Locke et al., 2000). 
4.5 Biological Circumstances: these embrace procreation among I-Nikunau and between 
them and peoples with different genes or physical features (cf. Anderson, 2012). 
4.6 Nutritional and Corporeal Circumstances: these encompass I-Nikunau’s health and 
quality of life outcomes associated with the range or quantity of victuals that they 
consume (cf. Campbell, 1991) and with the physical activities they undertake in going 
about their daily lives. 
4.7 Political Circumstances: these comprise the political systems, and structures or processes 
of political governance of which I-Nikunau have been part, as well as politics, power and 
related matters (cf. Doronila, 1985; Jones, 2010). 
4.8 Spiritual Circumstances: these comprise I-Nikunau’s religiosity, religious beliefs, 
religious conversion, religious differences, etc. (cf. Midelfort, 1978). 
4.9 Educational Circumstances: these encompass areas of knowledge in which I-Nikunau are 
educated, and who educates whom and how (cf. Liang & Chen, 2007). 
4.10 Social Circumstances: these comprise relations and interactions among I-Nikunau and 
between them and peoples of different languages, cultures, race, etc. They include 
participation, engagement and involvement, and acceptance and tension in these relations, 
etc. The circumstances in question encompass such phenomena as social roles and 
affiliations, individuality and communality, kinship and social structure (including 
descent, inheritance and marriage), domestic arrangements, social activities, work, 
leisure, lifestyle, aging, and social resources, including the interrelationship between 
social systems and the built environment (cf. Hockings, 1984; Levasseur, Richard, 
Gauvin & Raymond, 2010; Moglia, Perez & Burn, 2008; Pedraza, 1991; Walker, 2003). 
4.11 Organisational Circumstances: these encompass such matters as the nature, purpose, 
performance, structure and process of organisations in which I-Nikunau participate or that 
affect them (cf. Arnold, 1991; Bandury & Nahapiet, 1979; McGoun, Bettner & Coyne, 
2007; Young, Peng, Ahlstrom, Bruton & Jiang, 2008). 
4.12 Distributional Circumstances: these accord with how evenly, or conversely, how 
disparately, various material and intangible things capable of being distributed or shared 
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or experienced are distributed among I-Nikunau, and between them and other peoples, 
particularly peoples with whom I-Nikunau deal economically, socially or politically, or 
with whom they share the same social or natural space and time (cf. Arnold, 1991; 
Gewirtz, 2001; Krueger & Donohoe, 2005; McGoun et al., 2007; Wheatcraft & Ellefson, 
1983). 
4.13 Cultural Circumstances: these relate to I-Nikunau’s construction of learnt relations with 
each other and with other peoples, with things material and intangible, and with their 
surroundings generally. They embrace relatively loosely structured systems of shared 
habits, customs, social practices and general conduct so formed, and the symbolism 
attaching thereto. More generally, culture resides in the human mind; it has been, and 
continues to be, associated with social development, including separating the cultured 
from the others. How I-Nikunau respond to economic, political, social and other signals, 
compared or in contrast to other peoples, depends a great deal on their culture (cf. 
Carnegie & Napier, 2002; Harrison, 2000; Hockings, 1984; Porter, 1997; Thaman, 2003; 
Walker, 2003). 
4.14 Societal Circumstances: these derive from to the extents to which I-Nikunau constitute 
a separate society(ies) and to which they are part of other societies. They encompass the 
nature and composition of the different societies I-Nikunau are part of, for example, in 
terms of customs, laws and institutions, shared or separated (cf. Modell, 2014; Nunn, 
2013; Wejnert, 2002). In these contexts, society refers to how and why persons exist 
together in a state of social order of individuals, utu, communities, polities, etc. This 
existing together may be said to be based on mutual relations, or associations. Thus, 
societal circumstances encompass ways in which sociuses are linked or tied (Murphy, 
O’Connell & Ó hÓgartaigh, 2013; “Society”, 2017). 
4.1 Geographical Circumstances 
I-Nikunau live nowadays on Nikunau and in traditional island, urban island and metropolitan 
country diasporic communities elsewhere, as shown on Figure 3 and analysed descriptively in 
S3. These circumstances fit into a pattern of change that may be summarised historically, 
starting from at least a few centuries back and separated into five periods, as follows: 
1. For perhaps as long as a millenary or more up to the AD 1820s, the vast majority of I-
Nikunau lived on Nikunau. Although having their creation stories (see Latouche, 1983), 
the persons, families, etc. who went through ethnogenesis to emerge as I-Nikunau 
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probably arrived on Nikunau over many years from various places around the Pacific 
Rim, southeast Asia/Indonesia and Samoa (Addison & Matisoo‐Smith, 2010; Alaima et 
al., 1979; Di Piazza, 1999; Maude, 1963, n.d.; Sabatier, 1939/1977). Furthermore, 
emigration from and immigration to Nikunau arose during this millenary from inter-
island marriage, kinship and similar ties, and wars, but was seemingly small, having to be 
effected using canoes, with the stars, cloud formations and other natural means of 
navigation, and mainly involved the neighbouring southern Kiribati islands of Beru (50 
km distant), Onotoa (110 km) Tamana (140 km) Arorae (150 km), Tabiteuea (170 km) 
and Nonouti (230 km), and elsewhere within the Kiribati Archipelago. Otherwise, I-
Nikunau seemed largely undisturbed by outsiders (Bedford et al., 1980; Lewis, 1972; 
Maude & Doran, 1966; Sabatier, 1939/1977). 
2. From the 1820s to the 1910s, I-Nikunau continued to live mostly on Nikunau. Except 
that, at any one time, 10–20% might be working away temporarily (Bedford et al., 1980; 
Davis, 1892), and life on Nikunau was affected by new ideas, knowledge and skills and 
changed beliefs, values and attitudes they acquired through interactions with other I-
Kiribati and non-I-Kiribati and with which they returned to their atoll (Macdonald, 
1982a). Besides, the lives of I-Nikunau on Nikunau were affected by various presences of 
non-I-Kiribati, who engaged in previously unseen activities and had some social, 
economic and political influence, including through organisations they established with 
commercial and religious purposes in mind, and which I refer to in places as “non-
traditional organisations”. Much of the interaction with non-I-Kiribati during this 100 
years might be characterised as informal imperialism—informal because sovereignty was 
either not claimed (i.e., before 1892) or only de jure (i.e., from 1892 to 1917), and 
imperialism because, in contrast to forms of colonialism (see Horvath, 1972), there were 
very few permanent settlers from the I-Matang colonial race. 
3. From about 1917 to the 1950s, I-Nikunau mostly continued to live on Nikunau but were 
now de jure and de facto subjects in a British colony; except, during this period some 
were resettled in the Phoenix Islands, whence they were then moved to the Solomon 
Islands. The interaction with non-I-Kiribati during these 50 years might be characterised 
as formal or administrative imperialism by British officials of the Colony Government, 
through indirect rule from within the boundary of the Colony but still at a distance34 
(Davie, 2005; Lange, 2009; Horvath, 1972). 
4. From the 1960s to the 1980s, many I-Nikunau continued to live on Nikunau but an 
increasing proportion had begun the emigration from Nikunau to Tarawa, so initiating the 
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largest diasporic community of today. On Tarawa, the British officials of the Colony 
Government gradually implemented internal self-rule by I-Kiribati and Tuvaluans and 
then made the territory of the Colony formally independent, with the bulk (i.e., excluding 
Tuvalu) forming the Republic of Kiribati, of which I-Nikunau became citizens. 
5. Since the 1980s, what has now become a substantial minority of I-Nikunau continued to 
live on Nikunau while diasporic communities elsewhere, including in the Republic, 
increased in number and size and spread to metropolitan countries. During these four 
decades of sovereignty, on Nikunau and within Kiribati generally, interactions between, 
on the one hand, I-Nikunau and most other I-Kiribati and, on the other hand, the non-I-
Kiribati associated with a hotchpotch of aid organisations supposedly working in 
partnership with the Republic Government, have increasingly come to feature a national 
I-Kiribati élite of politicians, senior officials in government, and other persons associated 
with non-traditional organisations, be they commercial, religious, community or 
governmental (cf. Thomas & Kautoa, 2007). Thus, according to Horvath (1972)’s 
definitions, these are characteristics of neo-imperialism. 
The immediate catalyst for the changes after 1820 were Atlantic whalers; after exploiting 
other Pacific grounds since the 1780s, they began hunting the On-the-Line35 grounds during 
the December to March season, an activity that continued for three or four decades. Nikunau 
was convenient to this whaling area, and so where the whalers made a habit of coming ashore 
(Best, 1983; Lever, 1964; Lévesque, 1989; Macdonald, 1982a; Maude & Leeson, 1965; 
Mitchell, 1983; Morrell, 1960; Ward, 1946; Woodford, 1895). Among the many interactions 
between whaler and islander was for I-Nikunau (e.g., Peter and Thomas Byron) to join 
whaling ships’ crews, occurrences that might be interpreted as the seeds being sown for the 
pattern of I-Nikunau working away. Indeed, I-Nikunau labour, male and female, has been in 
demand ever since for seafaring, agricultural work (plantations, arable and pastoral farms, 
forestry, vineyards), mining and similar activities, whose proliferation gave rise to the so-
called “Pacific labour trade” and the aforementioned circular labour migration. This took I-
Nikunau to various places around the Pacific, Indian and Atlantic Oceans and adjacent 
continental land masses, and still does (see Bedford et al., 1980; Bollard, 1981; Couper, 
1967; Firth, 1973; Irvine, 2004; Lawrence, 1992; Lewis, 1988; Macdonald, 1982a; Maclellan, 
2008; McCreery & Munro, 1993; Morrell, 1960; Munro, 1993; Munro & Firth, 1986, 1987, 
1990; Sabatier, 1939/1977; Shineberg, 1984; Shlomowitz & Munro, 1992; Siegel, 1985; 
Speedy, 2016; Ward, 1946; Weeramantry, 1992; Williams & Macdonald, 1985).  
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However, between 1908 and 1980, in order to serve the interests of Britain and British 
Dominions (i.e., Australia and New Zealand), these places were largely restricted by the 
Colony Government (see Gilbert and Ellice Islands Protectorate (Consolidation) Regulation 
1908) to Banaba and, after 1946, Nauru,36 the phosphate islands, and it was not just male 
labourers who were involved but unimane37 as well and families (i.e., a wife and up to two 
children) (Macdonald, 1982a; Personal communication from a confidential source 2017; 
Shlomowitz & Munro, 1992; Weeramantry, 1992; Williams & Macdonald, 1985).38 
Over the years, I-Nikunau have had several motives to engage in this working away, with the 
motives varying in importance at different times and including motives for going to places 
and motives for not staying on Nikunau. From early on, the motives for going to places 
included adventure, curiosity and wanderlust (Macdonald, 1982a). The motives soon 
extended to earning cash, the surplus of which they could either use to purchase foreign 
manufactures to send to utu on Nikunau or take back there themselves, or, once facilities 
existed to do so, remit to these utu for their cash needs there (e.g., school fees, church 
contributions, purchases from trade stores).39 The motives also included responding to 
encouragement they took from stories and information brought back to Nikunau by I-Nikunau 
on their return from working away, and by visitors (e.g., beachcombers, aid volunteers). 
What is more, after a while, there were cultural expectations, backed sometimes by Colony 
Government processes, that the men in particular would take it in turns to work away, so as to 
share the experiences, earnings and other benefits among I-Nikunau and support I-Nikunau 
back home. These motives are still valid, albeit adjusted to present circumstances, and added 
to by the prospect of working away from not only Nikunau but also Tarawa or Kiribati 
generally leading to resettlement on higher ground, in economic and social senses as well as 
topographically, for example, in New Zealand 
The motives for not staying on Nikunau included escaping the effect of droughts (see Pastor 
Iakopo cited by Nokise, 1983, p. 180; Shlomowitz & Munro, 1992) and other natural 
hardships. Going away also enabled I-Nikunau to shake off, at least temporarily, some of the 
constraints and sterner discipline imposed in their traditionally-minded communities under 
the absolute traditional authority of unimane (see Hockings, 1984), or as experienced because 
of various church and colonial laws and regulations, as policed by officials of the LMS-
controlled te kabowi n abamakoro (= council of the island) and the Colony Government-
controlled Nikunau Native Government (e.g., see Gilbert and Ellice Islands Protectorate 
(Consolidation) Regulation 1908; Regulations for the Good, 1933). Again, these motives are 
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still valid, with the addenda of the likely adverse future consequences of climate change (cf. 
Radio New Zealand, 2015).  
The experiences of the many I-Nikunau who went away to work varied somewhat and was 
not without risks, including presumably the instances of economic exploitation, social abuse 
and virtual slavery that occurred to islanders generally (e.g., see Shineberg, 1984)—although 
many went as indentured labour, evidence of I-Nikunau having been blackbirded is equivocal 
(see Maude, 1981; Speedy, 2015), but evidence concerning I-Kiribati generally is clearer 
(e.g., Tate & Foy, 1965). Furthermore, it is not clear how many bad experiences were omitted 
from the aforementioned stories and information they passed onto others, and which 
encouraged others to follow in their footsteps. However, I-Nikunau seem to have been 
reticent about admitting that they have let themselves in for such bad experiences and putting 
others off from experiencing things for themselves, a trait which persists, as alluded to in 
S3.3.2 in mentioning studies by Roman (2013) and Thompson (2016) about recent New 
Zealand settlement experiences. The personal stories the settlers relied on from utu and 
baronga to inform their preparations, etc. omitted bad experiences and provided incomplete 
and incorrect information. 
Up to the 1960s, a majority of any generation who went away as part of circular labour 
migration or similar returned to Nikunau, sometimes with marriage partners from elsewhere, 
lived out the rest of their lives there and were buried there—reasons for not returning 
included marriage into other communities, choosing to settle permanently elsewhere and 
perishing (Bedford et al., 1980). Since, the pattern has changed: the majority still returned 
from their work location (e.g., Banaba, Nauru, New Zealand) but rather than Nikunau, many 
chose to settle permanently on Tarawa (see Bedford & Bedford, 2010). This choice arose 
from Tarawa’s monetisation, its opportunities to purchase land with their savings and acquire 
assets from which to make a living (e.g., trucks), its waged work, durable household items 
and amenities, and its budding cultural reputation as more developed, exciting and 
progressive. Indeed, things associated with the motives listed above for working and 
otherwise travelling away from Nikunau were increasingly to be found on Tarawa. A further 
reason was that, although parents might have been capable of living a subsistence life on 
Nikunau, their adolescent children were sometimes not, because most of their childhoods had 
been spent on a phosphate island, and so they lacked virtually any experience of the essential 
knowledge and skills, such as being able to fish, grow victuals, materials, etc. cut toddy and 
perform some other work, chores, etc., and found it difficult to cope with Nikunau victuals 
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and behave in keeping with traditional expectations of other I-Nikunau (confidential personal 
communication, 2009, from two sources who spent their school years on Banaba).40  
The catalyst for the coming about on Tarawa of its various circumstances alluded to above, as 
well as in S3.2, occurred about 1950. Following the Colony Government’s restoration, its 
officials initially adopted a reconstruction and development plan of devolved development of 
the Colony (see GEIC, 1946). However, by the early 1950s, new officials were in charge and 
they changed tack, embarking instead on social, economic and political development policies 
founded on the principle of “centralisation” on Tarawa (Connell & Lea, 2002; Doran, 1960; 
GEIC, 1970; Macdonald, 1982a, 1998; Maunaa, 1987). Further details of this piece of 
Kiribati history and the population consequences for Tarawa are set out in Box 1. 
Centralisation initially had consequences for I-Nikunau affecting their geographical, 
demographical, educational and economic circumstances and more. Between the 1950s and 
1970s, the largest contingent of emigrants comprised adolescent I-Nikunau; as higher 
academic achievers in Nikunau’s primary schools, they took up boarding places at the King 
George V School (KGVS) for boys and, by 1960, the Elaine Bernacchi School (EBS) for 
girls—this school eventually went co-educational as KGVEBS. Although they might have 
expected to live away from Nikunau for only a few years, their academic achievements at 
secondary school, from which achievements at tertiary level followed in some cases, led to 
longer term or permanent emigration. Work for which they were educated (e.g., medicine, 
nursing, secondary school and trades teaching, engineering, administration, accounting) was 
primarily on Tarawa, as were facilities in which they could share (i.e., the hospital, primary 
schools, shops, etc.), and so they have remained there, married, and had children, 
grandchildren and great-grandchildren. 
For the initial groups of students the effect of going to boarding school was separation from 
other I-Nikunau (see McCreary & Boardman, 1968). However, this separation was relatively 
short-lived, as these early I-Nikunau immigrants took deliberate steps to fulfil accumulating 
socioeconomic, cultural and similar obligations they had to utu ni kaan; these were besides 
economic obligations they were able to fulfil by remitting goods and cash to utu on Nikunau. 
These steps included accommodating young utu ni kaan (e.g., nephews and nieces) in their 
mwenga on Tarawa and, eventually, their then elderly dependents likewise. As for the 
numbers involved, Zwart and Groenewegen (1968) report 350 I-Nikunau residing on Tarawa 
during the 198 census, of whom 146 were under 15 years of age.  
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Box 1 Centralisation and Tarawa (the main source of this material is Macdonald, 1982a, 1998) 
The social, economic and political development policies of the Colony Government after about 1950 
were founded on the principle of centralisation on Tarawa. Capital grants from Britain’s Colonial 
Development [and, eventually, Welfare] Fund (Abbot, 1971), and how they were administered, were 
significant to these policies. Typical of the time, the pursuit of efficiency (Hopwood, 1984) was taken 
for granted, notwithstanding its ambiguities and absence from I-Kiribati culture. Centralising new 
amenities on Tarawa, compared with spreading them across a score of remote islands, reduced the 
Colony Government’s needs for capital from the fund in question. Moreover, the amenities were 
cheaper for the Colony Government to operate, because of economies of scale of individual services 
and of colony administration as a whole. It was believed that centralised facilities would need fewer of 
staff than otherwise and that they would be more productive by being in close proximity.  
These beliefs about employee costs applied particularly to I-Matang staff, who comprised the largest 
item of operating costs and the resource in shortest supply. Despite never having had to be recruited in 
great numbers; the number of I-Matang staff reached 50 during the 1950s, 80 in the 1960s and over 140 
by the 1970s—although junior administrative jobs held by Tuvaluans and I-Kiribati rose to 350 
permanent public servants by the mid-1950s and then to 1,000 in the mid-1970s (GEIC, 1957, 1969, 
1976), their pay rates were so low that they were of less significance to the Colony Government’s 
finances than the I-Matang staff were. I-Matang would also be easier and less costly to recruit and 
maintain if they and their families had ready access to amenities of reasonable quality (e.g., I-Matang 
doctors working at a central hospital on Tarawa would more readily send their children to primary 
school if there were one of high quality on Tarawa). 
Besides this reaping economies of scale and containing costs, effecting administrative and political 
control were seen as concomitant with centralisation, and so reinforced the belief held in centralisation 
by I-Matang officials on Tarawa and in Honiara (i.e., at, by then, the headquarters of the British 
Western Pacific High Commission) and London. Certainly, centralisation was of greater administrative 
convenience for those heading the Colony Government than decentralisation would have been. 
Moreover, it was also consistent with Britain’s largely self-interested policy for implementing 
decolonisation across its Empire. As Morgan (1980) relates, this policy involved transferring 
sovereignty to a single government covering the entire territory within each colony’s existing boundary, 
and so keeping the former colonies intact as new nation states, rather than the colonies reverting to the 
separate polities that, in most cases in Africa, Asia and the Pacific, existed in pre-colonial times—of 
course, this did not eventuate in the Colony because Tuvalu opted to separate, becoming a dominion, or 
a constitutional monarchy with a parliamentary democracy. Concomitantly, grants from the Colonial 
Development and Welfare Fund were easier to obtain if they endowed the intended seats of government 
of the postcolonial nation states with public institutions and facilities, commercial supply chains, public 
utilities, transport facilities and other infrastructure, with the expectation of these being politically 
strong and capable of sustaining the nations so created.  
Since Kiribati’s decolonisation, the activities of aid organisations have continually reinforced this 
centralisation, perhaps unwittingly, and the Republic Government has acquiesced with their decisions. 
Under the changing auspices of aid, development assistance and then investment partnership, these aid 
organisations have supplied all manner of infrastructure, amenities, facilities and systems (e.g., coastal 
protection, roading, air and shipping port facilities, public utility networks, clinics, hospitals, schools, 
colleges and other education and training institutions, a library and museum, government accounting 
systems), expert evaluations and advice and other aid-in-kind (and occasionally aid-in-cash) (e.g., see 
Asian Development Bank, 2009a, 2009b; Tables 16 and 17 in World Bank, 2005, pp. 48-49), largely 
under the auspices of one discrete project or another, mostly without much real coordination, and 
predominantly on Tarawa. Their consultants and officials make frequent visits to Tarawa—only a few 
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of these organisations have ever had offices there—but to nowhere else in the country. As elsewhere 
(see Burall, Maxwell & Menocal, 2006; Doucouliagos & Paldam, 2011), the efficacy of these projects, 
individually and collectively, is questionable, including that it is probable that they have largely 
reflected British and other Global North economic and political priorities for Global South countries, 
rather than cultural, social, political, environmental and domestic economic priorities of the countries in 
question (Burt & Clerk, 1997), and been performed without much involvement or engagement with the 
people affected—an exception proving the rule is reported by Mackenzie (2008). This is despite their 
rhetoric of aiding peoples of the Global South, Third World, Developing Countries, Emerging 
Economies, etc., and a desire to reproduce Global North prosperity in these lands. 
Almost from the start, not only did the policies associated with centralisation have an economic 
multiplier effect on Tarawa but they also fuelled an increase in its population, initially through 
immigration of workers and students from Nikunau and the other Outer Islands, and from Tuvalu, 
Britain, Australia and New Zealand. In the late 1960s, the immigration from within the Colony 
escalated when, contrary to recommendations made at the time, the Colony Government lifted 
regulations dating from the 1940s about who could live on Tarawa and why, effectively meaning it was 
a matter of choice (Bedford & Bedford, 2010; Bertram & Watters, 1984; Couper, 1967). Although 
many Tuvaluans and I-Matang left in the decade following the Republic being established, net 
immigration continued. The annual rate of immigration has barely abated up to now, despite 
overcrowded conditions that were evident to the naked eye by the 1990s.  
Figure 8 shows the effects of this immigration, and its consequences of procreation, on Tarawa’s 
population. Except, the figures for 1931 and 1947 include the half of the population who then lived on 
North Tarawa, including because the atoll’s government station and the colony hospital were there then 
(Maude & Doran, 1966; Pusinelli, 1947). The increase in Tarawa’s population is some 16-fold 
compared with before its precedence was cemented by centralisation. This is in stark contrast to the 
total population of all the Outer Islands combined; their population has risen from about 31,000 in 
1947—when Tabiteuea was the most populated of the Kiribati Islands, not Tarawa—to just over 54,000 
now, and so has not even doubled. 
 
Figure 8. Population of South Tarawa 1947 to 2010 (Sources: National Statistics Office, 2016; Office 
































To begin with, many of these young utu ni kaan also came for educational reasons, including 
going to secondary schools where boarding was not an option for them and going to primary 
school with the intention of going onto secondary school. Their parents and unimane on 
Nikunau soon realised that being educated at primary school on Tarawa improved young utu 
ni kaan’s chances of passing the secondary school entrance examinations. Indeed, they often 
saw better prospects generally for these children on Tarawa than on Nikunau, and, in any 
case, might expect to join them themselves in old age (Burnett, 2005; Dixon & Gaffikin, 
2014; Macdonald, 1982a, 1996a, 1998; MacKenzie, 2004; Maude & Doran, 1966). Later, the 
young utu ni kaan coming to Tarawa extended to those of post-primary school age who were 
unsuccessful in getting places at secondary school. They were encouraged by stories they 
heard about the different life available on Tarawa and wanted to experience it for themselves. 
A related matter was that, as the end of phosphate mining loomed on Banaba (c. 1979) and 
then Nauru (c. 2000), so Tarawa became where most I-Kiribati on Outer Islands went in 
search of cash employment—the closures affected about 100 I-Nikunau working on Banaba 
and about 145 working on Nauru, both statistics including families (based on Zwart & 
Groenewegen, 1968)—going further afield, to New Zealand, for example, did not arise until 
about 1990 and in smaller numbers than nowadays.  
The accommodating of elderly dependents by their grown-up offspring on Tarawa obviated a 
need for these offspring to return to Nikunau and live with these dependents. There, they 
would have been expected to complete such tasks as to go fishing, grow victuals, materials, 
etc., cut toddy and perform some other work, chores, etc., tasks for which they would 
probably be unfit or unskilled anyway—one reason to bear children was to ensure there 
would be someone to after you in old age (McCreary & Boardman, 1968). Said elderly 
dependents would have been doing these things for themselves when they sent their offspring 
to Tarawa as young people but that would have changed as they aged. This movement of 
elderly dependents has not applied to every mwenga on Nikunau, mostly those where all the 
younger generation had emigrated from Nikunau. However, according to age distribution 
data for the past 20 years or so (see Ministry of Internal and Social Affairs, 2007; Office of 
Te Beretitenti and T’Makei Services, 2012b), this movement has resulted in a much lower 
proportion of I-Nikunau over the age of 50 than would be the case without it, just as the 
proportion under the age of 14 is similarly much greater, which also suggests the birth rate 
among women of child-bearing age is high. 
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I now move onto matters related to diasporic communities beyond Tarawa. The first to form 
can, like the one on Tarawa, trace its beginnings to the Colonial Development and Welfare 
Fund, even predating it. However, it contrasts with this community and the ones in 
metropolitan countries described in S3.3 because, whereas these arose through individuals, 
immediate families or similar small parties moving in dribs and drabs, the community now 
being discussed arose through an organised movement of significant numbers who were to 
settle in kawa created specifically to house the settlers. Their story began in 1938: being 
concerned that Nikunau and neighbouring islands were too drought prone and infertile to 
support increases occurring in their populations, Colony Government officials conceived the 
idea of resettling some I-Nikunau on the uninhabited Phoenix Islands (lat. 3°–4°S, long. 
171°–174°W)41 (Autio, 2017; Maude, 1952)—according to Weber (2016), the British 
Government was also anxious to settle subjects on these islands to ensure they were retained 
as part of the Empire and not occupied by, for example, the United States of America. 
However, barely 20 years later, they and a further contingent of I-Nikunau from Nikunau 
were removed to Ghizo, Alu and Wagina42 in the Solomon Islands under another resettlement 
project again funded from London via Honiara (Cochrane, 1969, 1970; Fraenkel, 2003; 
Knudson, 1977; Larmour, 1984; Schuermann, 2014; Tammy, 2011; Weber, 2016).  
Although the move from the Phoenix Islands—nowadays the world’s largest marine 
protected area—was mostly attributed to difficulties of I-Nikunau surviving there, another 
reason was that the expenses of administering these extremely remote new settlements were 
beyond the affordance of the Colony Government (Laxton, 1951; Macdonald, 1982a). Having 
the settlers in the British Solomon Island Protectorate was cheaper and more expedient for 
Colony Government and High Commission officials, no matter various immediate and 
knock-on implications. The latter included subsequent internal emigration, starting in the 
1960s, from Wagina, Alu and Ghizo to urban Gizo and Honiara. This emigration, which for a 
while included families returning from Nauru and Banaba, is akin to that from Nikunau to 
Tarawa, and has given rise to an urban island diasporic community in Honiara.  
The experience of costs and other inconveniences by the Colony Government in respect of 
the Phoenix Islands scheme has not deterred the Republic Government from encouraging and 
financially incenting I-Nikunau and other I-Kiribati to take part in further resettlement 
schemes to remote islands. Since the 1990s, these have involved three of the even more 
distant Line Islands, where there are now traditional island diasporic communities of 
significant size, as mentioned in S3. Living on these islands seems to be proving more 
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tolerable than living on the Phoenix Islands was (see reports about each Line Island available 
from Office of the President, Republic of Kiribati, 2012). 
While aid funding was directly implicated in the above resettlement schemes, as the details in 
S3.3.1 and some of S3.3.2 indicate, this funding and the personnel they enticed to Kiribati are 
indirectly linked to the forming of metropolitan country diasporic communities, including in 
the United States (Roman, 2013). These communities at least began with colonial officials 
and aid organisation workers temporarily resident on Tarawa marrying I-Nikunau and other I-
Kiribati; thence, the couples, sometimes already with children, settled in their present 
locations.  
In S3.3.2, it is shown that the diasporic communities on the two islands of New Zealand 
developed further than applies to Britain, or the United States for that matter, than just 
mentioned. The immigration to there extended beyond couples of mixed races to I-Nikunau 
and other I-Kiribati singles, couples and families. There are consistencies between why and 
how these emigrants from Tarawa settled near Auckland, Wellington, etc. and utu ni kaan 
emigrated from Nikunau to Tarawa, as analysed above. In particular, the motive of better 
prospects for their children is important, even ascendant. At least, this was how her 
informants expressed it to Thompson (2016), rather than as better prospects for themselves, 
and so reflecting a cultural aversion to being seen as self-seeking and, conversely, a cultural 
obligation felt to others, in this case their children, and when settled in New Zealand, to utu 
and baronga who follow them. Seeing it this way may also lessen the dilemma they 
experience over not being able to fulfil obligations they have towards utu left behind on 
Tarawa, whether temporarily or permanently.  
What is more, most immigrants to New Zealand saw Tarawa as short of cash employment 
and similar opportunities, implying that looking for better, lusher ground, higher or 
otherwise, is part of their choice to emigrate. Indeed, the main factor in immigrating to New 
Zealand in recent years has been to take advantage of bilateral labour immigration schemes 
(i.e., Pacific Access Category and Recognised Seasonal Employer) (Fedor, 2012; Roman, 
2013; Thomson, 2016), with taking up opportunities study abroad a contributory factor for 
those offered educational scholarships. And they have relocated with help from earlier 
settlers. Except, rather than the help coming only from utu ni kaan, it has extended as wide as 
just being I-Nikunau or, in many cases, just being I-Kiribati.  
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Likewise, both immigrations have had or are having similar further demographic 
consequences of marriage, bearing children, being joined by elderly dependents, etc. 
However, regarding elderly dependents, I-Nikunau have found it difficult for elderly parents 
to join them in New Zealand, except on visitors’ visas of nine months maximum, despite the 
New Zealand Government’s immigration category of re-uniting families with New Zealand 
citizens and permanent residents. The reasons for difficulties are income and capital criteria 
associated with permanent resident or other longer-term visas being mostly far too high 
compared with what families can afford. What is more, the less restrictive dependent parent 
resident visa category, which is open to all nationalities, is oversubscribed. Moreover, even 
this oversubscribed category has conditions that are difficult to fulfil because parents do not 
qualify as dependent if they have adult offspring available to look after them on Tarawa or 
Nikunau. I-Kiribati tend to have larger families than people of the many other races 
competing in this category, for example, because Kiribati has never had a one-child policy 
and its unmet need for contraception, as elsewhere in the Pacific, is very high (see Daubé, 
Chamberman & Raymond, 2016).  
4.2 Demographical Circumstances 
This section builds on the population data used in introducing this study (see S1) and to 
describe I-Nikunau’s present circumstances (see S3), and those related for Tarawa in Box 1. 
The historical population statistics for Nikunau 1860–2015, arrayed in Figure 9, add to this 
demographical picture. The section also covers the forms of settlement and patterns of 
emigration and immigration outlined or alluded to in the earlier sections just mentioned and 
in S4.1. 
The total number of I-Nikunau differs from the population of Nikunau according to persons 
identifying as I-Nikunau not living on Nikunau and to persons not identifying as I-Nikunau 
living on Nikunau. In 1860, the two numbers were closer than nowadays, but even by that 
time, possibly 200 or so I-Nikunau were away from the atoll, either for customary reasons or 
because of working on ships and other Pacific Islands. Conversely, there were probably 
nowhere near as many non-I-Nikunau on Nikunau, including other I-Kiribati for customary 
reasons, and castaways, beachcombers and whale men of other races, mainly I-Matang 
(Macdonald, 1982a; Maude, 1964). Back in the 1810s, before working away became a factor, 
the populations of I-Nikunau and of Nikunau both numbered nearly 2,000, with differences in 
their composition only arising from interactions with peoples from neighbouring islands and 




Figure 9. Population of Nikunau 1860 to 2010 (Data sources: Bedford et al., 1980; GEIC, 
1957; National Statistics Office, 2013, 2016; Ministry of Internal and Social Affairs, 2007; 
Office of Te Beretitenti and T’Makei Services, 2012b; Pusinelli, 1947)43 
In contrast, today’s population of Nikunau is around 1,800 still, but less than 1,600 are I-
Nikunau, and there is an estimated diaspora of I-Nikunau of nearly 5,000, hence the 
worldwide total of I-Nikunau indicated in S3 of about 6,500. Furthermore, more I-Nikunau 
now live on Tarawa (i.e., about 2,600 – see S3.2) than on Nikunau, whereas, before the 
Colony Government instigated its policy of centralisation (see S4.1), the number there was 
only 32 (Pusinelli, 1947), or about 1% of Tarawa’s then longstanding base population of 
3,500, which it had either side of the war. However, with Tarawa’s population now over 
56,000 (National Statistics Office, 2016), the proportion who are I-Nikunau is still barely 5%, 
despite the growth in their numbers. 
The reasons for the increase in population of I-Nikunau from barely 2,000 in the 1810s to 
about 6,500 now include the following. First, judging by settlement patterns on Nikunau and 
the geographical distribution and size of aba held by each individual (cf. Hockings, 1984; 
Land (Copra) Tax Register 1910–1916), the population was already growing naturally at that 
time. Afterwards, the rate of growth seems to have increased, probably for several reasons 
around life expectancy, changes in birth control practices and more opportunities for 
marriage to non-I-Nikunau, both other I-Kiribati and non-I-Kiribati. New knowledge about 
health and wellbeing was imparted by outsiders. Trade improved food and nutrition security 
(Campbell, 1991) and made it possible to feed more children. The church and colonial 
authorities enacted regulations covering order, cleanliness, civility and similar (e.g., Gilbert 






























and Ellice Islands (Native Laws) Regulation 1912). New religious mores emerged about 
abortion and infanticide. Violent death lessened, including because local warfare reduced. I-
Nikunau mingled with other peoples while participating in the Pacific labour trade and on 
Banaba, and so the number of persons of mixed blood increased who are I-Nikunau by 
affinity. 
The rate of growth was further boosted after the 1950s by the new development policies 
alluded to in S4.1 around health, education, water and sanitation (e.g., see Asian 
Development Bank, 2008; Castalia Strategic Advisors, 2005; Doran, 1960; GEIC, 1957, 
1969; Veltman, 1982). These further reduced the susceptibility of I-Nikunau to the vagaries 
of drought, and so the effects of famine. They also improved the public health environment, 
notably as associated with clean water, and increased the availability of effective health and 
welfare interventions, including around childbirth, infectious diseases and easily-treated 
conditions (Bedford et al., 1980; Macdonald, 1982a; Pusinelli, 1947). The increase in life 
expectancy arising from all these has been despite the adverse nature of some developments 
in nutrition (Lewis, 1988). The development policies also led to the increased immigration to 
Tarawa outlined in S4.1 and, eventually, to adverse living conditions there (see S3.2), which 
may now be affecting life expectancy adversely (McIver et al., 2014; Thomas, 2002). 
However, the more prevalent effect of this immigration has been to increase the incidence of 
marriage to non-I-Nikunau, and so increase the rate of births per I-Nikunau parent. 
Two other points about population are remarkable. First, notwithstanding the emigration from 
Nikunau over the past eight decades to the Phoenix, Solomon and Line Islands and Tarawa, 
the its population, as shown on Figure 9, has not so much fallen as fluctuated; indeed, it is 
now more or less the same as 200 years ago. Some of this sustaining of the population is 
attributable to the number of non-I-Nikunau who have settled on Nikunau, temporarily or 
permanently. Their reasons for being there vary. They include the aforementioned I-Kiribati 
immigrating as a result of inter-island marriages; beachcombers, castaways, and itinerant and 
resident traders, all consequent to whaling, coconut oil and copra trading, and similar 
commerce; clergy associated with the Protestant (LMS then KPC/KUC), and RC Churches; 
and staff of Colony or Republic and island governmental organisations (Couper, 1967; 
Goodall, 1954; Macdonald, 1971, 1972, 1982a; Maude, 1964; Maude & Leeson, 1965; 
Munro, 1987; Nokise, 1983; Sabatier, 1939/1977; Speedy, 2016; Wilde, 1998). Indeed, the 
point at which the population was lowest, being the nearest statistic to the war, coincides with 
these outsiders probably being at their lowest because of the wartime cessation of trading and 
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the evacuation in 1941 of the colonial authorities to Fiji.44 However, probably more important 
is that this was also the time when the emigration took place to the Phoenix Islands (see 
Pusinelli, 1947). As intimated in S3.1, there are a significant number of I-Kiribati from other 
islands who now work for the Island Council or Republic Government, and so are living in 
Rungata with their families. 
Second, whereas most of the growth in the population of I-Nikunau on Tarawa during the 
1950s and subsequent decades is attributable to immigration to Tarawa, recently, the 
ascendant factor has become natural increase among I-Nikunau already on Tarawa. 
Furthermore, although I-Nikunau emigrating to New Zealand and similar destinations outside 
the Republic had previously been resident on Tarawa, rather than Nikunau, this emigration 
has barely affected the number still on Tarawa. 
The units of settlement presently on Nikunau and known as kawa are described and explained 
in S3.1, along with mwenga of which they are comprised. Kawa arose through the 
interventions of LMS and Colony Government officials in the name of goodness, orderliness 
and cleanliness between the 1880s and 1930s. Before then, I-Nikunau’s units of settlement 
were areas known as kainga. In the mid-19th Century, there were almost 50 kainga scattered 
around the atoll (for names and locations, see Latouche, 1983, p. 23); in turn, probably 350–
450 mwenga were spread among them. In contrast to the tight, ordered formations in which 
they are arranged in te kawa, these mwenga were scattered around the total area making up te 
kainga. Each comprised a co-residential utu ni kaan te mwenga, usually of 3–7 persons of 
two or, occasionally, three generations—those of two generations could comprise either 
parents and children or grandparents and adopted grandchildren (Hockings, 1984).  
Besides mwenga and the structures associated with them that are described in S3.1, te kainga 
also included te uma ni mane ( men’s house), of which there is a loose equivalent in te kawa 
of today but used by a wider range of community groups than just men (see S3.1), bangota ( 
stone shrines) and aba, on various items (e.g., coconut palms, pandanus, bwabwai) for 
victuals, materials, etc. were grown (re traditional victuals, see Grimble, 1933; Lewis, 1988; 
Turbott, 1949). These aba were frequented daily by te kainga residents according to the 
usufructuary rights each te mwenga had for cultivating them and taking produce. Besides, te 
mwenga had other aba away from te kainga in buakonikai: men would work on these distant 
aba for either a day at a time or a few days without returning home. Furthermore, sea 
conditions permitting, the men regularly ventured out to hunt and gather on marine areas 
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(known as maran and nama) to which they had rights45 situated within and beyond the reef 
(Pole, 1995).  
As well as the earlier kainga settlements being scattered and those in the later kawa ones 
being convergent, kainga were on ancestral land, and how they were established and how 
their populations were renewed was ancestral, whereas kawa are primarily a place where 
people reside. What is more, as well as an area of land, the term kainga signified alignment 
with a type of bilateral kinship group called boti ( clans), each named after te bakatibu who 
founded it (e.g., te boti of Kaokoroa) (Maude, 1963). All the residents of each te kainga 
belonged to the same boti, whereas residents of neighbouring kainga were in a different boti. 
Political, social and economic relations among neighbouring kainga were effected formally 
by virtue of all belonging to and participating in the district mwaneaba (Hockings, 1984; 
Lundsgaarde & Silverman, 1972; Macdonald, 1982a). Indeed, the explanation of boti is 
connected to this feature of kainga settlement patterns with mwaneaba at their heart. The 
interior of each mwaneaba was separated into areas, also known as boti, and named 
according to the members of te boti who sat in the area during formal occasions (e.g., botaki, 
bowi). An example of this naming of areas is provided by Latouche (1983, p. 74); his floor 
plan of Te Atu ni Uea Mwaneaba in Tabomatang shows the names of 18 boti. Furthermore, 
Latouche elaborates his map of kainga of Nikunau (see above) with genealogies (Latouche, 
1983, loose inserts).  
Of further significance is that the founding of particular boti originated in mwaneaba districts 
within and beyond Nikunau (e.g., on Beru) (for an explanation, see Maude, 1963). Thus, boti 
names were shared, or replicated, across Nikunau and the many mwaneaba throughout the 
other southern and central Kiribati islands, depending on whether particular boti had te 
kainga, and so members, in a district. The extent of this replication is evident from comparing 
mwaneaba floor plans from district to district and island to island—for floor plans from Beru, 
see Maude (1963), from Tabiteuea, see Geddes (1977), and from Onotoa, see Hockings 
(1984).46 What is more, members of boti in, say, the Tabomatang district of Nikunau would 
have had kinship links based on their boti with boti in the five other districts, and the same 
from island to island, no matter how many generations these dated from. To clarify, the 
replication of boti names was allied with te I-Nikunau’s membership of his or her te boti 
being recognised across islands. This was provided that he or she could authenticate it, a 
process that involved the claimant reciting their genealogy to the council in te mwaneaba of a 
district they were visiting, and so having it compared with that of the relevant kainga of that 
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district. Once authentication was complete, te I-Nikunau concerned was, among other things, 
entitled to sit in the area of te mwaneaba associated with their boti during formal occasions, 
and share in the entitlements, responsibilities and duties of members of that boti inside and 
outside te mwaneaba (see Grimble, 1989), and living in te kainga. 
Te I-Nikunau joined their boti at some stage of growing up, being initiated as an adult and 
marrying, as various researchers attempt to explain (see Goodenough, 1955; Hockings, 1984; 
Lundsgaarde & Silverman, 1972; Maude, 1963). As every I-Nikunau was also part of two or 
more utu by virtue of birth, tibutibu or marriage, these two bilateral kinship categories existed 
side by side; to clarify, residents of each te kainga could and usually did belong to a variety 
of utu.47 But whereas residents of neighbouring kainga belonged to a different kinship group 
in terms of boti, the residents of one te kainga could and probably did belong to the same utu 
as some residents of a neighbouring te kainga. Thus, in Tabomatang and the other five 
districts on Nikunau, the two categories were manifested as kainga, in the sense of people of 
the same boti living in one settlement, and mwenga in which all the members of the 
household were of the same utu.  
An implication of these circumstances of kinship and settlement was that, on top of bonds of 
utu through living together within te mwenga, bonds through belonging to the same boti 
engendered far more community mindedness, sharing and dependence among residents of te 
kainga than only geographical neighbours might show. Moreover, in many other ways too, 
said circumstances provided a solid basis of social structures within the districts and across 
the atoll, and among I-Nikunau and the peoples of the other southern and central Kiribati 
Islands (Goodenough, 1955; Grimble, 1989; Lundsgaarde & Silverman, 1972; Maude & 
Maude, 1931; Maude, 1963). As related in subsequent subsections, this carried on until some 
way into the 20th Century, gradually weakening as the boti kinship group type withered in 
importance. 
As to how and why today’s kawa48 came to replace kainga as the form of settlements, the 
clue to these questions are the churches being so prominent in them, and traditional 
mwaneaba mostly being absent. The churches were built in the four decades after the 
Christian missions arrived in the 1870s. Between 1873 and about 1910, the LMS mission was 
performed by resident pastors of Samoan origin, accompanied in many cases by their wives. 
Their post-conversion kerisiano fa’a-samoa version of Christianity included a strong dash of 
Samoan culture (Nokise, 1983). This kerisiano fa’a-samoa included different notions of 
village life from te kainga of I-Nikunau, and based on these notions they brought their I-
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Nikunau converts together in kawa adjacent to their mission premises. The main 
consideration in this was to separate converts from the unconverted still living in kainga. The 
number of converts increased during the 1880s (Nokise, 1983) and, as they did so, kawa 
became the ascendant form of settlements.  
In any case, the pastors perceived kainga as having links to ancestor worship and as a barrier 
to their authority to carry on their mission work, incidental to which was a desire to govern, 
and so be able to increase conversion and have everyone conform to church law, including 
observance of the Te Tabati. Although kainga were abandoned as settlements and have all 
but disappeared archeologically (cf. Di Piazza, 1999), the term is still used but now refers to 
parts or sections of kawa. The institution of boti was also challenged by the change from 
kainga to kawa, and as alluded to above, it too would ultimately be undermined through 
changes in political circumstances, although this was some time after the demise of kainga 
(Hockings, 1984).  
An added feature of the establishment of kawa arose when William Goward became the chief 
LMS missionary for the southern Kiribati Islands. Possessed of some town planning 
knowledge, he applied it in developing kawa as being model from an aesthetic perspective 
(Macdonald, 1982a). Thus, mwenga had to abut the street at right angles—this made them 
easy for the pastors and, later, the civil authorities to patrol and inspect (Geddes, 1977; 
Hockings, 1984)—and conform to standard designs, which incorporated wells and reef-
latrines. Maintaining the street and paths adjacent to each te mwenga was the responsibility of 
the occupants, giving rise to an early morning sweeping of the areas in question; curiously, 
this is still an almost daily occurrence that one sees and hears on Nikunau and elsewhere in 
the diaspora.  
The requirements about the extent, layout and situation of kawa and mwenga (and demise of 
kainga settlements), and for responsibilities to maintain them, came to feature in regulations 
officially endorsed, and probably suggested, by the Colony Government but formally enacted 
by the Nikunau Native Government, which carried them through enthusiastically all the same 
(Macdonald, 1982a). However, resituating mwenga raised issues about aba: essentially, 
mwenga were put on aba adjacent to the road but in which the then rights of te aba did not 
belong to anyone in te mwenga. This de facto loss of their usufructuary rights upset the 
existing rights-holders and their utu, who could have expected to inherit those rights. 
Hockings (1984) reports disgruntlement over this on Onotoa, to which the Colony 
Government’s response was to declare land adjacent to the road as its property, and then to 
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vest user rights in the head of te mwenga settled on each plot. However, the loss of rights 
often went deeper, being seen by members of te kainga whose ancestral land it was as 
dispossession and denial of rights to use said aba in the way they preferred.49 
Another matter arising from the setting up of kawa in place of kainga is for customary 
inheritance and transfer in the following century or so to have resulted in te I-Nikunau 
owning small plots of aba widely dispersed around the atoll. The corollary was for naturally 
coherent areas of land coming to be divided among many owners; this was inhibiting from a 
cultivation point of view, not to mention inefficient from a rational economic I-Matang 
perspective. Before, fragmentation was modified by collective use of aba by residents of te 
kainga, who through sharing utu or boti were amenable to cooperation and rationalising 
landholdings. However, on top of te kainga disappearing, and so no longer there to effect 
rationalisations that were desirable from a community view, the change in question and 
others of similar ilk have led to a greater sense of individuality and a keener sense of which 
aba belongs to whom (Baaro, 1987; Hockings, 1984; Macdonald, 1971, 1982a; Maude, 1963; 
Pole, 1995; Sabatier, 1939/1977; Trussel & Groves, 2003). 
The changes related in the previous few paragraphs and the various aba ownership problems 
accompanying them gradually dissipated, although some may still be bubbling beneath the 
surface. Indeed, aba matters are the most common subject of disputes among I-Kiribati that 
end up in courts. Disputes arise for various reasons, including disagreements over boundaries, 
encroachment on seldom-used aba being challenged, and contested ownership arising from 
inheritance and other transfers (see Lundsgaarde, 1968b). On Tarawa, similar issues arose 
and with land there at a premium, the issues just referred to are much more significant and 
keenly affect I-Tarawa as the ancestral landowners, especially as aid organisations, and 
before them, the Colony Government, have been concerned about the inefficiency concept 
mentioned above. 
In the last three decades, a further aspect of settlement to have changed on Nikunau is the 
distribution of the population becoming skewed towards the vicinity of Rungata. By the time 
the six kawa existing today were ascendant in the early 20th Century, it is probable that there 
were about 1,700 I-Nikunau residing on the atoll and these were more evenly spread than 
today—the earliest census data available (i.e., Pusinelli, 1947) indicates four kawa with 
between 11% and 15% of the population, with the two outliers being Tabomatang (6%) and 
Rungata (35%). This was still the case by the mid-1980s, when the population of the atoll had 
increased to about 2,000 (National Statistics Office, 2013), but without so many non-I-
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Nikunau public service workers present as there are today. Since, Rungata has grown by 
about 30% and accounts for nearly half the atoll’s total population (National Statistics Office, 
2016; Pusinelli, 1947; Zwart & Groenewegen, 1968). 
Three basic reasons explain how the present distribution came about. First, for no obvious 
reason, emigration from Nikunau in the 1980s and 1990s has emptied some kawa faster than 
others, to the point that Tabomatang for one, now with only 4% of the population (i.e., 
indicative of a 60% in headcount since 1968 – Zwart & Groenewegen, 1968), may lack 
sufficient residents to be a viable autonomous social unit. Second, although still small, the 
number of job positions and amount of casual work with the Island Council and Republic 
Government has increased. Besides, the pay and conditions of those working for the Republic 
Government on Nikunau now reflect those on Tarawa, and are a more prominent part of the 
atoll’s economy than hitherto (cf. Ministry of Internal and Social Affairs, 2007). Most of this 
employment is around Rungata, or Rungata is used as a depot or similar base. What is more, 
much of the full-time employment comes with accommodation, which is provided in the 
Island Council area in Rungata; this includes the persons in senior positions. Although these 
positions are open to I-Nikunau, they are usually filled by other I-Kiribati, for reasons of 
independence, and because these others have no mwenga or aba on Nikunau, they stay in the 
accommodation provided. Third, limited as they still are, the facilities and monetised aspects 
of the economy in and around the Island Council area and Rungata have been extended, and 
to access them I-Nikunau have to come to Rungata, or indeed live there, as is the case with 
the junior secondary school, which opened c. 2001. Besides, all this has had a multiplier 
effect around Rungata compared with the other kawa. This is epitomised in the private family 
store situated adjacent to the Island Council area being relatively prosperous compared with 
others on the atoll. 
I-Nikunau settlements and households elsewhere are inspired by those on Nikunau, past and 
present but all have had to adjust in various and sometimes substantial ways to the 
circumstances where they are located. On Tarawa, the aspects of colonialism that had 
affected traditional settlements on Nikunau between the 1840s and 1940s also affected same 
there, and Betio in particular and more besides were severely damaged during the Battle of 
Tarawa—despite an organised clear up effort in the mid-1950s,50 there are still war relics and 
spent munitions in evidence and unexploded bombs are occasionally uncovered. However, by 
the time I-Nikunau began settling in significant numbers, the precedence of Tarawa, its status 
as the Colony Government headquarters and its growth in population through immigration 
 
70 
were well in train (see Doran, 1960; Maude & Doran, 1966). I-Nikunau mwenga have had to 
fit in with these developments physically and socially (see S3.2). This includes some I-
Nikunau purchasing land from I-Tarawa or other owners and, once they were joined by utu ni 
kaan or had families of their own, sub-dividing this land to accommodate the consequent new 
mwenga.  
Similar, though more substantial, adjustments have occurred in Great Britain and New 
Zealand. On Great Britain, the dwellings and households resemble the norms of the British 
socio-economic class or level of affluence of the I-Matang partner in the I-Matang-I-Kiribati 
marriage and of the geographical district in which they are located (e.g., London, Cornwall, 
Mid-Wales, Lancashire); the links with Nikunau and Kiribati are reflected in decorative 
features and some social behaviours, rather than the structure, fabric, layout, etc. of 
dwellings. This also applies among earlier diaspora of I-Matang-I-Kiribati settlers in New 
Zealand, except that the norms are those of the majority Pākehā population—although 
Pākehā vary in ancestry among English, Scots, Irish, Scandinavian, Welsh, etc., most seem to 
have become Anglicised in a peculiarly New Zealand way, different from British (cf. Black 
& Huygens, 2007). However, with immigration continuing in significant numbers, and recent 
settlers being mostly all I-Kiribati singles, couples and families, the earlier diaspora in New 
Zealand are under greater influence than the diaspora in Great Britain to behave socially in 
ways reflecting Nikunau and Kiribati. 
For their part, these all-I-Kiribati settlers face some challenging aspects of housing deigns 
and utilisation, among other housing matters alluded to in S3.2. Their familiarity with New 
Zealand dwellings before arriving is often limited to what they have seen on Tarawa from the 
outside of modern single and double-storey houses of imported designs resembling them (see 
S3.2); not many have spent much time inside such dwellings, let alone lived in them, and so 
their experiential understanding of these structures and designs is incomplete and they can 
experience various difficulties, as noted by Thompson (2016). What seems to occur is that 
furnishing and decorating their interiors, utilising them spatially, etc. ends up as some 
compromise or other between mwenga on Tarawa and I-Kiribati perceptions of dominant 
cultural (i.e., Pākehā or ≈ I-Matang) norms for dwellings in New Zealand. Uncontrollable 
factors affecting this compromise include that fixtures, fittings (including carpets and stoves) 
and furniture have come with the rented dwellings in which most live. Besides, discretionary 
incomes are mostly relatively very low and spending on these matters is usually given a low 
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priority, including behind community contributions, motor vehicles, entertainment 
equipment, mobile devices and Internet access (cf. Kuruppu and Liverman, 2011).  
A major difficulty many I-Kiribati experience with dwelling structure and design has to do 
with the closed nature of houses, which presumably arises from considerations of weather-
tightness, especially during the New Zealand winter, and of Pākehā’s views about privacy 
and the function of houses, including as serving what Black and Huygens (2007) refer to as 
the short family (cf. Buckenberger, 2012). This closed nature contrasts with the open-style 
mwenga I-Kiribati arrivals were used to even on Tarawa, let alone Nikunau, where built 
structures are spread around a dwelling area and their sides are designed to admit breezes for 
cooling (see S3.1 and S3.2). These difficulties are particularly challenging for larger, 
extended families (cf. Berry, 2014), or when families share a house, which occurs frequently 
through a second or, even, third family being given a place to stay temporarily. The latter 
arises when the second or third family first arrive in a community and continues while they 
go about setting up separate households for themselves, which often takes months not weeks 
(see Roman, 2013; Statistics New Zealand, 2014; Thompson, 2016).  
Setting up their own households is identified by Thompson (2016) as a critical resettlement 
event for I-Kiribati arriving in New Zealand. Intriguingly, in the case of low-rent, and so 
usually poorly maintained, accommodation, it is sometimes the household officially renting 
the property that moves out, to a better, higher rent property, after vouching to the landlord 
that the family taking over the property and the rental agreement is reliable. What is more, the 
aspiration of many is home ownership, seeing it as freer, more stable and likely to provide a 
sense of achievement (see Thompson, 2016); arguably, this aspiration derives from te katei ni 
Nikunau and the way mwenga formed in kainga and later kawa (see S4.2). However, only a 
still small minority of I-Kiribati families in New Zealand have achieved this aspiration—the 
rate according to Statistics New Zealand (2014) is only 11%, and even that may include the 
earlier diaspora of I-Matang-I-Kiribati settlers. In any case, even those later settlers who 
achieve such aspirations may be deterred from changing fixtures and decoration by cultural 
attitudes to décor and lack of knowledge and skills in use of materials available locally 
(wallpaper, paints, soft furnishings, etc.).  
A further factor is that, although I-Kiribati may obtain perceptions of how non-I-Kiribati 
New Zealanders lay out their dwellings and furnish them, and so may feel some obligation to 
mimic these, they are probably more concerned about what other I-Kiribati think of them, as 
they are probably by far the most frequent visitors to I-Kiribati dwellings (cf. Thompson, 
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2016). Concomitantly, the perceptions they acquire through these visits of how other I-
Kiribati in New Zealand are seen to live in their dwellings influences them in terms of what 
is acceptable and not acceptable to these other I-Kiribati. 
4.3 Economic Circumstances 
The range of economic circumstances of I-Nikunau nowadays is broad, particularly according 
to where they live, as the descriptions in S3 indicate. On Nikunau, their micro- and macro- 
economies are barely distinguishable from each other or from social, political, religious and 
other facets of life; on Great Britain and New Zealand’s two islands, indeed even on Tarawa, 
I-Nikunau might be described as part of someone else’s macro-economy. The broadness of 
their circumstances reflects two fundamentals. First, many of them, or their recent ancestors, 
responded willingly to possibilities of being drawn away from Nikunau to work, be educated 
and for other reasons, and for dependents and other utu following them. As related in S4.1, 
these possibilities began when whalers first took on some men as ships’ crew and they have 
occurred frequently since and to a remarkable assortment of places. However, up to the 
1960s, nearly all I-Nikunau were still part of the Nikunau economy; it was only afterwards 
that the geographical broadening of their economic circumstances took effect, as their 
emigration became permanent.  
Second, as extensions of their subsistence economy activities, they took willingly to 
producing and trading coconut oil and, subsequently, copra. Oil was a product for which they 
already had uses (e.g., anointing their bodies, preparing food, fuelling simple oil lamps, as 
introduced by beachcombers) and copra replaced tobacco as the form of local currency, not 
only to purchase trade goods but also to pay “tax copra”, and church and civil fines, dues and 
fees51 (Couper, 1967; Lawrence, 1992; Maude & Leeson, 1965; Morrell, 1960). 
The references just made to taxes, church dues, etc. are an indication that the trade in copra, 
and indeed cash remittances received from I-Nikunau working away, enabled the 
establishment and perpetuation of other non-traditional organisations on Nikunau besides 
trade stores. Using either copra or cash, I-Nikunau have been increasingly called on to pay 
church contributions, fines for spiritual and secular misdemeanours, school fees, various poll, 
land and copra-export taxes, licence fees (e.g., for bicycles and dogs) and similar 
(Macdonald, 1982a; Nokise, 1983; Sabatier, 1939/1977). These have been due variously to 
successive religious organisations (i.e., the LMS and KPC/KUC, and the RC Church), 
successive governmental organisations (i.e., the Nikunau Native Government and Nikunau 
Island Council, and the Colony Government and the Republic Government) and community 
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groups. I-Nikunau have also made contributions in kind to these same organisations. Most of 
these have been voluntary, and are still. They have involved frequent exertions, such as on 
behalf of their churches, but have come to be seen as part and parcel of kawa or diasporic 
community life. Thus, I-Nikunau approach them with the same willing and cheerful attitude 
that they exhibit towards friends or visiting strangers and especially to koraki, no matter how 
distant is the relationship biologically or geographically. However, some were involuntary, 
the most significant and formal of these being so-called “communal workdays” required of 
almost all adults annually between the 1900s and the 1960s by the Colony Government (e.g., 
see Regulations for the Good, 1933). These were extremely unpopular and controversial (see 
Correspondent, 1913) and have left a legacy of a strong aversion to performing unpaid work 
for Te Tautaeka, whether it be the Nikunau Island Council or the Republic Government; this 
applies as equally to performing committee work without payment of a sitting allowance as it 
does to manual labour (Macdonald, 1982a). 
For many I-Nikunau still resident on Nikunau, copra is still a significant, if meagre, source of 
cash, as is brought out in S3.1; otherwise, many would have very little with which to pay the 
present day versions of the aforementioned taxes, school fees and church dues or to purchase 
imported goods. I-Nikunau receive a price for their copra that the Republic Government 
guarantees; this arrangement continues attempts by the authorities on Tarawa to counter what 
has proved to be a long-term downward trend in its price as a world commodity (see 
Razzaque, Osafa-Kwaako & Grynberg, 2007). These attempts began with the (Copra) 
Producers’ Development and Stabilization Fund in the 1950s. Estimates I was supplied by the 
National Statistics Office in a personal communication in 2009 show that a spike in the world 
copra price reduced the subsidy greatly in 2008 but this was only temporary. In 2017, the 
subsidy across the whole Republic is estimated as AU$25m (Kiribati Government, 2016). 
Although the subsidies were funded with assistance from the European Union’s Stabilisation 
des recettes d'Exportation (STABEX) for several years up to about 2000 (see Aiello, 1999), 
now they are borne by Republic Government general revenue. Given how much of this 
revenue (usually >60%) comes from licences issued to various foreign vessels to fish for tuna 
in Kiribati’s vast Extended Economic Zone (EEZ) (Williams, Terawasi & Reid, 2017), the 
subsidies are a method for I-Nikunau to share in this revenue while also being encouraged to 
be active by continuing to produce copra. One curiosity, however, is that the Republic 
Government is having to portray this guaranteeing of prices as a mechanism to stabilise 
incomes of I-Nikunau and copra cutters on other islands in the face of fluctuating prices, and 
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so to appear compliant with demands by the Asian Development Bank and others not to 
subsidise agriculture. 
The dynamics of the various economic and related developments explained above are as 
follows. Before the 1820s, I-Nikunau comprised a small, isolated and so virtually closed, self-
reliant, tropical atoll economy, although it is important to appreciate that this would not have 
meant there was no contact whatsoever with other people, not only on neighbouring Kiribati 
islands but further afield, and that this probably meant some innovations (e.g., plants, 
growing techniques) being introduced intermittently but rarely (cf. Gibson & Nero, 2008). 
This economy was based on subsisting on poor, drought-prone aba, the two lakes, reef and 
nearby parts of a vast ocean (Catala, 1957; Di Piazza, 2001; Republic of Kiribati, 2009; 
Lewis, 1981; Sachet, 1957; Thomas, 2001). However, nothing was only economic. Thus, 
participation, transactions, etc. took place as part of a wider awareness and acknowledgement 
of relationships with koraki, customary usufructuary rights in aba and marine areas, and 
technical knowledge and skills, magic, spells and rituals (A. F. Grimble 1989; R. Grimble, 
2013; cf. Gibson & Nero, 2008).  
Economic order was indistinguishable from other forms of order, covering affairs that might 
be classed academically as social, political, spiritual, military, environmental, cultural, etc. 
The basic economic units were mwenga and kainga, as covered in S4.2; their constituents 
eked out a living with the victuals, materials, etc., they procured from their aba, whether 
forming te kainga or in buakonikai, and from marine areas. Any surplus (e.g., of fresh fish) 
did not lead to barter or other trading—any such taking advantage was seen as kamama—but 
was shared with other kin, or with baronga, and an insufficiency was overcome similarly. 
This non-reciprocal distribution of victuals, materials, etc. extended to cooperation within 
kainga, for example in major fishing expeditions and on other occasions (Geddes, 1977; 
Hockings, 1984; cf. Burridge, 1957). Cooperation and assistance were also available from 
within utu and, particularly for significant tasks and projects, from other kainga in a district. 
This applied particularly when specialist knowledge and skills were needed (e.g., to build 
bata and other dwelling structures, canoes and other capital formation activities; to provide 
medical care and nursing), and in times of crisis. Furthermore, utu provided help no matter 
that they might normally reside on different kainga, including outside the district, in which 
case it was routine for the visiting helper to be fed and accommodated in te mwenga 
(Hockings, 1984). As alluded to throughout S3, these practices continue in modified forms 
today wherever I-Nikunau are located, including that in diasporic communities the sharing 
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and assistance occurs not only among utu but also among baronga (cf. Ratuva, 2014; 
Thompson, 2016). 
Another important traditional practice that survives today in modified form for transferring 
goods or services among I-Nikunau is bubuti; the practice is as social as it is economic (see 
Geddes, 1977; Macdonald, 1972; McCreary & Boardman, 1968). Basically, bubuti entails a 
person having the right to gift goods or services to another with whom they have some social 
relationship, or to solicit goods or services from that other, with an obligation on the part of 
the other to agree. While at the time of the gifting or soliciting, no corresponding action 
occurs that would turn this into an exchange, there are implications of potential reciprocity in 
the future, and just as it strengthens social relations among the participants, so there are social 
limits on how it is conducted (e.g., for it to be seen as begging would give rise to kamama). 
Not only does bubuti have continuing significance in the distribution of goods and services 
among I-Nikunau wherever they reside (cf. Duncan, 2014; Ratuva, 2014; Thompson, 2016) 
but also it is celebrated culturally; this continuity is despite repeated attempts made by the 
Colony Government to stamp it out (e.g., see Regulations for the Good, 1933). 
Order within the above economy was through gerontocratic rule, exercised by unimane 
within each te kainga, and, beyond that, within each of six districts. A feature of this rule 
were bowi held, respectively, in te uma ni mane and in te mwaneaba, hence the concept of 
mwaneaba districts. This order included quasi-taxing of mwenga based on income or wealth, 
levied, for example, to stage ceremonials in te mwaneaba. One item on the agenda of a 
meeting called to organise a particular event would be consideration of the items each te 
kainga, and, by implication, each te mwenga, would contribute. I have witnessed, or 
sometimes been part of, similar kinds of discussion on Nikunau and in diasporic 
communities. Kazama (2001) and Autio (2010) report similarly in their analyses of the role 
of the mwaneaba on Tabiteuea.  
Initial changes to the above circumstances coincided with visits to Nikunau by the 
aforementioned whalers and a few other passing ships. The visitors bartered with I-Nikunau 
for locally-produced goods and services, for example, coconuts and other fresh provisions 
(including, eventually, meat from the pigs and fowl bred from stock that whalers entrusted to 
I-Nikunau with this purpose in mind – Macdonald, 1982a), mats and other handicrafts, 
kaokioki ( coconut rum), and the services of nikiranroro (i.e., captives, slaves and single 
women known to have had sexual relations52) (cf. Druett, 1987). In return, I-Nikunau 
obtained kaako, for example, various metal implements (e.g., tools, weapons), trinkets, plugs 
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of tobacco and tobacco pipes, and the abovementioned fowl and pigs. For I-Nikunau, this 
bartering was a new concept, as implied above in mentioning how a surplus catch of fish was 
dealt with.  
The whalers were particularly after the oil they could process from whale carcasses; it was an 
important commodity in their ports of origin in Western Europe and New England, being 
used for, among other things, lighting, heating, cooking, lubricating, and making candles, 
soap, glue, corsets and umbrellas (Best, 1983; Lever, 1964; Mitchell, 1983; Phillips, 2006). 
Then, perhaps as the behaviour of whales changed or their stock was depleted (Davis, 
Gallman & Hutchins, 1988), and, in any case, as the demand for whale products declined in 
the face of alternatives, some also turned their attention to coconut oil, which had other uses 
as well and could be accumulated and transported in the same barrels (Maude & Leeson, 
1965).  
I-Nikunau’s response to this demand for coconut oil (1840s–1860s) was one of enthusiasm 
for more trade. They showed even more enthusiasm when the product demanded changed 
from oil to copra (1870s– ) (see Bollard, 1981); although coconut by coconut, the price 
received for copra was lower than for oil, they could cut and dry copra more easily and 
efficiently than they could press oil. Whatever, from the 1840s, I-Nikunau were increasingly 
incented to expand nut harvesting by planting more coconut palms, mostly on underutilised 
aba, so as not to affect their other land-based subsistence resources. The time they spent on 
cultivating palms, and cutting and either pressing or, later, drying nuts also increased 
(Macdonald, 1982a). Although this reduced the time available for other activities (cf. Lewis, 
1988), some labour saving devices were among goods that I-Nikunau could obtain through 
trade, thus making them more efficient in conducting some of these other activities, as well as 
in producing oil and then copra. However, droughts and poor soils were still constraining. On 
the other hand, the difficult growing conditions meant commercial planters were uninterested 
in turning Nikunau into a plantation, unlike some other Pacific islands.  
Not so some of the half dozen trading companies with bases on Butaritari, however; the 
change to copra, and the resulting higher production potential, incented them to change their 
mode of trading with I-Nikunau from passing, or itinerant, to resident. However, although 
they knew little about I-Nikunau, they probably perceived them as lacking the capital, 
connections and reliability necessary to be admitted into their companies and trading 
networks, to say nothing of the possible social, cultural and racial disdain and condescension, 
if not hostility, they may have harboured. In any case, for their part, I-Nikunau’s involvement 
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in proprietorial trade was constrained culturally, which, in studying their neighbours in 
Tuvalu, Munro (1987) attributes to “kinship obligations, community solidarity, and ethics of 
reciprocity that run counter to profit making and economic individualism” (p. 80) (see also 
Autio, 2010; Macdonald, 1982a, especially pp. 212–213) (cf. Burridge, 1957; Eisenstadt, 
1956). Thus, the trading companies in question financed I-Matang and Chinese agents to 
establish trade stores on Nikunau. Soon there were at least four stores, two serving single 
mwaneaba districts and two serving two neighbouring districts. The presence of these stores 
greatly increased I-Nikunau’s continuous access to victuals, hardware, cloth, implements and 
other trade goods, and so spurred them to produce more copra (Couper, 1967; Davis, 1892; 
Macdonald, 1982a; Maude, 1977; Maude & Leeson, 1965; Munro, 1987; Sabatier, 
1939/1977; Willmott, 2007). 
I-Nikunau’s enthusiasm for and level of participation in the trade that developed because of 
the stores was notwithstanding the companies and their agents undoubtedly having the upper 
hand in knowledge, skills, etc. This applied in knowing about concepts of trade, commercial 
manufacture and economic profit, the fairness or otherwise of prices at which goods were 
sold and copra was bought, and, indeed, the uses to which oil, copra, etc. were put—this 
being oblivious to what was happening to the products of their work also applied when they 
were working away, including in mining phosphate ore, for example, and still does in some 
cases. Undoubtedly, this comparative ignorance caused I-Nikunau disadvantages in the 
exchange rate between goods and copra, and in goods having inferiorities (cf. Bakre, 2008). 
Indeed, the period was not free of occasional disputes, but usually focusing on the particulars 
of whether the traders might reduce copra prices, giving reasons such as world prices falling, 
and not over the general circumstances of trade. Whatever, the disputes were most frequently 
conducted at the level of unimane and traders, rather than the individual copra cutter having 
to take on the trader alone.  
Although the siting of trade stores on Nikunau was a sign of prosperity, the stores and the 
trade were always susceptible to the frequency of droughts (Sachet, 1957) and fluctuations in 
external demand for copra (Munro, 1987; Razzaque et al., 2007). Over the entire time the 
stores have existed, these have frequently presented challenges not only for the viability of 
stores but also of the shipping services on which the stores rely to bring the kaako and collect 
the copra, and so the micro-economy on Nikunau (cf. Couper, 1967). The Great Depression 
period presented a particularly extreme challenge to the stores, shipping and the very survival 
of the trade, and had far-reaching consequences. The price of copra crashed so low that the 
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trade stores, then still in private ownership, would have folded had they not been 
reconstituted as I-Nikunau owned and operated cooperatives—I believe there were at least 
four of these by 1935, registered eventually under the Native Co-operative Societies 
Ordinance 1940. Concomitantly, the shipping and import-export services at the level of the 
Colony continued in private hands, but, whereas half a dozen companies were still around in 
the 1920s, their number was down to two by the late 1930s, namely Burns, Philp & Co, Ltd, 
by then based on Tarawa, and W. R. Carpenter & Co. Ltd, still based on Butaritari. The 
continuance of the trade was helped by copra prices recovering steeply when a world 
shortage of oils and fats loomed with the prospect surfacing of another major war (Catala, 
1957; Couper, 1967; Macdonald, 1982a; Maude, 1949, 1950). 
The cooperatives established on Nikunau at this time, together with perhaps a further 40 or so 
on neighbouring islands in Kiribati and Tuvalu, not only overcame the immediate issue of 
saving the existing trade but also they marked the beginning of the cooperative form of 
ownership across these islands, as at first embodied in boboti but then increasingly in 
mronron. This form of ownership is in tune with te katei ni Nikunau (Macdonald, 1982a); 
mronron in particular somehow meld distribution based on kinship with using cash to oil the 
process of goods purchased collectively being distributed among members, without the 
prospect of kamama associated with arm’s length trading for individual economic gain 
(Couper, 1967; Munro, 1987). Besides, I-Nikunau probably obtained a better deal because of 
the stores being reconstituted along cooperative lines, and were more in control of the trade 
than when it was in private I-Matang or Chinese hands. The better deal was despite I-
Nikunau who participated in the governance and administration of the cooperatives still 
mostly being at a knowledge disadvantage when dealing with external suppliers and 
intermediaries from the aforementioned shipping companies. Besides, even though these I-
Nikunau had gradually acquired knowledge and understanding through participating in the 
trade now for some decades, many economic and social concepts the trade encompassed were 
alien to them culturally, being both strange and even repugnant. This incognisance endures in 
modern contexts of trading and other economic relations, and still is challenging for I-
Nikunau, including on Tarawa and in metropolitan countries. 
Events in the Kiribati Islands during World War II (see Notes 21 and 42) caused a pause in 
trade from 1941 to 1948, which in turn affected not only I-Nikunau’s access of to trade goods 
but also the revenues used to operate and maintain churches, schools and government 
(Macdonald, 1982a). However, when the trade did restart, under the auspices of the Colony 
 
79 
Government with capital from London (Maude, 1949), copra prices were higher than for 
some decades before or since because the aforementioned world shortage of oils and fats 
continued, which was the case for another decade or so. I-Nikunau responded to these higher 
prices by increasing cultivation and production, and so their purchases of imported goods 
increased, including catching up with hardware replacement that had not been possible during 
the wartime disruption. The resumption of trade also meant I-Nikunau could resume paying 
taxes, school fees, licences, fines and other payments to the Colony Government, the 
Nikunau Native Government and the churches, meaning they too could revive and renew 
their activities and assets, and even their presences, in cases where they had left altogether. 
A significant change once trade had resumed was for the Colony Government to place the 
stores it had re-established on Nikunau under the ownership of a single cooperative, namely, 
Te Bobotin Nikunau. This cooperative was supplied from Tarawa, where the Colony 
Government had established a body responsible for the importing and wholesaling of goods, 
the collection and export of copra, and shipping services. The Colony Government made sure 
this enterprise had a monopoly by preventing the two companies mentioned above from 
returning to the Colony after the war. Concomitantly, on Nikunau, Te Bobotin Nikunau might 
also be said to have had a monopoly in the supply of goods and a monopsony in the purchase 
of copra. However, these concepts would neither be familiar to I-Nikunau or how they would 
have described the organisation in question, given tradition was largely based on forms of 
cooperation and inclusion among kinship groups in and around mwenga, kainga, mwaneaba, 
etc.; perhaps the one peculiarity was that, as with the Nikunau Native Government, Te 
Bobotin Nikunau was a whole of Nikunau organisation, not a mwaneaba district one, except 
that it had branches in four of the kawa, corresponding to the pre-war circumstances. Besides, 
from time to time, one or two church mronron stores operated as well, but usually buying 
their kaako from Te Bobotin Nikunau. 
Te Bobotin Nikunau remained significant for the first 50 years of its existence, not only 
economically but also politically, socially and culturally, as was true of its counterparts on 
Tarawa and other Outer Islands. But, like them, it has declined since the 1990s, resulting in 
the organisation I observed in 2009 being a shadow of the thriving enterprise I had observed 
two decades earlier. However, this decline contrasts with the enthusiasm still shown by I-
Nikunau for cooperative enterprises, which lives on at the grassroots level through mronron 
see S3.1). As others have described in writing about them (see Couper, 1967; Macdonald, 
1982a), and as I observed in 2009 while living in te mwenga running one on Tarawa, these 
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stores sell the most basic victuals, dealing in the smallest quantities (e.g., a cup of rice, sugar 
or flour, a spoonful of salt, a stick of tobacco or locally rolled cigarette) and at all hours, 
reflecting among other things the meagre incomes of their member-customers.  
Further to the point made above that up to the 1960s the economy for most I-Nikunau was 
Nikunau, this was notwithstanding that for I-Nikunau, the copra, remittances and imports, 
comprising not only consumables but also technology, knowledge and beliefs, had all 
represented economic changes, not to mention political, social and cultural ones. Nowadays, 
outsiders might perceive it as still largely self-reliant, even closed, because of such factors as 
its physical remoteness, the lack of export value of its copra and the low earnings of people 
temporarily working away. However, since the 1960s, there have been changes even more 
profound economically and otherwise as those earlier ones, as foreshadowed in dealing with 
their geographical and demographical consequences in S4.1 and S4.2. The upshot of these 
recent changes has been that the economy for most I-Nikunau since the 1970s has at least 
incorporated Tarawa, and perhaps for two decades has been more Tarawa than Nikunau. To 
appreciate more fully these changes retrospectively, I first consider the economy on Tarawa 
and I-Nikunau’s economic circumstances there, and then return to how the present Nikunau 
economy has evolved since the 1960s.  
The condition of Tarawa as a monetised economy traces back to the aftermath of the Battle of 
Tarawa, and the presence of supplied and moneyed American soldiers there and nearby 
(Macdonald, 1982a; Wright, 2000). Concomitantly, the restored Colony Government was 
headquartered there de facto and then de jure, from when Tarawa once again became the 
administrative centre of the Colony.53 Its role as economic centre also began emerging, 
including as the centre of the restored import-export trade around copra; indeed, three 
cooperatives, equivalent to Nikunau’s Te Bobotin Nikunau, were established and other 
enterprises besides, these in connection with the Colony Government’s fledgling 
development activities (Couper, 1967, 1968; Maude, 1949, 1950; cf. Morgan, 1980). 
After the war, under a Labour Government in London, new imperial policies were adopted; 
these involved development planning and extended to human development and social 
infrastructure (Morgan, 1980). The Colony Government was required to implement these 
policies,54 and signalled this by drawing up the first national plan for reconstruction and 
development (i.e., GEIC, 1946). This turned out to be the first of a series that continues today 
(e.g., see GEIC, 1970; Government of Kiribati, 1983, 2016), along with other representations 
suggestive of direction, coordination, altruism and unity of purpose (e.g., United Nations 
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Conventions on Biological Diversity and on Climate Change, the Millennium Goals). In 
proceeding to implement its plans,55 the Colony Government applied for capital finance from 
the Colonial Development and Welfare Fund, with the result that some of the applications 
were approved and the projects involved went ahead (Macdonald, 1982a; Maude & Doran, 
1966). 
The gist of these Colony Government activities and their geographical and demographical 
consequences are related in Box 1. They transformed the Tarawa economy in terms of its size 
and nature. A gradually accelerating series of civil engineering, education, health, housing, 
social welfare and other projects ensued, few of which could be associated with tradition, and 
these were accompanied by a steady inflow of people (see Figure 8), mainly from other 
islands in the Colony and supplemented from Britain, Australia, New Zealand, etc. by public 
and commercial administrators, teachers, medical specialists, engineers, etc. and their 
families. Banking, finance and insurance, telecommunications, public utilities, construction 
and vehicle maintenance, transport and similar services were established, some as joint 
ventures between the Colony Government and an overseas provider, public or private. The 
import trade was extended into goods of a modern nature and primarily meant for 
governmental body, business and domestic use, especially by the small but knowledgeable 
and economically substantial I-Matang community. 
Similar has continued since the Republic Government took over. Indeed, except for a brief 
lull in the early 1980s, development activities affecting Tarawa have not merely continued 
but accelerated. The lull arose because phosphate royalties from Banaba ceased in 1980 and 
the incumbent government adopted policies aimed at self-sufficiency and non-dependence on 
deficit funding from the former colonial power (Ieremia, 1993; Macdonald, 1982a).Two 
occurrences in the mid-1980s changed the situation, ended the lull, and gave the Tarawa 
economy added impetus. First, following international acceptance of United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982, the Republic Government was able to charge 
various foreign vessels for fishing for tuna in Kiribati’s EEZ.56 Second, the new Republic 
began being “discovered” by the ever-increasing number and wider range of supranational 
organisations, aid donor countries and organisations, middle-persons and other organisations 
that were joining the world’s fast expanding aid industry—on the growth of this industry and 
aid organisations, see Brown (2012), Organisation for Economic Development and 
Cooperation (2013) and Stubbs (2003).57  
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Something of the economic circumstances of I-Nikunau on Tarawa have been covered 
already in S3.2, indicating that the level at which I-Nikunau participate in Tarawa’s economy 
varies. Occasionally, some have been close to its centre, including having some involvement 
in government ministries and state-owned enterprises (e.g., as ministers and government 
department secretaries, public officials, medical professionals, educators, enterprise managers 
and staff, etc.). However, as their immigration has been fuelled less by education and more 
by utu relationships, so increasingly I-Nikunau are spread in their economic statuses, 
occupations, if any, and pursuits, with many being on the economy’s periphery. Accordingly, 
they exhibit signs of what even the free market leaning Asian Development Bank (2006) 
describes as “increased economic frustration” (p. 1), a frustration of quite longstanding (see 
McCreary & Boardman, 1968) and felt equally by many other people on Tarawa. Even those 
with some qualifications struggle to derive income from skilled or professional employment 
(Bedford & Bedford, 2013), or from running their own private business, and so struggle to 
shake off dependency. Indeed, reiterating S3.2, paid employment of any kind is difficult to 
find, particularly for young adults, because the availability of even casual, unskilled jobs is 
well below the numbers seeking them. 
Perhaps adding to this issue, and certainly not making it any easier, are persisting customary 
limits around who I-Nikunau might regard as legitimate employers, and concomitantly, 
around whether I-Nikunau can employ others in a modern sense (cf. Duncan, 2014). 
Notwithstanding changes in perceptions reported by Roniti (1985), going outside these limits 
may still lead to community censure, ridicule, kamama and being made te bai n rang 
(Macdonald, 1982a). From a potential employee’s point of view, doing so is tantamount to 
allowing oneself to be exploited by fellow I-Kiribati for the latter’s private gain. They are the 
same sorts of limits as apply to obtaining goods from other I-Kiribati as part of proprietary 
trade or to supplying goods to other I-Kiribati. The former may be interpreted as a sign of 
self-seeking and individual ambition, including aspiring to be better than the rest of the 
community, and the latter as a sign of not being self-sufficient. 
Nevertheless, as Macdonald (1982a) and Roniti (1985) observed in the 1980s, it is 
increasingly acceptable on Tarawa, not to say imperative, for te mwenga to earn a living 
through organising and administering, say, a trade store, and so being entitled to take an 
economic share of the cash surplus that may result, or going fishing with a view to landing a 
surplus catch for hawking. However, for this to be customarily acceptable, there must be a 
semblance of mronron principles involved, such as through involving, and being reliant on, 
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customers, in the form of other mwenga, with some family or other social links to te mwenga 
operating the store. What is more, the prime motive for operating a store should be to provide 
goods and services to these other mwenga. The income so derived should only be incidental 
to this prime motive and be moderate, which seems to be the case anyway considering the 
low mark-ups prevailing because of prices being determined according to similar goods being 
on sale nearby and the hours of work usually involved, whether it be out fishing, producing 
bread, donuts, ice blocks, locally rolled cigarettes, etc., or just tending the store. Besides, te 
mwenga operating the store are expected to refrain from conspicuous consumption, or any 
displays of greater affluence than the other member-participants.  
Notwithstanding lack of opportunities for many able-bodied I-Nikunau, particularly among 
the younger generation, to participate in Tarawa’s market economy, few possess the 
inclination to return to Nikunau to follow a subsistence life, let alone the knowledge and 
skills or beliefs and values associated with life there; this is despite probably having rights to 
use aba there and the Republic Government guaranteeing them a price for the copra they 
might produce. Kuruppu and Liverman (2011) find this applies to many of Tarawa’s residents 
with Outer Island roots; they also find them as being less self-sufficient than Outer Islanders, 
and more dependent on non-traditional government. Besides, returning to Nikunau might 
generate a sense of kamama about having squandered the opportunity to live and work on 
Tarawa (confidential personal communication, 2017). Among the less able-bodied on 
Tarawa, including members of the older generation, they cannot return to Nikunau because 
they depend on the younger generation, and so must stay on Tarawa with them, probably 
until they die; this is notwithstanding their having been raised on Nikunau, and so being used 
to the subsistence life there, and capable of teaching the young about living such a life. 
In any case, I-Nikunau on Tarawa perceive, probably rightly, that Nikunau continues to lack 
almost all the material, economic and social amenities they observe on Tarawa, and might 
occasionally be able to enjoy. What is more, some have also become accustomed to holding 
positions of authority by virtue of wisdom based on intellectual ability, knowledge obtained 
through formal learning and merit demonstrated by accomplishments, rather than through 
age, gender and birth, as prevails on Nikunau, along with various other of the more tradition-
oriented provisions of te katei (see Hockings, 1984). Especially the women (cf. Kutimeni 
Tenten, 2003; Rose, 2014), but the men too, have become accustomed on Tarawa to greater 
individual freedom, including in their personal conduct and private lives.  
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I now return to the Nikunau economy, to consider how it has changed, especially in light of 
the lion’s share of development and growth in activities, etc. having been performed on 
Tarawa. Just as the Colony Government was criticised in the late 1960s by observers sent 
from London (Macdonald, 1982a), it is no exaggeration to say that Nikunau, like the other 
Outer Islands, has been neglected by the aid organisations—some published advisors’ reports 
even refer to Kiribati as the island in the singular, perhaps implying that Kiribati and Tarawa 
are synonymous (cf. Teaiwa, 2011); many more point out that Kiribati comprises 33 islands 
but then say no more about the 32 others—and, almost as much, by the Republic 
Government. Moreover, Nikunau and the I-Nikunau residing there have gradually suffered 
from an accumulation of so-called “backwash”; that is to say, negative effects that growth 
and development at the centre can have on conditions at the periphery (see Brookfield, 1972; 
Connell, 2010; Couper, 1967; De Haas, 2010; Myrdal, 1957; Ortega, 2008). Emigration and 
parallel occurrences have resulted in resources, notably in the form of people who performed 
better at school, being drained from Nikunau to Tarawa; the resources referred to are 
political, social and cultural, as well as economic. The occurrences include the decline of the 
nationwide network of boboti, and with it Te Bobotin Nikunau; and air and sea transport 
becoming increasingly dependent on the Republic Government, which tends towards Tarawa-
oriented policies, finance and operating practices.  
Concomitantly, looking for spread effects (De Haas, 2010; Myrdal, 1957) that counter 
backwash, the Nikunau economy, though still isolated geographically, has received some 
economic benefits from the centre. Income from the supply of produce by I-Nikunau on the 
periphery for consumption on Tarawa is one potential form of such benefits. However, this 
has only been significant in terms of utu relationships, not in terms of income and economic 
activity on Nikunau. Only copra has had any export significance (Ministry of Internal and 
Social Affairs, 2007; Office of Te Beretitenti and T’Makei Services, 2012b) and, as outlined 
below, the circumstances of it all now going to Tarawa, but rarely further, is more social and 
political than it is economic, in the sense of the periphery supplying the centre with raw 
materials or victuals. Nevertheless, selling copra has gradually regained its position as the 
main source of cash among I-Nikunau on Nikunau, not especially because prices and 
production have increased but because other forms of incomes have declined. 
Infrastructure and similar projects are another form of potential benefits but, reiterating 
above, compared with what has happened on Tarawa, these have been minor and carried out 
reluctantly. Indeed, many were carried out initially only as a response to the aforementioned 
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criticisms of the Colony Government because of signs of torpor on Nikunau and the other 
Outer Islands. Since, some upgrading of earlier infrastructure has been effected, along with 
some additional provision, including under the Republic Government; the areas involved 
have been schools, clinics, administrative buildings, the road, wharf and airport (see S3.1). 
However, as alluded to in Ministry of Internal and Social Affairs (2007) and Office of Te 
Beretitenti and T’Makei Services (2012b), physical maintenance and expertise to effect them 
seem to have been problematic. Structures were constructed with foreign materials not 
readily available when needed to be replaced, and there has been a lack of skills, tools and 
funds (Thomas & Kautoa, 2007; cf. Alejandrino-Yap, Dornan, McGovern & Austin, 2013).  
The most visible provisions in recent years are the supply through aid donors of several 
utility vehicles and small lorries to the Island Council—vehicles on Nikunau have in the past 
been infrequent—and the establishment of the junior secondary school at Rungata. However, 
many of the vehicles I observed in 2009 were off the road, awaiting parts from Tarawa and 
beyond. Getting these is problematic because, assuming they can be identified on Nikunau, 
an order has to go to Tarawa, usually for overseas procurement, and then shipped through 
Tarawa back to Nikunau. Indeed, some rusting wrecks were accumulating for lack of parts, 
but the number was nothing compared with this phenomenon on Tarawa. And the school 
seems starved of money for learning resources and maintenance,58 but even so, some children 
succeed in the entrance examinations for senior secondary schools, which usually means they 
go to Tarawa to study and few ever return. 
A third form of potential benefits in the periphery–centre context are remittances from I-
Nikunau working on Tarawa and transfer payments to I-Nikunau from the Republic 
Government. Long before the 1960s, remittances from around the Pacific and then from 
Banaba, Nauru, etc. were of significance for the Nikunau economy; these remittances could 
be several fold greater than the amount that I-Nikunau could earn on Nikunau from cutting 
copra—Macdonald (1982a, p. 175) remarks on the ratio of remittances to copra in the 
southern Kiribati Islands being 4:1 in the 1960s. With I-Nikunau taking jobs on Tarawa in the 
1960s and 1970s, remittances became significant in the periphery–centre context but then 
declined in the 1980s and 1990s, as parents and other utu dependents accepted invitations 
from adult offspring to live with them on Tarawa (see S4.2).  
Regarding transfer payments, in the past decade or so, the aforementioned AU$40 per month 
non-contributory pensions for I-Kiribati over the age of 70 have not been insignificant in 
putting cash in the hands of I-Nikunau living on Nikunau. However, although one reason for 
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introducing it was to incent people to live on Outer Islands by enabling them to purchase 
some of their needs there, rather than have to rely on their adult offspring, and so perhaps 
have to move to Tarawa to join them, it has only been marginally effective in this regard. 
Indeed, the cash from this pension may actually be an additional incentive for adult offspring 
on Tarawa to have parents move there and join their te mwenga.  
Another arrangement constituting a form of transfer payments relates to present dealings 
around copra. As indicated above, all the copra that I-Nikunau can produce is now purchased 
by the Republic Government. The source of revenue the Republic Government uses to make 
purchases, that is licences to exploit the tuna fishery, make this arrangement at least as much 
a means to transfer cash to the hands of I-Nikunau on Nikunau as it is a way of procuring raw 
materials for a manufacturing operation, namely the copra processing plant the Republic 
Government built on Tarawa in the 2000s. Ultimately, Outer Islands’ communities on 
Nikunau, etc. are receiving shares of the proceeds of fishing licence fees. What is more, 
purchasing copra is essential for the government of the day to maintain political support 
among these islands’ inhabitants—the subsidised prices at which copra is purchased from 
copra cutters is invariably an issue at elections—and more generally for them accepting 
governance by a Republic Government from Tarawa. Like the aforementioned pensions, the 
Republic Government now seems to see the transfer payments through copra as an incentive 
for I-Nikunau to live on Nikunau, and not to immigrate to Tarawa, or even to return to 
Nikunau from Tarawa. But, as in the past (cf. Couper, 1967), their effectiveness in this regard 
seems to be marginal at best.  
Another significant stream of cash coming to the atoll are the Republic Government’s grants 
towards the Island Council’s annual recurrent expenditure mentioned in S3.1. Formally, the 
grants cover five out of every six months of the Council’s operating expenditures,59 and the 
Council is then supposed to raise enough to cover the sixth month from local revenues, which 
incidentally by virtue of local choice no longer include a land tax. However, reiterating S3.1, 
it is commonplace for these local taxes not to be collected because of I-Nikunau lacking the 
means to pay, with the consequence that the Council’s employees are without pay for the 
month. 
It is arguable that these various streams of incoming cash, goods, capital items and personnel 
have made I-Nikunau on Nikunau increasingly dependent since the 1960s on outsiders, 
including on, first, I-Nikunau in the diasporic communities on Tarawa and in the metropolitan 
countries, and, second, the Republic Government, sometimes in conjunction with aid 
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organisations. Moreover, the balance between these two has tilted away from private 
dependence based on utu relationships and towards government dependence, although, as 
intimated above, I-Nikunau seem more self-sufficient and less dependent on non-traditional 
government than Tarawa’s residents are (see also Ratuva, 2014). 
Regarding the economic circumstances of diasporic communities in metropolitan countries, 
Roman (2013) and Thompson (2016) relate that I-Kiribati arriving in New Zealand quickly 
realise, sometimes with surprise or even shock, how important money is to being able to live 
there. This surprise is notwithstanding how supposedly monetised the Tarawa economy is, as 
related above; the experience of many on Tarawa was that surviving with very little money 
was possible, added to which the quantity of transacting that occurs on Tarawa involving 
money is much less than is experienced in New Zealand. Some of the latter stemmed from 
having been under the misconception that there would be a vacant job waiting when they first 
arrived to smooth their re-settlement; not only that but also that the job would come with a 
house seemingly free of not only rent but utilities, property taxes, insurance, repair costs, etc., 
either literally or because charges would figure as deductions from wage payments. This 
misconception may not be as bizarre as it sounds because these are the circumstances that 
greet workers arriving under Recognised Seasonal Employer schemes, they were or are 
similar to the circumstances that greeted colonial officials, missionaries and aid workers 
arriving on Tarawa, and they are similar to the circumstances under which many Republic 
Government employees live on Tarawa.  
Roman (2013) relates that the earliest of the immigrants who came without a partner with 
New Zealand or British connection (see S3.3.2) faced particular difficulties, economic and 
otherwise, because of not knowing anyone in New Zealand to whom they could turn. Even as 
the numbers in New Zealand grew, many difficulties have continued. Thus, Thomson (2016) 
relates how, for a time after their arrival, most I-Kiribati singles, couples and families have 
experienced living at or below the poverty line. This arises from being obliged on arrival to 
accept low-paid jobs because often nothing better is available or accessible. The earnings 
from these jobs are usually inadequate to be able to pay for basic victuals, clothing (including 
school uniforms), housing, utilities, health insurance, so-called “voluntary” donations and 
other school expenses (e.g., for stationery, supplies, sports, examination entry), and other 
essentials in a New Zealand context. 
A significant factor in this matter is that not only is obtaining employment necessary in order 
to live in New Zealand, but also it is essential in order to obtain the visas needed to re-settle 
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under the Pacific Access Category. Although immigrants might hope to obtain employment 
before they arrive in New Zealand, invariably they do not and their initial entry is effected by 
the adult(s) having a work visa(s) and dependent children travelling on visitor visas. These 
visas are only converted to residence visas one the adult members of the immigrating family 
has permanent employment; if such employment is not secured within what the immigration 
authorities consider a reasonable time, then the immigrants must return to Kiribati. Given the 
imperative of permanent employment, the adults often accept the first job that qualifies as 
permanent, which usually means starting in a job on the acceptable income threshold, and so 
low-paid (cf. Roman, 2013; Thompson, 2016)—employers often know about the necessity of 
immigrants having a job and can factor this into the pay and conditions they offer or impose 
(cf. Reilly, 2011).  
After a period of settling in, many I-Kiribati, through means such as weak ties (see S3.3.2), 
have been able to obtain better-paid jobs, and so experience good management practices, 
protection of unions, and to move to better quality rental housing (e.g., between NZ$400 and 
NZ$600, depending on location – see S3.3.2), or even purchase a dwelling, and achieve a 
high level of contentment (see Roman, 2013; Thompson, 2016). However, at least as many 
have remained in low-paid jobs with various, usually adverse, economic, social, and physical 
and mental health consequences. These consequences include exploitation, insecurity, racism 
and, within households, some domestic abuse and violence. Thompson (2016) points to the 
mental anguish felt by some of her interviewees for not being able to provide for their 
families, particularly the children, as well as some women interviewees remarking on 
domestic violence but saying that they still felt safer in New Zealand than on Tarawa (cf. 
Kiribati Conceptual Framework Working Group, 2015; Lievore & Fairbairn-Dunlop, 2007).  
Overall, the median personal fortnightly income of I-Kiribati is NZ$565, or only 52% of the 
overall national median (Statistics New Zealand, 2014). As it is common for households to 
have two or even more members in full- or part-time work, as much through economic 
necessity as choice, I-Kiribati average household fortnightly incomes are likely to be around 
NZ$1,500, or 2 to 3 times more than on Tarawa, but still well below the circumstances of 
New Zealand national median households. The disparity of economic circumstances between 
I-Kiribati households and New Zealand households generally is further reflected in the home 
ownership rate mentioned earlier: the rate for I-Kiribati of 11% compares with a rate of 50% 
overall (Statistics New Zealand, 2014).  
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The differing experiences with employment and of labour mobility among I-Kiribati 
households in New Zealand have given rise to quite a wide range of living standards within 
diasporic communities. However, these disparities have not weakened ties much and 
communities are still quite tightly knit. Thus, the most obvious consequences of this wide 
range is that communities have adequate physical, economic and social resources to be 
internally supportive, the support going some way beyond receiving new arrivals into the 
community (see S3.3.2). Even so, some immigrants have seriously considered returning 
“home” to Kiribati for economic as well as other reasons (see Thompson, 2016), although 
how many have done so, or why, is unclear.  
Regarding the effect on Tarawa of emigration to metropolitan countries like New Zealand, 
unlike that from Nikunau to Tarawa, there do not seem to be many backwash effects, so far at 
least, probably because of how small a proportion of people are involved to date. Indeed, 
Tarawa may be a net gainer through the spread effects of remittances in kind and in cash, and 
of something akin to Pākehā concepts of going on holiday (Black & Huygens, 2007) and 
tourism (cf. Bedford & Bedford, 2013)—having utu in a metropolitan country means the 
accommodation and many other costs of visiting such a country are reduced. However, to 
most I-Kiribati, touring is an unfamiliar concept; most visits to New Zealand are about 
spending time with utu, and if they occur at all, visits to places of interest (e.g., national 
parks, museums, cathedrals, seal colonies) and partaking in adventures (e.g., jet boating, 
skiing) are incidental.  
The backwash effects being suffered by Tarawa presently are more to do with globalisation 
and the nation’s dependence on and acceptance of aid, as alluded to earlier in this subsection 
and in S4.1, S4.2 and elsewhere. However, should projections about life on Tarawa and other 
atolls being compromised by sea-level rise come closer to fruition, it is probable that there 
would be a scramble to emigrate. If so, it will be the younger, higher academic achieving, 
more qualified who will find it easiest to be accepted elsewhere, corresponding to what has 
happened in Nikunau’s case since the 1950s, with the consequence for Tarawa of intellectual 
and social decline, and almost certainly further backwash on Nikunau and the other Outer 
Islands. 
4.4 Environmental Circumstances 
Several references have been made already to how trends in climatic conditions and sea-level 
rise, and their likely dire consequences for residents of low-lying islands (e.g., insecurity of 
land, interruption of freshwater and food supply, coastal erosion, flooding), have brought I-
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Kiribati, and by inference I-Nikunau, to the world’s attention (e.g., see Donner & Webber, 
2014; Nunn, 2013; White et al., 2007). What is more, these trends have inspired a stream of 
aid projects classed as environmental, rather than economic or social, but still predominantly 
on Tarawa (e.g., see Republic of Kiribati, 2009). However, while on Nikunau the gradual 
effects of climate change may be things that I-Nikunau come to imagine and appreciate as 
problematic (Ministry of Internal and Social Affairs, 2007; Office of Te Beretitenti and 
T’Makei Services, 2012b), on Tarawa, I-Nikunau face more immediate, very real 
environmental concerns of impaired living conditions on an overcrowded and 
environmentally degraded atoll (Office of Te Beretitenti and T’Makei Services, 2012c).  
Tarawa’s “worrisome trend,” as the Asian Development Bank (2006, p. 1) describes it, is 
most apparent in the living spaces found on the shores of the most overcrowded parts of 
Betio. In contrast to mwenga or anything of modern design (see S3.2), these comprise tightly 
packed lines of buatarawa and kiakia, which seem to have arisen by agreements among utu 
to subdivide already crowded dwelling areas, not necessarily with the knowledge or formal 
approval of the I-Tarawa landowners or the leaseholders, which in many cases is the 
Republic Government (cf. Corcoran, 2016; Maunaa, 1987). Whatever, these are a 
consequence of inter-related or reciprocative factors: reconstruction after the Battle of 
Tarawa; the enthusiastic construction of infrastructure, and provision of facilities and 
equipment, by the Colony Government, Republic Government and aid organisations, with 
insufficient resources and knowledge to maintain them since; seven decades of immigration 
and urbanisation; a density of human population far in excess of what is naturally sustainable; 
etc. etc. (Biribo & Woodroffe, 2013; Carden, 2003; Corcoran, 2016; Doran, 1960; Solomon 
& Forbes, 1999). 
A further phenomena arising in the past three decades in my experience is the incidence of 
motor vehicles, with perhaps a 100 fold increase since the 1980s—Doran (1960) reports the 
presence of only 24 vehicles on Tarawa, compared to over 7,000 in 2007, according to the 
World Bank (Trading Economics, 2017)—as well as an obvious change from merely 
construction and delivery lorries, and minibuses, which provide public bus services and 
official transport for officials of various government bodies and aid organisations, to the 
proliferation nowadays of saloon cars and similar private vehicles, owned by single mwenga 
and among utu and other social groups. The sheer number of vehicles, much in excess of the 
capacity of Tarawa’s single road running through the middle of its ribbon of residential 
settlements (see Figure 5), has brought about significant traffic congestion, much air 
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pollution, and many traffic injuries and deaths—the road is so difficult to cross at certain 
times of the day as to cause some partitioning of the settlements in question. Then, once these 
vehicles break down irreparably, usually for want of parts and the money to purchase them, 
they add to the countless rusting vehicles littering the atoll—occasionally, the more obvious 
of these are collected by the authorities and transported offshore, usually ending up at the 
bottom of the ocean. 
Ironically, many environmental issues on Tarawa stem from overcrowding having rendered 
inadequate the very public and private infrastructure that has encouraged the immigration at 
the root of the overcrowded conditions. Furthermore, the living conditions of most residents, 
coupled with their straitened economic circumstances and cultural constraints on their 
adaptive capacity (Kuruppu, 2009; Kuruppu & Liverman, 2011; Storey & Hunter, 2010), are 
giving rise to chronic health problems and economic, if not cultural, poverty (McIver et al., 
2014; Thomas, 2002) (cf. Bryant-Tokalau, 1995; Connell & Lea, 2002). However, the 
prospect of living among these conditions is but a mild deterrent on further immigration from 
Nikunau or other Outer Islands, whether it is for the socio-economic and cultural reasons set 
out in S3.2 and S4.1–S4.3 or for the more recent, somewhat ambiguous reason of climate 
change (see AJ+, 2014; Locke, 2009; Smith, 2013). 
The neo-liberal policies foisted on the Republic Government by some aid agencies are not 
helping alleviate inadequacies of public services for dealing with immediate environmental 
issues. As inferred in S4.3, these policies have often been condensed into ministries (e.g., 
education, health, transport, local government) having to cut spending overall, and thence to 
spend much less on consumables in order to leave budgets for employees largely intact. An 
example of the implications is that refuse vehicles go without routine or other maintenance, 
and so become unfit to function—most will join the accumulation of scrap vehicles 
mentioned above—refuse collection employees are idle and refuse goes uncollected, and so 
residents fly-tip their household refuse near the lagoon and ocean edges—recent initiatives, 
promoting recycling and neighbourhood rubbish collection and cleaning have gone some way 
to address this issue but plastics (e.g., ice block wrappers) and other non-degradable waste 
are still a problem (confidential personal communication, 2017). Similar problems one 
observes for lack of public or private money, knowledge or criticism include power houses 
surrounded by diesel waste, unused premises being in a dilapidated state, sea-walls, 
causeways and roads in dangerous states of disrepair, and immobile or unwanted 
government-owned vehicles rusting in compounds next to crowded residential areas—some 
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were imported for construction projects by aid contractors and gifted to the Republic 
Government to avoid the cost of repatriating them. 
On Nikunau, the immediate natural environment resembles Tarawa only in the two being 
low-lying, restricted, narrow strips of land, surrounded by ocean, with maritime equatorial 
climates, whose obvious features are bright sunshine, intermittent and irregular rainfall, and a 
daily temperature range between 26° and 34°. Besides having a small population, Nikunau is 
relatively empty of fabricated structures, although its vegetation (e.g., the quantity of coconut 
palms) and features such as bwabwai pits and fish traps are a result of human activity (Lewis, 
1981). Nikunau’s small population and remoteness from any other population centres mean 
that its marine areas (i.e., the foreshore, reef and surrounding ocean) are relatively pristine 
and abundant in seafood. It is also generally free of rubbish, junk, etc., for reasons such as 
low consumption by the small population, low incomes resulting in low imports of packaged 
goods, low aid spending resulting in few scrap vehicles and similar, and greater ingenuity and 
incentives for turning potential rubbish, junk, etc. into useful implements (Ministry of 
Internal and Social Affairs, 2007). 
Elsewhere, it would be difficult for any of I-Nikunau’s diasporic communities not to occupy, 
or be close to, higher ground than is available in Kiribati. However, this living on higher 
ground is largely coincidental, rather than by design, although the populations of Alu and 
Ghizo are obvious exceptions; the I-Nikunau there lived in coastal settlements established in 
the 1950s, but, in 2007, a tsunami forced them to flee to higher ground, albeit only a few 
miles distant, where they have chosen to remain (Schuermann, 2014; Weber, 2016). Although 
I-Nikunau in the various diasporic communities are certainly more conscious of the issue of 
low-lying land being insecure than they were only a decade or so ago (see Fedor, 2012; 
Kuruppu & Liverman, 2011), it is, to reiterate, an exaggeration and simplification to claim 
that I-Kiribati moved to New Zealand pre-emptively, in search of higher ground, because of 
the projected environmental consequences for Kiribati of climate change. However, they did 
regard Tarawa as overcrowded, and brought this environmental consideration into their 
decisions to choose to emigrate from there (see Fedor, 2012; Roman, 2013; Thomson, 2016).  
As to other aspects of the environmental circumstances of I-Nikunau’s diasporic communities 
outside Kiribati, these vary with geography, income and wealth, and so on. Taking as 
examples the urban areas of New Zealand associated with the larger diasporic communities 
(e.g., South Auckland, Porirua and the Kapiti Coast, Hutt Valley, Mahurangi), most 
households, even those with lower incomes, live in less crowded neighbourhoods than many 
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would have previously experienced on Tarawa, and which have modern conveniences that 
are taken for granted in such places, for example, mains electricity, clean water, sewerage, 
telephones, broadband, paved footpaths and roads, street furniture, town planning controls 
and building regulations, regular public services, including refuse and transport, parks and 
playing fields, schools, and doctors’ surgeries. However, as related in S4.2, in many, the 
number of occupants per household is probably similar to Tarawa, taking into account both 
extended family circumstances and temporarily accommodating second or third families.  
Another significant environmental feature facing I-Nikunau in New Zealand is the climate 
(cf. Roman, 2013). Reiterating S3.3.2., temperatures are much cooler than anyone from 
Kiribati is used to, particularly outside the summer season, at night generally, the further 
south they live (e.g., Invercargill) and if, as many do, they live in older, rental houses, with 
inadequate insulation and inefficient heating systems. One consequence is that electricity bills 
arising from heating their homes can represent a significant financial burden, heightening the 
challenge, physical and mental, of coping with poor housing and low incomes (Thompson, 
2016). Even so, many I-Kiribati seem to adapt to the climate, including in the clothes they 
wear, how they utilise sunshine and by just accepting the cold. 
Regarding emigration from Kiribati being compelled by climate change, there has been some 
linking between liberalisation of the immigration policies of New Zealand and other potential 
countries of immigration with the uncertain future for inhabiting the Kiribati Archipelago and 
other islands forming the Republic. This reason for emigrating is an area of growing concern 
to observers, researchers and other outsiders, perhaps more so than for many I-Kiribati just 
going about their normal lives. The subject includes smoothing the path of immigration to 
other places, where resettlement will likely entail issues that often accompany forced 
resettlement. These include matters around the resettlement process, financial hardship, lack 
of special support, problems with land rights, citizenship and identity—including being 
regarded by people “native” to the country of arrival as immigrants, and sometimes 
resented—loss of culture and language, destruction of homeland, and ceasing to be 
recognised internationally as other than residents in the country of arrival (Collins, 2009; 
Fedor, 2012; Roman, 2013; Smith & McNamara, 2015; Thompson, 2016; Reilly, 2011; 
Weber, 2016; Williams, 2008; Wyett, 2014).  
Many outsiders see a need for organised bilateral schemes of immigration and resettlement, 
such as New Zealand’s Pacific Access Category, but based on climate change effects (see 
Brickenstein & Tabucanon, 2014); these would be designed and effected in order that I-
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Nikunau and other I-Kiribati would settle and carve out an identity among other ethnocultural 
groups. Although personal, domestic and neighbourhood matters alluded to here and in other 
subsections may seem mundane and hardly “environmental” as such, they do reflect the sorts 
of things about which I-Kiribati arriving in a new country need help in understanding, and so 
their importance in designing schemes of resettlement should not be underestimated.  
An area of interest raised by Thompson (2016) concerns information acquisition by I-Kiribati 
to help their immigration to New Zealand. As intimated already, I-Kiribati arriving in 
metropolitan countries like New Zealand rely a great deal on utu and baronga who have 
preceded them in immigrating. This reliance extends to obtaining most of the information 
they process being from earlier immigrants, often preferring it to official information, despite 
some of that seeming to be available in te taetae ni Kiribati even (e.g., see New Zealand 
Immigration, n.d.). The official information, no matter how accurate it might be, is not 
always appreciated or likely to be trusted because it comes from a non-kin source—it does 
not help that the example just cited has people whose physical features suggest they are from 
other Pacific Island countries (e.g., Samoans, Tongans) but have speech bubbles written in te 
taetae ni Kiribati. Besides, the official information is mostly in written form and 
unidirectional, rather than oral and capable of being discussed in order to bring out its 
meaning and significance. The official information also seems not to appreciate the 
circumstances in which most I-Kiribati come to New Zealand; either that, or it is not 
acceptable politically to acknowledge said circumstances, as they are out of kilter with the 
image of new immigrants, being young, highly skilled and motivated, middle class, probably 
without children as yet (e.g. see images on New Zealand Immigration, 2017a). 
The preference for information from utu and baronga who immigrated earlier is 
notwithstanding that much of the information received is often so incomplete, inaccurate and 
insufficient as to be unreliable or tantamount to misinformation (Thompson, 2016). Various 
reasons account for these inadequacies: even after having been through the experiences of 
preparing, travelling, arriving and settling themselves, I-Nikunau in question may not 
appreciate the extent of the information they have acquired, may be unable to articulate said 
information and may remain ignorant of important information. Besides, they may be shy, or 
otherwise reluctant, to impart details of what happened to them, particularly any misfortunes 
that befell them or other negatives; I-Kiribati are probably not unique in taking care not to be 
seen as te bai n rang through being ignorant of “common sense” things and of making 
mistakes, and still feeling foolish about the consequences. A related issue is not to want to 
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infer that the potential recipient of the information they could impart does not have the 
information already or lacks common sense to fathom the situation for themselves. What is 
more, they may be reluctant to provide information that is tantamount to advice for fear of 
being blamed if the advice proves incorrect—avoiding blame and any risk of having to 
apologise are strong traits in te I-Kiribati psyche.  
4.5 Biological Circumstances 
I-Nikunau’s present biological circumstances, similar to those of other I-Kiribati, are the 
result of contact with I-Matang, Chinese, Tuvaluans, other Pacific peoples and people of 
other races. As inferred in S4.3 and other subsections, this contact has occurred for at least 
150 years on Nikunau, although it was mostly begun when copra gave rise to traders residing 
on Nikunau (Pusinelli, 1947).60 Indeed, many of the resident traders, whether I-Matang or 
Chinese, arrived as unaccompanied men and were permitted and encouraged to marry I-
Nikunau by unimane; an exception was Rakera Turner, whose story of marrying elsewhere 
and returning to live and trade on Nikunau (with husband Andrew) is related by Maude 
(1977). The intermarriage continued with other temporary residents, including pastors. 
Meanwhile, contact arose at the other places where I-Nikunau men and families with children 
of marriageable age resided temporarily while working. Recent examples are contacts 
between I-Nikunau and I-Matang on Tarawa, particularly between the 1960s and 1990s, that 
gave rise to diasporic communities in Britain and New Zealand (see S3.3.1 and S3.3.2). 
The descendants of the aforementioned intermarriages retained the given names or surnames 
of their fathers as their surname. This retention is reflected in contemporary surnames among 
I-Nikunau and around the Kiribati Archipelago in general (e.g., Anro (from Andrew), Kum 
Kee, Murdoch, O’Connor, Schutz). What is more, some children of the marriages were 
trained in the knowledge and skills of the outsiders, including in storekeeping, accounting 
and commerce, and, for example, took over the family’s trade store or obtained another 
elsewhere, as did their offspring (cf. Munro, 1987), with the result that some of these 
surnames remain prominent in commerce and government today. 
It might be supposed that, before 19th Century contact, I-Nikunau were some sort of 
thoroughbred, with little dilution of their genes, other than through contact with neighbouring 
islands. However, the inhabitants of the Kiribati Archipelago before the 1820s were 
undoubtedly descended from a diverse range of peoples, who thus provided a quite wide gene 
pool (Addison & Matisoo‐Smith, 2010; Maude, 1963). While their relative isolation since at 
least the 15th century meant that they went through a process of bio- and ethno-genesis, their 
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te katei ni Kiribati customary practices regarding marriage and limits of karikira ( incest), 
expressed as e ewe te kaaroro ( the fourth generation goes free) (Grimble, 1921, p. 27), 
protected against inbreeding and genetic drift (re these concepts, see Bittles, 2010). 
Moreover, protections against inbreeding and genetic drift have persisted since; this includes 
possessing the genealogical knowledge to preclude relationships developing between first, 
second or third cousins. Indeed, in urban and metropolitan diasporic communities in 
particular, these preclusions are perhaps even wider than third cousins because, in present 
generations, details of customary practices and reasons for them have often become blurred 
and decoupled, and so anyone “related” is precluded from marrying.  
A further change is that choosing marriage partners is nowadays far more up to the partners 
themselves than to unimane and parents, as was mostly the case on Nikunau and most of the 
other Kiribati islands as recently as the 1980s (see McCreary & Boardman, 1968).61 For the 
diasporic community on Tarawa, this means much more inter-I-Kiribati contact, marriage 
and children; and for diasporic communities elsewhere, it means some broadening with 
regard to race, ethnicity, etc. of contact, marriage, children and affinal membership of 
communities, but perhaps not as great as it would be if, for example, the diasporic 
communities in New Zealand were less separated and more integrated (see S3.3.2). 
4.6 Nutritional and Corporeal Circumstances 
The current nutritional circumstances of I-Nikunau in their different locations coincide 
significantly with what Lewis (1988) identifies as gustatory subversion and nutritional 
dependency on metropolitan countries. These circumstances have various health, illness and 
medical ramifications (see also Catala, 1957; Gilkes, 2006; McIver et al., 2014; Thomas, 
2002, 2003). These ramifications are also affected by the physical activities in which I-
Nikunau may engage, which vary according to age, gender and similar, and according to 
location and the traditional or modern lifestyles associated therewith. The ramifications also 
mean that nutritional and corporeal circumstances, including mental health, are interrelated. 
This can be expressed crudely in terms of consumption fuel intake in the form of victuals, 
fuel consumption through physical activities and fuel retention determining body weight. A 
potential source of mental health issues are the stresses of immigrating, say to New Zealand 
from Tarawa, or even to Tarawa from Nikunau (cf. Lewis, 1981), including struggling 
afterwards to reconcile conflicts between the traditional and the modern (cf. Thompson, 
2016; Wright & Hornblow, 2008). 
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Mention of traditional victuals produced on and around Nikunau was made in S4.2, referring 
to studies into these (Di Piazza, 1999; Grimble, 1933). These were added to, enhanced, 
substituted and displaced from when whalers came. Since, greater availability of, familiarity 
with and demand for imported, processed victuals (see lists in S3.1 and S3.2), and methods of 
preparing them (e.g., frying62), and improved constancy and greater abundance of supply of 
all victuals, have shaped I-Nikunau’s nutritional circumstances (Gilkes, 2006; Lewis, 1981, 
1988). Two experiences related in S4.1 to S4.5 are of longstanding and particular significance 
to these circumstances. First, the imported victuals sold in trade stores were conditioned by 
the profitability of copra and whether the trade items could be procured cheaply and had a 
long shelf life. Second, the imported victuals distributed to workers and their families as 
rations by employers, including the British Phosphate Commission, reduced how long I-
Nikunau spent fishing and cultivating crops, and so increased how long they were available to 
work in the mines, or on the farms, etc., thus increasing their productive worth and containing 
costs. The supply of rations were stipulated in agreements and regulations (e.g., Gilbert and 
Ellice Islands Protectorate (Consolidation) Regulation 1908). From I-Nikunau having had 
little, if any, exposure to these up to at least the 1870s and even 1900, some (e.g., rice, tinned 
corned beef) are now staples or regarded even as ceremonial delicacies.  
All parties to the supply, demand and consumption of these victuals have seemed oblivious to 
their nutritional value or toxicity. Even today, nutritional appreciation among I-Nikunau, 
particularly understanding of choice of victuals, levels of consumption and other dietary 
matters, seems slight and unimportant, despite the accumulating morbific consequences, such 
as obesity, diabetes, high blood pressure, or hypertension, and high cholesterol (see Lewis, 
1981). Moreover, by contrasting I-Nikunau on Tarawa with those on Nikunau and in New 
Zealand, it becomes clearer that many of their present nutritional circumstances are aligned 
with their demographical and geographical circumstances.  
Unlike I-Nikunau on Nikunau, those on Tarawa have little land on which to cultivate crops 
and fishing is usually unproductive because of over-fishing, not to mention loss of previously 
common skills and unfamiliarity with fishing grounds (Republic of Kiribati, 2009; Office of 
Te Beretitenti and T’Makei Services, 2012c; Thomas, 2002, 2003). What is more, unlike I-
Nikunau in New Zealand, they have few opportunities to acquire victuals of high quality and 
nutritional value (e.g., fresh vegetables and fruit, fresh milk, lean meat, fibrous cereals) (cf. 
Thompson, 2016), mostly because they are not physically available, or otherwise because 
they are out of their price reach. A further constraint is that many victuals are seen as things 
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bought by the more privileged, including I-Matang, and being labelled as trying to be like an 
I-Matang exposes I-Nikunau to te bai n rang, even kamama. 
Something that seems peculiar is that many stores on Tarawa do not generally sell fresh 
produce, nor very many locally produced items, the victuals being dried, tinned and bottled, 
and so preserved (in brine, vinegar, sugar, etc.) or, in recent times, frozen. This might be 
explained by the history of trade stores there and on Nikunau, etc. being one of only selling 
imported items, with local produce not customarily being the object of trade. Locally 
produced fresh vegetables and fruit that are for sale are hawked at the roadside or in small 
market areas (cf. McCreary & Boardman, 1968); this applies to locally caught fish and to 
bananas from Butaritari. The other exceptions include the aforementioned bread, donuts, ice 
blocks, locally rolled cigarettes, etc., but usually their sale is limited to mronron stores, 
having been produced by mronron members, and at prices that must hardly cover the costs of 
their ingredients, let alone the labour they entail. 
The possibility of internal trade involving the Outer Islands and Tarawa seems to have been 
forever frustrated by various inadequacies. These include the unreliability of shipping, copra 
producers on the Outer Islands being reluctant to switch from a longstanding, now subsidised, 
cash crop to new crops that it would be more difficult to turn into cash, and many mwenga on 
Tarawa simply lacking money to purchase local fish and garden produce regularly enough for 
it to be worthwhile for suppliers to maintain supplies. Demand may also be affected by 
perceptions of local produce being inferior to, or less fashionable than, imported goods (cf. 
Catala, 1957; Lewis, 1988).  
Despite inferences above about I-Nikunau in New Zealand having many opportunities to 
acquire victuals of high quality and nutritional value, this has not brought about great change 
to victual consumption and nutritional circumstances there very quickly; this is despite 
Thompson (2016) being told by some interviewees that availability of fresh victuals was a 
reason for immigrating. The reasons changes being slow seem related to most I-Nikunau in 
New Zealand having lived on Tarawa before and now live as all I-Nikunau or I-Kiribati 
households, rather than the mixed race households that were a feature of the early diaspora 
(see S3.3.2). Their knowledge and expectations about victuals are based much more on 
conditions on Tarawa. Not only are they more familiar with the appearances and methods of 
preparing victuals available on Tarawa in tinned, bottled, preserved, frozen or ready 
processed forms (e.g., corned beef, sausages, milk, chicken drumsticks and wings, fruit salad, 
tomato sauce) than with same in New Zealand but in their fresh forms, but they are also 
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unfamiliar with many other items common in New Zealand but rarely, if ever, seen on 
Tarawa (e.g., fresh milk, cheese, parsnips, swedes, asparagus, most greens and salads, meat, 
poultry and game, berry and stone fruits, offal). This unfamiliarity, etc. may be less so among 
children because of the school curriculum; they be more amenable to healthier victuals (e.g., 
tap water, fresh fruit and vegetables) and more appreciative of the virtues of lower 
consumption. However, it is the adults who acquire the victuals and determine what is served 
for meals. Besides, the victuals that feature in marketing campaigns aimed at younger persons 
and are part of New Zealand’s pop culture are the less healthier ones (e.g., sugary drinks, fast 
food). 
These claims are exemplified at the frequent botaki held in New Zealand’s diasporic 
communities. The most popular victuals at these still partially reflect the narrow range of 
items referred to above and in S3.2, save that there is likely to be a roast pig, barbecue, 
ground and other meats, coleslaw, pumpkin, kumara, potatoes and eggs, and fish may be 
absent in the unlikely event of members of the community not having caught any, or had 
some brought from Tarawa, and kept it frozen—many I-Kiribati regard the fresh fish that is 
widely available from retailers in New Zealand as too expensive. The victuals will mostly be 
high in salt, sugar or fat, either naturally (e.g., because of using cheap cuts of meat) or 
because of how they are prepared (e.g., because of excess use of sugar-based marinades and 
dressings, salt and saturated fats). These victuals are widely associated with detrimental 
health effects, as are the narrower range of the cheaper victuals among these consumed at 
home or otherwise away from botaki (cf. Bathgate, Alexander, Mitikulena, Borman, Roberts 
& Grigg, 1994; Lewis, 1981; Statistics New Zealand and Ministry of Pacific Island Affairs, 
2011; Thompson, 2016). 
A few other factors affect purchase and consumption in New Zealand. First, there can be a 
perception that if a victual was expensive and privileged on Tarawa, then the same continues 
to apply in New Zealand, including that their purchase may be regarded as behaving like I-
Matang, and so risking ridicule. This is notwithstanding how price patterns of fresh produce 
on Tarawa and in New Zealand are often reversed; for example, many fresh cool-climate fruit 
and vegetables are far more readily available and cheaper in New Zealand, whereas, as noted 
above, fresh fish and other seafood are mostly more expensive, certainly in the case of tuna. 
While being more expensive has the expected effect of deterring demand, the cheapness may 
not encourage as much change in consumption as it might, particularly among households in 
the lower deciles of the income scale, who may be satisfied with rice, flour, sugar and similar, 
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which are cheap anyway and can at least fill a family’s stomachs, even if not very nutritiously 
(cf. Lewis, 1981).  
Second, whereas, apart from breadfruit and pandanus, seasonality does not seem to apply to 
crops grown in Kiribati, seasonality affects almost all crops in New Zealand. Even so, most 
crops are available in New Zealand all year round, either through cold storing or freezing 
them or through growing them in artificial conditions or through importing them from the 
northern hemisphere. However, among I-Kiribati, just how seasonal fresh victuals are in New 
Zealand is not always fully appreciated without information exchange and storytelling; nor is 
how their prices vary accordingly, and so when the most advantageous times to buy are. For 
example, in winter, because they are imported or grown under glass, tomatoes and other salad 
items can be three or four times their summer prices, whereas the prices of root vegetables 
stay at reasonable levels from harvest time through winter because their storage is relatively 
easy.  
Third, purchasing fresh victuals in loose form, although usually cheaper, can be problematic 
compared with purchasing them in pre-priced packages. This occurs because of a mix of 
language and ability-to-pay issues. For example, purchasing loose produce at, say, a 
delicatessen counter in a supermarket or more traditional shop requires the shopper to state 
the product and quantity wanted. Purchasing loose produce in a supermarket or self-serve 
vegetable market requires bagging the items in the produce area and taking them to the 
checkout for payment. It is not until the shopper is going through the checkout that the price 
per unit of measure (e.g., per kg.) of the produce is converted into the price the shopper will 
be asked to pay, at which point having insufficient funds to make the payment might lead to 
kamama, which is best avoided, and can be by sticking with pre-priced packages. Similar 
awkwardness over possible lack of funds, from language shyness and through social 
hesitancy can also deter use of other trading venues, business outlets and amenities in New 
Zealand. These include visiting shops not set up in the way supermarkets are and which 
require interaction over a counter or similar. They include restaurants, other eateries and bars, 
in which victuals anyway are often regarded as far too expensive, and tourist attractions 
reasons for whose attractiveness is not always clear culturally.  
Incidentally, it is commonplace in New Zealand to pay for even minor purchases using debit 
cards, something which are not used much on Tarawa, if at all. These too can be declined 
when making purchases for want of funds, and so a source of embarrassment, or they may be 
accepted but take the bank account beyond any authorised limits, so incurring penalty charges 
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for the user, which if their income is low can be significant. Credit cards are also widely used 
in New Zealand but few I-Kiribati seem to have them, reflecting their absence on Tarawa. 
Another group of amenities commonly found in New Zealand whose use may be limited by 
awkwardness and cultural misunderstandings are playing fields, swimming pools, 
gymnasiums, tennis, netball and basketball courts, bowling greens, golf courses, ski fields 
and other sports facilities, parks, urban walkways and bicycle tracks, bush and beach walking 
tracks, rock climbing and hunting areas, and other leisure facilities. Yet all these have 
potential when it comes to I-Nikunau’s corporeal circumstances, or the extent to which 
physical activities are a required or discretionary part of the life I-Nikunau lead. On Nikunau, 
the still largely traditional life involves much daily physical activity (Ministry of Internal and 
Social Affairs, 2007), and so does not entail I-Nikunau having to make a special effort to 
engage in discretionary activities out of health and welfare considerations. For example, 
water is drawn and carried from wells; toddy is cut from the fronds of coconut trees, which 
have to be climbed; copra and various subsistence crops, and firewood, involve manual 
cultivation or collection; fish and shellfish are caught or collected manually; walking and 
cycling are main means of travelling; and sports, pastimes and dancing involve physical 
exercise (see S3.1).  
Elsewhere, usually more can be achieved with less effort, and so life can be more sedentary 
than on Nikunau. On Tarawa, many of the paid jobs I-Nikunau do there are more mental than 
physical—similar applies among children attending school—and they use the money they 
earn to purchase goods, services, transport and utilities, rather than expend much physical 
effort to produce them. In any case, subsisting is constrained by the scarcity and over-
exploitation of resources (see S3.2), and so the physical exercise that goes with such activities 
barely arises. Thus, to engage in physical exercise equivalent to that which is a normal part of 
life on Nikunau is discretionary on Tarawa, and while young persons make much use of areas 
set aside for volleyball, basketball and football, or otherwise improvise, including swimming 
in the lagoon, many older I-Nikunau choose not to indulge or to indulge at insufficient levels. 
Insufficient that is to offset their consumption of victuals, etc., which is probably higher than 
on Nikunau because much more is readily available. Thus, many more on Tarawa than on 
Nikunau are overweight, leading to health issues (e.g., obesity, diabetes, cardiovascular 
diseases). 
In metropolitan countries, the health issues just alluded to on Tarawa also arise more often 
than on Nikunau; this is notwithstanding that probably more I-Nikunau, say, in New Zealand 
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than on Tarawa are in physical jobs (e.g., labouring, cleaning, farm work) and their working 
hours, and so physical activities, are longer (see S4.3). It is also notwithstanding the many 
easily accessible sports and leisure amenities in New Zealand, as listed above (i.e., swimming 
pools, walking tracks, etc.), many of which are free or available at subsidised rates through 
local councils, with special rates for families with low incomes. However, with victuals being 
cheaper and more readily available than on Tarawa, even to those in lower paid jobs, 
consumption of them is probably higher. The overall effect of these circumstances is a 
tendency for many immigrants to gain weight, which in turn leads to health issues similar to 
those listed above for Tarawa along with gout, hepatitis and mental stress (cf. Thompson, 
2016; Wright & Hornblow, 2008).  
With personal health services being far better resourced and of much greater extent than on 
Tarawa, more of these issues are diagnosed and treated, which can in turn lead to ambiguous 
attitudes by the diagnosed, including continuing to indulge knowing that treatment is 
available, rather than reducing indulgence, changing behaviours or taking other preventative 
actions. The various reasons for lack of such actions include expectations in communities to 
be involved in frequent community or other group events, most of which involve sharing 
victuals. They also include indulging in physical exercise out of health and welfare 
considerations not being something that is part of te I-Nikunau’s culture, which being 
founded on traditional life, still operates on the basis of physical activities and efforts being 
indistinguishable from living that life.  
In any case, for adults brought up on Tarawa, many of sports and leisure amenities in New 
Zealand are unfamiliar, and the point of some of them is quite puzzling, be it walking up 
mountains and along beaches or lane swimming. However, children in metropolitan countries 
can get greater exposure to these amenities, especially so with New Zealand’s broad range of 
sports and a tradition of them being played at school from a young age. That, combined with 
community activities involving dancing, means young I-Kiribati in New Zealand have more 
opportunities than adults for physical exercise (e.g., swimming, rugby, volleyball, dancing, 
netball, basketball). Besides, they may be more amenable to healthier victuals and to 
consuming less of them. However, these things are discretionary and children mostly have to 
exercise this discretion themselves because the adults lack experience of these things, not 
having been raised in New Zealand, let alone had experience of its schools, etc. The 
outcomes vary but with a tendency among these children as adults towards overweight and 
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show signs of the early onset of health issues connected with nutrition and exercise 
(Thomson, 2016). 
4.7 Political Circumstances 
The political systems under which I-Nikunau live today comprise elaborate and hegemonic 
nation states, usually characterised as democratic and of whose voting population they are a 
small or tiny minority. These differ greatly—in geographical extent, size of population 
governed, scope of responsibilities, type of system, incidence of colonialism, et cetera—from 
the traditional I-Nikunau system that existed up to the mid-19th Century, before any 
semblance of colonialism or diaspora arose, and that Uakeia of Nikunau is alleged to have 
spread to the other Kiribati islands in the 17th Century (Kambati, 1992). Nonetheless, some 
vestiges of that traditional system are evident in the political systems still existing on 
Nikunau, and within the diasporic communities inside Kiribati and in the other nations 
enumerated at the start of S3. However, they are not provided for in the Constitution of 
Kiribati 1979, and so are not part of the Republic Government structure in a formal sense, 
and aid organisations and other outsiders regard them at best as informal.  
Politically, the other nations just referred to are either constitutional monarchies with 
parliamentary democracies or are republics. Whichever, they all include characteristics (e.g., 
separation of powers, equality under the law, universal franchise, no taxation without 
representation) associated with the “Westminster System”, which as its name infers is 
connected to the systems of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and before that, 
the Kingdom of England. Indeed, the head of state of all the constitutional monarchies in 
question is the same person, although she has titles distinctive to the realm (e.g., Queen of 
New Zealand). However, each has a different person as head of its political government, 
usually with the title, prime minister. 
The system in Kiribati itself, as illustrated in Figure 10, is a democratic republic. Compared 
with Britain and New Zealand, as well as Australia and the Solomon Islands among countries 
with diasporic communities and being constitutional monarchies, its main difference is that 
the offices of head of state and head of political government are both held by the directly 
elected te beretitenti. Furthermore, he or she—there has yet to be a female beretitenti—has to 
be a member of the legislature, Te Mwaneaba ni Maungatabu, as have the ministers whom 
s/he appoints to form Te Kabinet—among other relevant countries, similar applies in Fiji, but 





Figure 10. Present Structure of Government in the Republic of Kiribati 
I have included aid organisations in Figure 10, but as a separate element, in order to indicate 
their de facto status vis-à-vis the system. They are shown on a par with Te Kabinet and 
ministries, reflecting how they wield significant influence on the performance of the 
executive function of government. The actions of aid organisation representatives and the 
extent of their informal authority in many matters have at times seemed akin to filling the 
shoes of the senior Colony Government officials. The latter departed in the 1970s and 1980s, 
as their roles were seemingly localised, and as the Republic Government’s need for deficit 
funding from the former colonial power ended (see S4.3) and those whose continuing 
presence was a condition of this funding became surplus to requirements.63 I-Kiribati who 
replaced them formally had arguably been afforded insufficient practical training and 
experience (Macdonald, 1982a); besides, the systems they inherited were designed for 
empire, not self-government along I-Kiribati lines (Dixon & Gaffikin, 2014). Especially early 
on, this made them extremely susceptible to the influence of the experienced and well-
resourced aid organisation representatives with whom they dealt. Indeed, the activities and 
methods of the aid organisations are consistent with informal imperialism or neo-imperialism, 
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in which a strong external influence is exercised over an emergent local (i.e., I-Kiribati) élite 
of politicians, officials and other prominent persons (Horvath, 1972). 
The lower portion of Figure 10 shows the elements of the Republic Government’s structure 
as they apply on Nikunau Atoll—the diasporic communities on Tarawa and in the Line 
Islands come under equivalent island councils and courts there. Besides, I have included the 
six mwaneaba councils on Nikunau (see S3.1) but, as with aid organisations, as a separate 
element because their status vis-à-vis the system is de facto, not de jure. These traditional 
councils oversee affairs, organise activities, maintain traditions and regulate conduct in their 
respective kawa (cf. Autio, 2010; Kazama, 2001; Thomas, 2001). Although not shown on 
Figure 10, one finds I-Nikunau on Tarawa using equivalent committees to effect similar 
purposes in their social and community groups, whether oriented around utu, religious 
denominations, historical associations with kawa on Nikunau, or being I-Nikunau (see S3.2); 
these are less traditional in who participates, including women and not-so-old men. In 
diasporic communities outside Kiribati, similar prevails in governing bodies of associations, 
such as were mentioned in S3.3, including Kiribati Tungaru Association and Kiribati 
Waipounamu Community. The peoples making up these communities from the other Kiribati 
Islands have some familiarity with Nikunau’s traditional system through the 17th Century 
exploits mentioned earlier of Uakeia of Nikunau. 
According to Maude (1963), the traditional system developed on Nikunau and nearby Beru 
between about the 14th and 19th Centuries. The system was gerontocratic and based on 
mwaneaba districts, of which there were six back then too (see S3.1, S4.2 and S4.3). For 
example, the mwaneaba district around what is now Tabomatang had as its focal point Te Atu 
ni Uea Mwaneaba, and comprised the territory of the various kainga closest to it and the 
population residing in mwenga on these kainga (see S4.2). Te I-Nikunau could easily walk 
around the boundary of his or her district in a single day. Besides being closely or distantly 
related to some of them, te I-Nikunau knew personally all members of the council for his or 
her district, and they knew him or her. Said councils and their processes were constituted 
orally, a legacy of bakatibu ( ancestors), as encapsulated in te katei ni Nikunau.  
The literature dealing with the mwaneaba customs, protocols and related matters on Nikunau 
and elsewhere in the Kiribati Archipelago and Banaba is extensive and features aspects of 
these councils and this political system (e.g., Alaima et al., 1979; Geddes, 1977; 
Goodenough, 1955; Grimble, 1921, 1933, 1989; Hockings, 1984; Kambati, 1992; Kazama, 
2001; King & Sigrah, 2004; Lambert, 1966; Latouche, 1983; Lawrence, 1983; Lewis, 1988; 
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Lundsgaarde, 1968a; Lundsgaarde & Silverman, 1972; Macdonald, 1971, 1972, 1982a; 
Maude & Maude, 1994; Maude, 1963, 1991; Sabatier, 1939/1977; Teweiariki, n.d.; Thomas, 
2001). This literature attests to temporal and geographical variations around a set of ideas that 
have endured, as discussed by Autio (2010). The councils were subject to no external 
authority in a hierarchical sense. Internally, there was some elements of hierarchy, relating to 
gender and to the relative status and roles of boti. However, unlike what had come to exist in 
islands further north in the Kiribati Archipelago by the 19th Century, there were no uea ( 
monarchical chiefs) (Macdonald, 1982a). The councils performed their functions 
wholistically, although they might be analysed as political, judicial, legislative, executive, 
religious, social, economic, etc., and, in turn, the mwaneaba districts can be seen as political 
territories, legal jurisdictions and religious parishes. The essence of these ideas was that 
cooperation among neighbouring kainga sustained the bonds that were integral to living on 
Nikunau.  
The institution of boti (see S4.2) was politically ascendant in the traditional mwaneaba 
system on Nikunau and many other Kiribati islands (Maude, 1963). The council comprised 
atun te kainga (literally, the heads of kainga), the senior unimane in each te kainga. Each te 
kainga comprised members of the same boti, and each councillor was also atun te boti, or the 
head of his boti in the district. Besides being custodians of te katei and superintending 
conduct in their district, the councils also oversaw customary rights and laws that applied to 
gathering, propagating, cultivating, fishing and other use of aba and marine areas in their 
respective districts. Each council was also responsible for dealings with councils from other 
parts of the atoll, a task made easier because of the replication from district to district of boti. 
Even so, not everything could be resolved peaceably and disputes over aba were not only 
frequently at the centre of island politics, they occasionally led to hostilities between 
mwaneaba districts (Lundsgaarde, 1968a).  
The councils met in open session and might have seemed to have trappings of community 
participation and accountability, verging on democratic, although oligarchic is another 
possible description (see Lundsgaarde, 1968b). It was during these sessions, which according 
to Hockings (1984) were only occasional, that members of each te boti sat behind te atun te 
boti in the area of the mwaneaba associated with their boti (see S4.2); otherwise, when te 
mwaneaba was used for other, less formal, purposes, the sitting arrangements might be less 
structured. During these formal mwaneaba sessions, only atun te boti were permitted to 
speak; other unimane were expected to attend but not speak, and likewise all residents of each 
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te kainga in the district. However, the views expressed by te atun te boti during formal 
sessions, and positions taken on decisions about policies and issues, were subject to 
counselling before these sessions by unimane from each te mwenga in the te kainga that te 
atun te boti represented (Hockings, 1984).  
Notwithstanding the increasing presence of whalers, beachcombers, castaways and traders 
between the 1820s and 1870s, the traditional system continued, with each district and its 
mwaneaba council being relatively autonomous (Maude, 1960). Indeed, traders traded in one 
district, or two at most, rather than the entire atoll, reflecting the autonomy and discreteness 
of the districts. Although it is inconceivable that the economic, or even social and cultural, 
influences of these outsiders did not spill over into the political, any political influence 
appears to have been insubstantial, particularly as patterns of settlement (i.e., in mwenga on 
kainga) were not seriously affected (see Hockings, 1984; Maude, 1964). Nevertheless, seeds 
of political change might have been sown, as was undoubtedly the case among those I-
Nikunau who had lived away temporarily and returned with a different view of the world, 
prompting them to reflect on the political structures and processes on Nikunau, as well as 
matters social, religious and cultural (Borovnik, 2005; Macdonald, 1982a; Rennie, 1987).  
Subsequently, several major longitudinal interventions have occurred to transform the 
traditional system to the present one, affecting not only structure but also whence te I-
Nikunau was formally governed—that is, from within his or her mwaneaba district, then at 
the level of Nikunau Atoll, and then from elsewhere, including for nearly a century, from 
outside the Kiribati Islands. Moreover, each intervention influenced how Nikunau became 
part of a formal state covering the Kiribati Archipelago and the other islands in the Republic, 
how I-Nikunau have come to live on Tarawa and elsewhere, and how vestiges of the 
traditional system remain, albeit outside the formal system. The interventions have also led to 
the present system being more democratic and less gerontocratic.  
The first intervention came from the pastors of Samoan origin mentioned in S4.2. After an 
inauspicious start in gaining converts (see Turner cited by Nokise, 1983, p. 168), they began 
making more of their cultural understandings in furtherance of their theological aims, and so, 
by the 1880s, had gained sufficient influence in each mwaneaba district to be involved in 
their traditional political processes, structures and functions; this included gradually 
converting unimane (Garrett, 1992; Macdonald, 1982a; Maude, 1963; Nokise, 1983). 
Subverting these political processes, etc. to further their aim of conversion proceeded such 
that they established the aforementioned te kabowi n abamakoro (see S4.1),64 which Davis 
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(1892) observed as having authority across the whole of Nikunau and comprising 70–80 
unimane drawn from the six mwaneaba districts. Concomitantly, the mwaneaba councils in 
the districts became increasingly subservient to this single council and, as kawa replaced 
kainga as the form of settlements (see S4.2), the distinction between atun te boti and other 
unimane began to blur.  
Just as there was little separation between politics and traditional religion in te mwaneaba 
previously, so the nature of governance exercised by te kabowi n abamakoro was as much 
theocratic as gerontocratic, but instead reflecting the LMS’s Christian values and beliefs—
this governance extended to everyone on Nikunau, including traditional believers and RCs, 
with Sabatier (1939/1977), an RC priest, characterising it as “constant tyranny from the 
Protestants” (p. 181). These values and beliefs were reflected in the laws te kabowi n 
abamakoro passed, including those running to observance of Te Tabati. What is more, 
accountability in these laws was increasingly portrayed as giving a personal reckoning, 
eventually, to the spiritual being named in Bingham (1907) as Iehova (≡Jehovah), and, more 
immediately, to His earthly representatives, the pastors.  
This earthly accountability was manifested in revenues from copious fines (in copra) imposed 
for even the most trivial infringements of the aforementioned laws and for other minor 
misdemeanours (e.g., failing to respond quickly enough to a summons to te mwaneaba). Said 
laws were enforced by a profuse force of kaubure ( wardens and police constables, council 
officials), as also observed by Davis (1892) (Macdonald, 1982a). The fines were added to 
with other contributions akin to quasi-taxes the pastors levied, which were paid 
enthusiastically in copra. Amounting to a tidy sum, the pastors were able to finance 
impressive church buildings, along with equally impressive dwellings—in describing similar 
built by the RC Church only a little later, Sabatier (1939/1977) relates how the building 
materials (e.g., cement, wood, asbestos, zinc-covered sheeting) were imported from Sydney 
at great cost—religious activities and personal comforts for themselves and even their I-
Nikunau deacons and catechists. Although the dwellings and comforts exposed the pastors to 
criticisms of self-aggrandisement (Grimble, 1952, 1957; Lundsgaarde, 1978; Lundsgaarde & 
Silverman, 1972; Maude, 1989; Munro, 1996), another interpretation is that their 
circumstances were “a living example of the accomplishments that could follow from 
Christianity and civilisation” (Macdonald, 1982a, p. 49). Besides, significant amounts left the 
atoll for the upkeep of LMS headquarters, whether in Malua or, from 1900, in Beru, and run 
by I-Matang missionaries. These matters are revisited in S4.8.  
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The second intervention came from officials of the British Empire, one of the so-called Great 
Powers with colonial interests in the central and south Pacific region in the late 19th 
Century—the others were France, Germany and, mostly further north, the United States of 
America. In 1892, on the insistence of the German Government,65 Davis annexed Nikunau 
and the other Kiribati islands in the name of the British Government by virtue of treaties with 
unimane or, in a few cases (e.g., Butaritari), uea (see Bennion, 2004; Davis, 1892; Morrell, 
1960; Ward, 1946).66 The new Colony Government enacted Native Laws 1894 and imposed a 
successive series of poll and land taxes, as evidenced by Land (Copra) Tax Register 1910–
1916.67 These laws had the effect of te kabowi n abamakoro serving de jure as the Nikunau 
Native Government from 1895, and the taxes had the effect of according secular legitimacy 
to the aforementioned revenue raising activities of the LMS (cf. Munro, 1996). Part of the 
yield from the taxes was forwarded to the Colony Treasury to help pay for administering the 
Colony. As long as that happened in a timely fashion, the Colony Government took no more 
than a cursory, distant interest in the LMS’s form of rule of Nikunau and neighbouring 
islands (Grimble cited by Macdonald, 1982a, and by Maude, 1989), despite these islands 
coming within its formal jurisdiction.  
The Colony Government’s neglect of Nikunau between 1892 and 1917 arose largely because 
its priorities lay elsewhere, initially with the northern islands, where copra, and so tax-copra, 
was more plentiful and where trading disputes were rife, and then with Banaba, after it was 
added to the Colony in 1901 and phosphate mining was begun.68 Other than a few visits or 
similar short presences (e.g., see Wilde, 1998, as mentioned by Sabatier, 1939/1977), mainly 
to pacify sectarian disputes between the LMS majority and RC minority (see Macdonald, 
1982a), Nikunau was largely neglected up to the late 1900s; one reason was an insufficiency 
of financial or personnel resources to take a closer interest in the southern Kiribati Islands 
generally, let alone Nikunau.69 The frequency of visits increased in the 1910s but only 
because of the Colony Government’s involvement in recruiting, transporting and eventually 
repatriating labourers needed by the phosphateers on Banaba (Grimble, 1952, 1957; 
Lundsgaarde, 1978; Maude, 1989; Munro, 1996; Sabatier, 1939/1977; Williams & 
Macdonald, 1985).  
The third intervention began in 1917 and arose from what had come to be perceived by three 
parties as problems following the second intervention; the three parties were the Colony 
Government on Banaba, the LMS leadership in Samoa, and the bishop of the RC Church, 
based then on Bikenibeu on Tarawa, and its mission posts and converts on the southern 
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islands. About 1900, the LMS had established a headquarters for the southern Kiribati Islands 
at Rongorongo on Beru and appointed William Goward as the chief missionary. Goward 
gained a reputation for encouraging zeal and excesses among I-Kiribati and Tuvaluan pastors 
he appointed and their congregations—Sabatier (1939/1977) likened Goward’s style to that 
of an autocratic prince bishop. It was the combined actions to curtail these excesses by the 
outside parties enumerated above that led to the third intervention (Garrett, 1992; Macdonald, 
1982a; Nokise, 1983; Sabatier, 1939/1977). The start of the intervention was marked by the 
Colony Government establishing a Southern Gilberts District and sending Grimble (1952, 
1957) to Beru as resident district officer. His arrival in 1917 coincided with Goward being 
retired by the LMS, although it was 1919 before he reluctantly left the Colony.  
Grimble turned out to be the first of several successive resident district officers on Beru up to 
1941; others included Maude (1977) and Bevington (1990). Their presence meant a Colony 
Government official was much closer than previously to Nikunau—a canoe ride, in fact—and 
so could visit more easily, if still only intermittently—besides Beru and Nikunau, there were 
five other atolls in the district. Even so, the concept of indirect colonial rule applied (cf. Bush 
& Maltby, 2004; Davie, 2005; Lange, 2009; Morgan, 1980; Newbury, 2004; Ward, 1946), as 
is evident from the structure of government shown in Figure 11, which stretched from the six 
kawa on Nikunau up to the imperial palace in London. 
Rule in this structure emanated, at least formally, from the monarch in London, but, in any 
case, the highest tiers of government were outside the territory of the colony, and occupied by 
persons from the colonising power and I-Matang by race. Inside the territory, there was a 
colony-level tier and then a district-level tier, both occupied by persons from the colonising 
power or, later, one of its dominions, and I-Matang by race. The quality of being indirect 
arose from the next tier(s); the bodies70 and persons in this tier(s) interceded in the system of 
rule between the positions occupied by I-Matang and the native subject population on 
Nikunau and on the other islands. These were native political bodies and quasi-political 
official positions occupied by natives, some I-Nikunau, through election or by appointment, 
and some other I-Kiribati or Tuvaluan, by appointment—from an I-Matang point of view, 
there was no difference between I-Nikunau these other I-Kiribati or Tuvaluans sent to govern 
or administer them, but not so from an I-Nikunau point of view, not in those days when a 
national I-Kiribati identity was hardly germinating (see Lundsgaarde, 1968a; Macdonald, 
1982a, 1996a, 1998). In a similar manner to including them in Figure 10, I have included the 
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six mwaneaba councils on Nikunau as a separate element because their status vis-à-vis the 
system was de facto, not de jure.  
Figure 11. Structure of Government in the Colony under Great Britain from the 1920s until 
as late as the 1960s (I-Kiribati and Tuvaluans held posts in italics, I-Matang in regular font) 
The political structure portrayed in Figure 11 was such a geographical stretch that, according 
to Grimble (1952), as far as I-Nikunau, I-Beru, I-Tabiteuea, etc. were concerned, the district 
officer was te kamitina (≡ commissioner) and perceived not only as King George V or 
similar’s direct representative but also as his kinsman. Indeed, the resident commissioner 
being some week’s communication away on Banaba meant the district officer exercised a 
great deal of authority autonomously, and so, as far as I-Nikunau were concerned, much still 
hung still on directions from Beru, but now from the district officer rather than the chief 
missionary. It was the district officer’s responsibility to oversee the native bodies and 
officials on Nikunau, etc. On visits to Nikunau and otherwise, he would appoint members of 
the native courts and the native government council, or, if applicable, organise elections to 
the council; this was albeit that some of these were not de jure until they had been formally 
ratified by the resident commissioner. He would oversee, intervene in and even direct these 
bodies, review their decisions, and evaluate their procedures. He would appoint their senior 
officials (e.g., the island magistrate (referred to as te tia-motiki-tueka) and te tia-koroboki ( 
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scribe, clerk and treasurer), again subject to the resident commissioner’s formal ratification, 
and oversee these officials’ activities, including auditing their accounts and records and 
replenish their cash imprests. He would provide basic training and development. He would 
bring local procedures in line with the relevant Colony Government ordinances, regulations, 
etc. (e.g., Laws of the Gilbert and Ellice Islands Colony 1952; Gilbert Islands, Island 
Regulations 1939; Regulations for the Good, 1933; Revised Native Laws 1916) (Grimble & 
Clarke, 1929; Macdonald, 1971, 1972, 1982a).  
The provisions of said Colony Government ordinances, regulations, etc. covered murder, 
abortion, rape, assault, theft, prostitution, customary extra-marital sex, sorcery, drunkenness, 
gambling, marriage, and registration of births, marriages and deaths. They resembled laws 
applied by the LMS in many ways, except their coverage was more temporal than religious—
observance of the Te Tabati was not provided for, for example. Presumably, in an attempt to 
communicate with unimane and I-Nikunau generally, the earlier ones at least were printed in 
te taetae ni Kiribati, as well as English. However, by the time Laws of the Gilbert and Ellice 
Islands Colony 1952 was published, this practice of using both languages seems to have 
ceased and only English was used—the latter practice continues even under the Republic 
Government (e.g., see Election of Beretitenti Act 1980; Kiribati Primary Materials, 2017), 
although the Local Government Act 1984 had been translated into te taetae ni Kiribati by 
2006 (Ministry of Internal and Social Affairs, 2007). 
Translation into te taetae ni Kiribati notwithstanding, the ordinances, etc. reflected I-Matang, 
rather than I-Nikunau, values, etc. Thus, they recognised individuals, close family and 
households (i.e., mwenga), and natives forming the geographical cum administrative entities 
of village (i.e., te kawa) and island; there was also some recognition of utu, but only as the 
concept was consistent with recognition of dependence and inheritance among utu ni kaan 
(Hockings, 1984); conversely, they excluded recognition of the socio-political entities of boti 
and kainga, and of mwaneaba districts—this pattern was repeated in Colony Government 
rolls of residents, land registers and censuses. However, this did not mean that district 
officers and some other Colony Government officials were mostly not cognisant of these 
excluded concepts; on the contrary, they frequently encountered them in their work, as, for 
example, Maude (1963) acknowledges in the case of boti, which he found valuable still from 
1929 to 1938, when he was Native Lands Commissioner. 
The district officer’s de facto autonomy was subject to him making an annual return to report 
on the activities of native governments and courts on each island and about circumstances, 
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events, etc. in his district, including Nikunau (Grimble & Clarke, 1929). The Nikunau Native 
Government had to submit information to the district officer for these returns. In turn, the 
resident commissioner used these returns and other reports to produce biennial reports to the 
high commissioner and secretary of state (e.g. GEIC, 1932, 1957) and otherwise keep his 
superiors informed of events, although again communications often took weeks, including to 
receive acknowledgments, replies and instructions.  
All the formal information flows seem to have been about I-Nikunau and other I-Kiribati but 
were for I-Matang. They amounted to a primarily temporal political and administrative 
accountability (cf.) to men outside mwenga and utu, and outside of what remained of kainga 
and boti, which as related in S4.2 had been the institutional pillars of the I-Nikunau social 
system and traditional system of government. Said accountability was mostly upwards, 
reflecting the relationships between government and people being hierarchical (cf. Hassall et 
al., 2011; Sinclair, 1995), and alien in form, content and purpose. Even so, the perception of 
I-Nikunau that the district officer was a kinsman of the king in London seems, for a while at 
least, to have refreshed I-Nikunau’s attitude to Colony Government taxes, some even 
regarding the copra as tribute received in London by the king (see Grimble, 1957, p. 157)—
the attitude to paying these taxes had taken a knock when, as related above, the Nikunau 
Island Fund balance was sequestered.  
During the six decades of this third intervention, the Colony Government established, 
maintained and bettered some public infrastructure and amenities at the so-called government 
station (now the Island Council’s premises) near Rungata (see S3.1) and elsewhere along the 
atoll; for example, the two clinics and two primary schools that serve Muribenua and 
Tabutoa, and Nikumanu and Tabomatang, and the associated dwellings for teachers, and 
medical orderlies and dressers (now replaced by nurses)—the third clinic and primary school 
are part of the area at Rungata—and the airport. However, these developments owed a lot to 
I-Nikunau resources and efforts, including, between 1900 and the 1960s, the aforementioned 
communal workdays. After 1950, this Colony Government activity was in the form of a few 
project grants or similar funding and aid-in-kind. Concomitantly, I-Nikunau exerted influence 
in these projects on their atoll through their unimane in the mwaneaba at kawa level and 
through their churches and boboti and mronron, notably Te Bobotin Nikunau (Grimble & 




Arguably the above went on while relations between colonisers and colonised were 
characterised by the “working misunderstanding” that was rife among the main protagonists 
in colonial situations (see Bohannan, 1965; Lundsgaarde, 1968a). Sources of this 
misunderstanding were not least the use of two languages—English and te taetae ni 
Kiribati—and how the various I-Matang officiating in the district office on Beru from1917 to 
1941 and from 1970 to 1983—between 1948 and 1970, the so-called district office was on 
Tarawa—or otherwise visiting Nikunau had to reconcile dealing with I-Nikunau, etc. 
officiating in the council and courts on Nikunau, and at kawa level, and meeting expectations 
of their superiors in the colonial chain of command, expectations that usually reflected their 
unfamiliarity with life in the Colony and ignorance of Nikunau and life of I-Nikunau. It 
appears that, whereas I-Nikunau saw an autonomous, largely self-reliant island, with 
opportunities to venture away to work or study, I-Matang saw a very minor unit within a 
colony at the farthest flung corner of their Empire (Grimble, 1952; Macdonald, 1982a). 
The vestiges of the traditional system not only persisted during this third intervention, and so 
explaining its survival today, politically and socially, but also it was perhaps even more 
important to I-Nikunau then than subsequently. Between the 1920s and the 1960s, te bowi of 
unimane in each te kawa were the most prominent kind of what might be categorised as 
“quasi-traditional organisations”—that is organisations that, albeit much changed, having 
incorporated many so-called post-contact adaptations (e.g., see Lundsgaarde, 1966, 1978), 
resemble traditional organisations, such as mwaneaba, kainga and mwenga, and in which utu 
and baronga relationships are a significant feature. These unimane headed either mwenga or 
small groups of mwenga of the same utu ni kaan (see S4.2 and elsewhere). In each te kawa 
and across the atoll, they acted as a counter to colonialism, and so mostly operated separately 
from the official British system, often as a thorn in its side. Using whatever traditional 
authority remained to these bowi, some of it deriving from association with the LMS, 
unimane countered aspects of indirect rule that ran contrary what they saw as I-Nikunau’s 
interests. In particular, I-Nikunau increasingly and enduringly regarded the Nikunau Native 
Government, and its successor, the Island Council, not as a grassroots body but as an 
extension of Te Tautaeka, or the Colony Government, of which they were wary (Macdonald, 
1971, 1972, 1982a), and are still, despite its reincarnation as the Republic Government 
(Hassall et al., 2011; Ortega, 2008).  
As well as the distance between Nikunau and the headquarters’ island of the Colony and, 
now, Republic Governments (i.e., Banaba, then Tarawa), various incidents contributed to this 
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perception and attitude, and these have stuck in the memory, including being passed through 
the generations. They included the extremely unpopular and controversial communal 
workdays mentioned in S4.3; the sequestration in 1917 of all cash reserves entrusted to the 
Colony Government by the native governments72 and the curtailment of the latter’s financial 
autonomy73 (Macdonald, 1971, 1982a); and the inequity of social and economic development 
efforts on Nikunau compared with Tarawa (see S4.1). This wariness is manifested in I-
Nikunau’s apathetic attitude towards, and reticence about performing voluntarily for, 
governmental organisations, in complete contrast to the willing and cheerful attitude they 
have towards exertions on behalf of utu, friends, visiting strangers and their churches. 
A strategy unimane used in order to keep the Nikunau Native Government at a distance from 
their traditional rule was to refrain from standing in elections to it, and instead nominating 
their younger selections, who, having their support, were bound to win (Macdonald, 1971, 
1982a). Another was to refuse to carry out committee and related work without receiving a 
sitting allowance. Concomitantly, they were prominent on the elected governing bodies of 
pre-war boboti and Te Bobotin Nikunau, thereby controlling the atoll’s economic system (see 
S4.3), and so deriving political influence that way vis-à-vis the Nikunau Native Government 
and Colony Government (Couper, 1967; Macdonald, 1971, 1972, 1982a).74 Otherwise, 
despite the appearance of allowing them to participate in how they were governed, I-Nikunau 
often found the official system frustrating. Many official practices were alien to I-Nikunau, 
by virtue of even fundamental matters, such as entailing the unusual technology of writing 
and dealing with external parties and in English.  
Figure 11 also lacks any I-Kiribati in any Colony-wide positions, reflecting a point made 
above, and Ieremia (1993) observed retrospectively, that even at independence in 1979, 
Kiribati not only lacked any nationally known leaders but also the very concepts of a nation 
and national leaders were strange (see also Macdonald, 1982a, 1996a; Van Trease, 1993a). A 
related point is that the principle of centralisation on Tarawa (see S4.1) was adopted by the 
Colony Government despite peoples from the various islands, that is I-Nikunau, I-Butaritari, 
I-Arorae, etc., and even I-Tarawa, not identifying with the territory of the Kiribati 
Archipelago as a single nation, let alone a nation that included the extended territories of the 
Colony in the Line and Phoenix Archipelagos—the policy of centralisation stemmed from the 
British Government intent on nation building (see Morgan, 1980), as per the fourth 
intervention discussed next. 
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The fourth intervention was initiated outside the Colony, with the British Government 
responding to pressure from the so-called International Community in the aftermath of World 
War II. This pressure arose from concerns about the future of colonial peoples and the 
dismantling of empires, for example, as encapsulated by the United Nations Declaration of 
1960. It led to what remained of the British Empire in Africa, the West Indies, Asia and, 
eventually, the Pacific being decolonised (see Morgan, 1980), Kiribati being one of the last. 
As this decolonisation process was in full swing elsewhere, the resident commissioner set in 
motion a process by which the system of government at Colony level changed from being 
entirely or largely autocratic in the mid-1960s, with the resident commissioner being advised 
by officials, to one of internal self-rule by the mid-1970s, with the prospect later of 
independence. This change saw the resident commissioner gradually transfer some of his 
authority to an executive body and the establishment of an assembly. The executive body 
started as a mix of I-Matang officials and I-Kiribati members but matured into a cabinet of 
mostly I-Kiribati ministers, save for the finance portfolio; this executive body carried on after 
1979 as Te Kabinet, as appears in Figure 10. And the assembly started advisory, with 
representatives selected from the islands in the Colony, but matured into an elected body that 
carried on after 1979 as Te Mwaneaba ni Maungatabu, as also shown in Figure 10 (Gilbert 
and Ellice Islands Order 1974; Macdonald, 1970, 1982a).  
This fourth intervention of shifting political authority from I-Matang to I-Kiribati was mostly 
felt on Tarawa. The undertaking there of civil engineering, education, health, social welfare 
and other projects in the name of economic and social development had already been 
underway for over a decade (see S4.1 and S4.3), and so this political development lagged 
behind, with the implication that there had been no I-Kiribati politicians who could have 
expressed views on the policy of centralisation that underpinned said development. Indeed, 
although the political system varies from the Westminster system (see above), much else 
about it resembles the system under British colonial rule. This is explained by how colonial 
officials instigated and closely oversaw internal self-rule, arguably to such an extent that in 
substance their ascendancy continued up to 1979, even though in form I-Kiribati occupied 
leading political positions (Macdonald, 1970, 1972, 1982a, 1983). These officials were 
prominent in drafting the Constitution of Kiribati 1979, except for local preferences 
prevailing in two matters that have attracted most attention in the history of this period, that is 
Tuvalu separating from Kiribati after a referendum and Kiribati adopting a democratic 
republic system (Goldsmith, 2012; Macdonald, 1982a; Van Trease, 1993a). Some of these 
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officials even carried on in positions created for them in the Republic Government 
administration, notably in the area of public finance, as a condition of deficit funding from 
the former colonial power. 
The fifth and current intervention also arose outside the Republic, corresponding with 
concerns about the economic and social conditions of colonised and other peoples. This 
produced pressures for various measures, leading to an expansion worldwide of socio-
economic aid and a global industry. The beginnings of this in the Colony have just been 
referred to and were mostly financed from the Colonial Development and Welfare Fund. As 
related in S4.1, S4.3, S4.4 and elsewhere, the Republic Government picked up the aid baton 
and, since the mid-1980s, its politicians and officials were having dealings with a hotchpotch 
of aid organisations (Dixon, 2004a; Macdonald, 1996a, 1998; Mackenzie, 2004).  
A feature of this fifth intervention is for Kiribati to have been categorised as yet another 
“developing country”, or more precisely a “least developed country” (United Nations, 2017), 
signifying a country in need of aid, including political and administrative aid. The most overt 
form of this political and administrative aid to have affected the political system under which 
I-Nikunau live today in Kiribati has come from persons, etc., with Anglosphere connections. 
Reflecting policies in their countries of origin, including New Zealand and Britain, they have 
been particularly active in promoting ideas with a neo-liberal bent, although the projects in 
support of these have involved an extensive, often conflicting, variety of beliefs, values, 
motivations and specialities, including in the conditions they have attached to funding and in 
the ways the projects are carried out. Indeed, this latter observation applies to aid projects 
generally, and is significant politically because, despite arrangements between donors and 
recipients often being labelled nowadays as “partnerships” (cf. Webster, 2008), aid 
organisations’ policy consultants, project implementation staff, etc. invariably have the upper 
hand in the dealings around projects, etc., as indicated in discussing Figure 10 and the 
practical training and experience of I-Kiribati who entered the Republic Government and 
inherited the structures, processes and systems left behind by the Colony Government (Dixon 
& Gaffikin, 2014; Horvath, 1972; Macdonald, 1982a). 
Underlying this asymmetry in donor-recipient dealings in Kiribati are such considerations as 
aid workers’ enthusiasm, even zealousness, in seeking out what they perceive as problems for 
I-Kiribati and Kiribati, or in applying, usually off-the-shelf, solutions, or even both. The 
advent of perceived problems of climate change and sea-level rise has added especial impetus 
to this enthusiasm. Furthermore, most development projects proceed only after being 
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evaluated according to policies and criteria of whichever donor organisation has been 
involved. Formally, the Republic Government also has to approve each one, but questioning a 
donor’s judgment and generosity is not easy, either culturally, or technically or expertly, 
including in the area of so-called financial management and control, which is far from neutral 
in its political consequences.75 Aid organisation representatives are dealing still not only with, 
as suggested earlier, an emergent I-Kiribati élite of politicians and officials of the Republic 
Government but also with similarly prominent I-Kiribati associated with institutions inherited 
from formal colonial or earlier neo-imperial times. These sometimes inexperienced, often 
unworldly and mostly non-expert I-Kiribati have often shared the aforementioned enthusiasm 
but, in any case, have found it difficult to resist the various and often incongruent opinions 
expressed under the auspices of aid organisations. Moreover, I-Kiribati issues and desired 
actions may be more stifled now than in the past by the choices of situations for evaluation 
and similar being made at a distance, and particular evaluations being completed during 
shorter engagements (see Macdonald, 1982a). Indeed, it is arguable that for much of the time 
since the advent of the Republic, aid organisation personnel have been prominent in 
determining the official direction of the governments under which I-Nikunau on Tarawa and 
on Nikunau have lived, hence the claims above about neo-imperialism characterising the 
structure, process and functioning of Kiribati’s political system, particularly on Tarawa. 
Back on Nikunau, just as economic developments on Tarawa have had accumulated 
backwash effects there (see S4.3), so the same can be said about the political developments 
outlined above. Apart from all else, emigration in general, and emigration of the Nikunau’s 
more intellectually able in particular, have drained resources from, and so weakened, political 
institutions at the atoll and kawa levels, including church and cooperative organisations as 
grassroots political forces—this is particularly evident at Tabomatang, whose population of 
<70 is barely half that of 30 years ago. However, on paper at least, at the island level, 
Nikunau continues to have local government and local judicial offshoots of the system on 
Tarawa, as shown in Figure 10. And at kawa level, traditional and grassroots politics goes on, 
although many unimane heads of families are on Tarawa and their utu have been reticent to 
deputise for them in kawa bowi. 
Perhaps a positive is that the formal political bodies on Nikunau seem closer to I-Nikunau 
than they were a decade or two ago, even though some wariness remains from times when 
these bodies, and especially the Nikunau Island Council, were regarded as an extension of Te 
Tautaeka, and I-Nikunau was accountable to it, rather than the other way around. Reasons for 
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the closer-ness include the following three occurrences. First, although resident district 
officer positions were in the government administrative structure inherited from the Colony 
Government, these were soon disestablished by the Republic Government. This was in 
response to local disapproval of such arrangements once the I-Matang incumbent was 
replaced by an I-Kiribati—the disapproval was grounded in te katei, there being 
unwillingness to accept an I-Kiribati in such a lauded official position above unimane in a 
political system that was no longer topped by I-Matang officials, and so with I-Matang 
authority.  
Second, the Republic Government seems further away, less interested and less intrusive. 
Some of this dates from the 1980s and 1990s, when emergent national leaders and newly-
promoted senior officials were preoccupied with setting up the new state on Tarawa (e.g., see 
Government of Kiribati, 1983) (Ieremia, 1993; Macdonald, 1982a, 1996a; Van Trease, 
1993b). Since, said leaders and officials have been grappling with the effusion of aid and the 
population growth and other unfamiliar issues materialising on Tarawa (e.g., see Biribo & 
Woodroffe, 2013; Castalia Strategic Advisors, 2005; Connell & Lea, 2002; Duncan, 2014; 
Locke, 2009; Thomas, 2001). 
Third, there has been some work conducted by consultants to the Colony and Republic 
Governments on decentralisation, political as well as economic (e.g., Green, Bukhari and 
Lawrence cited by Lewis (1988); Ortega, 2008; Pitchford cited by Connell (1987), Corcoran 
(2016), Roniti (1988) and Maunaa (1987);76 the reports, Ministry of Internal and Social 
Affairs (2007) and Office of Te Beretitenti and T’Makei Services. (2012b) were associated 
with or a result of the same United Nations’ project as Ortega’s study was. However, this 
closer-ness is notwithstanding that most of the funding for the Island Council comes from the 
Republic Government and that its annual budget is subject to limits set by Republic 
Government officials on Tarawa, not to mention other financial controls from there and from 
Republic Government officials on Nikunau. The Republic Government also appoints its 
senior staff, who are usually posted from Tarawa and originate, at least ancestrally, from 
other islands. 
The way activities are organised and controlled at kawa level, including the holding of 
various special events, reflects much of the insularity of mwaneaba districts and kainga in the 
past (see Hockings, 1984) (cf. Autio, 2010; Kazama, 2001). Besides, quasi-traditional 
mwaneaba councils continue to oversee affairs, organise activities, maintain traditions and 
regulate conduct (see above), and so te kawa’s unimane appear to have a significant say in 
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the organisation of its social life, reflecting that te mwenga have emerged as the basic kin 
units socially and in matters both economic and political. However, depending on the nature 
of the events, etc. that te kawa is called on to organise, there appears to be more sharing of 
this authority among other adults living there.  
National politics in Kiribati dates from the 1960s at most. I-Nikunau have had their share of 
involvement, including participating in the political bodies arising from internal self-rule; 
several I-Nikunau rose to prominent official positions and holding political office before and 
after the Republic was inaugurated (e.g., see Index of /sites/docs/hansard, 2014; Macdonald, 
1982a, 1983). This has continued, with a few I-Nikunau being appointed to ministerial 
positions (e.g., Beniamina Tinga was vice-president 2000–03 and Tiwau Awira was a 
member of te Kabinet 1979-94). If they were not there already, many of the I-Nikunau 
concerned moved to Tarawa, and became members of the diasporic community there, finding 
it impossible to fulfil their duties as members of parliament, etc., unless they lived on 
Tarawa. Subsequently, they only visit their islands occasionally, including to campaign 
during elections. These elected persons and senior officials are besides the many I-Nikunau 
now working in the public service in various middle-ranking and junior administrative, 
technical and professional positions. As a proportion of these offices and positions, the 
overall number of I-Nikunau involved are probably about what can be expected from a people 
comprising 4–5% of the adult population both of Tarawa and of Kiribati. However, apart 
from the two Nikunau Island parliamentary seats, factors other than being I-Nikunau are 
behind I-Nikunau being elected or appointed to positions. Administrative positions and 
increasingly political office have been associated with educational attainment;77 political 
office has also increasingly followed on from a successful career in the public service or 
other organisations on Tarawa, including churches. Indeed, mwaneaba district or single 
island figures have long since been replaced by figures with national political status and other 
prominence (cf. Macdonald, 1982a).  
Regarding relations between I-Nikunau and the Republic Government, despite the notions of 
a republic and citizens, rather than empire and subjects, the notion of the Republic 
Government giving a formal account to an I-Nikunau or broader I-Kiribati audience, on 
Tarawa, Nikunau or elsewhere, is impaired by the structure, process and technology (e.g., the 
accounting system) of government being largely unchanged in substance, if not in form, from 
the days of the Colony Government. This may seem a strange claim to make, given the 
significant amount of aid project activity there has been in the past 35 years in the areas of 
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administration, policymaking, governance, management and information systems. However, 
if anything, the continuing imposition through these projects of administrative methods, 
expertise, ideas, materials processes, structures, systems, technology, etc. has reinforced the 
aforementioned hierarchical nature of government and accountability being mostly upwards. 
The accountability is shaped around and focused on foreign concepts and concerns, and is far 
better suited to outsiders than to I-Nikunau or broader I-Kiribati audience, and so, unwittingly 
or otherwise, is consistent with the aforementioned claims of a strong external, neo-imperial 
influence (Dixon & Gaffikin, 2014; Hassall et al., 2011; Ratuva, 2014; Macdonald, 1996a, 
1998; Mackenzie, 2004). However, a substantial saving grace when it comes to 
accountability is that, on small islands, even one that is as densely populated as Tarawa, 
residents can observe much and can be much observed. Similarly much can be heard, mostly 
face-to-face, in the forms of te kakarabakau ( formal debating and discussing) and 
maroro/winnanti. How much knowledge and power this gives to the aforementioned I-
Nikunau or broader I-Kiribati audience, cast in the role of The People, is open to question; 
but it does seem to be effective during elections and by deterring politicians from displays or 
other outward signs of affluence. 
Outside Kiribati, in metropolitan countries, I-Nikunau are very much on the political 
periphery of the nations and towns or cities in which they live, being entitled to vote if they 
qualify as citizens or residents, but not much else, at least as I-Nikunau or I-Kiribati. 
Otherwise, they tend to have to muddle through the political, administrative and service 
arrangements laid down by the powers that be, whether in immigration, housing, healthcare, 
schooling, tertiary education, labour practices, welfare, taxation, elections, the structure and 
process of governments and parliaments, local government, etc.  
Where politics does arise for many members of diasporic communities outside Kiribati (and 
indeed on Tarawa) is within the communities themselves. As alluded to already, the 
communities often set themselves up formally (e.g., see Kiribati Tungaru Association, 2017), 
partly because this is a requirement of hiring venues for events and making successful 
applications for community event funding, and partly because of internal protocols, 
recognition of roles and speaking on a community’s behalf, for example, to local and national 
government organisations and to media. As this politics plays out, it is more obvious than on 
Nikunau that te mwenga comprise the basic kin units politically and in matters both social 
and economic (e.g., subscriptions are denoted not by per person but by per household, 
regardless of household size). In the case of economics, this household unit coincides to a 
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significant extent with the norms of Anglosphere societies around them. However, within the 
community the unit te mwenga reflects not only how members come together regularly and 
where (see S3.3.1 and S3.3.2) but also how power, authority and status among a community 
is exercised or allocated. For example, usually the most senior I-Kiribati males are expected 
to speak for their mwenga on community matters, except that this role falls to the most senior 
female if the husband is non-I-Kiribati, and this situation makes it easier for all the women to 
join in (cf. Rose, 2014). 
4.8 Spiritual Circumstances 
The great proportion of I-Nikunau, wherever located, are practising Christians and frequently 
involved in church activities, as indicated throughout S3. Even so, some traditional beliefs 
and rituals continue, but mostly below the surface or in ignorance of their origin (Hockings, 
1984; Macdonald, 1982a). For the most part, an RC–Protestant duopoly of longstanding 
continues on Nikunau virtually intact, whereas on Tarawa and in metropolitan countries that 
duopoly has been broken by small but significant numbers of members of diasporic 
communities joining other denominations. For diasporic communities, church is a potential 
sphere for mixing with the non-I-Nikunau among whom I-Nikunau live geographically. This 
potential is most evident on Tarawa, where church activities often draw people from across 
diasporic communities of the different Kiribati islands, a routine example being the many 
children who attend church high schools.  
In diasporic communities outside Kiribati, there is a dichotomy between joining existing 
congregations of the same faith and establishing a congregation limited to I-Kiribati. Thus, in 
various centres in New Zealand, for example, RCs, although meeting together for some RC I-
Kiribati occasions, tend to use churches serving the multiracial communities in which they 
live, and so usually worship in English—Statistics New Zealand (2014) report that 960 (45%) 
of I-Kiribati in New Zealand identified themselves as RCs. On the other hand, most 
Protestants—estimated as 890 (38%)—rather than attend extant local churches, have 
preferred being loyal to the KPC/KUC, and so establish their own congregations. What is 
more, apart from general fundraising to provide for routine expenses, the four largest 
congregations in New Zealand, that is in Auckland, the Bay of Plenty, the Kapiti Coast and 
Invercargill, have accumulated capital to purchase dwellings for pastors, with land on which 
they plan to erect churches. The KPC/KUC’s head administrative office on Tarawa posts 
pastors from Kiribati to live and serve among these four largest congregations and visit the 
other communities, and deacons are recruited and trained from within all the communities to 
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assist the pastors. KPC/KUC events are held within and among members of New Zealand’s 
diasporic communities, and occasionally, over long weekends, across these communities—
venues range from members’ homes and community and church halls to campgrounds and 
marae (≈ mwaneaba associated Māori iwi) hired for said weekends. Next to identifying as I-
Kiribati, and organising around that, the KPC/KUC in particular is a further means in New 
Zealand of community support and association, around language and culture (worship is in te 
taetae ni Kiribati), and part of maintaining separation from other peoples in the country. 
The origins of Protestantism on Nikunau are alluded to in S4.1 in accounting for changes in 
the settlement pattern on Nikunau and in S4.7 in relating the atoll’s political circumstances up 
to 1920. In the 1870s, the Samoan District Committee of the LMS sent representatives to 
perform a mission to convert I-Nikunau and other peoples in the southern Kiribati Islands to 
Christianity. For over 25 years, this mission was effected by pastors and their wives trained at 
the LMS theological college and regional headquarters at Malua in Samoa, and so who were 
mainly Samoans. Pastor Iosefatu, who arrived in 1873, was the first of four pastors who 
resided on Nikunau in the 1870s, and a further 11 were so resident afterwards, the last 
arriving in 1901; each stayed for upwards of eight years, some spending the rest of their lives 
there (Nokise, 1983).78  
When the first pastors arrived, I-Nikunau still adhered to various traditional beliefs, spiritual 
features and rituals, which had accumulated over centuries and were largely indistinguishable 
from the secular (Grimble, 1989); this adherence was despite any influences of I-Nikunau 
returning from working away having been exposed to Christianity or other religions,79 or of 
whalers, beachcombers, castaways and traders. Traditional spiritual associations were made 
with the structure and orientation of buildings on mwenga. Religious features found in 
mwenga and kainga included boua-n-anti and bangota; these were dedicated to bakatibu and 
other anti ( spirits, possibly of the first human bakatibu of the boti)—for an illustration of te 
anti stone, see Alaima et al. (1979, between pp. 18 and 19), and for te bangota, see Baranite 
(1985, p. 78)—and were decorated and adorned regularly with offerings of food. As well as 
social and political centres, and inns for visitors, mwaneaba served as religious centres. 
Indeed, Grimble called te mwaneaba a “tabernacle of ancestors in the male line” (quoted by 
Maude, 1963, p. 11), one of their vital features being that the relics of their founder were kept 
in a place in the roof and, on ceremonial occasions, were taken down and washed—for a 
photograph of this practice on Tabiteuea, see Alaima et al. (1979, between pp. 18 and 19)—
(se also Hockings, 1984; Lewis, 1988).  
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Life’s activities required much knowledge and many skills (e.g., fisherman, cultivator, 
warrior, dancer, victuals preparer), some of them specialist skills (e.g., architect, canoe 
builder, composer, choreographer), and, as is not unusual in most societies (see Abrahamson 
& Fairchild, 1999), the exercise of these by I-Nikunau included attendant magic, spells and 
rituals—these circumstances are remarked on by Grimble and Clarke (1929), who advised 
their subordinate district officers that “[S]imple magic rituals and charms are the 
concomitants of every conceivable form of native activity” (p. 6). Each te boti had its totem, 
usually a real creature whom boti members held in high regard and, for example, were 
forbidden to hunt or eat. Magico-religious practices were integral to various critical life 
passages of mwenga and kainga residents (A.F. Grimble, 1989; R. Grimble, 2013).  
After an inauspicious start in the 1870s, the pastors had mostly succeeded in the mission of 
conversion by 1890. Concomitant with this religious success, first, they achieved political 
success, bringing about an almost unfettered theocratic-colonial regime on Nikunau and 
across the southern Kiribati Islands; unfettered, that is, by either the vestiges of the traditional 
methods of rule or the British colonial authorities (see S4.7). And second, when the Les 
Missionnaires du Sacré-Cœur (or Sacred Heart) de Jésus, representing the RC Church, 
arrived on Nikunau in 1888, they initially repulsed them, and for the three subsequent 
decades, largely kept it at bay (Baranite, 1985; Garrett, 1992; Goodall, 1954; Grimble, 1989; 
Maude & Maude, 1994; Maude, 1967; Nokise, 1983; Sabatier, 1939/1977). Artefacts of this 
success include the churches, church mwaneaba, pastors’ dwellings and the former church, 
now government, primary schools, as mentioned in S3.1, built then and since with labour and 
copra contributed by their congregations. The congregations also maintained these structures 
and took turns feeding and looking after the district pastor in their mwenga (Macdonald, 
1971, 1982a). 
The extent of the pastors’ political success is outlined in S4.7; arguably, this was incidental to 
being successful in converting I-Nikunau, but vital to it nonetheless. The pastors gained 
influence among atun te boti and other unimane in mwaneaba and wholesale conversion of 
the population followed. As outlined in S4.2, the pastors were not unfamiliar with various 
aspects of te katei, including the ways of te mwaneaba, because some of the concepts 
underpinning these traditions also applied in traditional Samoa under kerisiano fa’a-samoa 
(Maude, 1963). Regarding mwaneaba in particular, the pastors eventually persuaded I-
Nikunau to end the aforementioned practices relating to the relics of the founder and to afford 
them a proper burial.80 In a related development, not only was the religious function of 
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district mwaneaba superseded by the use of churches for religious rituals but also church 
mwaneaba took over their function as a place for social gatherings; the traditional mwaneaba 
premises fell into disrepair,81 with the result on Nikunau today that a few standing stones is 
all that remains of them, except the one in Nikumanu (see S3.1). 
Despite the success they had had across the southern Kiribati Islands, the Samoan pastors 
were criticised for their conduct by William Goward, in assuming the role of chief LMS 
missionary in 1900 (see S4.7); he described them as “inconsistent, incompetent and un-
Christ-like” (Macdonald, 1982a, p. 89)—Goward’s criticism echoed much previous criticism 
levelled at Samoan missionaries by their I-Matang counterparts (see Munro, 1996). Using 
this pretext to reform the mission, Goward and his wife Emmeline trained I-Kiribati pastors, 
teachers and their prospective marriage partners at Rongorongo.82 This training helped renew 
the mission and localise the organisation. The curriculum extended to mission administration 
and to teaching in mission schools. The graduates were posted to Nikunau and the other 
islands, eventually replacing the Samoan incumbents—the reforms turned out to be a prelude 
to the mission expanding throughout the Kiribati Archipelago, and to Banaba, Nauru and 
beyond (Garrett, 1992).  
The headquarters at Rongorongo was an additional call on the revenue collected on Nikunau 
by the pastors, in the form of copra mainly. It was used there to fund the LMS’s education 
and training activities, printing and publishing (e.g., te taetae ni Kiribati translations of the 
Bible (see Bingham, 1907), prayer books and hymnbooks83) and general administration. This 
was besides what was spent on or provided in kind on Nikunau (see above). The political 
control of Nikunau, including through te kabowi n abamakoro, was important to this revenue 
being raised (see S4.7). Thus, under Goward, the quasi-political nature of the mission 
continued, but with an additional, more active, less distant, upper echelon. The sectarian 
persecution and discrimination towards anyone or anything to do with the RC Church also 
continued.  
The RCs on Nikunau during the LMS’s political ascendancy included I-Nikunau who had 
been away labouring (Macdonald, 1982a) and traders, notably Frank (François) Even (see 
Nokise, 1983), an Irishman by the name of Harrison and Tom Day (or O’Day – see Munro, 
1987). Indeed, it was they who encouraged the RC Church to send a mission to the Kiribati 
Archipelago in the first place and who assisted the missionaries who arrived on Nikunau but 
were expulsed on more than one occasion (see Sabatier, 1939/1977—another trader, by the 
name of Smith, helped these missionaries escape from Nikunau in 1899). These RCs 
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persisted in their beliefs and practices, and it was this persistence and that of the RC Mission 
itself that, after the Colony Government brought the LMS’s rule to an end in 1917 (see S4.7), 
helped the RC Church get established on Nikunau. The proportion of RCs reached 19% in 
1931, 23% in 1947 (Pusinelli, 1947) and 29% in 1968 (Zwart & Groenewegen, 1968). Today. 
over 47% of the atoll’s residents are RCs, compared with the over 49% who are KPC/KUC 
(Office of Te Beretitenti and T’Makei Services, 2012b)—barely 3% of Nikunau residents are 
other than KPC/KUC or RC, although many indulge in traditional beliefs as well, at least 
secretly.  
During the intervening 100 years, relations between the two Churches and their adherents 
have been beset by conflict, hostility, rivalry, rejoinders and claims and counter-claims of 
sectarianism (see Maude, 1967; Sabatier, 1939/1977), albeit that these behaviours became 
less physically violent and more subtle as time passed—it is possible that some of this 
division, hostility and violence may have been a continuance of intra-island animosity 
existing before the Christians arrived, with people joining one church primarily because their 
adversaries had joined the other (Macdonald, 1982a). What is more, similar attitudes, albeit 
with ever-decreasing levels of physical violence, have been shown towards other Christian 
denominations and other faiths (e.g., the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, the 
Seventh-Day Adventists (SDAs), the Bahá’í Faith) since they applied to and were permitted 
to enter the Colony or Republic and establish premises on Tarawa—the first to do so were the 
SDAs in 1947 (Pusinelli, 1947); 10% of Tarawa’s population is now affiliated with these 
others. 
By virtue of the Colony Government posting a district officer to Beru in 1917 and assuming 
de facto control of Nikunau and the other southern Kiribati Islands (see S4.7), the LMS’s 
streams of revenues from taxes and fines from Nikunau and other islands were interrupted; 
the LMS had been almost entirely dependent on this revenue, which had been coming from 
the entire population, not just the LMS’s congregations (Macdonald, 1982a). It more or less 
made up for this lost revenue by expanding or re-designating some of the existing 
contributions from its congregations and having these congregations turn to other ways to 
gather revenue, or fund raise, for local and headquarters’ uses. Thus, informal tithes on copra 
and cash remittances were instituted, social events were staged with fundraising appendages, 
handicrafts (e.g., coconut mats, fishing hats, knives of sharks’ teeth) were produced and sent 
to Banaba and, later, Tarawa, for sale to temporary residents and visitors, particularly I-
Matang (see Catala, 1957), and trade stores were operated—these are referred to earlier as 
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church mronron. The KPC/KUC continues this pattern of fundraising today, be it on 
Nikunau, Tarawa and in diasporic communities elsewhere, with some enhancements; for 
example, bingo sessions are popular among communities on Nikunau (Ministry of Internal 
and Social Affairs, 2007), Tarawa and in New Zealand. Across the Kiribati Archipelago, 
island congregations compete for the prestige of which island can send the greatest amount to 
KPC/KUC headquarters on Tarawa. 
From the outset, this fundraising placed greater work burdens on I-Nikunau associated with 
the LMS, as they had to continue paying taxes, fines and, later, licence fees, etc. but to the 
Colony Government instead of the LMS. This led some to switch their allegiance to the RC 
Church (cf. Gilkes, 2006), joining those who had favoured it because the RC clergy paid its 
adherents, for example, in tobacco, for work done and services rendered, including building 
churches and supplying the clergy’s domestic needs (e.g., victuals, house materials)—unlike 
the LMS, the RC Church had external, albeit meagre, benefactions to call on, and I-Nikunau’s 
contributions were less involuntary (see Sabatier, 1939/1977). However, for several decades, 
the majority stayed with the LMS, and thence the KPC/KUC; it has only been during the last 
four decades that the proportion of RCs on Nikunau has approached its current level of 47%.  
Spiritual conversion, and the political control that accompanied it by the LMS in particular, 
has had continuing consequences for I-Nikunau. Reflecting afterwards on what he found on 
taking up the post of district officer on Beru in 1917 (see S4.7), Grimble opined that when the 
Samoan pastors and then Goward were ascendant they had degraded anything about I-
Nikunau that prevented promotion of Christian myths, superstitions and impostures as 
superior, heroic, etc. He opined that the clerics had made I-Nikunau and their neighbours 
“ashamed of his ancestry, ashamed of his history, ashamed of his legends, ashamed 
practically of everything that ever happened to his race outside the chapel and the class-
room” (cited by Macdonald, 1982a, p. 133, and by Maude, 1989, p. xxiii) (cf. Bakre, 2004). 
Following time spent on Onotoa six decades later, Hockings (1984) claims that 
the many physical manifestations of traditional communal spiritual activity—the 
kainga, the bangota, the uma ni mane, the initiate huts— have all but disappeared in 
this general process of the desanctification of everyday life, and in their place of stands 
the church. (p. 472) 
However, to attribute these many changes solely to Christianity would exaggerate, just as to 
claim that they have all been negative is inaccurate. Many other factors were at work, 
associated with people other than missionaries visiting Nikunau and I-Nikunau returning 
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from working, etc. away with a changed perspective on life. Not only that but also the new 
religion(s) appealed positively to most I-Nikunau. The religions afforded opportunities to 
come together in ways different from the traditional mwaneaba (Hockings, 1984). They 
entailed stories about the outside world, and the introduction of knowledge, practices, etc. In 
producing written translations of the Bible, etc. in te taetae ni Kiribati, the English- and 
French-speaking missionaries (e.g., Hiram Bingham, Ernest Sabatier) adapted the Modern 
Latin alphabet to suit te taetae ni Kiribati in a way still ascendant today. I-Nikunau learnt to 
read and write, and quenched a thirst for knowledge, including at mission schools; at first, 
these catered for all ages, but then concentrated on children of primary or elementary school 
age and, later, of secondary school age. This was an alternative source of knowledge to 
unimane and unaine, and so satisfied a desire among some I-Nikunau to be less dependent on 
elders and less predisposed to their authority. 
The missionaries instituted many other things with widespread and long-lasting 
consequences. They introduced new food plants, notably breadfruit and pawpaw (Nokise, 
1983). They introduced the days of the week, including Te Tabati, and holy days, so 
imposing a new sense of chronological order on I-Nikunau, although even now keeping to 
time is not a strong point, even in diasporic communities. As indicated in S3.1, Te Tabati 
observance is still very evident, particularly among Protestants but among RCs too, but in 
their different ways, as are Easter and Christmas as religious festivals. 
Several restrictions were placed on I-Nikunau stemming from what the LMS missionaries in 
particular regarded as “evils”, as listed by Grimble (1989, pp. 315–318). I-Nikunau’s practice 
of nakedness (cf. Officer on Board the Said Ship, 1767, pp.135–138) was banned in the 
names of modesty, etc. The obligation to wear clothes led to the import of cloth and 
acquisition of skills and equipment (e.g., needles, sewing machines) needed to make clothes; 
it also led to afflictions such as tuberculosis and skin diseases from wearing clothes unsuited 
to the climatic conditions (see the school photograph referred to in Note 82). Being modestly 
attired, also gave some freedom to post-pubescent young women to be seen and appear in 
public, whereas traditionally they had been confined, usually pending marriage (see Grimble, 
1921).  
Restrictions on abortion as birth control methods (see Veltman, 1982)84 led to bigger 
families. These restrictions are still in place, although abortions are still performed in 
traditional ways. Birth control and family planning through contraception are encouraged, 
including that teams of specialists make occasional visits from metropolitan countries, 
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especially to Tarawa. Attempts to restrict tibutibu were withstood, preserving much of the 
social and economic benefits of this practice, which continues today. However, its 
misunderstood “informality” (e.g., lack of government authority and recognition in official 
documents) can present problems for families trying to immigrate to metropolitan countries. 
The missionaries were concerned with the level of intoxication from alcohol and nicotine, 
especially among men. Restrictions on the import of alcoholic beverages were reasonably 
successful, as were those on locally produced ones, more or less—Nikunau was still dry 
when I visited in the 1980s. Today, among I-Nikunau, there are those who drink alcohol and 
those who abstain, with the latter being the greater proportion, particularly on Nikunau. In 
any case, kava drinking has become fashionable in recent years, particularly among groups of 
men, both in diasporic communities and now on Nikunau itself (National Statistics Office, 
2013). While intoxicating, kava is often associated with lower levels of physical violence 
than alcohol, although opinions differ of this, and the after-effects on work, etc. are raising 
criticisms (Grace, 2003; Kiribati cabinet minister, 2013; Kiribati people ‘cursed’, 2017). 
Similar restrictions on tobacco on Nikunau failed miserably, with the incidence of stick 
tobacco, pipes and self-rolled cigarettes still high, although even there, and far more 
obviously on Tarawa, these have given way over the past few decades to manufactured 
cigarettes. Whichever, smoking tobacco is still widespread among I-Nikunau—National 
Statistics Office (2013) reports 44% of the adult population of the Republic smokes 
tobacco—notwithstanding that many in metropolitan country diasporic communities have 
taken heed of the strong messages about its deadly consequences sent out by public health 
advocates and the price signals accompanying these messages—according to Statistics New 
Zealand (2014) of 22% of I-Kiribati who have smoked regularly since the age of 15, a third 
claim to have given up. However, in Kiribati, the messages are less strong and there are no 
such price signals; indeed, for a time the price of tobacco was controlled in similar ways to 
rice and other staple imports and school exercise books.  
Curtailments of sexual promiscuity led to reductions in the activities of nikiranroro and the 
diminution of polygynous relationships, including eiriki ( sexual relationships between a 
husband and his wife’s unmarried sisters), and of customarily-sanctioned extramarital sex 
involving, or as entailed in, tinaba relationships ( sexual relations between a wife and her 
husbands’ uncles) (see Grimble, 1957, 1989; Hockings, 1984). They also impacted the forms 
and frequencies of dance, which LMS clerics often referred to as lewd acts, along with 
accompanying songs, poems and music (Macdonald, 1982a)—the RC clergy encouraged 
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more mellow forms of dance by incorporating them into the Mass (Nokise, 1983, Sabatier, 
1939/1977). However, dance, etc. were never stamped out and, as indicated in S3.2, they 
have re-emerged as objects of national pride, with participation being widespread, including 
in diasporic communities (see Autio, 2010; Dambiec, 2005; Kiribati Tungaru Association 
UK, n.d.; New Zealand Kiribati National Council, n.d.; Whincup, 2005). 
4.9 Educational Circumstances 
I-Nikunau’s educational circumstances can be clarified by distinguishing between traditional 
and modern, or as I call it here, formal. The formal, deriving as it does directly or indirectly 
from Britain, more or less, is common to I-Nikunau wherever they are located. It is organised 
into a system divided into primary, secondary and tertiary levels. This system comprises 
schools and other institutions, teachers, curricula, examinations or qualifications and similar 
at each level. Running beside it, in te mwenga, te mwaneaba, and corresponding places 
within communities are vestiges of traditional education; these are particularly important and 
significant in matters of social conduct, language and culture. I-Nikunau participate in both 
wherever they are located, although the mix of the two differs according to distance from life 
on Nikunau. In terms of being perceived by either adults or children as “education”, however, 
the formal is very much part of I-Nikunau’s recent past and present (see S3 and S4.1) and 
now seems ascendant in all locations.  
I have already referred to wider consequences that developments of formal education and 
participation in it have had for I-Nikunau, including emigration (see S4.1 and S4.2), political 
participation (see S4.7) and religious beliefs (see S4.8), and these matters are revisited in this 
section. I-Nikunau in Kiribati now participate in formal education up to Year 10 (i.e., 15–16 
years of age) as a matter of course in primary and junior secondary schools on Nikunau (see 
S3.1), Tarawa and other islands where they are brought up. Those whose academic 
attainment is sufficient, as measured using common national examinations, go on further, 
including to senior secondary schools (Years 11 to 13), which are all on Tarawa, except for 
limited provision on Beru, Tabiteuea, Nonouti, Abemama, Abaiang and Tabuaeran. All these 
schools share a school year, February to December, to coincide with Fiji, New Zealand and 
Australia, and each has its weekly timetables of classes, conducted largely in classrooms by 
recognised, qualified teachers. Particularly above primary level, these classes are divided into 
year groups (i.e., the students are mostly sorted by age) and into subjects (e.g., mathematics, 
English, geography, science), which are defined in syllabuses, as reflected in mostly English-
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language textbooks, other learning resources, examinations and other forms of summative 
assessment.  
Success in the primary and secondary levels of the system, and indeed of the system, is 
predisposed towards individual students going onto the next level or stage, with stages 
covering a school year, and ultimately attending an English-language university overseas, 
thus reinforcing the importance of the outside world, English-language curriculum. Or, to put 
it another way, the system has been based consistently on pushing out pupils or students who 
fail at the end of a stage, and so the successful students are those remaining after the rest have 
been filtered out. Having said that, opportunities to leave the formal system with 
qualifications nowadays are probably greater than ever before. It is also now easier to resume 
formal education as an adult, and so obtain a second chance. However, this is much less the 
case than in metropolitan countries with diasporic communities, where adult education 
provision is far more extensive than on Tarawa. 
For those who do succeed by graduating at the end of Year 13, some obtain aid donor 
scholarships to attend university institutions and similar overseas, including the main campus 
in Fiji of the University of the South Pacific or its law campus in Vanuatu.85 Some 
scholarships are also awarded to I-Nikunau and other I-Kiribati who are already employed in 
the public service, including enabling them to study for masterates and doctorates. Those 
without scholarships mostly have to make do with studying on Tarawa at the University of 
the South Pacific Kiribati Campus, sometimes with a view to obtaining a scholarship 
subsequently. Others who graduate from junior and senior secondary schools (i.e., having 
passed the Year 10, 11, 12 or even 13 exams) go on to Tarawa’s non-degree tertiary 
institutions (e.g., the Institute of Technology,86 Marine Training Centre,87 Fisheries Training 
Centre, School of Nursing, Teachers’ College).  
In the diasporic communities, children invariably participate in the education systems of their 
place of abode. In the metropolitan countries, this is something most parents are highly 
desirous of, often advancing it as a reason for having immigrated, as Roman (2013) and 
Thompson (2016) find among I-Kiribati immigrants in New Zealand. These metropolitan 
country systems are mirrored by the formal system in Kiribati, for reasons given next, and so 
need not be described in more detail here. 
The formal system in Kiribati reflects its introduction and maintenance by outsiders, whether 
under the auspices of religious bodies (since the 1880s), the Colony Government (between 
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the 1920s and 1970s) and Republic Government (since the 1980s), including with assistance 
from or influence of British and other I-Matang teachers, British and other foreign 
examinations boards, international professional teaching bodies, foreign higher and further 
education institutions, and aid organisations. For the most part, the curriculum derives from, 
and is mostly about, the outside world, there being little provision, if any, for knowledge and 
skills associated with living on atolls, either in quasi-traditional ways or otherwise, let alone 
about Nikunau or Kiribati in particular. Indeed, although most teachers are now I-Kiribati, 
the syllabuses, qualification standards, methods of teaching and learning, etc., along with the 
beliefs, values, knowledge and skills underlying their training in Kiribati and overseas, still 
reflect what the abovementioned outsiders, spiritual or secular, and particularly from Britain, 
New Zealand, Australia and the other Anglosphere countries, have regarded or now regard as 
appropriate for pupils and students of different ages (see Burnett, 2009).  
In contrast, traditional education was all about I-Nikunau on Nikunau, whether in areas one 
might label curricula, methods of teaching and learning, knowledge and skills, values, beliefs 
or structures. The vestiges of the traditional system that remain on Nikunau reflect the ways 
I-Nikunau now live there, as recounted in S3.1 and in S4 so far. Education in traditional 
dancing is a prime, overt example of such vestiges, one that binds I-Nikunau there with I-
Nikunau in all the diasporic communities, at times resembling what Autio (2010) gleaned 
from her study on Tabiteuea in 1999-2000. She observed schooling in dance as frequent and 
intensive, taking the form of dancing practices, arranged and conducted by unimane and 
unaine with expertise in choreography and dance instruction. In metropolitan countries, 
especially when a formal event is in the offing (e.g., a National Day gathering), the area of 
dance is similarly ascendant in the traditional education that goes on in people’s home and in 
the community, led by those who have inherited this expertise. For some results, see British 
Museum (2017), EventFinda (2014) or PixMasta Studio (2017).  
Notwithstanding, these vestiges of traditional learning are a far cry in content and method 
from the traditional system of educating boys and young men, and girls and young women in 
what each gender required to enable them to live materially, socially, culturally, etc. on 
Nikunau in past times, as pieced together by various authors (e.g., Grimble, 1921, 1989; 
Hockings, 1984; Teweiariki, n.d.). Ascendant probably up to the 1880s, this system was 
designed to initiate these young people into I-Nikunau society as adults, partakers in 
ceremonials, marriage partners, parents, domestics, fishermen, cultivators, crafts persons, 
warriors—for photographs and illustrations of a warrior and traditional weapons, see Alaima 
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et al. (1979)—dancers, etc. A notable aspect of the curriculum was knowledge of self 
genealogically, given the social categories of utu, boti and kainga being based on ancestry 
(Goodenough, 1955; Lundsgaarde & Silverman, 1972; Maude, 1963). The curriculum also 
comprised ancestral traditions, customs, religion, rituals, stories, technologies, etc. Its gender 
basis was reflected in how unimane oversaw the teaching of older boys and unaine oversaw 
the teaching of young children and older girls; the teaching was conducted on mwenga, 
kainga, buakonikai and marine areas. A notable aspect of the structure was a distinction 
between some knowledge, skills, spells, etc. being generally shared among everyone and 
some of same being restricted to only select few. That is, for reasons of place in the 
community and honour, architecture and building construction (see Hockings, 1984), canoe 
building, composing and choreography (see Autio, 2010), medical practice, midwifery and 
similar were jealously guarded specialisms, knowledge, skills and spells being passed orally, 
preciously and secretly from a person of one generation to a kinsman of the next generation 
(Lawrence, 1983). 
Aspects of the traditional curriculum system that were practical when it came to living on 
Nikunau survived for quite some time, some until now. However, the LMS Mission and, 
later, the RC Mission vanquished many aspects that that they saw as perpetuating animism, 
paganism, heathenism, savagery, etc. (Macdonald, 1982a), or otherwise obstructed or 
impeded their aims of converting individuals and communities, and retaining those converts. 
The LMS pastors put in place the forerunners of the present formal system, establishing and 
maintaining mission schools on Nikunau and neighbouring islands; these were vital to 
conversion. Reiterating S4.8, the schools gradually made children of primary or elementary 
school age their main concern; this occurred alongside providing something of the nature of 
secondary education for aspiring pastors, catechists and other teachers, perhaps at Malua but 
certainly at Rongorongo (see University of Southern California Digital Library, 2017). The 
mission schools combined religious instruction, and cleanliness, etc. being next to godliness, 
with reading, writing and arithmetic. The teaching had to be in te taetae ni Kiribati, more or 
less. The teachers comprised the pastors from Samoa and local catechists whom they trained, 
and then the graduates, both I-Kiribati and Tuvaluan, of the pastor and teacher training school 
at Rongorongo. Having vanquished much of the traditional system, the LMS’s schools were 
as much part of its theocratic-colonial regime as the spiritual and political structures and 
processes the pastors had put in place as outlined in S4.7 and S4.8.  
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The LMS schools’ ascendancy was virtually unchallenged until the RC Church gained a 
permanent foothold on the atoll in the 1920s. From then on, a dual system prevailed on 
Nikunau. Sabatier (1939/1977) explains that the two Churches were obliged to provide a 
primary school in every kawa “for fear of losing the young people” (p. 212) to the opposing 
camp. In the four kawa where both the LMS and RC denominations had converts, the LMS 
and RC schools, along with their churches and other buildings, were situated at opposite ends 
of each one; this was in keeping with the pattern in most kawa on most of the other islands, 
with “the big mwaneaba for dancing in the centre” (Sabatier, p. 320). The pattern followed 
tacit agreement between the two Churches but can be interpreted as characterising a 
continuing sectarian divide down to even this level (see S4.8). Teaching continued in the 
hands of church-trained teachers, except now some were RCs, including I-Kiribati trained at 
Manoku on Abemama (Sabatier, 1939/1977; Garrett, 1992). 
The actions of the missionaries were reinforced by the Colony Government, many of whose 
policy philosophies still seem to persist under the Republic Government (Burnett, 2002, 
2009). In 1920, it established an Education Department—this was based on Tarawa rather 
than the then Colony headquarters of Banaba—and stipulated that young I-Nikunau (aged 7–
16 years) must attend primary school. However, as the Colony Government lacked a policy 
of, and funds for, development interventions (see S4.3), the actual schools and most of the 
funding were provided until the 1960s by the two church organisations, with parents being 
obliged to pay school fees to the churches. The training of primary school teachers on Beru 
(LMS) and Abemama (RC) from the early part of the 20th Century meant that these teachers 
have been mostly I-Nikunau or other I-Kiribati since, with te taetae ni Kiribati being the 
language of most teaching, although not all imported learning materials were translated from 
their original English form and English was taught as a subject. 
The Colony Government took over primary education in the Colony in the 1960s, and so 
brought the religious division of schools on Nikunau to an end, since when it and then the 
Republic Government has operated the atoll’s three primary schools, along with virtually all 
others in the country. The provision for the training of primary teachers also changed then, 
when the Colony Government established the secular Tarawa (now Kiribati) Teachers’ 
College. Although many of the graduates of this college passed through KGVEBS, where 
English was officially the language of tuition for many years—almost all students, even those 
from Tuvalu, spoke te taetae ni Kiribati (confidential personal communications from a 
former teacher and former student, 1998)—the language they brought to the primary school 
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classroom has continued to be te taetae ni Kiribati.88 Although scholarships for teacher 
education overseas has supplemented this training, only a minority of these have gone to 
primary level teachers, compared with those at secondary level. Some supplementing of I-
Kiribati teachers has occurred at primary level on Tarawa and even on Nikunau, through an 
intermittent supply of non-I-Kiribati missionaries, contract teachers and volunteers, notably 
from the Peace Corps between 1973 and 2008 (e.g., see Myers, 2001). 
The first post-primary (or quasi-secondary) education institution at which I-Nikunau could 
enrol was arguably the pastor training school established in 1900 at the LMS headquarters at 
Rongorongo on Beru mentioned above. The students attended as boarders, taking them away 
from Nikunau for months or years at a time, and even longer—pastors were usually posted to 
islands other than their own—perhaps even permanently (see S4.1). Same applied to the 
similar institution established on Abemama by the RC Church.  
The first move by the Colony Government into providing schools was in 1922, when it 
established a post-primary boarding school next to the Education Department on Tarawa, 
which it named KGVS after the then king. Although seeming to break with the policy of not 
being involved in local social development, such development motives were not paramount 
in the idea for KGVS: instead, it was intended only to educate a limited number of I-Kiribati 
and Tuvaluan young men—the annual intake for the first several years was about 20—to 
perform clerical work for the Colony Government and British Phosphate Commission and to 
act as native government officials—a significant ingredient of this education was English, 
because graduates needed English to perform the clerical work for which their studies were 
intended to prepare them. However, these intentions were soon displaced by a more 
magnanimous approach, albeit after some rancour between two groups. The one group had 
initiated the move, it was somewhat conservative, comprising officials in London and the 
older Colony Government officials (e.g., Grimble, who was by then the Resident 
Commissioner) on Banaba. The other group, more liberal in its thinking, comprised the I-
Matang teachers who had arrived from Britain and its dominions to establish KGVS, staff of 
the Education Department on Tarawa and some younger colonial officials (e.g., Maude) 
(Burnett, 2005; Macdonald, 1982a; Maude, 1977).  
The conservative group expected that most I-Nikunau would spend their lives on Nikunau 
and pursue a kawa life (to fish, cut toddy and copra, be parents, contribute domestically, be 
Christians, etc.), perhaps going to Banaba, Nauru, etc. as labourers for short periods (see 
Burnett, 2007; Lundsgaarde, 1974; Macdonald, 1982a). They were concerned that, if too 
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many I-Nikunau and other I-Kiribati were educated to too high a level, including in English, 
it could raise their expectations unrealistically, and cause social disgruntlement and political 
discontent. Indeed, restricting numbers and the curriculum was consistent with Resident 
Commissioner Grimble’s Museum Policy, which, according to Maude (1977), was based on 
the belief that the Kiribati and Tuvalu Islands were incapable of development, and so best 
kept “a close preserve inviolate from European rapacity” (p. v). In a parallel development, 
Grimble compiled the aforementioned Regulations for the Good (1933), whose extended 
array of restrictions on various matters (e.g., tibutibu, canoe use and fishing, curfew, holding 
botaki and dance events, and entering the government station) provide “a classic statement of 
the paternalistic nature of the administrative structure that had emerged” (Macdonald, 1982a, 
p. 127) and, presumably, of the restricted curriculum envisaged in the formal education 
system, if and when it was secularised. The missions supported this group, believing 
advancing their education might reduce I-Nikunau’s willingness to accept church discipline 
and, in any case, wanting to retain their roles as providers of primary education. 
In contrast, the liberal group, especially the teachers, had other ideas, and it was these that 
prevailed, particularly once Grimble was out of the picture by the mid-1930s. They wanted to 
extend the curriculum and increase participation at secondary level, and revise the 
philosophic rationale of the system. Indeed, they sought a review of the Colony’s capacity for 
development and of the Colony Government’s roles in development (Macdonald, 1982a). 
Among them and their successors, they extended the KGVS curriculum to broader academic 
subjects than were required merely to clerk. Nevertheless, this curriculum included English as 
the officially prescribed medium of teaching, learning and everything else (Burnett, 2005, 
2009; Macdonald, 1982a),89 and it is only quite recently that English’s officially prescribed 
exclusivity at KGVEBS has changed. 
The teachers and their allies also steadily increased student intakes at KGVS, an expansion 
their immediate post-war successors continued; this expansion was despite shortages of 
funds, personnel and physical resources, both during the Great Depression and after the 
school was re-established beside the Colony being restored—indeed, delays occurred to a 
Colonial Development and Welfare Fund development project to upgrade the school in the 
early 1950s. Their post-war successors were also instrumental in establishing EBS, which 
eventually opened in 1959, also financed from the fund and after one or two deferments 
because of the post-war shortages, and notwithstanding conservative attitudes to the 
education of young women, including among I-Kiribati. Furthermore, although under its 
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project approval remit EBS was only supposed to educate young women in a manner seen as 
suited to their gender (Burnett, 2002), that restricted curriculum was also short-lived, and 
barely a decade later the merger occurred to bring about the co-educational KGVEBS, with a 
curriculum that distinguished a lot less according to gender roles than befitted local traditions, 
although conservative norms about gender roles then current in Britain did prevail (e.g., in 
areas of sports and technical subjects, and boys tending towards sciences and girls towards 
arts).  
Places at KGVS, EBS and then KGVEBS soon became much sought after, and while the 
number of places were expanded, this expansion could not keep pace with demand for places. 
This led to the creation of an annual common entrance examination for all primary school 
pupils in order to select intakes. It also led the KPC/KUC and RC Church, and, later, the 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints and Seventh Day Adventist Church to establish 
co-educational schools in the secondary field; the KPC/KUC and RC Church’s increased 
involvement in secondary education also coincided with their withdrawal from the primary 
sector. Most of this provision was on Tarawa although there were schools on Beru, Nonouti, 
Abemama and Abaiang. The churches’ involvement was in part a response to insufficient 
secondary level places being available for their children, and a way for each faith to attract 
and retain young people, as had been the case in the primary sector area. The entrance 
examinations for KGVEBS also came to be used by these schools; they took the second cut, 
with the rest exiting the system after completing primary school (see Burnett, 2004). 
Gradually, however, the lesser status of some of these church secondary schools vis-à-vis 
KGVEBS has been changing, especially those that have gradually became more secular, so 
much so that one or two now compete with KGVEBS for the students topping these 
examinations. What is more, increasing proportions of their graduates have gained 
scholarships to enable them to go onto tertiary study. 
Since their inceptions, KGVS, EBS and then KGVEBS have played significant parts in 
shaping Kiribati and I-Kiribati, including many I-Nikunau. Two matters stand out. First, 
KGVEBS in particular advanced the emancipation of women, especially on Tarawa, although 
on Nikunau attitudes to gender are still traditional and rather conservative (confidential 
personal communication, 2017, from an election candidate); this is despite longstanding 
community groups advancing the cause of women (e.g., Reitan Aine Kamatu or RAK, about 




Second, as already analysed in S4.1, the schools’ location on Tarawa meant that I-Nikunau 
who succeeded in the entrance examinations, and the equivalents from the other islands, left 
their islands to study there. Although many returned home to Nikunau, etc. for each 
December-January break, shipping schedules permitting, they in effect lived on Tarawa while 
completing their multi-year programme, and so swelled its population. Furthermore, after 
graduating, the work and life they were most suited to was on Tarawa, and so their 
immigration there was likely to be longer term, if not permanent. A further twist arose during 
the 1960s, by when it was becoming clear that pass rates in the annual entrance examinations 
were increasingly skewed in favour of children schooled on Tarawa.90 To take advantage of 
this occurrence, parents on Nikunau and elsewhere sent their children of primary school age, 
and eventually even pre-primary school age, to live with utu on Tarawa in order to be 
schooled there (Burnett, 2002; confidential personal communication from a former student 
who went through this process, 1987), thus swelling immigration even more.  
Secondary education continued under the Republic Government as above during the 1980s. 
Except, it did attempt to provide most Outer Islands with community high schools, but this 
notion was rejected by so many parents that these failed to materialise; the parents objection 
was that their curriculum was oriented to practical subsistence, local vocations and young 
people remaining on their Outer Island (see Hindson, 1985). However, notwithstanding the 
expansion of KGVEBS, including through new school premises, and the activities of 
Churches, the demand for places continued to increase; besides, secondary education was still 
selective and not universal. This led to it establishing two other secondary schools in the 
1990s and then, around 2000, establishing the junior secondary school system, with a school 
on most islands, including the one described in S3.1 on Nikunau. The two other secondary 
schools comprised one on Tabiteuea, which was intended to serve the southern Kiribati 
cluster of islands, including Nikunau, and the other on Tabuaeran, which was to cater for the 
increased new-settler population (including I-Nikunau) in the Line Islands. However, similar 
to the church schools named above on the Outer Islands, both are much smaller and less 
resourced than KGVEBS. The continuing smallness of the school on Tabiteuea derives from 
its unpopularity among non-I-Tabiteuea, including I-Nikunau. Although it is closer to 
Nikunau geographically than Tarawa is, this is not so in terms of convenient travel. What is 
more, most potential I-Nikunau students do not have utu on Tabiteuea, whereas they do on 
Tarawa. Both schools have often been unpopular also with teaching staff, who are used to life 
on Tarawa, rather than on Outer Islands.  
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Establishing the junior secondary school system was a major step in a Republic Government 
policy to make entry to secondary education from primary education universal and 
compulsory, rather than selective, based on examinations; it means that all children on 
Nikunau or wherever can now stay at school until at least Year 10, and need not leave their 
atoll to do so. Concomitant with their creation, the existing secondary schools were re-
designated as senior secondary schools (Years 11 to 13), entailing an increase in the number 
of places available in these year groups. Even so, study at this level is far from universal, and 
an entrance examination is used for selection, presumably with a continuing bias towards 
graduates from junior secondary schools on Tarawa. Indeed, it might be hypothesised that the 
establishment of the junior secondary school at Rungata has made it even more difficult for I-
Nikunau living on Nikunau to reach the ascendant schools on Tarawa because students who 
have studied on Nikunau for three years beyond primary are competing for places with 
students who have done likewise on Tarawa, including any sent there to live with relatives in 
order to go to primary or junior secondary school. In any case, those successful in the 
examination mostly attend senior secondary schools on Tarawa, even though the various 
government and church schools mentioned above as being on Outer Islands continue to 
operate. Reasons are given above for even the two of these that are closer to Nikunau than 
Tarawa geographically being unpopular; besides, the KPC/KUC school on Beru seems to be 
struggling to survive (Office of Te Beretitenti and T’Makei Services, 2012a).  
The important role I-Matang teachers had in secondary education policy is related above. 
Such teachers continued at KGVEBS and other secondary schools well into the 1990s, 
although gradually I-Kiribati joined the staff of these schools, so much so that virtually all 
their permanent teaching staff are now I-Kiribati. Moreover, until very recently, most of these 
staff, especially the senior teachers, were themselves KGVEBS students in the period when 
most teachers were I-Matang, and so were inculcated in the ways of these times, albeit that 
they went on from KGVEBS to obtain degrees and teacher qualifications overseas. Even so, 
these teachers have localised methods somewhat, if not the syllabus contents, including that, 
as mentioned above, the language of teaching has increasingly become te taetae ni Kiribati, 
both for practical reasons, as teaching positions were localised, and as a matter of cultural 
policy, in keeping with markedly changed international attitudes to indigenous languages 
(e.g., Welsh, Te Reo Māori). Nevertheless, English is still important at school because most 
of the textbooks in use are in English, not to mention that the contexts they portray are 
Anglosphere ones. The delivery of the syllabus and the practising of English is helped by the 
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supply of missionaries, contract teachers and volunteers in the secondary sector being more 
extensive and dependable than in the primary sector. What is more, the futures of many 
students include English-language study at universities overseas and working for the 
Republic Government, etc. in written English, at least, and probably spoken English too (e.g., 
in dealing with aid organisations, international church groups). Besides, English is also the 
language of students aspiring to work overseas or to emigrate.  
Opportunities for tertiary education study by I-Nikunau and other I-Kiribati, including local 
facilities within Kiribati, have been achieved mainly through a mix of Colony or Republic 
Government and aid organisation activities. Similar to even junior secondary provision until 
very recently, participation in tertiary study has invariably involved I-Nikunau being away 
from Nikunau, with consequences of many I-Nikunau staying away permanently, except to 
visit. Indeed, provision within Kiribati got underway only in the Colony Government’s last 
decade or so, with the vocational institutions mentioned above for seafarers, fishers, teachers, 
nurses, clerks and tradespersons, and the University of the South Pacific Kiribati Campus 
opening as a one-room office on the KGVEBS campus in 1976 before moving to premises of 
its own premises in 1978. As with KGVEBS, etc., the administrators and teachers at these 
institutions were originally English or other I-Matang, and the language of tuition, etc. was 
English. 
Before this local provision was established, I-Nikunau, along with other I-Kiribati, were 
going overseas to obtain tertiary education. This was initiated in the 1920s when a few I-
Kiribati attended the Suva Medical School (now part of the Fiji National University) to train 
as medical dressers (see Fiji National University: College of Medicine, 2016; “Fiji Medicine 
Men,” 1944; GEIC, 1957). This gradually expanded in numbers, subjects studied and places 
visited—most subjects are now studied across the sciences, arts, humanities and professions, 
and at bachelor, master and doctoral levels and in Fiji, Australia, New Zealand, Cuba, et 
cetera—and the local provision was added as demand and supply warranted. Even so, for a 
long time, numbers participating locally and overseas tended to reflect estimates by planners 
in the Colony Government (see GEIC, 1970), and then the Republic Government (see 
Government of Kiribati, 1983), of how many persons with particular specialist knowledge 
and skills were needed.  
The norm of still going overseas for undergraduate and postgraduate studies is 
notwithstanding recent expansion at the University of the South Pacific Kiribati Campus. 
Although sometimes other foreign languages may be involved (e.g., medical training received 
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in Cuba is conducted in Spanish), English is the main language of study in the countries to 
which students are sent. The curricula derive from ideas, concepts, contexts, etc. relevant to 
the home countries of the institutions, as well as the English-language research literature and 
English-language textbooks. The lecturers, teachers, etc. may be from various countries, but 
not only will few, if any, will be from Kiribati, most are unlikely to know much about 
Kiribati, except as a likely casualty of sea-level rise, and many may not have even heard of it.  
These issues are also reflected in the distance-learning materials, etc. that comprise the 
increasing but still limited range of undergraduate courses available at the University of the 
South Pacific Kiribati Campus; a saving grace is that many are tutored by I-Kiribati in a mix 
of te taetae ni Kiribati and English. Demand for these courses has steadily increased because 
growth in numbers of Year 13 students has outstripped growth in scholarships, and so the 
proportion of who can obtain scholarships to study overseas is falling. Demand from 
Tarawa’s large youth population has also been outstripping supply in the vocational 
institutions for some time, in part because their courses are seen as a means of facilitating 
obtaining work overseas, perhaps in an effort to emigrate. In these institutions, much 
localisation in staff and language has occurred, but perhaps not quite as much as in secondary 
education, particularly in the matter of advisors to the principals, rather than the teaching 
staff. Having said that, the position of director of the University of the South Pacific Kiribati 
Campus has been held by I-Kiribati for three decades now. A reason for the presence of 
foreign advisors is that aid organisations and the Republic Government have tried to raise the 
standard of qualifications to those in metropolitan countries, including by students taking 
assessments in common with students studying in those countries, with the intention that 
emigrants will find their qualifications are accepted by employers in the countries where they 
settle. 
In the rest of this section, I deal with various issues arising from the developments of the 
formal system analysed above, and with assorted consequences. I-Nikunau have shown great 
enthusiasm for learning and knowledge about the outside world and their own world as 
interpreted by outsiders, as well as for the forms this knowledge can take, be it in traditional 
oral stories related by teachers from elsewhere or in written and cinematic forms, as 
introduced by churches, colonial and aid sources and commercial sources, and for the skills 
needed to access that knowledge, including reading, writing, watching, listening, interpreting, 
criticising and evaluating. As claimed in S4.8, this outside knowledge was an alternative to 
what unimane and unaine have had to offer; it enabled some I-Nikunau to be less dependent 
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and predisposed to these elders and their authority, including to make inquiries, pose 
questions and find answers without offending these elders. Thus, curtailment of the 
traditional system was not something I-Nikunau resisted all that much, retaining parts that 
suited them, including the dance practices. Indeed, the latter are a subject in which 
demarcations between the traditional and the formal have long persisted, with traditional 
dance being learnt from one’s elders not from schoolteachers (cf. Autio, 2010; Macdonald, 
1982a). More generally, in Kiribati and elsewhere, unimane and unaine still figure in the 
personal development of young I-Nikunau, as remarked on in S4.8.  
One issue of interest is how the mix between the traditional and formal differs according to 
where I-Nikunau are located. On Nikunau, the exposure to non-I-Kiribati learning of any sort 
is limited mainly to the school classroom, textbooks and, away from school, films and stories 
told by returning residents and foreign visitors. Indeed, the exposure to learning of an I-
Kiribati nature, except as it derives from Nikunau, can also be rare, such as extending only to 
the teacher being from another island and having trained on Tarawa—this may be such that 
students on Nikunau know more about the outside, Anglosphere world of textbooks than they 
do about Tarawa or other islands in the Republic. On Tarawa, the potential exposure to non-I-
Kiribati learning is undoubtedly greater than on Nikunau, including through access to the 
Internet and mixing with more returning residents and foreign visitors, but is still often 
dominated by what they meet at school; missing from this learning is very much about life on 
Outer Islands and knowledge and skills for surviving on atolls traditionally, other than 
through the stories of grandparents perhaps.  
In metropolitan countries, the formal education received by I-Kiribati children reflects life in 
general around them more so than is the case in Kiribati; one reason for this is that the 
curricula and textbooks used, like those in Kiribati, reflect the Anglosphere world. At school, 
reflecting life in general away from the home or community, Kiribati barely rates a mention, 
either in the main curriculum or in extra-curricular activities, unless it is to do with global 
warming, and climate change (Bedford & Bedford, 2010; Fedor, 2012; Gillard & Dyson, 
2012; Taberannang, 2011; Thompson, 2016). This applies in New Zealand, notwithstanding 
various idiosyncrasies, both among the dominant Pākehā and as a result of bi- or multi-
culturalism. Notwithstanding exceptions arising through extra-curricular activities for so-
called Pasifika (or Pacifica) students (e.g., Pasifika speech competitions – see Riccarton High 
School, 2017), I-Kiribati children’s exposure in New Zealand to tacit and explicit knowledge 
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about Kiribati and I-Kiribati mainly occurs at home and during regular diasporic community 
activities, rather than at school.  
In the aforementioned extra-curricular activities in New Zealand schools, Kiribati is 
somewhat incidental to Samoa, Tonga, etc. This state of affairs is understandable both from 
the points of view of the so-called Pasifika Community itself and of the New Zealand 
authorities91 and their schools. The population of I-Kiribati in New Zealand may be 
significant by Kiribati standards but they are only a small proportion of the population with 
affiliations to any of the Pacific Islands, as illustrated in Figure 12 (see Bedford, 2008; 
Bedford & Bedford, 2013; Wright & Hornblow, 2008). Moreover, I-Kiribati comprise barely 
0.05% of New Zealand’s population, and so are a tiny minority, so much so that there is no 
separate box for them to tick on official forms, whether related to education or other 
governmental administration processes—I-Kiribati are expected to tick the Other Pacific 
box. In any case, in normal parlance at school, and elsewhere, I-Kiribati children, and adults, 
are often referred to as Pasifika or Pacific Islanders, rather than I-Kiribati. However, among 
the persons comprising the categories Pasifika or Pacific Islanders, I-Kiribati are gradually 
being acknowledged more as distinct, although even among these persons, the question, 
“Where’s that?” is still not unusual. 
 
Figure 12. Pacific migration 1979-2016 (Source: Edens, 2017) 
Continuing on the theme of a mix of traditional and formal, while the two complement each 
other in some respects (see Garrett, 1992), they can also conflict. On Tarawa, let alone 
Nikunau, participation in formal education has meant outside knowledge of questionable 
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relevance displacing arguably still valid knowledge for I-Nikunau and other I-Kiribati. Two 
significant areas of I-Nikunau’s cultural circumstances are particularly concerning, namely, 
their knowledge of their material culture and sustaining life in general on Nikunau and 
similar places, and their legends, history and ancestry (cf. Republic of Kiribati, 2009). 
In New Zealand, particularly in non-mixed I-Kiribati households, my observations suggest 
that unimane and unaine are concerned for the spiritual well-being and general discipline of 
the young in the face of the secular education rendered in the schools that most I-Kiribati 
children attend. This is consistent with some distance existing between learning at school and 
learning at home. The school curriculum encourages students to speak out, challenge, 
criticise and so on. As Roman points out, these qualities are not always appreciated by 
parents or grandparents, leading to confusion, even conflict, when children behave at home 
according to this curriculum. Further confusion arises at school when children behave as they 
are taught at home: their teachers are apt to criticise them for not participating in discussions 
and not expressing opinions—see point in S3.1 about kamama arising whether a person 
answers a question correctly or incorrectly, so discouraging curiosity and encouraging 
introversion (McCreary & Boardman, 1968).  
A related dilemma for parents in New Zealand, according to Roman (2013) and Thompson 
(2016), is whether to encourage or discourage their children mixing socially with non-I-
Kiribati children; some parents fear not only loss of language and culture but also exposure to 
undesirable activities, including roaming the streets at night and substance abuse. However, 
no matter what their parents’ views are, children do mix at school, as encouraged by the 
school curriculum, be it in sports or whatever.  
Another matter pointed out by Roman (2013) relates to relations between students, teachers 
and parents in New Zealand. He indicates I-Kiribati parents, fathers especially, are not used 
to the amount of parental involvement there is in raising children in New Zealand compared 
with Tarawa. This involvement ranges from participating in parent-teacher sessions at school 
to spending time with children at home or at sports or on outings. For example, parents find it 
peculiar to take children on tours of the countryside to look at flora, fauna, landscape and 
other geological features, or to visit tourist and leisure attractions with an educational slant, 
such as museums, art galleries and theatres. 
Among parents and young adult learners, the aforementioned enthusiasm for learning 
knowledge about the outside world has been evident in their preferences for their children, 
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and even themselves, to study subjects and gain qualifications that might give them 
opportunities to leave Nikunau and the kawa subsistence life there—see mention above of the 
failure of community high schools—(Burnett, 1999, 2007; Dixon, 2004b; Geddes et al., 
1982; McCreary & Boardman, 1968), or nowadays, to leave Tarawa, because of its adverse 
living conditions and insecure future (see S3.2). I-Nikunau have come to see qualifications as 
enablers of emigration on their terms, rather than under the categories environment refugee or 
climate refugee (cf. Smith & McNamara, 2015; Williams, 2008). This is notwithstanding the 
frequent experiences of recent immigrants that qualifications obtained in Kiribati (e.g., in 
teaching, nursing and various trades) not being recognised in New Zealand (see S3.3.2) or 
other metropolitan countries in which they sought to settle. Most of those affected have not 
always appreciated the problem until after arriving there, and they have usually had to accept 
low-paid, unskilled jobs, at least temporarily—the evaluation “low-paid” is by comparison 
with pay rates in the metropolitan country, not with the pay rates a skilled or qualified person 
might expect on Tarawa, which are generally even lower (Bedford & Bedford, 2013). 
Thompson (2016) finds that, in order to obtain better jobs, many caught in this situation have 
either upgraded their qualifications to ones that are recognised or are intent on doing so. Or, 
they were studying for new tertiary education qualifications anyway; this was more often 
among adult women than their male partners (cf. McCreary & Boardman, 1968), as borne out 
in findings published by Statistics New Zealand (2014) about the gender of those studying.  
The question of the language of tuition, textbooks, ideas, assessment, etc. is alluded to several 
times above, with te taetae ni Kiribati and English the prime choices. Burnett raises this 
matter in his work on school education (see esp. 2005, 2009), arguing that English as (one of) 
the languages of instruction is something of a double-edged sword. For the vast majority of I-
Nikunau and other I-Kiribati, whether on Nikunau and other Outer Islands or on Tarawa, 
English, since it was introduced in schools, has only ever been a school language. As 
mentioned in S2, English has always presented difficulties for I-Nikunau taught on Nikunau, 
compared with anyone taught on Banaba and, later, Tarawa, and anywhere else where pupils 
have been exposed more to English than on Nikunau, while at primary school and, since 
2001, at junior secondary school.  
English as an issue also affects I-Kiribati beyond Kiribati, resonating with findings of studies 
of non-mixed I-Kiribati households in diasporic communities. Gillard and Dyson (2012) in 
particular raise the predicament of I-Kiribati in New Zealand in the matter of language, and 
whether parents should try to make English a household language, either beside te taetae ni 
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Kiribati or otherwise. With the prospect of children starting pre-school or primary school, 
parents can face a dilemma of how much exposure their young children should have to 
English beforehand; this is assuming that such exposure is possible in the home, which it may 
not be. The perception that lack of English will disadvantage their children when they start is 
often borne out by events, particularly when the number of I-Kiribati attending a school is 
tiny; indeed, they might be exposed to teasing or worse from children of other races 
(Thompson, 2016).  
Even in diasporic communities, English competence raises issues. My experience at the 
frequent botaki in New Zealand is of some divisions between children, and adults, for that 
matter, of various ages who are either more comfortable in speaking either te taetae ni 
Kiribati or English, or less comfortable in either of these. Indeed, Statistics New Zealand 
(2014) reports that 230 (16%) of I-Kiribati born in Kiribati but living in New Zealand cannot 
speak English, compared with 420 (68%) of I-Kiribati born in New Zealand who cannot 
speak te taetae ni Kiribati. Among factors behind these differences are whether children were 
born in New Zealand, or how old they were when they arrived in New Zealand, and how long 
they and other members of their household have been in New Zealand. The language they are 
expected to use at home and the length of time they have attended school in New Zealand are 
other factors.  
4.10 Social Circumstances 
As I-Nikunau’s social circumstances are interrelated with their other circumstances, and so 
many have been dealt with already in passing in S4.1 to S4.9, I focus here only on selected 
social matters, adjudging them important and subsumptive of other relevant matters. I survey 
how these matters have been changing, and sometimes waxed and waned in significance. I 
also consider how they have come to differ according to where I-Nikunau are located, as 
exemplified by metropolitan New Zealand compared with urban island Tarawa, and 
compared with traditional Nikunau. 
Among I-Nikunau socially, as well as in matters both economic (see S4.3) and political (see 
S4.7), mwenga comprise the basic kin units, although in observing the situations of Nikunau, 
Tarawa and New Zealand, for reasons of geographical separation and economic 
independence, among others, this may be clearer in New Zealand than on Tarawa, and then 
again clearer than on Nikunau. However, that is not to say that the situation of most I-Kiribati 
households in the several diasporic communities in New Zealand resemble even tentatively 
the norms of the Anglosphere society around them. Indeed, except for Māori iwi and diaspora 
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of other Pacific Island states (e.g., Samoa, Tonga), the sense of mwenga interdependence, 
helping each other out, cooperating, coming together and belonging as part of daily life (cf. 
Thompson, 2016) is much stronger and somewhat different in nature compared with most of 
the other ethnocultural groups among which these I-Kiribati diasporic communities live, 
including those originating, for example, in several of Asia’s most populous countries.  
It is arguable that this characteristic of mwenga interdependence, no matter whether on 
Tarawa or in New Zealand, reflects the social circumstances familiar to I-Nikunau on 
Nikunau, present and past, not only since kawa became the ascendant form of settlement but 
also before, when kainga were the ascendant form (see S4.2). For example, on occasions 
when I stayed in Tabomatang in the 1980s, mwenga of each te utu were at times so closely 
knit as to be difficult for the uninitiated outsider to distinguish. What is more, all mwenga 
were part of te kawa, and expected to contribute and participate in the frequent political, 
social and cultural activities going on in it. These communal activities were mostly in or near 
the church mwaneaba; they included botaki involving the whole te kawa or portions of it 
(e.g., residents from a particular area of te kawa, young men’s groups, women’s groups, kawa 
welfare groups), daily gatherings of unimane to eat, smoke and talk as one group, weekly 
screenings of films,92 bowi of unimane and passing the time, including with card and board 
games. Church-related activities were ubiquitous, including observance of te Tabati. 
Another social feature of mwenga on Nikunau was the important place of senior women in 
their organisation, including in how these women organised the younger women and the 
children in domestic choring and such like (cf. Rose, 2014); all these women were involved 
in kawa and church activities, such as weaving mats, baskets, and fishing hats, and rolling 
string and cigarette “paper”, and the children attended the inter-kawa primary schools 
regularly (see S4.9). For the men’s part, the many that were able-bodied went fishing and 
worked aba belonging both to them and to those whose owners were working away or 
otherwise absent; infirm and old men stayed in te kawa, socialising in te mwaneaba or te 
mwenga. These patterns are reflected on Tarawa and in New Zealand, except men’s work is 
often in waged or, even, salaried jobs and women too are often in employment, and mwenga 
rely economically on goods and services bought with cash, rather than on fish and crops 
caught or grown through subsisting (see S3.2, S3.3.2, S4.3 and S4.6).  
The most memorable social activities from time I spent on Nikunau in Tabomatang, Tabutoa 
and other kawa took place in mwaneaba and resemble those analysed on Tabiteuea by 
Kazama (2001) and Autio (2010). Apart from almost daily, informal activities, they also 
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included several botaki to welcome, be hospitable to and farewell visitors, and to celebrate 
festivals; there was also a birth and a funeral, each held around mwenga of those affected, 
again including botaki. Reiterating S4.7, bowi of unimane were largely responsible for 
deciding the format and, if discretionary, the timing of these botaki and other special events, 
and on the distribution of work and the contributions from among mwenga. I have 
participated in many more similar activities on Tarawa (see S3.2) and in New Zealand (see 
S3.3.2). In both these, botaki and other community activities are timed and framed taking 
account of other aspects of life outside the diasporic communities that were not relevant on 
Nikunau. These aspects include employment and school commitments, and in New Zealand’s 
case, travelling time and the availability of suitable venues (i.e., campgrounds, marae, etc. 
where overnight stays in communal sleeping areas are permitted). A further difference in 
New Zealand is that decisions about special events, etc. are the responsibility of committees 
of formal associations. Their membership include women and younger persons of either 
gender. On Tarawa, things began changing in the 1960s (see McCreary & Boardman, 1968) 
but they are still somewhere in between, with a person’s education and status at work gaining 
significance in terms of who makes up te bowi and is involved in decisions.  
Accepted behaviours and similar, as embodied in te katei ni Kiribati are a feature present at 
the events I have just recounted and more generally within kawa and diasporic communities. 
Persons’ boundaries and obligations under te katei seem generally understood but if these are 
not clear, or are infringed, then it falls to whoever comprises te bowi (i.e., unimane, the 
committee, etc.) to decide or act. Looking much further back than the past 30 years or so of 
my observations, previous observers report that social controls, etc. of the 1820s were widely 
impressed by the traditional education system for initiating young people into society as 
adults, warriors, marriage partners, parents, etc. (see S4.9). Te katei evolved with the coming 
of the Churches and exposure of I-Nikunau to life and values associated with I-Matang, 
including at school and working away. Even so, the version on Nikunau was, and has 
remained, traditional, with communal obligations and expectations of individuals by age and 
gender being stringent, and boundaries set around potential individual freedoms. Indeed, as 
exemplified by observance of te Tabati, albeit in different ways depending on church 
affiliation, te katei was modified but not made much more or much less stringent by the 
missions.  
This contrasts with Tarawa, where according to my observations and various informants 
adherence has weakened somewhat in the past three or more decades, and then again 
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compared with New Zealand. This weakening, or relaxation, seems attributable not only to 
the onset of modernity (e.g., tenets of formal educational, awareness and experience of values 
and general conduct in more liberal societies, social media, private possessions) but also 
because of population turnover and disconnect from the original source of the controls. What 
I am driving at is the proportion of the adult population on Tarawa who lack any experiential 
knowledge of life on Nikunau is quickly increasing, as is starting to happen in New Zealand 
in relation to Tarawa, and so the ways brought from Nikunau are being displaced by the ways 
formulated on Tarawa, or in New Zealand’s case, the ways brought from Tarawa are being 
displaced by the ways formulated in New Zealand. 
Concomitant with these various changes, especially the more recent ones, I-Nikunau became 
more conscious of their individual selves and being part of an immediate family, and of the 
responsibilities and obligations that accompanied these capacities. Although this individuality 
tends to be more evident among I-Nikunau as one moves away from Nikunau into urban 
island and then metropolitan country diasporic communities, individuality has never been 
totally absent among I-Nikunau on Nikunau. Indeed, there is every indication that, as among 
I-Tabiteuea, this individuality existed before I-Matang entered the scene (see Geddes, 1977) 
and their desires to be “differentiated” and “undifferentiated” are of long standing or part of 
tradition (see Autio, 2010). Furthermore, that this individuality, or differentiation, among a 
tradition of community, or undifferentiation, was based on te I-Nikunau’s holdings of aba 
and marine areas and the specialist knowledge and skills they secreted from generation to 
generation (Geddes, 1977). As indicated in S4.8 and S4.9, these individually held resources 
were as much social as economic, spiritual or political.  
In pointing to its longstanding existence, Geddes (1977) claims that individuality among I-
Tabiteuea had been obscured by their social, political and religious constructions (i.e., boti, 
kainga, utu and mwenga), which as discussed extensively in previous sections are also at the 
centre of I-Nikunau society. Changes involving traders, missionaries and Colony Government 
officials wrought the demise of boti and kainga, and caused major revisions to utu. When 
these events occurred, the heart of social control moved from the traditional mwaneaba (and 
te kainga) to the church mwaneaba, with the cooperative enterprises and Te Tautaeka (i.e., 
the Colony Government authorities, including its island-based subordinate bodies, the Island 
Council and courts) in the mix too (cf. Hockings, 1984). As a result, individuality that was 
previously obscured was made plainer. In particular, following the demise of kainga (see 
S4.2), individuals (e.g., te I-Tabiteuea, te I-Nikunau) assumed a greater sense of personal and 
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exclusive user rights to particular aba (Goodenough, 1955; Hockings, 1984; Lundsgaarde & 
Silverman, 1972; cf. Polanyi, 1957). Alongside this demise, however, four other 
developments subsequent to colonial contact brought out a greater consciousness of self, and 
I would argue that these too fuelled this innate individuality.  
First, conversion from beliefs about I-Nikunau living on Nikunau and the spirits of their 
ancestors living on Matang, etc. (see Latouche, 1983) to Christianity entailed te I-Nikunau 
giving something of a personal reckoning to Iehova (see S4.8) and his Earthly 
representatives, rather than only a reckoning to unimane, who were expected to depart for 
Matang soon. Second, engaging in copra production, trade and paid work, as distinct from 
subsistence work around kainga (see S4.3), gave rise to te I-Nikunau participating in 
contracts and markets as an individual (see S4.3). Third, taxes (including the performance of 
communal workdays), school fees, fines, and licence fees were demanded from te I-Nikunau 
individually by governmental bodies (see S4.3 and S4.7). Fourth, the laws of the Colony 
Government, although cognisant of close family and households (i.e., mwenga), placed 
responsibility, obligations and restrictions on individual te I-Nikunau, and anyone who broke 
these laws was charged and tried as an individual (see S4.7).  
These four still apply, albeit in more modern guises, particularly in diasporic communities. 
Furthermore, in metropolitan countries, I-Nikunau experience and are drawn into an 
individualism of a secular kind, which is rife in their ascendant Anglosphere cultures and 
easily rubs off on te I-Kiribati, particularly among those at school, where it is a deliberate 
aspect of their learning. Indeed, this is often a source of tension in te mwenga, particularly 
those spanning three generations, namely persons of school age, working age parents and the 
latter’s parents. Members of the eldest generation can be frustrated to find that, having 
reached the condition of unimane or unaine, these lack the status of yesteryear (see S4.9). 
Alongside bolstering individuality in among traditional societal constructions on Nikunau of 
boti, kainga and utu, aba comprising the atoll and marine areas adjacent to it were a 
significant social resource for generations of I-Nikunau, at least up to the third quarter of the 
20th Century; this applied even to I-Nikunau absent from the atoll. I-Nikunau were born on 
their aba, and they conversed with each other, subsisted, worshipped, established mwenga, 
had children and were buried on them—indeed, Trussel and Groves (2003) give the 
translation of aba as land and people generally. Thus, this social significance of aba 
paralleled their economic (see S4.3) spiritual (see S4.8) and political (see S4.7) significance; 
moreover, they were prepared to defend their customary rights to them, physically or 
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litigiously (see Baaro, 1987; Lawrence, 1992; Lundsgaarde, 1968b, 1974; Lundsgaarde & 
Silverman, 1972; Macdonald, 1971, 1982a; Maude & Maude, 1931; Maude, 1963; Pole, 
1995; Roniti, 1988; Sabatier, 1939/1977; Thomas, 2001). One way these significances can be 
appreciated is from the number of terms in te taetae ni Kiribati that relate to aba. As these 
terms also bring out other important social relations in I-Nikunau society (cf. Grimble, 1989, 
re Butaritari), I shall enumerate them. 
Ownership implied enjoying usufructuary rights to te aba and marine areas in life, and mostly 
to pass these rights on at death to a member of utu ni kaan as te aba n utu—for an elaboration 
of how this worked and its consequences in terms of landholdings and boti-utu relations, see 
Hockings (1984). However, there were exceptions and the list was extensive (Maude & 
Maude, 1981; Pole, 1995; Trussel & Groves, 2003), including the following. Te aba n tibu or 
toba was given for tibutibu, the adopted child obtaining the rights as if natural. Te aba te bora 
on n tinaba was given as part of tinaba relationships—these relationships were eventually 
stamped out by the Christians (see S4.8). Te aba ni kakua was given as a mark of gratitude 
for assistance. Te aba ni mumuta or kuakua was given as a reward for nursing. Te aba n 
tangira was a gift for other reasons. Te aba n nenebo or nebonebo formed compensation for 
murder, other serious wrongdoings, breach of promise of marriage, et cetera—this 
compensation ended when the Colony Government instituted the practice of crime against, 
and punishment by, the state.93 Te aba n toka stemmed from wars, which led to aba 
belonging to the vanquished being shared out (and captured former owners being enslaved or 
driven away)—any wars in the Kiribati Archipelago (e.g., on Tarawa) were curtailed in the 
early years of Colony Government.94 
An important corollary of these social transfers of rights in aba and marine areas was the 
development of something akin to asset registers, which in turn made for an indigenous 
accounting of social, economic and cultural significance, the other facet of this accounting 
being genealogy or ancestry. This second facet stemmed from constructions of kinship groups 
and social categories running though society, namely, utu, boti, mwenga and kainga—that 
these are a form of accounting, social and otherwise, is supported by the striking similarities 
between them and those in Winiata’s typology of Māori resources (see Gallhofer, Gibson, 
Haslam, McNicholas & Takiari, 2000), not to mention discussions of Gibson (2000) and 
Greer and Patel (2000) about accounting of Australian Aboriginals. Thus, this accounting 
integrated the ancestry of I-Nikunau, living and dead, with an inventory of aba and marine 
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areas associated with Nikunau; it recorded who presently had rights to each item and the 
history of how these rights had come about.  
This accounting was supported by the keeping of the records, a process that was also 
significant to social relations. Said records were entirely oral and of longstanding, being passed 
from one generation to the next, both between affected individuals and between unimane. The 
records pertaining to an individual were passed to them as part of the rights of passage to 
adulthood (see S4.9) and to being accepted as a member of te boti (see Grimble, 1952). A 
young person developed the ability to recite those applying to him or her. This knowledge and 
ability was important to establishing one’s place in society and in supporting one’s claims to 
rights associated with boti and aba. Indeed, as indicated in S4.7, if a person was at some time 
to visit a mwaneaba district where they were not known, they could authenticate their boti by 
reciting their ancestry through several generations and have it compared with the local oral 
records and understandings of their boti kept by unimane at the place visited. Authentication 
entitled them to sit with their te boti during, for example, formal social, spiritual and political 
proceedings of mwaneaba, and to receive hospitality and accommodation from members of te 
boti in question. 
The role of unimane in the latter is an example of how oral records and understandings were 
a source of their knowledge-power and status. Unimane were reputed to be able to recite 
genealogical records of their boti or kainga and utu, and to not only know the name of every 
aba held by members of their utu but also to be able to describe them, their boundaries and 
their history of ownership—for versions of these records recited by I-Nikunau unimane and 
recorded in writing, see Latouche (1983) and Uering (1979).95 An extension of the 
knowledge-power and status conferred on unimane through the records was the authority they 
gave bowi of unimane in mwaneaba to adjudicate over disputes about aba, usually after 
hearing the litigants state their cases but occasionally through formal combat between the 
litigants under the control of bowi (Lundsgaarde, 1968a).  
The Colony Government challenged to this knowledge-power and status of unimane, at least 
as far as aba were concerned. It instituted kabowi n aba ( lands courts) on each island to 
replace the judicial proceedings in mwaneaba, and Te Kabowi n Aba of today on Nikunau, 
and its equivalent on Tarawa, are the result. It made various attempts (see Townsend, 1951) to 
replace the oral with the written (e.g., Register of Landowners and Lands 1908), but the series 
of written registers that resulted proved less-than-successful (Pole, 1995), and so hardly 
diminished the importance of unimane’s records of aba among I-Nikunau and as part of 
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proceedings in Te Kabowi n Aba. Indeed, for a while at least, these proceedings might not 
have seemed substantially different from those in mwaneaba. However, Te Kabowi n Aba 
involved fewer jurists, whose source of authority and appointment process were colonial not 
ancestral, and it covered the whole of Nikunau, not just one or other of the districts.  
The Colony Government’s less-than-successful attempts to replace the oral with the written 
have been followed since by equally frustrated attempts under the auspices of the Republic 
Government. Mostly, these have been at the behest of aid organisations, which see written 
registers as vital to transactions in land, and see buying and selling land as an important part 
of their recipe for economic development and efficient use of resources, including that such 
transactions are a necessary aspect of much potential foreign investment (cf. Connell, 1987). 
Said organisations are equally impatient about restrictions in te katei impeding these 
objectives (see Duncan, 2014; Government of Kiribati, 1983; Ministry of Works and Public 
Utilities, 2011).  
The root of the restrictions in te katei is that the value of land to I-Nikunau is of a socio-
cultural nature, rather than merely economic. What is more, trading in aba is likely to bring 
kamama on sellers: sellers would be putting themselves ahead of their descendants in order to 
make easy money, instead of making a living in ways by which usufructuary rights to aba 
would be passed on. As for the attempts to establish written land registers, these threatened 
the high regard in which the oral records and unimane have been held among I-Nikunau. In 
any case, their I-Matang compilers sought to base them on premises akin to British 
commercial views of land and of systems of land ownership. In these, land is primarily a 
commodity, whose source of, and reason for, ownership is predominantly economic, and on 
which a financial value can be put, using quantitative measures. Such premises were, and 
within most of Kiribati still are, far removed from I-Nikunau and other I-Kiribati meanings 
and practices of aba ownership, uses and conveyancing. These acknowledge the social and 
kinship-ancestral significances of aba, as reflected in the traditional oral records and 
understandings, and in the continuing standing of these records even in the judicial system. If 
one wanted to assess the value of land to I-Nikunau, one needs to think in socio-cultural 
terms, using qualitative means (Baaro, 1987; Lawrence, 1992; Lundsgaarde, 1968a, 1974; 
Macdonald, 1982a; Pole, 1995). 
The aforementioned impatience of aid organisations over the land situation in Kiribati is 
notwithstanding the customary restrictions on disposing and acquiring aba through trade 
being supplemented in the Constitution of Kiribati 1979 by restrictions on non-I-Kiribati 
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being able to purchase land in the Republic. These provisions have countered lesser laws and 
official policies proclaimed under the auspices of successive Republic Government 
administrations permitting and encouraging land sales in keeping with neo-liberal ideas, 
advice, etc. Thus, notwithstanding the formal legal possibilities, aba are still difficult to trade 
as if they were a commodity, although more so on Nikunau and the other long-settled Kiribati 
islands than on the recently settled Line Islands.  
It is on Tarawa, however, where the aid organisations feel the restrictions particularly keenly, 
as far as the foreign investors, for whom they seem to be rooting, are concerned. There, 
although the social significance of aba may be diluted, it still applies, and so affects members 
of its diasporic community of I-Nikunau, along with diasporic communities associated with 
other Outer Islands. Indeed, most settlers reside on aba over which I-Tarawa still have rights 
or claim to have rights (see S4.4). However, because of its history as the Colony Government 
headquarters and now main political and commercial centre of the Republic, these rights and 
claims have gone through great upheaval and so are much more complicated and confusing 
than on the other islands (except perhaps Banaba). To some extent, I-Tarawa most affected 
have been appeased in practice by receiving lease payments at regular intervals, largely from 
the Republic Government (cf. Corcoran, 2016). 
As genealogy and aba continue in importance among I-Nikunau, so does the use of oral 
records and understandings, albeit that their form, context, application and meaning are much 
adapted, particularly in diasporic communities. Already mentioned in this section is their use 
on Nikunau in Te Kabowi n Aba as evidence for settling disputes about aba and rights to 
them, and they are used too on Tarawa, as part of the disputes procedures just alluded to 
there, as well as on the other Kiribati islands. For I-Nikunau residing outside the Kiribati 
Archipelago with no practical intention of returning, the significance of their aba there, along 
with the matters with which acquiring aba was associated, are diminishing or have already 
been lost, and so too is their need of aba records. This is notwithstanding many I-Nikunau in 
diasporic communities, particularly in metropolitan places, still referring to having aba on 
Nikunau, but in socially and culturally symbolic ways, including identifying with Nikunau 
and being I-Nikunau, rather than as an economic resource on which they or their descendants 
might make a living in future (cf. Shuval, 2000). Concomitantly, in their prolonged absence, 
many of these aba are utilised by utu, and perhaps maintained and regenerated by them as per 
the concept of usufruct; as time passes, and one generation replaces another, their de facto 
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possession fuse with de jure user rights, and so ownership, as it is understood on Nikunau, 
including by incorporation in oral records and understandings of same.  
The records and understandings of genealogy also continue to be used to check for 
consanguinity, particularly to avoid karikira in the choosing and approving marriage partners, 
which as alluded to in S4.5 has been a concern of longstanding (Grimble, 1989; Maude, 
1963). More than that, given the spread of the I-Nikunau diaspora, knowledge of one’s 
ancestry can be significant in making introductions among not only I-Nikunau but also I-
Kiribati generally, and in joining a diasporic community. Thus, when meeting for the first 
time someone unfamiliar but who speaks te taetae ni Kiribati or is otherwise identified as I-
Kiribati, one of the first things I-Nikunau do is to test whether they are related or ascertain 
which friends or acquaintances they have in common. More formally, if strangers are present 
at a botaki in New Zealand, the proceedings are usually opened by everyone forming a circle 
and each person in turn introducing themselves according to their ancestry and the island(s) 
whence these ancestors originated. These particulars are conditions for participating in 
community events and part of expecting and receiving accommodation and hospitality from 
seemingly distant relatives during a visit or extended stay (cf. Hockings, 1984). Nevertheless, 
given how liberally the status of baronga is recognised in diasporic communities away from 
Kiribati and especially in metropolitan communities (see S4.3), lack of kinship is unlikely to 
be used as a reason to turn away a visitor: being able to speak te taetae ni Kiribati or being 
vouched for by a mutual acquaintance is invariably enough to be accepted and 
accommodated.  
The similarities between oral records of I-Kiribati, and the kinship practices they underlie, 
and those of Māori (see above) and some other settler peoples in New Zealand has helped in 
forming relations and developing mutual understandings between the diasporic communities 
there and the peoples they live among, for example in hiring marae for special events. Said 
similarities also mean the authorities in New Zealand have some familiarity with said 
practices, even if sometimes some are apt not to respect them, and compared with official 
policies, much of which still reflects New Zealand’s dominion legacy and the approaches 
once utilised in Kiribati by the Colony Government. 
Gender, age and categories of same (e.g., male-female, young-old) are other aspects of social 
circumstances that can be used to surface contrasts between past and present, and according to 
whether I-Nikunau are living in traditional island, urban island or metropolitan country 
settings. Gender roles and behavioural expectations in general are less marked today than at 
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any time previously, including in the knowledge and skills learnt and practised (see S4.9), 
and in the general conduct expected, permitted and tolerated because someone is male or 
female (see S4.3, S4.7 and above) (cf. Grimble, 1921; Hockings, 1984). Additionally, this is 
appreciably more so the further one moves away from Nikunau (cf. Autio, 2010), although, 
even on Nikunau, women are accepted in such former male roles as deacons, pastors and 
governmental administrators. However, it is probably significant that these examples are non-
traditional roles arising from colonial interventions.  
In the matter of relations between ages, while older people, particularly those accorded the 
status of unimane and unaine still command respect, these relations have altered such that 
worldly knowledge and formal qualifications count at least as much as age, and gender for 
that matter, particularly in urban island and metropolitan country settings where these criteria 
apply in other respects (e.g., positions in workplaces, determinants of income and wealth). 
Indeed, my longitudinal experience of the status of unimane on Nikunau is that from being 
ascendant in the late 1980s, this ascendancy seems to have deteriorated considerably barely 
20 years later. However, I should add the caveat that my later observations were brief and not 
as well situated as my earlier ones were, when I resided in kawa for several weeks at a time. 
Indeed, extended fieldwork studies in the late 1990s on Tabiteuea by Autio (2010) and 
Kazama (2001) would suggest unimane retain not only respect but also authority. However, 
Tabiteuea is reputed to be more traditional than neighbouring islands (Autio, 2010), and so 
may not be a reliable proxy for how things stand on present day Nikunau. 
I now turn to social resources of a colonial and post-colonial nature (e.g., hospitals and health 
systems, schools and education systems, prisons and penal and correction systems). Many 
such resources have been referred to in most previous sections, from which it is plain that, 
within Kiribati, they are far more abundant on Tarawa than on Nikunau, and that, 
notwithstanding some access issues for diaspora (cf. Arlidge et al., 2009), they are more 
abundant in the metropolitan countries than on Tarawa. Furthermore, beginning in the post-
war decades, the extent of these resources within Kiribati has steadily increased but far more 
so on Tarawa than on Nikunau, largely because of centralisation policies, conscious (see 
S4.1) and less witting.  
Besides, whereas much external capital, from the Colonial Development and Welfare Fund 
and aid organisations, lies behind development on Tarawa, most of the capital for social 
resources on Nikunau has had to be contributed by I-Nikunau, usually involuntarily, an 
exception being the cooperative ventures referred to in S4.3; the involuntary nature of their 
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contributions was epitomised most by communal workdays (see S4.7). All well as 
contributions to state and church, I-Nikunau have had expend capital in order to comply 
personally with ever more stringent living regulations; for example, I-Nikunau had to gather 
materials for and work on maintaining and improving mwenga and te kawa to bring them up 
to I-Matang specifications (see S4.2).  
Compared to their kin on Tarawa, the reality for most I-Nikunau on Nikunau has been, and 
still is, one of exclusion from the social resources now present within Kiribati but located on 
Tarawa. When in need of more than, say, basic primary education, or, nowadays, basic junior 
secondary education, or rudimentary outpatient or short stay medical care, most I-Nikunau 
residing on Nikunau have gone without. Except, that is, if they passed the school entrance 
examinations (see S4.9) or participated in specially arranged excursions (e.g., a visit for a 
group of I-Nikunau group to receive hospital treatment from a team of visiting Australian eye 
specialists). Otherwise, not many I-Nikunau can afford the passage by ship, assuming a 
convenient ship was to hand, and, even fewer, the airfare.96  
This dearth of social resources of a colonial and post-colonial nature on Nikunau is 
notwithstanding British officials in Honiara and London becoming concerned in the mid-
1960s about torpor on Nikunau and the other Outer Islands, compared with relative vibrancy 
on Tarawa and, at that time, Banaba; they were also concerned about the increasing flow of 
immigrants to Tarawa. They instituted various projects to address these concerns, intent on 
restoring Nikunau and the other islands as attractive to live on; the projects extended existing 
infrastructure, facilities and communications, and improved education, health and welfare 
services. The structures included classrooms, clinics, staff houses, an island courthouse and 
Island Council buildings, localised water and sewerage systems, a deeper channel in the reef, 
roads and causeways, and the scheduled airline and telephone connections. Besides, new 
district facilities intended to benefit Nikunau and its southern neighbours were established on 
Tabiteuea and the district officer post was reinstated on Beru, after a gap of 30 years.  
Associated with these physical and administrative developments were political ones, as 
alluded to in S4.7: after some teething problems,97 these development led to renewed 
influence of unimane in choosing projects and in island governance more generally, through 
the re-constituted Island Council and courts, as well as trade, that is through Te Bobotin 
Nikunau. Following these measures, there was a slight change in how I-Nikunau regarded the 
Colony Government: that is less as an instrument of authoritarian control from Tarawa and 
more a means of constructive control and source of conditional external funds (Macdonald, 
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1972, 1982a). Perhaps somewhat ironically, however, the extent of developments and the 
effect of political processes waned after the advent of the Republic Government. Its priorities 
lay in establishing itself (see S4.7), with the consequence that Tarawa was once again the 
focus, to the detriment of elsewhere. Besides, immigration of I-Nikunau and other I-Kiribati 
was giving rise to issues on Tarawa, to which the Republic Government, assisted by aid 
organisations, responded with projects, facilities, services, etc., prompting a reciprocal, or 
circular, effect of more immigration, more issues and more responses (see S4.1–S4.3). Hence, 
the gap between social resources on Nikunau and those on Tarawa regathered momentum and 
has continued to widen since.  
For I-Nikunau and other I-Kiribati even being on the periphery of Tarawa’s economy has 
been preferable to remaining on their islands and being marginalised socially, as well as 
economically, politically and other ways. This marginalisation was plain during my last visit 
to Nikunau in 2009; buildings belonging kawa, churches, schools, trading and the Island 
Council showed neglect in terms of physical maintenance and uses (cf. Ortega, 2008), 
reflecting and corresponding with a noticeable number of mwenga being unoccupied (see 
S3.1). Neither the frequency nor importance of unimane gatherings were as obvious as they 
were two decades earlier, probably for lack of unimane: many unimane heads of mwenga 
were residing on Tarawa with their adult offspring, and their siblings still on Nikunau were 
reluctant or unable to assume their mantle in their absence—see Lundsgaarde (1978) for a 
similar situation arising on Tabiteuea from the 1970s compared with the 1960s. 
Concomitantly, communal social life in kawa seemed subdued for want of their leadership, as 
well as for want enthusiasm and even participants.  
In metropolitan countries, the abundance of social resources, along with employment 
opportunities, have been the major attractions for singles, couples or families of 
predominantly I-Kiribati blood to immigrate, including so that children can access schools 
(cf. Thompson, 2016). Nevertheless, baronga and similar social aspects of diasporic 
communities seem at least as important for I-Nikunau to remain there, rather than returning to 
Kiribati. In any case, the availability of social resources for those settling in metropolitan 
countries has its less savoury aspects: their rights of access to these resources, along with 
perceptions of how much use they make of them, can be a reason for being resented by 
existing populations, some of whose members see immigrants as getting a freeride on these 
resources. The argument is usually along the lines that immigrants have not contributed any 
of the capital that has accumulated in the schools, hospitals or similar amenities. Coupled 
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with that, because of the menial, low-paid jobs they hold, they are perceived as not paying 
much tax; or are perceived as receiving unemployment and other social welfare benefits 
through being lazy and reluctant to work (e.g., see “Daily Mail Comment,” 2012; Slack & 
Brown, 2016). These jibes, some of them clearly cast with racist intentions towards “brown-
skinned foreigners”, can deter I-Nikunau from taking up their full legal entitlement to, or 
otherwise making use of these resources, which does not stop the jibes.  
4.11 Organisational Circumstances 
I-Nikunau’s present organisational circumstances can be clarified by distinguishing between 
two types of organisations to which I have already referred, namely, quasi-traditional 
organisations (see S4.7) and non-traditional organisations (see S4.1). In making that 
distinction, however, there is a case for mronron and KPC/KUC congregations to be regarded 
as more quasi-traditional than non-traditional, despite their derivations from commercial and 
religious organisations of external origin. In any case, I-Nikunau, wherever located, 
participate in more organisations nowadays than was the case traditionally and they are 
otherwise affected by the activities of even more organisations. What is more, the further I-
Nikunau live away from Nikunau and tradition, such as on Tarawa or in New Zealand, the 
greater and more complex is the web of organisations around them or affecting them, and the 
more peripheral they are in the arrangements of how most of the organisations in question are 
run, certainly in the case of non-traditional organisations that is.  
I-Nikunau’s peripheral status vis-à-vis non-traditional organisations, whether commercial, 
religious, community or governmental in nature, is particularly relevant to the present day 
and the future, since these organisations influence their lives significantly. This peripheral 
status seems to derive from difficulties I-Nikunau have connecting with the range of 
economic, political, social and cultural matters with which many non-traditional 
organisations concern themselves, and difficulties they have comprehending the 
paraphernalia (e.g., types, structure, procedures, history, raison d’être, financing, legal status) 
involved in such organisations. A major source of these difficulties is that these non-
traditional organisations were physically and socially constructed over decades, if not 
centuries, before I-Nikunau encountered them. Furthermore, the principals of these 
organisations were intent on effecting and achieving objectives they set and from which they 
derived benefit on their terms (e.g., commodity acquisition, trading profit, creating a source 
of labour, stamping out of one religion and conversion to another, subjection, order, 
civilisation and development), not on I-Nikunau’s terms; indeed, it has often been the case 
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that I-Nikunau suffered or were harmed, perhaps not intentionally but in ways that could have 
been foreseen.  
Having alluded to circumstances and evidence for the above statements, claims, etc. in 
previous sections, here I review and synthesise those I adjudge important, starting with I-
Nikunau’s traditional state. As first indicated in S4.1, traditionally, I-Nikunau lived as 
mwenga as part of kainga within mwaneaba districts. These organisations were involved with 
matters with which I-Nikunau chose to be, or were content to be, concerned, and were run by 
them according to te katei structures and procedures passed on in traditional systems of 
education, etc. As Hockings (1984) opines, the organising of I-Nikunau communities was 
founded on the boti-mwaneaba scheme, boti concerning themselves with the affairs of 
kainga. Concomitantly, mwenga affairs, including births, deaths, etc. were the remit of utu. 
When conflicts or disputes occurred, boti and utu were counterfoils in terms of power, 
especially as rights relating to aba and marine areas were widely distributed, and passed 
down through, within and among utu, rather than boti.  
These traditional organisations were challenged and significantly changed or replaced 
following the arrival on Nikunau and in its vicinity (e.g. Beru, Nonouti, Tabiteuea, Tarawa, 
Butaritari, Banaba) of representatives of foreign commercial and then religious organisations, 
and eventually governmental organisations. The non-traditional organisations these outsiders 
established continued as offshoots or similar of the overseas organisations they represented. 
Further to what is related above about their objectives and histories, although varying in 
purpose, each possessed a logic derived from their similar place(s) of origin, places, logics 
that were quite different from any to be found on Nikunau or elsewhere in the Kiribati 
Archipelago in almost every respect one can imagine. What is more, before reaching or 
otherwise affecting Nikunau, their systems of personnel, procedures, ideas, purposes, 
interests and financing had spread far and wide, Nikunau being about as far as they might 
spread at the time, and probably still, Antarctica and the International Space Station excepted.  
Not only were I-Nikunau generally ignorant about these organisations, systems and the 
networks they constituted, and their history, but also the outsiders were not quick to enlighten 
them, perhaps not thinking it was important or realising such knowledge was of economic, 
social and political value to them vis-à-vis I-Nikunau. Even so, the organisations established 
on Nikunau and in its vicinity were adapted to fit with conditions among I-Nikunau. 
However, most of the adaptation was on I-Nikunau’s part, rather than the organisations’ (cf. 
Lundsgaarde, 1966). Furthermore, for quite some time, I-Nikunau’s participation in the 
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activities of these non-traditional organisations, even on Nikunau, was almost always on the 
outside—marriage to traders led to a few exceptions perhaps—if not physically then socially, 
culturally, economically and politically. It took major events or similar offshore (e.g., the 
Great Depression, World War II, international pressures for European decolonisation) to 
change fundamentally I-Nikunau’s relations with each of the non-traditional organisation 
types. Furthermore, a lack of alternatives, other than for the organisation(s) to lapse, was 
often the reason that I-Nikunau or I-Kiribati were allowed to be more involved, or stepped in 
to fill a vacuum vacated by outsiders.  
The organisation types in question, be they commercial, religious, community or 
governmental, were also subject to gradual changes from within, but increases in I-Nikunau 
or I-Kiribati involvement through these changes were selective and usually conditional on 
various inductive cum acculturation processes, many of them portrayed as education and 
training. For example, I-Nikunau offspring of I-Matang traders were trained by their fathers, 
etc. in the art of storekeeping and made familiar with ideas of private ownership, the business 
entity as separate from the person, profit and arm’s length transactions (see S4.5). Prospective 
pastors studied at the LMS headquarters at Rongorongo and acquired Protestant ethics, or 
were expected to (see S4.8). Prospective clerks studied at KGVS on Tarawa and assimilated 
cultural nuances wrapped in the syllabuses of the various subjects (see S4.9). Even so, 
involvement of I-Nikunau and other I-Kiribati led to some adaptation of these non-traditional 
organisations to reflect te katei and Kiribati beliefs, values and culture, as is exemplified next 
in the trade stores, as part of successive systems of maritime trade, and the Island Council, as 
part of a system of imperial governance and colonial administration. Incidentally, the 
churches on Nikunau, as part of the LMS-KPC-KUC system, could also be used as an 
example.  
The history of the trade stores is set out in S4.3. After six decades in private hands, during 
which I-Nikunau’s participation in them and the succession of maritime trading networks of 
which they were part, economically and logistically, was largely restricted to the lowest 
levels of these networks—I-Nikunau were either copra cutters, supplying the networks from 
the outside, or employees, at no higher a level than store-workers, deckhands and other toilers 
(Couper, 1968)— I-Nikunau stepped in and took them over, so as to maintain their means of 
exchanging their copra for the goods and cash on which they had become somewhat 
dependent. District Officer Maude acquainted I-Nikunau with ideas around the cooperative 
forms of ownership, having seen and been impressed by them in Tuvalu (see Catala, 1957; 
 
162 
Maude, 1949, 1950). By applying these ideas, I-Nikunau were able to reconcile running the 
commercial stores with notions in te katei ni Nikunau of community and social 
undifferentiation. Each of I-Nikunau’s te boboti was governed by an elected committee, on 
which unimane predominated, and they frequently convened bowi of members (e.g., a whole 
kawa). Boboti administration and accounting was performed, for little or no formal payment, 
by a few I-Nikunau, who had probably derived the requisite knowledge and skills from being 
involved in private and church trading and Nikunau Native Government administration. 
In addition to addressing the immediate issue of the trade of copra for imported goods 
continuing on Nikunau, this change also marked cooperative ownership, with semblances of 
traditional organisations adapted to commerce, being the norm on Nikunau for over eight 
decades—this form is only now perhaps being threatened by the prospect of stores run along 
more proprietorial lines, including branches of those that have existed for three decades on 
Tarawa, mostly in the hands of naturalised I-Kiribati or those of mixed I-Matang or Chinese 
ancestry, and Nikunau-based businesses that resemble them. However, the life of the original 
boboti that were established on Nikunau was short lived, affected by the wartime pause in 
trade. With this war out of the way, the restored Colony Government, with Maude as resident 
commissioner, helped I-Nikunau establish Te Bobotin Nikunau, which became important to I-
Nikunau not only in an economic sense (see S4.3) but also politically (see S4.7) and socially 
(see S4.10).  
I-Nikunau generally saw Te Bobotin Nikunau’s ascendancy for over 50 years as being for the 
common good, with community savings providing financial and social capital. Its authority 
derived from unimane from around the atoll being involved in its governance and 
enthusiastically so, and bowi of members being convened regularly. That authority was seen 
to be exercised in a broadly-beneficial, social way, rather than a narrowly-beneficial, 
economic way. Low prices were charged for goods, calculated usually on a standardised 
12.5% mark-up, and, correspondingly, fair prices were paid for copra. Although surpluses, if 
any, could be distributed to members as cash bonuses, usually in proportion to purchases, 
they were mostly used for expansion, including into functions that were novel to I-Nikunau, 
such as providing a savings and loans bank and screening films and staging other activities 
that could be enjoyed by entire communities (Catala, 1957; Couper, 1967, 1968; Dixon & 




Te Bobotin Nikunau’s decline over the past 25 years or so (see S4.3) might be linked to a 
string of interrelated economic, organisational, administrative ideological and cultural 
reasons, including the following. Although Nikunau’s population has remained about the 
same over this period despite emigration, incomes from copra and remittances probably fell 
in real terms, as well as in relative terms vis-à-vis Tarawa and further afield. However, if this 
has happened, it not affected other trading entities continuing, or even starting up (i.e., kawa 
and church mronron, and, in one case, a proprietary store); indeed, these were now out-
competing Te Bobotin Nikunau, including as agents authorised for handling copra on behalf 
of its single buyer, the Republic Government (see S3.1 and S4.3). Emigration has reduced the 
supply of intellectually able persons and unimane on Nikunau. The cooperative network of 
training and support across Kiribati has also declined, particularly on Tarawa. At the behest 
of aid organisations that became so influential in the structure of the Kiribati economy, the 
Republic Government has adopted neo-liberal policies, and these favour competition and 
disfavour cooperation; its cooperative oversight agencies responsible for regulation, 
development, education, training, etc., have been starved of funds and outside assistance, and 
allowed to run down.  
The importing and exporting channels into and out of Tarawa, and the distributing of goods 
within Kiribati, were deregulated as part of these neo-liberal policies and several businesses 
became involved. For mronron and other trading entities on Nikunau, Tarawa and elsewhere, 
this has meant no longer having to go through the likes of Te Bobotin Nikunau in order to 
obtain goods for resale. The ones on Nikunau seem to have chosen to deal directly with 
businesses on Tarawa because Te Bobotin Nikunau has not responded to opportunities 
afforded by more goods being available on Tarawa for importing to Nikunau, and the 
equivalent has occurred on Tarawa. Although in number, if not in size, most of these trading 
entities on Nikunau and Tarawa are run along the cooperative lines disfavoured by the aid 
organisations, they have a stronger grassroots character in keeping with local culture, 
compared even with the likes of Te Bobotin Nikunau, which, when push came to shove, were 
more associated in I-Nikunau’s and other I-Kiribati’s minds with Te Tautaeka (see Roniti, 
1985). Indeed, seeing Te Bobotin Nikunau decline, unimane and I-Nikunau generally reacted 
by switching their support to kawa and church mronron, and so hastened that decline. This 
switch may also be seen as moving away also from an atoll-wide organisation to district or 
kawa level organisations.  
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Whatever, kawa and church mronron seem to be seen by I-Nikunau at least as legitimate as 
Te Bobotin Nikunau for being run along cooperative lines. The ideas of private traders and 
private profits, favoured by supporters of neo-liberalism but resented during the pre-
cooperative era, continue to be kept at bay, at least on Nikunau, if much less so on Tarawa, 
where some of the substantial trading and service entities the Colony Government handed 
over to the Republic Government have been either privatised or closed down, and their lines 
of business taken up by new private businesses. Even so, the Republic Government has had 
to sustain its role as a monopsonist in the trade with copra cutters (see S4.3), despite some ire 
from aid organisation representatives who see this primarily as economic interventionism and 
a form of agricultural subsidies. The intervention came about because Te Bobotin Nikunau 
and its equivalent on other islands declined so much that their cash flows were insufficiently 
buoyant to provide the working capital for the copra purchasing process. The guarantee that 
the Republic Government now gives copra cutters relates both to price and receiving cash on 
the same day as they deposit their copra (see S3.1 and S4.3). This intervention was a political, 
social and economic necessity; Outer Island MPs realised that the continuing support of copra 
cutters on Outer Islands, including responding to their demands for increases in the price paid 
for copra, was vital to their re-election. 
The history of the Island Council, including te kabowi n abamakoro, the Nikunau Native 
Government and the associated island courts, is set out in S4.7, with additional material in 
S4.8, tracing its links to the Samoan pastors and their immediate successors in furtherance of 
their spiritual ambitions. The idea of a governmental based purely on territory, rather than 
kainga–boti kinship, not to mention its functions (e.g., island rules, island taxation), were 
new concepts or new applications. So too was the oversight it underwent from Beru after 
1900, first from those at the LMS headquarters and then by the Southern Gilberts district 
officer. Nevertheless, it appeared that I-Nikunau controlled the council and courts, since they 
peopled the positions associated with these organisations, and the highest official positions 
(e.g., the island magistrate and te tia-koroboki) were held by other I-Kiribati, if not I-
Nikunau.  
But this appearance somewhat disguised the amount of authority lying with the district 
officer, who when all said and done was a single chief, a concept at odds with I-Nikunau’s 
tradition of distributed authority in which uea were tabu—hence Tabi(u)-te-uea Atoll. 
Financial control processes, which entailed, for example, approving council estimates and 
auditing council accounts (see Nikunau Native Government Cash Book 1915–1933), were 
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significant ways in which the district officer wielded his authority, apart from simply being te 
I-Matang (see Bevington, 1990)—that being I-Matang mattered is borne out by the district 
officer positions being disestablished almost as soon as they were localised (see S4.7). These 
processes, and the attendant reporting (see Grimble & Clarke, 1929) about I-Nikunau, their 
atoll and the Southern Gilberts District (cf. Ellice Islands District Report, 1936), were quite 
disproportionate to the quite paltry amounts of money involved as far as the revenues and 
expenditures of the Colony Government were concerned98 (Dixon & Gaffikin, 2014). Thus, 
the means of control were arguably less about money per se than how a colonial official 
could oversee and intervene in organisations that the colonial authorities portrayed as 
belonging to I-Nikunau (cf. Neu, Gomez, Graham & Heincke, 2006; Newbury, 2004). As for 
the colonial authorities themselves, although their district officer was subordinate to persons 
further up a hierarchy (see Figure 11), geographical remoteness meant he could exercise 
much of their authority with little interference from them; indeed, the aforementioned reports 
were one of the few ways his distant superiors actually exercised theirs.  
The parallels between, on the one hand, the council and courts and, on the other hand, the 
trade stores are noteworthy. Both were at the lowest levels of their respective systems, one of 
imperial governance and colonial administration and the other of maritime trade, and so 
subject to control by mostly I-Matang outsiders placed near and far—of course, it should not 
be overlooked that persons at upper levels of the two systems had common interests and often 
colluded. Just as the financial control processes over the council were significant in effecting 
this I-Matang control, so similar processes applied to the trade stores, first between I-Matang 
or Chinese trader and company, and then, and more so, when the stores were reformed as 
boboti under I-Nikunau member-governance and administration. What is more, for as long as 
the trade stores were run by I-Matang and Chinese agent-traders, these processes served 
largely commercial purposes, with principals using reports to evaluate the security of their 
invested capital and the profits and returns on this capital; thus, once the principals and their 
agent-traders, or the proprietary traders, evaluated that trade was no longer going to be 
profitable in the future, or were just stuck for cash because of the effects of the Great 
Depression, they cashed up as best they could, leaving I-Nikunau and the district officer to 
pick up the pieces (Maude, 1949).  
Thereafter, on paper at least, control of boboti began to converge with how the council was 
controlled, especially once Te Bobotin Nikunau was in place and subject to the Co-operative 
Societies Ordinance of 1952. The financial oversight and other provisions of this legislation 
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afforded plenty of scope for political, as well as commercial, control (cf. Roniti, 1985). 
However, unlike the council, distant political control of Te Bobotin Nikunau was impeded by 
unimane’s enthusiasm for it in principle and because it was financially viable in its own right, 
as measured by its profit and loss account, and not dependent on Colony Government funding 
like the council—the council’s dependence was a mix of the form of accounting, that is 
revenues and expenditures were budgeted and accounted for separately, and of it being 
burdened with recurrent costs of social development projects initiated by the Colony 
Government (see S4.7). Besides, between the late 1940s and 1970, political control of the 
council and cooperative by district officers was hampered by the latter being based on 
Tarawa, rather than Beru. 
A further issue about non-traditional organisations is that despite how I-Nikunau and other I-
Kiribati have tried to localise and otherwise adapt them to reflect Kiribati beliefs, values and 
culture associated with te katei, etc., many of their colonialistic traits are still evident four 
decades after the Republic Government was inaugurated, making them distinguishable still 
from the much adapted traditional organisations. Retaining some colonialistic traits has arisen 
through the non-traditional organisations being part of bigger hierarchical and networked 
structures that go beyond Nikunau in particular and Kiribati generally (e.g., see Figure 10).  
Examples of these structures span religion, trade and government. I-Nikunau clergy and their 
congregations are incorporated into elaborate, worldwide networked organisations. The RC 
Church is a single organisation headquartered in the Vatican City, and the KPC/KUC is 
affiliated with the World Council of Churches and the World Communion of Reformed 
Churches. The vast majority of goods bought by I-Nikunau at trade stores run by I-Nikunau 
or other I-Kiribati are produced elsewhere and imported through commercial networks. I-
Nikunau comprise the Nikunau Island Council and some are prominent in the governing and 
administering the Republic, a sovereign state that is part of some greater world order, 
including that its renewal and development involves supranational organisations and other aid 
organisations.  
A further, continuing aspect of this colonial trait of networked, hierarchy is of quasi-
traditional organisations exhibiting some subservience to non-traditional organisations, be it 
within Kiribati or in diasporic communities in metropolitan countries. However, whereas on 
Tarawa, the quasi-traditional organisations can exert some political influence, being a 
legitimate part of indigenous society, invariably elsewhere, the quasi-traditional are dwarfed 
by the non-traditional, just as the I-Kiribati population is but a small percentage of the entire 
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population, and where they are invisible politically (e.g., in New Zealand, they are outside the 
Pākehā–Māori model of New Zealand politics). But whether those on Tarawa actually exert 
this influence is a moot point, the question perhaps being why they would not do so. The 
answer seems to lie in continuing self-perception of inferiority, in knowledge and skills, 
technology, culture and race, inferiority that the different outsider groups (e.g., aid 
organisation staff, foreign politicians and diplomats, foreign business people, foreign 
religious body representatives) seem unable to address even if they wish to.  
As to traits of tradition retained by quasi-traditional organisations, there are various 
examples. Although kainga were seemingly obliterated when the LMS and then the Colony 
Government sought order and control of I-Nikunau by resettling them in kawa (see S4.2), 
kinship relationships persisted through utu and mwenga. Indeed, the concept of, and the 
relationships entailed in, baronga arose based, in the case of Nikunau, on adjacency of 
mwenga (cf. Geddes, 1977), in the case of Tarawa, on home island affiliation and, in the case 
of metropolitan countries, on language and identifying with Kiribati. It is even possible to 
argue that the incidence of baronga relationships bears some resemblance to boti, the 
institution that seemingly lost significance alongside the aforementioned demise of kainga 
and was itself eventually obliterated.  
The official structure and processes of quasi-traditional organisations exhibit other traditional 
traits side by side, usually complementing one another, but occasionally conflicting. Whereas 
tradition relies entirely on the oral for transacting business and keeping records, the quasi-
tradition also incorporates the written, including by having written constitutions, written 
agenda, minute books, and written or electronic documents dealing with proposals for events 
and schemes, financial and other reports, and various records. Whereas gender and age mean 
a great deal in tradition, the quasi-tradition allows women (cf. Rose, 2014) and younger 
people not only to speak but also to carry the day in making and implementing decisions. 
Whereas consensus has to be reached in tradition to determine decisions—these are then 
spoken by te tia-motiki-tueka ( the speaker of decisions)99 and everyone signals their 
willingness to accept, for example, by clapping in unison three times—the quasi-tradition 
allows decisions to be reached sometimes by a simple majority and it may be unnecessary (if 
inadvisable) for the minority to have to be persuaded and then signal acceptance. Whereas in 
performing roles or tasks, or implementing decisions, any special responsibilities and skills 
required in the tradition are exercised or organised by the kinship group who are the keepers 
of those special responsibilities and skills (see Geddes, 1977; Grimble, 1989), the quasi-
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tradition provides for officials to be elected or appointed, and for the implementation of 
decisions to be assigned to them, usually implicitly, as an extension of making the decisions, 
and having the time, resources and abilities to do so, acquired independent of kin groups 
(e.g., at school, by consulting reference materials in libraries or on the Internet, using non-I-
Kiribati contacts, such as weak ties mentioned by Thompson, 2016). Whereas everyone 
knows in tradition who is responsible for doing what, and if they do not do it, they bring 
kamama on themselves and their kin, to whom they know they will have to answer, without 
having to report, the quasi-tradition often provides for reporting and accountability to be 
more explicit. However, the latter provision is often ineffective because, in the tradition, 
anyone who brings kamama on someone else, by questioning that someone else’s behaviour 
outside te katei understandings based on kinship relationships (see Geddes, 1977), actually 
brings kamama on themselves.100 
It is on Tarawa that the contrast between traditional and non-traditional organisations and 
practices is most conspicuous and conflictual nowadays. The traditional arises from the I-
Nikunau diasporic community (and the equivalent communities associated with the other 
Outer Islands), and indeed I-Tarawa, having established organisations on Tarawa in which 
practices from their home islands are replicated. As well as mwenga, etc., they often establish 
mronron and church groups within the diasporic communities of the different islands and 
these traditional or quasi-traditional practices extend into these groups. The non-traditional 
arises from the Colony Government, which initiated an increasing array of activities in the 
names of post-war reconstruction and economic, social and, eventually, self-government 
development, and from the Republic Government, with no end of encouragement and 
incentives from officials, experts, consultants, etc. associated with aid organisations, who 
seem far more concerned with functionality, than with culture—they seem even to regard 
functionality as acultural—and so have little understanding of why things show signs of 
failing when they are present, not to mention falling apart after they leave.  
The Republic Government not only continued the Colony Government’s behaviour but also 
made it possible for non-traditional, private business activities to expand, and so, in the area 
of commerce, notably on Tarawa, there is an array of enterprises, ranging from ones owned 
by the Republic Government, or ones in which it is a joint-venture partner,101 to the many that 
are entirely private, be they either quasi-traditional cooperatives (i.e., mronron, etc.) or 
proprietary, and so lacking in much tradition other than for sake of appearance or similar 
“marketing purposes”. Consistent with the claims above, the quasi-traditional organisations 
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on Tarawa just mentioned and others associated with the I-Nikunau diasporic community 
(and the equivalent communities associated with the other Outer Islands) sit beneath, or are 
subservient to, the non-traditional organisations also just mentioned. 
In relation to diasporic communities, while the discussion above about non-traditional 
organisations focussed on these organisations bringing ideas, objects and similar into 
Nikunau and the other Kiribati islands, so these same organisations, commercial, religious 
and governmental, are also significant as the main vehicles through which, as early as the 
1820s, I-Nikunau spent time away from Nikunau. In recent decades most of this going away 
has been tantamount to permanent emigration, whether intentional or through one thing 
leading to another, within and outside the Kiribati Archipelago, and so giving rise to the 
diaspora. These claims are illustrated in various places in S4.1 to S4.10, including the 
following.  
I-Nikunau taking up positions as deckhands, etc. on the periphery of the 19th Century 
maritime trade proved to be the forerunners of I-Nikunau continuing to be involved in 
seafaring work, as facilitated for the past 50 years by the Marine Training Centre. I-Nikunau 
labouring since the mid-19th Century for commercial organisations engaged in mining and 
various forms of agriculture around the Pacific and beyond is exemplified nowadays by their 
participation in Recognised Seasonal Employer schemes in New Zealand, which are mostly 
associated with vineyards, dairy farming and fruit farming. I-Nikunau intent on the priesthood 
received education and training on Beru, Abemama, Abaiang and, later, Tarawa, and these 
atolls are among those on which the churches sited their secondary schools that selected I-
Nikunau have attended since. I-Nikunau were among the native staff employed by the Colony 
Government as it expanded, particularly in the decades after World War II. In preparation for 
this work and for social development type reasons, I-Nikunau were admitted to secondary 
schools and tertiary colleges that the Colony Government established on Tarawa. These 
schools and colleges are now run under the auspices of the Republic Government, and the 
curriculum continues to be geared to I-Nikunau earning a living doing non-traditional work 
for non-traditional organisations, primarily Republic Government services and businesses, 
and mostly on Tarawa or otherwise away from Nikunau. 
While working for non-traditional organisations has been the longest-lived factor in 
emigration, along with education and training to some extent in preparation for such work, 
significant instances of emigration have resulted from organised resettlement schemes. This 
applies to I-Nikunau establishing settlements on the Solomon Islands and Line Islands; the 
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two schemes in question were devised and implemented by the Colony and Republic 
Governments respectively, with financing from outside donors; both reflect long-held 
considerations and concerns, alluded to in S4.1, among some Colony Government officials 
and advisors about overpopulation of Nikunau and other Kiribati islands (e.g., see Autio, 
2017; Maude, 1952; McCreary & Boardman, 1968; Veltman, 1982). Further schemes for I-
Nikunau and other I-Kiribati are now being mooted among the Republic Government, aid 
agencies and others, as they weigh up the prospect of the atolls of Kiribati becoming 
uninhabitable through climate change, sea-level rise, etc. (see Kuruppu & Liverman, 2011; 
Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Program, 2015). Incidentally, although the 
Pacific Access Category has the inklings of a bilateral arrangement with a foreign 
government around climate-induced re-settlement, it was devised by the New Zealand and 
Republic Governments more to assist New Zealand in addressing shortages of labour in 
urban services and agriculture, and provide relief from unemployment among I-Kiribati and a 
further stream of remittances for Kiribati, than with the likely outcome of sea-level rise for I-
Kiribati in mind (Thompson, 2016).  
While I-Nikunau and other I-Kiribati interactions with non-traditional organisations increase 
after they immigrate to metropolitan countries, various traits of tradition are evident in many 
aspects of life in their diasporic communities, thus justifying the use of the “diaspora” label. 
This is particularly so in organisations they have established in their diasporic communities 
(e.g., Christchurch Kiribati Community, Kiribati Tungaru Association, Kiribati Waipounamu 
Community), whose quasi-traditional qualities are evident in the matters with which these 
organisations mainly concern themselves, how these organisations function operationally, 
and how they are constituted and governed (e.g., on the basis of mwenga rather than 
individuals). These traits and qualities contrast with those in local organisations, be they 
commercial (e.g., shops, banks), religious (e.g., Anglican churches), community (e.g., scout 
groups, philanthropic trusts) or governmental (e.g., territorial authorities or local councils, 
government ministries interested in the Pacific), which is most evident when the 
organisations in question have dealings, for example, in a diasporic community organisation 
applying for community grants, hiring campgrounds and other venues, or maintaining bank 
accounts. Such considerations also come into dealings in Kiribati between aid organisations 
and I-Nikunau and other I-Kiribati organisations, including those associated with the 
Republic Government (see S4.7).  
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4.12 Distributional Circumstances 
I-Nikunau’s distributional circumstances can be considered in terms of three distributions of 
things (e.g., wealth, welfare, power, risk from sea-level rise): first, the distributions among I-
Nikunau forming a community in the same social and geographical space (e.g., on Nikunau 
or in a single diasporic community); second, the distributions between I-Nikunau and other 
peoples with whom they occupy the same space (e.g., on Tarawa or where in New Zealand 
there is a diasporic community); and third, the distributions between communities of I-
Nikunau in different geographical spaces (e.g., in New Zealand compared with urban island 
Tarawa and compared with traditional Nikunau).  
As the examples above of things that can be distributed, distributional circumstances range 
across, and are intertwined with, the economic, social, political, environmental, etc. 
Economically, the distributions are reflected in I-Nikunau’s comparative material wealth, 
including personal belongings, mwenga, aba and similar, their comparative subsistence 
produce and incomes, and their comparative consumption and savings. Socially, they are 
reflected in, among other things, their relative status, welfare and wellbeing. Politically, they 
are reflected in their relative power, influence, rights and such like (Wheatcraft & Ellefson, 
1983). Environmentally, they are reflected in, for example, their relative circumstances of 
demography and their relative prospects or risks in the face of expected trends associated 
with, say, climate change, etc. (cf. Thomas & Twyman, 2005) Thus, to analyse distributional 
circumstances, I draw on circumstances and occurrences that are economic, social, political, 
environmental, etc.  
Among I-Nikunau forming a community, things capable of distribution, or the things that are 
distributed by virtue of events and situations, are part of the descriptions of the present in S3 
and the analyses in previous subsections of S4; so too are how the present distributions have 
come about or how they are occurring presently. Age, gender, kinship groups and similar are 
among the factors associated with how distributions of these things vary in each community, 
just as they have been traditionally on Nikunau. But in addition, particularly among I-
Nikunau living in urban and metropolitan diasporic communities, other factors besides these 
have come into play, notably education, employment and income, marriage and relations 
outside the community. As a result of so many factors, traditional and modern, and the 
interplay among them, and consequential factors too, the various distributions have gradually 
increased in disparity within communities.  
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Even so, it has been my experience that I-Nikunau and most other I-Kiribati, wherever 
located geographically or otherwise, have usually taken steps to avoid conspicuous displays 
of being advantaged or better endowed, economically, socially, educationally, etc. than others 
of their community in whichever diasporic community they are part of or happen to be 
visiting. This quality of avoiding conspicuous displays of greater wealth, authority, 
knowledge and similar endowments coincides with observations by Hockings (1984) and 
Autio (2010), among many other researchers and other observers and participants of life, of 
kawa and other traditional units, particularly in the southern Kiribati Islands; indeed, any 
such displays are usually greeted with mirth from one’s peers, and so one is made te bai n 
rang (re urbanising Tarawa, see McCreary & Boardman, 1968). Concomitantly, those 
disadvantaged or poorly endowed, while accepting of support, are keen to maintain at least an 
appearance of self-sufficiency.  
Even with the spreading of I-Nikunau away from Nikunau to form the various diasporic 
communities reported in this paper, adherence to these traditions and self-restraint or 
suppression are still noticeable, although they have been adapted or substituted by things 
more modern or in keeping with the circumstances that particular communities experience, 
according to their geographical situation, and so been weakened compared with behaviours 
on Nikunau. Arguably, there is a direct correlation between this noticeability and the number 
of community members who meet together regularly and the frequency with which these 
members deal with each other. I-Nikunau are commonly generous among each other with 
whatever they are able to give, and this is encouraged from generation to generation; and they 
expect the same of each other. This is done within the context of respect for form, tradition 
and kinship relationships, and an expectation that some effort is being expended in acquiring 
knowledge of these. A further feature is that the principle of tabu te uea, or there are no 
chiefs, is usually adhered to, infringing this being seen as a conspicuous display of authority 
and power; but this does not prevent someone from exercising specialist knowledge, skills or 
contacts on behalf of the community when these are called for. 
In their dealings with other peoples, severally and jointly, I-Nikunau seem to hope for similar 
generosity, reciprocation and humility but have come to expect much less most of the time. 
This expectation has arisen from their past first-hand and other dealings with I-Matang and a 
few other peoples who, in matters of commerce, government and social relations, have 
pressed home such advantages as knowledge, skills, technology and rhetoric, and convey 
hubristically senses of privilege and social pre-eminence; stories passed onto them by their 
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forebears have added to these expectations. Thus, as alluded to in S4.3, I-Nikunau have 
shared in the economic benefits of trade, employment and exploitation of natural resources 
(e.g., whales, copra, phosphate, tuna) but invariably the lion’s share seems to have gone to I-
Matang or other outsiders. However, over time, the share accorded by outsiders to I-Nikunau 
in these various distributions seems to have been more respectful of the latter’s position as 
the underdog, or on the weaker side of asymmetric relationships, and, more recently, of their 
human rights and their rights as “individuals”.  
Additionally, I-Nikunau can themselves be a barrier to this sort of change, being overly 
respectful still of I-Matang’s seemingly superior knowledge, technology and material goods, 
and continuing to defer to I-Matang as a people, as in colonial times (see Bevington, 1990), 
while tending to be embarrassed, even ashamed, of what they consider as either traditional or 
as their knowledge, etc. being inferior (see S4.8). For example, I myself encounter the long 
held notion that I-Matang men possess wide expertise in all technology associated with the 
outside world, being able as a matter of course to repair muskets, watches, car engines, 
computers, etc.  
These mentalities of deference, acquiescence, interpolation, inferiority, etc. on the part of I-
Nikunau and other I-Kiribati are particularly significant in the sphere of development, 
resulting in the research, methods, findings, opinions, etc. of external consultants, who are 
usually I-Matang still, often going unscrutinised, unchallenged and misunderstood by I-
Kiribati (cf. Dixon & Gaffikin, 2014), and so being given far more weight than would be the 
case among a conversation, meeting or audience of fellow I-Matang. Examples where this 
applies are law making, governance, macroeconomic policy, public administration and 
business practices, infrastructure and construction, education, health, environmental issues 
and deploying information technology, as mentioned or alluded to in previous sections. 
Despite there still being room for improvement in attitudes towards I-Nikunau and other I-
Kiribati among I-Matang (and other non-I-Kiribati), and in the human status in the eyes of 
the latter, they have come quite a long way since Officer on Board the Said Ship (1767, 
pp.135–138) wrote about “naked indians”. Similar since I-Matang warships were sent on 
patrol later to inspire “good behaviour” (Sabatier, 1977, p. 148) among “the various tribes of 
savages who are subject to no laws” to give “countenance and support to peaceful traders” 
(Wilson in general instructions to officers of British ships operating from the Australia 
Station in 1879, cited by Macdonald, 1982a, p. 65; see also Simmonds, 2014). 
Concomitantly, notions of the Great Powers caring for and helping islanders, including I-
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Nikunau, and stopping them from being abused, particularly through being kidnapped, 
abducted or lured on board ship (see Macdonald, 1982a) and while working away, led to 
legislation in Great Britain, notably the Pacific Islanders Protection Acts of 1872 and 1875 
(see Ward, 1946).102  
A few years later, I-Nikunau were discussed indirectly and paternalistically by the officials of 
the Great Powers in terms of having a modicum of rights, but with said Powers there in a 
colonial capacity: 
to watch over the preservation of the native tribes, and to care for the improvement of 
the conditions of their moral and material well-being, and to help in suppressing 
slavery, and especially the slave trade. They shall, without distinction of creed or 
nation, protect and favour all religious, scientific or charitable institutions and 
undertakings created and organized for the above ends, or which aim at instructing the 
natives and bringing home to them the blessings of civilization. (in Article VI of the 
General Act of 1885). 
These sentiments among the Great Powers and similar persisted for some decades. Globally, 
they are evident in the Covenant of the League of Nations (League of Nations, 1919)—
Article 22 mentions “a sacred trust of civilisation.” Alas, the civilising of said native tribes 
under these policies extended to appropriation and destruction of their lands, slavery and 
other forms of economic exploitation, obliteration of their beliefs and values, and genocide 
even (see, for example, Davie, 2000; Edwards, 2014; Gibson, 2000; Gowdy & McDaniel, 
1999; Greer & Patel, 2000; Kearins & Hooper, 2002; King & Sigrah, 2004; Macdonald, 
1982a; Neu, 2000; Neu & Graham, 2006). Locally, the sentiments were incorporated in the 
instructions to district officers issued by Grimble and Clarke (1929) (cf. Bevington, 1990; 
Macdonald, 1971, 1972, 1982a; Maude, 1977).  
Notwithstanding the social hypocrisy and economic and political subterfuge associated with 
it, I-Nikunau experienced, under this civilising policy paradigm espoused by the world’s 
“leading nations”, the beginnings of the social and economic development analysed in S4.1 to 
S4.3, and the political development analysed in S4.7. Their social status also began to rise, 
although it was still heavy on supplicancy; they became what amounted to “subjects”, rather 
than “non-persons”. From these beginnings, and as the civilising policy paradigm gave way 
to a one of modernising, they were eventually accorded the statuses of “subjects capable of 
internal self-rule” and then of “citizens of a modern republic” (see Morgan, 1980; Tucker, 
1999; Willis, 2005). Subsequently, under the neo-liberalising policy paradigm being 
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championed by selected aid organisations, they had their citizen status added to with such 
statuses as “customers”, “clients” and “rational economic individuals in a neo-liberal 
society”, at least in the writings of officials associated with said aid organisations, as they 
rolled out projects of structural adjustment, economic reform, privatisation, etc. (see Barokas 
& Rubin, 1988; Dixon, 2004a).  
A further parallel development was that in metropolitan countries, I-Nikunau were recognised 
as persons eligible to obtain visas and immigration papers, and so be accorded such statuses 
as visitors, workers, students, permanent residents and citizens, with associated political, 
social and economic rights and obligations. The coming about and growth of diasporic 
communities in various countries of this sort indicate the extent to which applications have 
been approved and visa and other papers issued. 
Similar trends of I-Nikunau’s rising entitlement to rights (and incurrence of obligations), 
social status, etc. are noticeable in numerous other respects. The following examples relate to 
trends in four areas, namely, conditions of employment, extraction of natural resources, 
participation in organisations and status of language, spanning the past two centuries.  
First, since the 1820s, I-Nikunau have been involved continuously in working away from 
Nikunau (see S4.1). In the 19th Century many, including those who were indentured 
labourers, endured near-slavery, racism and similar economic and social exploitation (see 
McCreery & Munro, 1993; Munro, 1993). By the early 20th Century changes were becoming 
noticeable; in particular, wages, other emoluments (e.g., housing, rations) and other 
employment conditions on Banaba, and later Nauru, gradually became more favourable than 
hitherto and, contemporaneously, were probably better than for work elsewhere in the Pacific 
(cf. Shlomowitz & Munro, 1992), which in any case they were prevented from taking on (see 
S4.1); these changes went hand in hand with industrial or related disputes (e.g., over prices 
charged at the employer’s stores) (see Williams & Macdonald, 1985).  
These improvements to the conditions under which I-Nikunau have worked outside Nikunau, 
and more recently, outside Kiribati have continued; for example, they now prevail, at least 
officially, for I-Nikunau working worldwide as seafarers and, in New Zealand, on 
Recognised Seasonal Employer schemes. However, all the way along, wages, conditions 
have been inferior to those of white labourers, including, for example, in the phosphate 
industry in Australia and New Zealand. Nowadays, most of the work given to I-Kiribati on, 
for example, Recognised Seasonal Employer schemes is work that local New Zealand labour, 
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of whatever colour and ethnicity, is unwilling to do, including because wage rates are 
unattractive and, probably more importantly, conditions are unacceptable (e.g., having to live 
in remote places and work irregular, unsocial hours at different, scattered places). And there 
is still the potential for exploitation, intended or otherwise. Again, Recognised Seasonal 
Employer scheme workers are an example; they are at a disadvantage in dealing with 
employers, or at least feel so, and so are reluctant to exercise fully written contractual rights 
or legal protections under local employment laws (e.g., rights to a minimum wage, holiday 
pay, etc., health and safety protections) (cf. Reilly, 2011). In any case, some of these rights, if 
received in the letter, are eroded by excessive deductions for transport, accommodation and 
victuals—the abusive overcrowding endured in Blenheim by 22 workers on a Recognised 
Seasonal Employer scheme (“Kiribati workers go home”, 2008) is a widely reported example 
in which the Pākehā perpetrator was criticised by some but defended by others (see Van Wel, 
2008).  
The reluctance, etc. just mentioned on the part of Recognised Seasonal Employer scheme 
workers is notwithstanding potential and actual help from extant members of diasporic 
communities. However, although they may be more familiar with laws, rights and customs 
pertaining to work, accommodation and similar, they too suffer disadvantages and are open to 
exploitation in the workplace and in other aspects of life (cf. Roman, 2013; Thompson, 
2016). As I-Nikunau and other I-Kiribati singles, couples and families arriving in New 
Zealand under the Pacific Access Category exemplify, it is one thing for a country to have 
laws about social equality, or against gender, racial or similar discrimination, but quite 
another for recent immigrants to be in a strong enough position vis-à-vis other peoples or the 
authorities to take advantage of such legal protections, or perceive themselves culturally, 
socially, politically or economically as in such positions (cf. Reilly, 2011).  
As for their own distributional circumstances, these I-Nikunau, etc. arrive in New Zealand on 
a mix of work and accompanying family visitor visas, but with the prospect of permanent 
resident visas under the Pacific Access Category, provided they comply with their visas and 
attain the employment-related and income criteria laid down under this Category by the 
immigration authorities, as explained in S3.3.2. The work most take to satisfy these criteria is 
usually low-paid, resulting in them living at or below the poverty line for some time after 
their arrival, and can be with bad employers and at places where they must endure workplace 
discrimination, even from other workers of Pacific heritage (see Thompson, 2016). Although 
many move to better-paid jobs subsequently, just as many remain in the low-paid job sectors, 
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with adverse consequences for entire families, as enumerated in S4.3, S4.6, etc. Alongside 
raising further, similar issues in relation to having to rent poor quality houses let by bad 
landlords, Thompson (2016) notes language and similar personal inadequacies impeding 
access to official support. This support takes such forms as written information (e.g., Ministry 
of Business Innovation and Employment, 2017) aimed at either preventing getting into 
predicaments in the first place or indicating what remedies exist for persons when they find 
themselves in such predicaments, and as approaching official bodies (e.g., the Tenancy 
Tribunal in New Zealand) that can settling disputes in landlord–tenant or employer-employee 
relationships. 
Second, reiterating S4.1, whaling was conducted in the vicinity of Nikunau between the 
1820s and 1870s, the ocean being exploited ruthlessly by whaling ships without any 
international legal recognition of I-Nikunau having any economic rights, and so of 
entitlement to any form of rent, royalties or similar—I doubt the very idea even occurred to 
anyone involved at that time, as was still the case on terra firma103 let alone the high seas or 
the atmosphere. This is in complete contrast to I-Nikunau and other I-Kiribati now receiving, 
through the auspices of the Republic Government, significant licence fees from the fishing 
fleets exploiting the tuna fishery within Kiribati’s EEZ (see S4.1 and S4.3).  
Even so, these fees are a small proportion only of the reported value of the fish caught, and 
illegal, unregulated and unreported fishing is perceived as a significant occurrence (Fedor, 
2012), as an EEZ of some 3.55 million km2 is difficult to surveil, even with assistance from 
the Royal New Zealand Air Force (New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 
2015). Furthermore, unlike the mining of Banaba, I-Nikunau and other I-Kiribati obtain very 
little employment from the fishery, either at sea or onshore, except for personal goods and 
services (e.g., present-day equivalents of kaokioki and nikiranroro – see S4.3) supplied to 
ships’ crews during onshore leave on Tarawa (see Bohane, 2006). What is more, many 
potential present benefits of the fees are foregone because the Republic Government has been 
persuaded by aid organisation advisers to contain its expenditure well below what this fees 
revenue might afford, and so run significant surpluses, which are then invested outside 
Kiribati—see S4.3 and outline of the Revenue Equalisation Reserve Fund in Note 49. 
In case the reader is wondering why I have not incorporated more about royalties from the 
mining phosphate on Banaba into this example of trends in I-Nikunau’s distributive rights 
vis-à-vis outsiders, the reason lies in Banaba being comprised of aba of I-Banaba, and so the 
main interest of I-Nikunau in Banaba being as a place to labour. Correspondingly, I-Nikunau 
 
178 
saw themselves as not much more than mineworkers, entitled to wages, etc., rather than 
entitled to a share in the phosphate deposits as a saleable commodity. Indeed, 
notwithstanding the two islands having been established by British authorities within the 
same single polity by 1900, and recognised as such by the other Great Powers, I-Nikunau, at 
that time and during the decades after, regarded Banaba and the other islands in the Colony as 
separate social and political entities from Nikunau—the idea of a national I-Kiribati identity 
was barely evident until the 1970s or 1980s, and then mostly among those educated on 
Tarawa and prominent in political and bureaucratic circles there (see S4.7). Thus, as far as I-
Nikunau have been concerned for most of these decades, it has been I-Banaba who have 
suffered various wrongs at the hands of the British Government, the British Phosphate 
Commission and British dominion interests.104 For their part, I-Banaba were probably as 
upset by what I-Nikunau did on their island as they were by what I-Matang staff of the 
British Phosphate Commission did, showing this in acts of protest even as the last of the 
phosphate workers were leaving in 1980 (confidential personal communication, 2009, from 
someone who, as young person, was among those boarding the last ship).  
The degree of concern among I-Nikunau for the plight of I-Banaba seems to have changed in 
recent decades, in part because of greater identification with Kiribati as a national identity. 
But another factor in this seems to be greater awareness and appreciation of issues around 
human rights and care of the environment (e.g., land restoration after mining, greenhouse gas 
emissions), and of redress for past wrongs and their present-day consequences. This last 
matter is something that has come to the attention of diasporic communities in New Zealand 
through proceedings and settlements under the auspices of the Waitangi Tribunal (see 
Ministry of Justice, 2017).  
Third, having been on the periphery of non-traditional organisations, be they religious, 
community, commercial or governmental, I-Nikunau have come to fill positions of greater 
responsibility and authority in each type, as related in S4.11. In Churches, having once been 
mostly confined to the flock, more became deacons, and some became, or now can 
potentially become, pastors and senior pastors, and priests and bishops. In government and 
politics, having largely been restricted to the status of native tribes and native subjects for the 
first several decades of the Colony Government, albeit with some men occupying native or 
island government positions of kaubure and similar and a few being Colony Government 
clerks, the gradual emergence of I-Kiribati self-rule and then the advent of the Republic saw 
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some I-Nikunau rise into senior administrative and political positions at nation-state level, 
and even join supranational organisations.  
The above changes in relation to church and state notwithstanding, contributing to church and 
state infrastructure and administration and having to comply personally with ever more 
stringent regulations placed an economic and social burden on I-Nikunau during colonial 
times, as noted in S4.10. These burdens affected the daily activities in which I-Nikunau were 
involved, mostly to fulfil their obligations to their utu and kawa. These activities included 
obtaining subsistence produce from their aba, the reef and the ocean, and, through producing 
and selling copra, obtaining the various trade goods that were classed almost as necessities. 
Only a portion of these impositions was offset using imported technologies in order that 
activities could be completed more efficiently. Maude evaluated their aggregate effect as a 
“hitherto unsuspected degree of poverty” (1952, p. 66), noting that this effect was not entirely 
appreciated by the relevant authorities. These burdens continue on Nikunau and Tarawa, and 
have parallels elsewhere, including self-imposed ones relating to establishing and 
maintaining religious networks in metropolitan countries (see S4.8). Having said that, it is 
arguable that the burdens are significantly or more than entirely offset by their benefits. 
In commerce, whereas marriage and mixed-race descent might have once been the only way 
into the business side of the copra trade or of acquiring similar commercial status, the way 
the trade was organised under the auspices of boboti saw I-Nikunau taking up official 
positions of governance and administration. Although their elevation in commerce came at a 
time of dire straits for copra and all the world’s other commodities, this predicament proved 
short-lived (see S4.3 and S4.11). Before, the incomes I-Nikunau derived from coconut 
oil/copra started out as barely 5% of the price that their produce realised elsewhere (i.e., New 
South Wales, New England, Western Europe, etc.). After, under boboti, it surely rose, 
although even then they probably hardly ever reached 15%. I-Nikunau were disadvantaged 
vis-à-vis I-Matang by ignorance of, first, what I-Matang were doing with the oil or copra 
(e.g., using it in the manufacture of soap, candles, butter substitute, explosives and livestock 
feed), and, second, of how I-Matang markets, trading and accounting practices worked. 
These particular disadvantages in commerce exemplify the nature of those prevailing still but 
in different forms, depending on location. That is, the actual vital knowledge needed on 
Tarawa or in New Zealand, say, has changed, but the idea that I-Nikunau lack such 
knowledge, understanding, etc. has not, despite formal education, scholarships, tertiary study 
and the rest, because these formal processes have not equipped them anything like 
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sufficiently in areas enumerated above and other sections where being disadvantaged and 
being in asymmetric relations are discussed.  
Fourth, having been at various disadvantages with other peoples for lack of literacy and 
because English was the language of literacy, I-Nikunau have seen the status of te taetae ni 
Kiribati as a written language gradually increase, be accepted as a spoken language in non-
traditional organisation settings. This has redressed some of the imbalance between I-
Nikunau and I-Kiribati who are largely without English, and I-Nikunau and I-Kiribati who 
are comfortable with speaking and working in English but who use te taetae ni Kiribati in 
everyday life. Not only that but also this acceptance of te taetae ni Kiribati as not as inferior 
to English as it once was means that I-Nikunau are less excluded in dealing with outsiders 
(e.g., visiting representatives of aid organisations and of commercial and religious 
organisations) on grounds of the social status of their language. Even so, lack of English has 
meant I-Nikunau face practical limitations, such as in travelling, or trying to settle, outside 
Kiribati, and in accessing the myriad of external items (e.g., educational materials, 
entertainment) that have become increasingly available on Tarawa, a trend that has 
accelerated since the arrival of the Internet in the late 1990s. They also continue to be 
disadvantaged in Kiribati by the volume of reports, consultation documents, project 
proposals, job advertisements that presume formal and technical English, whereas lack of te 
taetae ni Kiribati does not disqualify someone from working as a consultant, advisor, etc. in 
Kiribati, although lack of English does.  
In relations between communities of I-Nikunau separated geographically, while diaspora and 
circular migration have entailed reciprocity at different levels between such communities, 
their different locations, and so geographical separation, has given rise to rather obvious 
disparities in distributional circumstances. These disparities are brought out in previous 
sections, in which I have placed particular emphasis on comparing Nikunau with Tarawa 
environmentally, politically, economically, socially, etc., and then Tarawa with New 
Zealand—this allows for the pattern of I-Nikunau usually having moved first from Nikunau 
to Tarawa and then, perhaps a generation or more later, from Tarawa to New Zealand..  
To recap what I said or inferred previously, the Nikunau natural environment is much more 
pristine certainly than Tarawa and probably than New Zealand, despite the latter’s clean, 
green image (see Roper, 2012). I-Nikunau on Nikunau are much more politically 
autonomous, in complete contrast to New Zealand, where they are basically powerless; on 
Tarawa, I-Nikunau have as much power among I-Kiribati probably as they are a proportion 
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of the I-Kiribati population, although some of that power is curtailed by aid organisations 
being a major political force vis-à-vis I-Kiribati. While economically, life in New Zealand is 
more cash-based and costs of living there are higher, so too are incomes. Although some of 
those incomes are remitted to Tarawa and Nikunau, even after that, I-Nikunau in New 
Zealand mostly have more disposable income and belongings than I-Nikunau on Tarawa, and 
certainly have greater access to free and low-priced facilities, including education, health, 
welfare and social facilities, and these facilities are generally of a much better standard. On 
Nikunau, facilities and similar are scarce compared with what is on Tarawa, largely because 
aid organisation projects, and before that, Colony Government projects, have been heavily 
weighted in favour of Tarawa at the expense of Outer islands (Thomas & Kautoa, 2007); 
indeed, Nikunau did not even rate a separate mention in such plans as GEIC (1970) and 
Government of Kiribati (1983), and Outer Islands in general are referred to only in passing, 
incidentally or as if unimportant (cf. Connell, 2010). Moreover, reiterating above, I-Nikunau 
have had to provide many of the physical resources through which most of their atoll’s 
infrastructure and administration has arisen, whether these be traditional, church or state. 
4.13 Cultural Circumstances 
That I-Nikunau, whether on Nikunau or in diasporic communities, inhabit a bounded world 
around shared habits, customs and general conduct, which are distinct from those of non-I-
Kiribati, is abundantly evident. The same is so for I-Nikunau as distinct from other I-Kiribati 
on their various home islands, the more so as the others’ islands are distant from Nikunau 
(Grimble, 1989; King, 1996; Macdonald, 1982a); indeed, this was part of my argument in S2 
to justify my choice of I-Nikunau as the study identity, rather than I-Kiribati. However, it is 
arguable that because of homogenising forces (e.g., greater mixing of residents while away 
from their islands, informal and formal colonial rule, formal education) said distinctions have 
reduced over time, and so are not as great as they once were.  
What is more, in their diasporic communities, including on Tarawa and, say, New Zealand, 
cultural and other distinctions between I-Nikunau and other I-Kiribati are also much less 
clear, increasingly so as time elapses since leaving Nikunau, and leaving Tarawa, or being 
born into the diasporic community. Concomitantly, across the various places where I-
Nikunau live, their shared habits, customs and general conduct have come to differ as those 
who have left Nikunau, or left Tarawa, have adjusted to their place of settlement, including 
mixing with the people, I-Kiribati and non-I-Kiribati, there. Furthermore, change in diasporic 
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communities, such as on Tarawa and in New Zealand, is also being driven generational 
change, including where the youngest generation was born and has been brought up.  
I have tried to capture the above thoughts in the following paragraphs. The first two reflect 
my experiences and observations over quite some time. The third draws on findings of 
interviews conducted by Burnett (1999) during a study of secondary education, cross-
referenced to anthropological, archaeological, ecological, ethnographic, sociological and 
other studies, indigenous accounts, etc. 
At a botaki in te mwaneaba on Nikunau or at a public hall in New Zealand, many habits and 
customs, and conduct in general, would strike, say, new I-Matang guests as quite different 
from what they are used to. A profusion of symbolism is involved in both settings, reflecting 
what Hockings (1984) notes as intense investment by I-Kiribati in cultural symbolism. A 
cultural guide could describe, translate and explain the proceedings, interpret the meanings 
they hold among I-Kiribati, and otherwise enlighten the visitors. Even so, most visitors would 
probably still have difficulty “getting it”, for want of deeper background on I-Nikunau (or I-
Kiribati) life experiences, and how these experiences interrelate and relate to things, material 
and intangible, with which they identify and hold as important, and on what “makes them 
tick”. Besides the reasons the guide gives for the proceedings may often be reduced to 
something to the effect of, “Because that’s the way we do things; it’s part of our culture,” the 
origins of the proceedings, symbols, etc. having been lost in time, space and logic. Similar 
applies to I-Matang as visitors to mwaneaba for occasions other than botaki and to mwenga, 
or as observers of conduct of I-Nikunau and I-Kiribati generally. What is more, I-Nikunau 
from Tarawa visiting Nikunau or New Zealand and participating in the same events, although 
seeing and hearing many things with which they were familiar, not least the language, might 
still require guidance, to either adjust to tradition on Nikunau or adjust to the New Zealand 
version of the proceedings in Auckland, Wellington, or on Te Waipounamu.  
If combining their visit to Nikunau with visits to other Outer Islands, I-Matang or other non-
I-Kiribati would notice many similarities going from island to island, particularly among 
adjacent islands, but if they took the trouble they would discern differences too, and might be 
able to link these differences with what marks out people from each island, including I-
Nikunau from the rest. However, for these visitors to make these distinctions at a gathering 
on, say, Tarawa of I-Kiribati from several islands would be very difficult. This would be even 
more so in a metropolitan setting like New Zealand, where behaviour is some amalgam of the 
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habits, etc. from the different home islands, and is tempered further by a mix of absence from 
Kiribati and conditions in New Zealand.  
The cultural and related circumstances of the peoples of different Kiribati islands, including 
I-Nikunau, have attracted outside attention from time to time over the past 100 or so years, in 
areas such as myths, legends and traditions, social organisation, kinship, identity, ancestry, 
custom, land tenure, maritime culture, material culture, architecture, diet and food 
preparation, and song and dance. I have referred widely to some of these studies in previous 
subsections. In the study referred to above, Burnett (1999) delved into cultural awareness 
among I-Kiribati, bringing out their perceptions of how their culture has been changing. The 
areas they singled out as those of greatest cultural change were oral traditions, magico-
religious beliefs and practices (cf. Grimble, 1921, 1933, 1989; Kambati, 1992; Latouche, 
1983; Sabatier, 1939/1977), trade and use of money (cf. Asian Development Bank, 2002; 
Couper, 1967), relationships and social organisation, including gender roles and children’s 
roles (cf. Geddes, 1977; Goodenough, 1955; Lundsgaarde, 1966; Lundsgaarde & Silverman, 
1972; Rose, 2014), mwaneaba (cf. Autio, 2010; Lundsgaarde, 1978; Maude, 1963) and diet 
(cf. Catala, 1957; Di Piazza, 1999; Grimble, 1933; Lewis, 1981, 1988; Turbott, 1949). More 
formally, a group of I-Kiribati writers (i.e., Baranite, Roniti, etc.) compiled the series of 
articles on cultural changes published in Mason (1985). Similarly, Alaima et al. (1979) 
comprises a series of papers by I-Kiribati writers in which they refer to culture and changes 
to cultural circumstances obliquely in writing about aspects of pre-history and history. More 
recently, Teaiwa (2015) attempts to question the structural ruptures to cultural circumstances 
caused by informal and formal colonial or imperial interventions, pointing out their far-
reaching material, economic, political and spiritual consequences, desirable and undesirable 
(cf. Thaman, 2003). 
So far this discussion of I-Nikunau’s cultural circumstances is something of a mishmash of 
ideas, concerns, things, etc. is resemblant of a study by Sewell (2005), in which, having 
brought out the anthropological foundations of culture, which is whence most of the studies 
cited above derive, and recent extensions into many other disciplines, he argues that culture 
has come to be interpreted in two ways. Either, it stands for a bounded world of beliefs and 
practices, synonymous in many respects to a society, and so used in such phrases as Kiribati 
culture, Western culture, pop culture, material culture, etc. (cf. Kuruppu, 2009). Or, it is a 
theoretical category abstracted from social experience and its complex realities, and so is 
distinguishable from other categories, including economic, political, etc. Having criticised 
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both these, Sewell concludes that dialectic consideration of culture is useful in discerning “a 
sense of the particular shapes and consistencies of worlds of meaning in different places and 
times and a sense that in spite of conflicts and resistance, these worlds of meaning somehow 
hang together” (2005, p. 93).  
By virtue of including this separate subsection on culture, I may seem to have adopted 
Sewell’s second interpretation; however, each of the other subsections throughout S4 contain 
many references to what can be construed as elements of culture, past and present. These 
references in other subsections also raise how elements of culture have been changing, 
including the changes brought about through I-Nikunau’s varying geographical 
circumstances, and so, taken together, accord with dialectic consideration of culture. For 
example, in S4.10, general conduct associated with interdependence is shown as ever-present, 
but alongside emergence or clarity of individuality. These matters are reflected in changes 
related in S4.3, among other places, including a continuing regard for cooperative forms of 
trade in the form of mronron but an increasing propensity for families to operate proprietary 
businesses and for individuals to do work for other I-Kiribati in employer-employee 
relationships.  
More generally, analysis and discussions in those other subsections indicates that traditional 
objects and relationships, and habitual ways of knowing, interpreting, perceiving, doing, 
appearing and behaving, have been adapted, reconstructed, augmented, replaced or displaced. 
These changes and their cultural ramifications are reflected in, among other things, the mode 
of production (e.g., cultivating copra and trading it for goods and services), religion (i.e., 
converting to Christianity) and the political system (e.g., being part of a formal structure and 
process within the Republic and a semi-formal structure and process beyond its boundaries). 
However, despite apparent changes in particular circumstances (i.e., geographical, 
demographical), there do seem to be constancies, or at least some areas where cultural change 
is much slower than in other areas.  
For example, I-Nikunau in Kiribati, whether on Nikunau, Tarawa or elsewhere, comprise 
quasi-traditional communities that are based around their utu, church, and, on Tarawa, home-
island kawa, home island and, to a limited extent, affiliations with the name of their work 
place. As for I-Nikunau in New Zealand and other metropolitan countries, despite many 
exhibiting urban life styles, the diasporic communities they comprise retain various social 
and cultural practices reminiscent perhaps of Nikunau but certainly of a meld of various 
Kiribati islands. Indeed, as Firth (1973) implies about the Kiribati Islands before their 
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annexation by the British authorities and their subsequent political unification as the 
Republic, it is culture that binds these I-Kiribati communities; the formal organisation of 
these communities, with rules and being registered with, say, Charities Services in New 
Zealand, are mostly practical conditions for them functioning as an entity recognised under 
New Zealand law, and so able to obtain grants from funding bodies, hire venues, own 
equipment (e.g., for sports or playing music) or real property, etc. (see S4.8 and S4.11) 
What is more, these constancies, or slower changes, along with deliberate attempts to 
maintain culture, are not a matter of chance but of choice and action, which for diasporic 
communities are significant facets of their formal existence. For example, the Kiribati 
Tungaru Association aims, among other things, to teach the young generation in Britain and 
elsewhere in Europe about culture and traditions of the Kiribati Islands through dialogue and 
dance (see Kiribati Tungaru Association, 2017). Similarly, I-Kiribati who have immigrated to 
New Zealand in the past decade or two have chosen to establish themselves there in a way 
that accords with their social and cultural values. According to Thompson (2016), this 
includes retaining te taetae ni Kiribati, continuing to show respect within baronga-based 
structures, dealing with others in the diasporic community on the basis of trust, friendship, 
mutual dependence and reciprocity based on kinship, bubuti and similar, rather than on 
English contract law, rational economic exchange at arm’s length, caveat emptor, etc. And, 
according to Fedor (2012), it includes performing various forms of dance, along with music, 
songs and poems, and going to great lengths to source native materials for dancing costumes 
from Kiribati. In turn, I-Nikunau on Nikunau respond to the backward current of these 
adaptations conveyed from a distance, or even brought “home”, by utu, etc.; for example, one 
sees dancing costumes, dwellings, furniture, etc. not only into which non-native materials are 
incorporated but also designs as well.  
As exemplified in S3.2 and S3.3, I-Nikunau living away from Nikunau adapt elements of 
their culture according to conditions, etc. in their adopted places of abode, and reconstruct 
learnt relations with each other inside each diasporic community and across communities. 
These elements and relations differ from place to place because they take account of, and 
embrace or acquiesce to the influence of, the other peoples among whom they live in these 
different places (e.g., other I-Kiribati, I-Matang, Pākehā, Solomon Islanders) and things, 
material and intangible (e.g., dwellings, victuals, music, sports, modes of production, social 
relations), comprising these other people’s differing cultures. Among I-Nikunau within 
diasporic communities, especially those in metropolitan countries, further dynamics arise 
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from, among other things, variations in their marital status, marriage partners, the ethnic 
composition of families and the composition of households, and in education, employment 
religious affiliation and immigration status. A further dynamic within diasporic communities 
and between them is in how one generation gives way to another, and so how one 
generation’s experiences give way to those of the next. Thus, I-Nikunau living away from 
Nikunau on Tarawa are increasingly less likely to have been born and brought up on 
Nikunau, and in New Zealand, the proportion born and brought up there, rather than on either 
Tarawa or Nikunau, although still small is increasing. 
The above exemplify how traditional elements of I-Nikunau’s culture continue to connect 
traditional Nikunau with urban island Tarawa and with metropolitan New Zealand. They also 
bring out how their culture is dynamic, and so increasingly diverse, because of the dynamics, 
or things influencing it, varying by location, etc. Thus, for example, one observes not only 
differences among I-Nikunau in the diasporic community on Tarawa than there is among I-
Nikunau on Nikunau, and an even greater cultural range among I-Nikunau in the diasporic 
communities in New Zealand, but also a greater cultural range. This diversity is 
notwithstanding the continuing influence on social forms and practices, on Nikunau and away 
from it, of Autio’s (2010) concept of undifferentiation as a cultural principle, which 
underpins the criticism I-Nikunau occasionally aim of “behaving like te I-Matang.” This 
principle is clearly in evidence when I-Nikunau, or I-Kiribati in diasporic communities away 
from Kiribati gather in numbers for botaki or similar social purposes. 
The drawing attention to juxtaposing of I-Kiribati dance and costumes of materials from 
Kiribati by Fedor (2012) in diasporic communities in New Zealand (see above) brings out the 
distinction between but interrelatedness of material and intangible culture. As far as the 
composition of I-Nikunau’s material culture on Nikunau up to the 1960s, Koch’s (1965/1986) 
study on Nonouti, Tabiteuea and Onotoa seems reasonably reliable, in terms physical objects, 
their form, range, origin, novelty, changeability, etc., as is so for Hockings’s (1984) study 
focused on buildings and other structures and their cultural ramifications (see S4.2). Further 
evidence relevant to culture of an intangible nature, often mixed with the material side, is 
provided, either purposefully or incidentally, from the different islands at various times by 
the mix of authors listed above (i.e., Autio, 2010; Catala, 1957; etc.).  
The general thrust of this evidence is that culture on Nikunau and the other Outer Islands has 
been influenced from outside those islands in two interrelated and, arguably, just as important 
(Macdonald, 1982a; Rennie, 1987) ways; that is, by outsiders (e.g., whalers, traders, 
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missionaries, colonial officials) coming to the islands and by I-Nikunau and other I-Kiribati 
returning to their home islands, having been away for work, schooling and other reasons. In a 
variety of ways, new beliefs, concepts, implements, knowledge, learnings and interpretations, 
skills and crafts, values, etc. made their way to Nikunau, and so extended I-Nikunau’s 
culture, intangibly and materially. For one thing, returning I-Nikunau and visitors told their 
stories to in mwaneaba and at other opportunities, in traditional ways that genealogy and 
history were shared, and so passed on knowledge of wherever they had travelled to or 
originated, including something of the nature of the lands the storytellers told about, and of 
the technologies, customs, economic systems, religions, social conditions, events, leaders, 
religious practices, etc. found there. Indeed, these stories incented some listeners to travel 
away from Nikunau themselves but one issue was that the stories often left out the 
storytellers’ bad experiences and misfortunes (see S3.3.2, S4.1 and S4.4). For another thing, 
returning I-Nikunau and visitors introduced many of the implements mentioned in previous 
subsections, including victuals, seeds and plants, livestock, cloth, furniture, fittings, 
furnishings, money, books, writing materials, weapons, tools, utensils, lighting, push-
bicycles, motors, machinery, generators, refrigeration, electrical appliances, musical 
instruments, audio and video players, computer devices and other equipment. Similarly, the 
knowledge, etc., which pertain, among other things, to fishing and cultivation, cooking, 
garment making, metalworking, carpentry, coopering, mechanics, reading and writing, 
education, playing music, conducting religious rituals, jurisprudence, politics, health and 
well-being, construction, baking, brewing and other local manufacturing.  
Noteworthy in the past two decades is the increased incidence of entertainment equipment for 
screening movies, music videos and other videos at will, instead of the once-a-week reel-to-
reel films formerly organised by Te Bobotin Nikunau. Mostly, this equipment, along with 
petrol generators and solar cells needed to power them, is owned by kawa or church groups, 
rather than a single mwenga, as is also the case of other big price items such as motor 
vehicles The incidence of computers and related devices was barely in evidence when I 
visited in 2009, although the Island Council treasurer had very recently obtained a laptop for 
the first time; this was courtesy of the Republic Government, for whom she also carried out 
some agency duties. I understand that in the eight years since various devices (e.g., laptops, 
iPads, mobile phones) have become more evident on Nikunau, often gifted by utu on Tarawa 
and further afield. However, access to the Internet and similar is still limited, and so has not 
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had as significant effect yet as materials copied on CDs, DVDs, USBs, etc. have on youth 
culture in particular, or on culture in general.  
The situation of Tarawa in regard to the Internet, computer technology and electricity to 
power equipment is quite different, with mobile devices having become commonplace and 
access to the Internet easier, more reliable and more affordable. As mentioned or alluded to in 
previous subsections, many things of cultural significance have been possibilitated by this 
development. One deserving particular mention is the use of social messaging applications at 
no or very low cost (e.g., Skype, Facebook Messenger, WhatsApp Messenger); these have 
boosted contact among utu wherever they (e.g. Tarawa, London, Christchurch, Wellington, 
Honiara). Similarly, “friends” and “group members” can share daily events and 
circumstances through social media (e.g., see Nikunau Maneaba on Facebook, n.d.). People 
who a decade ago might not have seen each other for years, and only spoken to each other on 
the telephone intermittently and at considerable cost, can now see and speak to each other 
daily using these devices and applications.  
Not only that but also these people share their knowledge, skills, crafts and experiences, and 
exchange electronic and physical goods more easily, and so their habits, general conduct and 
even customs can change, or existing or traditional habits, general conduct and customs can 
be reinforced. The possibility of producing videos of dancing and other events, and sharing 
these on YouTube or similar, adds to these possibilities; indeed, YouTube or similar gives 
access to non-I-Kiribati music, dancing, sports, and a whole host of entertainment, 
technology and the like, providing knowledge, skills and crafts capable of “catching on” and 
becoming part of culture on Tarawa, youth culture in particular, quickening cultural change 
there compared with previously. 
However, that is not to say that previous cultural change on Tarawa was as slow as on 
Nikunau now. Since the 1940s, it has a much greater presence of non-I-Kiribati, many of 
them there to bring about change (e.g., teachers, engineers, consultants). The immigrants, 
such as I-Nikunau, it has received from other islands have been younger and more intellectual 
than the communities they left. The life for I-Tarawa and immigrants has been affected by 
the much greater infrastructure, facility and intangible developments there. Thus, the culture 
for many I-Nikunau on Tarawa has since the 1950s and 1960s included living in dwellings of 
non-traditional design and materials, including having walls, doors, windows and rooms; 
moreover, even most traditional dwellings have been on the mains supply of electricity since 
the 1980s and 1990s. That life has also included exposure to people originating from other 
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Kiribati islands and from other countries, and to their habits, customs, conduct and culture. 
And it has included the cash economy, and working for others for set hours in return for cash, 
and being overseen and instructed in their work by another person from outside their mwenga 
or utu. Etc. Etc. The advent of the Internet, etc. is a continuation of the developments that 
have been part and parcel of cultural change, as well as an accelerator of that change. 
On changes to culture more generally over the past two centuries, these have accompanied 
the displacement of traditional knowledge, skills, and magico-religious and related beliefs 
among I-Nikunau, even on Nikunau, with same originating elsewhere and introduced, 
whether as described above by returning I-Nikunau or visitors, or as part and parcel of 
conversion to Christianity and the implementation of formal education (see S4.8 and S4.9). 
The literacy skills in the school system has been inextricably linked by their teachers, first 
non-I-Kiribati and then their I-Kiribati successors, with a curriculum established and 
maintained by successive parties who came from outside Nikunau and Kiribati. That is, the 
Churches, which regarded most of traditional culture as the antithesis of their religious 
mission; a colonial government, which was steeped in Britishness notwithstanding how it 
reflected developments in British ideas and practices since the mid-20th Century, including 
about education (Burnett, 2009); and aid providers, whose educational thinking has reflected 
further developments, particularly those expressed in the English-language.  
Insofar as this curriculum has included knowledge and skills relevant to everyday life, 
perhaps unwittingly in many cases, the material, has been more about that life in places 
where the curriculum originated, than on Nikunau, Tarawa or similar; for example, the 
KGVEBS domestic science curriculum, in preparation for Cambridge Board examinations, 
featured preparation of everyday victuals, but everyday mostly in Cambridge! In regard to 
items associated with the material culture of Nikunau (e.g., see Koch, 1965/1986), and 
Tarawa for that matter, the incidence of, for example, imported implements (e.g., tools, 
boats), made from metal alloys, plastics and similar, has increased, and so use of skills in 
making locally producible items, and other knowledge connected with their use, etc., have at 
least declined and mostly been lost altogether (cf. Lawrence, 1983).  
Before the 1870s or so, the older generation, that is unimane and unaine, covered the 
everyday life curriculum for living on Nikunau along with everything else on the traditional 
curriculum (see S4.9), and so it remained as far as the everyday life curriculum was 
concerned. Except this was done outside school hours and because increasingly tacit, rather 
than formal, especially in matters that mission and later teachers saw as unbefitting and 
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actively discouraged (see Grimble’s criticism of the mission curriculum cited in S4.8). 
Moreover, the knowledge, etc. that unimane and unaine could pass on about traditional 
technology and non-traditional technology introduced in their generation was for ever being 
reduced in value or made redundant altogether because much technological change cum 
material culture occurred as successive I-Nikunau returned to Nikunau and outsiders came to 
Nikunau, both bringing further waves of new technology and knowledge of how to use it.  
The upshot was for the speed of technological change, and where it was driven from, to 
undermine traditional ways of passing on technological knowledge and cultural knowledge 
together. What is more, each wave of new technology, despite much of the knowledge about 
using it not extending to the ramifications of sustaining it, seems to have been seen, at least 
implicitly, as a linear and irreversible improvement, with no prospect of future need for 
technological knowledge no longer in use, traditional or otherwise, and so no need to reposit 
that knowledge in case its significance and value were to recur. These losses of knowledge, 
or failure to hand down knowledge within generations, is notwithstanding oral traditions still 
being strong and substantial the literacy skills having been acquired in the school system. 
This decline can be viewed as a threat to I-Nikunau being able to sustain life in the very 
peculiar natural environment on Nikunau without the current level of outside support; nor 
does it bode well for the challenges of life on Tarawa either if the current level of outside 
support was interrupted (cf. Republic of Kiribati, 2009). Such proposals as organising 
training workshops and publish booklets on “traditional conservation skills/practices” (see 
Republic of Kiribati, 2009, p. 57) may be seen as a sign of this threat being appreciated, if not 
responded to very convincingly.  
Regarding the fate of some parts of I-Nikunau’s intangible culture that were in the traditional 
curriculum but which mission and later teachers actively discouraged, the most notable of 
these are stories of myths and legends, history and ancestry, social conduct and social 
pursuits, including dancing songs and music. As with much traditional technology, many 
were not passed on in traditional ways from generation to generation, especially between the 
1880s and 1980s, the period of LMS and British colonialism. The continued existence of 
much knowledge of this nature, when imperious outsiders have begun to admit its importance 
as a human right, etc., is due in no small way to the interest taken in collecting and repositing 
this knowledge by I-Matang anthropologists, historians, etc. (e.g., Geddes, the Grimbles, 
Koch, Latouche, Lundsgaarde, Macdonald, the Maudes, Sabatier) (cf. Kambati, 1992). As to 
the future of this knowledge, interest in it among I-Nikunau and other I-Kiribati has been 
 
191 
rejuvenated, notably in diasporic communities, where the methods and resources of 
education, anthropology and preservation of cultural heritage seem to have been melded with 
traditional methods (e.g., see British Museum, 2017; Tungaru: the Kiribati Project, 2016).  
Dance is the most significant exception of knowledge having been transmitted continuously 
through traditional means, along with song and music (see Autio, 2010; Dambiec, 2005; 
Whincup, 2009), despite how critical some religious leaders were of it (e.g., William Goward 
of the LMS – see Macdonald, 1982a), and how traditional means of teaching learning have 
deteriorated at the hands of formal education and technological change. Having survived this 
prejudice and other impediments to their survival, dancing, etc. are not only common on 
Nikunau (see Teuea, 2010) and throughout Kiribati (Autio, 2010), what is more, they are a 
principal feature of all diasporic communities, including in collaborations with native 
institutions (see British Museum, 2017; EventFinda, 2014; PixMasta Studio, 2017), and so a 
mainstay of I-Nikunau’s cultural identity. 
4.14 Societal Circumstances 
To analyse I-Nikunau’s societal circumstances I make use of the notion of “socie-ties”, a 
word play on the now obscure verb “socie”, meaning to ally for some common purpose or to 
join or bind, and on “ties” in the form of powerful and pragmatic social constructs or 
institutions (see Quattrone, 2015, 2016). Ten generations ago, being isolated to an extent that 
is difficult to conceive today, albeit that there was some interaction and commonality with the 
I-Kiribati inhabitants of neighbouring islands, the possibilities of I-Nikunau constituting a 
society seem self-evident—even when they travelled, they always expected to return to 
Nikunau, except through marriage or to live with kin on other islands. However, this state of 
being together geographically, and away from virtually everyone else on the planet, was only 
one of many ties by which they were socied to one another and that gave rise to the society in 
question, as may be implied from the histories related in various parts of S4.1 to S4.13.  
Ascendant among these other ties were I-Nikunau’s social relationships based on kinship, 
including boti and utu; these figured in their demographical, political, spiritual, social and 
organisational circumstances, among others (see S4.2, S4.7, S4.8, S4.10 and S4.11). Further 
prominent ties were that I-Nikunau lived as and in mwenga situated on kainga, both being 
physically and socially similar. They shared in the same skills and crafts, and lived on the 
same victuals procured in similar ways from adjacent aba and marine areas. Their grasp of 
the world was shaped by what they heard, saw, smelt, touched and tasted on their atoll and 
the ocean and atmosphere surrounding it. They developed a common language to 
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communicate, and to express how, collectively and historically, they interpreted the 
observations, etc. just referred to, including how they imagined this world had come about, 
what they were doing in it and what happened to those who died. These interpretations and 
imaginings were an important part of the knowledge, understandings beliefs and values they 
shared. All the matters just enumerated were reflected in I-Nikunau’s long-established, but 
still dynamic (e.g., see Maude, 1963; McCreary & Boardman, 1968), myriad of common 
customs, rituals, etc. (i.e., te katei ni Nikunau) of 11 or 12 generations ago; these covered the 
roles they should play out in their lifetimes and how they should conduct themselves, 
collectively and individually.  
About 10 generations ago, I-Nikunau’s ancestors encountered whalers and, since, all the 
circumstances of I-Nikunau as a people discussed in S4.1 to S4.13 have changed rapidly, and 
with them, their societal circumstances. The adverb “rapidly” is apposite when one compares 
how similar changes of equivalent substance and magnitude were spread across the history of 
many more than 10 generations of the race and societies to which these whalers belonged, 
namely I-Matang. This same race has featured most prominently in I-Nikunau’s subsequent 
history, be it as traders, Pacific labour trade employers, missionaries, colonial officials, 
phosphateers, World War II combatants, aid workers, consultants or the majority population 
in metropolitan countries where I-Nikunau diasporic communities now occur.  
In discussing the types of circumstances covered in S4.1 to S4.13, a good many rapid changes 
to I-Nikunau’s societal circumstances are referred to or implied, including by reference to 
their encounters with I-Matang and other outsiders in the roles listed above. This rapidity of 
change to Kiribati society was observed by Sabatier (1939/1977) a century ago, and 
Macdonald (1982a) made a similar observation three decades ago; it is a pattern often 
repeated in many Pacific Island societies (see Nunn, 2013). Here I direct attention to the 
changes in question by concentrating on the changes in the ties that have socied I-Nikunau 
over the past two centuries.  
Geographically, I-Nikunau are still to be found on Nikunau, but in a far less isolated state; as 
well as sharing their atoll with other I-Kiribati and outsiders, many of them impermanent or 
transitory, their economy features imports and exports, and they have transport, postal and 
telecommunications links to the outside world. They are also to be found on Tarawa in 
sufficient numbers to constitute a diasporic community, but as the people around them on 
Tarawa are not that different in appearance, language and other social, cultural and economic 
traits, they exhibit integration (Berry, 1997, 2005) in that society quite strongly, as I claimed 
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in S3.3.1. New Zealand and Britain are two of the several other places where I-Nikunau now 
live and where they are part of diasporic communities. But these communities differ in two 
ways from the one on Tarawa: first, rather than only comprising I-Nikunau, these are I-
Kiribati diasporic communities; and second, whereas the one in Britain exhibits a significant 
degree of integration into British society, owing to the couples who founded it being a mix of 
I-Matang and I-Kiribati, the ones in New Zealand exhibits high degrees of separation, being 
mostly comprised of I-Kiribati singles, couples and families and still expanding mostly 
through immigration from Tarawa (see S3.3.1., S3.3.2, S4.1 and S4.2).  
Demographically, although not usually living on adjacent aba, except on Nikunau, I-Nikunau 
still keep close physically, where possible, and socially, adopting communications 
technology as rapidly as its availability and lowering of costs allow, and placing a high 
priority on having that technology. They also share their mwenga with others in their 
diasporic communities when the need arises. This is reflective of them continuing socially to 
value kinship highly, within each community and across their communities. That includes the 
continuing significance for I-Nikunau of utu, albeit adapted to modern circumstances, as is 
evident from the extent that utu is used in this paper in writing about the present (cf. Gilkes, 
2006; Ratuva, 2014; Roman, 2013; Thompson, 2016). Utu’s survival as an institution is 
probably because it is mainly about blood ties, social and economic rights and obligations 
over land and other resources, and temporal knowledge, whereas boti, which is now virtually 
extinct as an institution, had much to do with pre-colonial religious, political and judicial 
matters, all of which were targets of colonial change. Indeed, particularly in the geographical 
absence of very many utu around them, I-Nikunau have come to also value baronga and 
similar strong or fictive kinship ties. I-Nikunau are also cognisant of how kinship is part of 
the societies in which they live (e.g., on Tarawa, within the Māori and range of Pacific Island 
peoples that form part of New Zealand society). 
They share in the same victuals, now procured through subsistence and market means of 
production, distribution and exchange, depending on circumstances, the range of victuals 
having broadened and changed to some extent. Victuals continue to be as important socially 
as they are nutritionally, including at botaki. Indeed, botaki, bowi and similar remain a central 
feature of life on Nikunau and in diasporic communities, and where one can see 
demonstrations of quasi-traditional conduct, roles, custom, beliefs and values, as people come 
together for one purpose or another. In metropolitan countries in particular, but elsewhere 
also, this continuance of quasi-tradition is despite life’s economic, social, political and other 
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pressures to behave differently, not only to survive economically but also to conform with 
local societal expectations in order to be accepted and “get on” permanently. This 
consideration of permanence in metropolitan countries in most cases reflects lack of any 
intention to return to Nikunau or even Tarawa, except to visit family and, perhaps, out of 
curiosity about whence one’s ancestors originated.  
As to I-Nikunau’s present grasp of the world, this is even more widely shared than in the past 
among utu, baronga, etc. through stories based on personal experiences, etc., even on 
Nikunau. More I-Nikunau than ever before have more comprehensive stories, etc. about 
peoples and societies around them and at a distance, through media of various kinds (e.g., 
social, video and audio, broadcast, social, print). Supplementing this, and indeed of possibly 
at least equivalent importance, particularly in metropolitan countries, are formal education 
and said media. Nevertheless, how I-Nikunau interpret these experiences, stories, education 
and media sources and reach meanings from them individually and collectively is still bound 
by the language(s) they work in; in many cases, even among those living in metropolitan 
countries but not brought up there, this is chiefly te taetae ni Kiribati, albeit a modern version 
to which many words, terms and phrases have been added over the past two centuries, while, 
over the same period, quite a lot of words, terms and phrases have largely fallen out of use 
through lack of relevance or applicability. This experience, etc. of the world has led to many 
changes in beliefs and values, particularly reflecting the societies in which they live. Thus, 
particularly away from Nikunau through Tarawa and to metropolitan countries, egalitarian, 
democratic and individual freedom principles have become accentuated, and gender 
discrimination, gerontocratic authority and even religious observance is much reduced. 
Nevertheless, adherence to principles of self-reliance and of collective fairness, sharing and 
hospitality, and aversion to conspicuous personal displays of social or economic advantage 
still continue within and across communities, regardless of the societal circumstances.  
Coming to a much changed grasp or understanding of the world has happened alongside I-
Nikunau being inducted into an increasingly interdependent global society. This condition 
even applies to those remaining on Nikunau, as raised above already in some respects but 
worth repeating and expanding. Thus, they are socially interdependent with the other 
societies around them, whether I-Beru, I-Tabiteuea, I-Tarawa, etc. in Kiribati or I-Matang, 
Pākehā, Māori, Solomon Islander, Chinese, etc. outside it. They are economically 
interdependent, supplying labour and copra, and permitting foreign fleets, such as from 
Japan, Taiwan, Korea, the United States and Spain, to fish their Extended Economic Zone for 
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tuna under licence, for example; and in return receiving goods from Japan, China, Australia, 
etc., services and cash, including that received by the Republic Government and that it 
invests abroad under the auspices of the Revenue Equalisation Reserve Fund. They are 
politically interdependent—some might say dependent—with Kiribati being a member of the 
United Nations and the International Monetary Fund, to name but two bodies that have some 
influence over I-Nikunau development—others include agencies, etc. associated with the 
governments of Australia, New Zealand, Taiwan, Japan, Korea, etc. These conditions extend 
to spiritual interdependence, worshipping the same deity—E tuaña Aberaam (≡ the God of 
Abraham) (Bingham 1907)—as many others around the world, and adhering to the ethical 
and moral rules associated with the multiplicity of denominations within this religion. They 
are culturally interdependent, as is exemplified even in the case of diasporic communities in 
metropolitan New Zealand. The communities in New Zealand, as those elsewhere, seemingly 
maintain and re-construct their distinctiveness, while simultaneously acquiring footholds in 
the host community(ies); this is notwithstanding how much separation the communities there 
still exhibit (Fedor, 2012; Gillard & Dyson, 2012; Roman, 2013; Taberannang, 2011; 
Thompson, 2016) (cf. Agyemang & Lehman, 2013; Berry, 1997, 2005; Watkin Lui, 2009). 
It is through these interdependencies that I-Nikunau have been increasingly able to emigrate 
from Nikunau, and now from Tarawa, to settle on Tarawa and in the Solomon and Line 
Islands, and now in metropolitan countries. Most of this interdependence is asymmetrical, the 
distribution of benefit favouring the hosts of the settlement; nevertheless, the settlers still 
regard their settlement as advantageous, such as in terms of greater access to cash and to 
secure their children’s futures, as well as theirs. It is through emigration that I-Nikunau’s 
societal circumstances have changed and are changing, the changes not only affecting the 
emigrants but also those left behind, at least for the time being, but who many outsiders and 
increasing numbers of insiders believe will have to emigrate because of sea-level rise, or 
perish through drought, changes to living conditions, public health issues, etc. (e.g., see 
Kuruppu, 2009; Roy & Connell, 1991). 
5 Conclusion 
In this paper, I have set out to illuminate and stimulate interest in the demographical, 
economic, social and political dynamics of peoples associated with atolls, particularly in the 
Pacific. I focused on the I-Nikunau people for two basic reasons: first, for the reasons set out 
in S2, in which I indicated that although I-Nikunau more or less started out from one atoll, the 
majority now forms a diaspora, whose coming about is where much of the novelty and value 
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of this paper lies, compared with focusing on a territory, such as an atoll or an atoll nation 
state; and second, simply because I am in a position that Roslender and Dillard (2003) have 
labelled “privileged” among a culturally homogeneous group of people with indigenous ties 
to one atoll. I used empirical materials gathered in this position to construct a rough story. I 
then elaborated that story and, with help from ideas, concepts, evidence, etc. in a large 
collection I accumulated of secondary sources, many of them cited in the paper and listed in 
the reference list, turned the story into the descriptive, retrospective analysis and 
interpretation now presented. 
The story is partitioned into the 14 themes as set out in Figure 7 and foreshadowed in 
introducing the analysis in S4. As indicated there, these particular themes, and the notion of 
breaking the whole down into such parts, reflects my predominantly I-Matang culture and 
thinking, informed by literature mostly written by people of that ilk. It contrasts with I-
Nikunau culture, in which thinking, activities, things, rituals, etc. seem wholistic and 
inseparable (cf. Autio, 2010; Kambati, 1992; Whincup, 2010); this is notwithstanding the 
national motto te mauri, te raoi, ao te tabomoa, and how the three terms it comprises are used 
as a basis of analysis in Ministry of Internal and Social Affairs (2007). However, I have 
attempted to present my analysis and interpretation in a way that makes links to previous 
themes and their histories, without I hope being too repetitive. My intention is that the reader 
obtains a sense of the interrelatedness of I-Nikunau’s circumstances and, from that, 
appreciates the experiences through which I-Nikunau as a people have gone and are now 
undergoing are better understood when considered wholistically (cf. Kuruppu, 2009). Indeed, 
in leaving organisational, distributional, cultural and societal circumstances to the end, I hope 
to have provided some synthesising of matters covered in detail under the earlier themes, not 
only of where I-Nikunau are in these respects, but also how they have got there, in order to 
inform where they are going, not just geographically but in every sense of te mauri 
(demography, natural resources, water, environment, health, education, housing, social 
welfare and social infrastructure), te raoi (social capital, community life, local institutions, 
crime and the justice system, religion, political authority and governance), and te tabomoa 
(economic activities and economies, modes of production, transport and communications 
infrastructure). 
On the question of what about peoples of other atolls, in Kiribati, in the Pacific more 
generally, and elsewhere? Has this paper anything to offer them and the researchers, etc. who 
are studying them? This is not the first paper to consider demographical dynamics of peoples, 
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or dynamics of demographic change or history, even in relation to an atoll, nor of economic 
dynamics of peoples, nor etc., however it is unusual, if not unique, for bringing these issues 
together in such detail, either for an atoll people or otherwise. One might therefore wonder 
why, and suggest that it is because it is of no importance. And yet, in using the accelerating 
accumulation of papers about Kiribati, or about I-Kiribati as immigrants or settlers, in 
diaspora, as mostly stimulated seemingly by interest in climate change, I cannot help but 
notice the countless references, incidental or more substantial, to many of the occurrences, 
events, enduring traditions, abandoned traditions, changes in circumstances, constancies in 
circumstances, etc. that I have elaborated in this paper. While one might question the 
relevance of including some of these matters in some of these papers, not to mention the 
validity and reliability at times, that so many researchers make so many references would 
suggest that they have some importance for grappling with the complexities of research about 
the future of peoples still inhabiting the world’s atolls and facing whatever challenges this 
future may bring, climate-related and otherwise. It is on this basis that I commend this paper 
to researchers concerned with atolls as source of ideas and a research approach.  
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1 After Commodore John Byron, whose ships Dolphin and Tamar encountered the atoll during their voyage 
around the world (Officer on Board the Said Ship, 1767). 
2 The concept of diaspora has evolved over the past half-century or so (see Cohen & Van Hear, 2008). Here, I 
use it in the broad senses of a people who identify with a place, that is Nikunau Atoll in this study, and who 
have settled in groups elsewhere, and the collection of places inhabited by the groups and the actual dispersion 
processes. Regards the groups in each place, I refer to them as “diasporic communities” (cf. Shuval, 2000), 
using “community” in the sense of a body of people who live in the same place and have ethnicity or culture in 
common. 
3 Kiribati (/ˈkɪrɨbæs/) is the local enunciation of Gilberts. The name arises from Captain Thomas Gilbert, who, 
in 1788, commanded a British East India Company ship that sailed through the Kiribati Archipelago bound from 
Port Jackson to Canton (Gilbert, 1968; Richards, 1986). Except when stating proper names or quoting other 
sources, Kiribati and Kiribati Islands (and Kiribati Archipelago) are used in this document in preference to 
Gilberts and Gilbert Islands. 
4 I-Kiribati (/ˈɨkɪrɨbæs/), like I-Nikunau ((/ˈɨnɪkuːnaʊ/), is a word in te taetae ni Kiribati (or Gilbertese), the 
Austronesian-type language unique to and spoken (and increasingly written) across the Kiribati Archipelago. 
The prefix “I-“ attached to an island or group of islands (other examples are I-Tarawa, I-Beru and I-Matang) 
indicates persons with social and cultural ties to the island or group in question in an identifying or belonging 
sense, rather than a mere a residential sense. In relation to Nikunau, Kain Nikunau has a similar meaning, 
although it may infer being normally resident on Nikunau. Incidentally, singular words in te taetae ni Kiribati 
are distinguished from plural ones by being preceded by te, and so to refer to a single person, one says, for 
example, te I-Nikunau. 
5 The name arises from being thought at first to be from Matang, a place associated with fair people in some 
Kiribati Island’s legends (Grimble, 1989). I-Nikunau distinguish I-Matang by skin colour only; while there is 
some appreciation of language differences, say between English, German and French, differences of class, 
socio-economic status and Anglosphere country of origin are much less well understood. 
6 I am grateful to Uentabo Mackenzie for bringing my attention to this document, one of a series dealing with 
most islands in turn using a the same contents structure. 
7 A further elaboration is inferred by Maude (1963), who explains that a person’s utu is in theory an indefinitely 
extensible category of near and distant kindred, but in practice one bounded by knowing with whom one shares 
a common ancestor. In my experience, this often amounts to scores or even hundreds of people, given the still 
keen knowledge of genealogy among I-Nikunau and other I-Kiribati, the common ancestor being possibly 
several generations back and long dead. However, nowadays, I-Nikunau usually distinguish between utu, 
meaning utu ni kaan ( close kin), and koraki (i.e., broader-kindred utu) (personal communications from Hegnes 
Dixon and Dick Overy). Thus, depending on the context, the term utu is often used to refer to near kindred 






other hand, are usually are more distant contemporary consanguine relatives, with whom the solidarity is not 
quite as keen but still strong.  
8 According to Maude (1963), a generation corresponds to about 25 years. Generations were used in compiling a 
genealogical tree during this study for ana utu [Name of person] ni kaan going back six generations. The tree 
was compiled from oral sources among te utu ni kaan (i.e., [Name]’s closest kin). The birth year of the oldest 
man in the sixth generation was in the 1850s and the youngest female in the 1870s. This gap partly reflects male 
marriage partners being 5–10 years older than female partners by virtue of how males and females were seen, or 
initiated, as adults (Grimble, 1921); such a gap was also evident in official censuses a century later (see 
Pusinelli, 1947; Zwart & Groenewegen, 1968; Veltman, 1982). 
9 The term “Outer Islands” refers to all the islands in the Republic of Kiribati apart from Tarawa. The term is 
widespread in the Pacific (see Connell, 2010). 
10 I am grateful to the late Tiarum Tiare/O’Connor for letting his niece, Hegnes Dixon, and myself accompany 
him to this shrine. 
11 For photographs, see Alaima et al. (1979), Hockings (1984), Koch (1965/1986) and Whincup (2010). 
12 For photographs and illustrations of mwaneaba, see Alaima et al. (1979), Maude (1963) and Whincup (2010). 
13 The name Kiribati Uniting Church (KUC) was adopted in 2014 by the bi-annual assembly of what had 
previously been known as the Kiribati Protestant Church (KPC). However, the validity of this name changing 
process is presently the subject of a court case lodged by some members of the Church, and it is possible that the 
Church in question might revert to its former name—another possibility is that it might split into two 
organisations. Thus, I use the acronym KPC/KUC to refer to this church. 
14 The occurrence of buildings to which the name mwaneaba is applied is typical of most institutions and 
corporate bodies not only on Nikunau but also, and more so, on Tarawa; this is irrespective of the widening 
disparity in construction, uses and protocols applying compared with the traditional mwaneaba (see Whincup, 
2010). 
15 The two words boboti and mronron were first written by Bingham in the 1850s (see Bingham, 1907). Boboti, 
which roughly translates as a coming together of the people (see Trussel & Groves, 2003) is now used in 
reference to government-regulated cooperative societies. Mronron, which roughly translates as spherical or 
round (see Trussel & Groves, 2003), refers to informal or proto consumer cooperative societies. 
16 Fresh sap obtained from inflorescence of the coconut palm. 
17 Copra is the dried meat obtained by collecting, splitting and drying coconuts. 
18 Stipulations in laws, etc. regarding entitlements and prohibitions on grounds of age are compromised still by 
the infrequency with which births were registered, certainly up to the 1980s and possibly even today; this is 
notwithstanding a legal obligation to register them dating from Revised Native Laws 1916 and facilities having 
existed on Nikunau to do so for almost as long.  
19 As selling their copra, collecting their money and, often, turning this money straight into goods affects the 





matters here. The Republic Government as actual purchaser of the copra is represented on Nikunau by 
designated staff with offices in the Island Council administration building. During any weekday morning, a 
copra cutter can weigh in his (still all male) copra at one of the atoll’s stores. The storekeeper records each 
weighing in and compiles a list of all copra received that morning. Around noon, the storekeeper takes the list to 
the Island Council office where it is processed by a clerk. As part of the paperwork s/he then does, the clerk 
calculates the total amount that should be paid to cutters on the list. The calculation is based on the guaranteed 
price per kilogram set by the Republic Government. The clerk hands the processed list to the Island Council 
treasurer, who then gives the storekeeper the amount of money needed to pay the cutters. The storekeeper 
returns to his store and, in the course of the afternoon, the cutters return to collect the money they are owed—by 
now, several hours will have passed since a cutter first visited the store to deposit the copra. The copra cutters 
either use the cash received to purchase goods there and then, or hold onto it to be able to meet other needs for 
cash. 
20 In terms of premises associated with social and political activities, these include churches, primary and 
secondary schools, tertiary education and training institutions, the large central hospital and a few smaller or 
even tiny medical facilities, the national library, the museum, coastal defences, embassies and high 
commissions, numerous offices of non-governmental organisations (NGOs), urban councils and government 
ministries, and the complex around Te Mwaneaba ni Maungatabu (i.e., parliament). Regarding commerce, they 
also include innumerable retail outlets, which range in size from hawkers’ fish stalls and roadside kiosks (of 
which there are hundreds), to half a dozen supermarkets (the largest in 2009 had six aisles and three checkouts 
but I now understand from confidential personal communication (2017) that the supermarkets have, in total, 30–
40 aisles and about 20 checkouts), a few garages, several bars and eating places, various construction and 
similar business depots, small works producing biscuits and processing seaweed and copra, business offices, 
storage facilities and workshops, two power generating plants, a few hotels and guesthouses, three or four bank 
branches, the container terminal, wharves and harbour buildings, and the international airport (an inventory is 
included in Castalia Strategic Advisors, 2005, although it is increasingly out of date). 
21 The Colony Government went into exile in Fiji between 1941 and 1943 while war raged in the vicinity of the 
Kiribati and Marshall Islands. Its officials were evacuated from the Colony in 1941 along with British Phosphate 
Commission staff and other I-Matang in anticipation of an invasion by Japanese forces of Banaba, Tarawa and 
some other Kiribati islands—the Japanese intended to establish a forward military position in the central Pacific 
(i.e., the airstrip and port facilities on Betio) and restore Banaba as a source of phosphate, which the British 
Phosphate Commission had ceased supplying them with a few years earlier. A few Colony Government officials 
returned to Tarawa with the American-led Allied Forces who invaded it in 1943 to expel the Japanese forces of 
occupation in what became known as the Battle of Tarawa. Tarawa was subsequently decided on as the Colony 
Government headquarters, these previously having been on Banaba (Macdonald, 1982a; Resture, 1998; Wright, 
2000).  
22 By this term, I am referring to economic activities and social relations associated with the members of a 
society transforming natural objects into useful implements, and distributing and exchanging them. This is from 





exchange relations, and their consequences extend to urbanisation, cultural beliefs, ideologies, politics and 
social classes. 
23 These dwellings were erected at various times by various interests. The Colony Government erected some to 
house its incoming I-Matang, I-Nikunau and other non-I-Tarawa employees—these houses were graded 
according to status and those for native employees, I-Kiribati and Tuvaluans, were of a smaller, cheaper type, 
often arranged in closely packed rows. The Republic Government erected some for similar employment reasons 
and for social hosing reasons, often in conjunction with aid organisations and as part of aid projects. Foreign 
governmental agencies, aid organisations and private companies have also erected some to cater for their staff 
on Tarawa. Some were erected by private citizens, usually of mixed ancestry and still having overseas 
connections.  
24 Most I-Matang and other non-I-Kiribati involved in the Colony Government and its agencies on Tarawa, and 
many working on contract in the 1980s and 1990s, were present for at least several months and often a few 
years, and so lived with their families on the atoll in houses built for this purpose. In contrast, many aid 
contracts involving I-Matang and other non-I-Kiribati are given nowadays to itinerant consultants. They visit 
Tarawa for only days or weeks at a time, rather than months or years, and stay in hotels and guesthouses. Their 
families rarely accompany them. 
25 Similar perceptions apply to victuals, clothing, equipment, almost everything in fact. 
26 For one reason or another, the once significant practice of victuals (e.g., dried fish, pulverised and pressed 
pandanus, kamwaimwai) being sent occasionally from Nikunau to utu on Tarawa has decreased significantly. 
Cash and imported goods used to be sent the other way but not as an explicit exchange, and this too has 
declined.  
27 Many readers may take this state of affairs of working for a living for granted, and may be bemused by it 
having to be said. However, seen from a traditional I-Nikunau perspective, it is still novel (cf. Lawrence, 1983); 
indeed, there are limits still to whom I-Nikunau regard as legitimate employers in the context of any kamama 
attached to working for other people or employing people to do work one should be doing oneself (cf. Duncan, 
2014).  
28 These mronron may be formed by utu, various types of community groups, such as groups based on the 
settlement in which one lives on Tarawa, or particular church congregations in that settlement, or all I-Nikunau 
in that settlement, or I-Nikunau originating from the same te kawa on Nikunau. 
29 National Statistics Office (2006) reported average fortnightly household incomes on Tarawa were about 
AU$450 in 2006. The rates of pay for most work seem quite low: pay within the public service is mostly higher 
than outside it, but the highest public sector salaries are under AU$20,000 per annum (International Monetary 
Fund, 2014). 
30 The bananas are imported from Butaritari; they are perhaps the only commercial import of significance on 
Tarawa from any of the Outer Islands.  
31 Throughout its duration, English was the official language of the Colony Government, including as the 





district officers came to speak te taetae ni Kiribati and some rules, etc., were translated from English into te 
taetae ni Kiribati; English was also the main language of the British Phosphate Commission. Today, English 
and te taetae ni Kiribati are both official languages of the Republic Government, with English ascendant in 
written documents, including in legislation (see Kiribati Primary Materials, 2017) and official documents (e.g., 
Government of Kiribati, 2016; Kiribati Government, 2016), and in information technology systems. English is 
also the oral and written language used in dealing with aid organisations. In contrast, te taetae ni Kiribati is the 
oral language within government, including in Te Mwaneaba ni Maungatabu and local and island government, 
where increasingly te taetae ni Kiribati has come to be used in written documents too. Without doubt, te taetae 
ni Kiribati is the oral language of everyday life, in which it gradually came to be written more widely than in the 
bible (Bingham, 1907) and other religious texts. 
32 United Nations Children’s Fund (2014) claims that the United States of America had the largest, with New 
Zealand second, but I have not been able to corroborate the number it cites for the United States, that is 1,858; 
indeed, this number is far more than my Kiribati anecdotal sources suggest and is inconsistent with data in 
Bedford and Bedford (2013) and Roman (2013)—Roman puts the number as low as 76. 
33 For a detailed discussion of events and concerns of the British authorities regarding protectorates and 
colonies, see Munro and Firth (1986). Regarding the de facto status of the northern and central Kiribati Islands, 
and Banaba, they argue that the status of protectorate was short-lived in practice, and that the formalisation of 
colony status in 1916 was as much as 20 years after this status had actually arisen.  
34 Nikunau is 770 km from Banaba and 495 km from Tarawa. 
35 Line probably refers to the Equator. However, see Best (1983) for clarification of positions of whaling 
grounds.  
36 Unlike Banaba, Nauru was never part of the Colony, instead being administered by on the British Empire’s 
behalf by Australia from 1919, as per the territorial redistribution provisions negotiated at the Paris Peace 
Conference and set out in the Nauru Island Agreement 1919. Before, it was part of the Imperial German Pacific 
Protectorates and other German territories in the Pacific; these were shared out among Japan, Australia, New 
Zealand and the British Empire as Mandates by the League of Nations (Blakeslee, 1922).  
37 It was the practice of the authorities on Banaba and Nauru, that is the British Phosphate Commission and 
respective governmental authorities, to house families from each labour supplying island adjacently, thus 
forming, for example, an I-Nikunau community of mixed gender and varying ages. Unimane were contracted to 
liaise between a community and these authorities, who saw these extant cultural means as a way to maintain 
order and social stability.  
38 I-Nikunau continued working on Nauru until mining ceased there in the early 2000s. 
39 The physical process of remitting cash to Nikunau has been physically problematic and mostly costly; indeed, 
it was not until the beginning of the 20th century that there were any postal services on Nikunau through which 
money could be transferred telegraphically or otherwise. In any case, although it has become somewhat easier to 
transmit cash to Tarawa, through the Australian commercial bank and Western Union agents there, and thence 
to Nikunau, even today, cash is not that useful on Nikunau. There is only a very limited range of goods available 





by purchasing goods where they work. This was exemplified by those working on Banaba and Nauru, where 
they could shop in stores catering primarily for I-Matang staff, etc. and ship their purchases to Nikunau on the 
labour recruiting ships administered by the Colony Government. Nowadays, an issue faced by I-Nikunau and 
other I-Kiribati working away are avoiding freight costs, excess baggage charges, etc. arising from transporting 
goods home themselves. 
40 By way of further explanation, whereas I-Nikunau were contracted to work on the phosphate islands for only 
two or three years at a time, during the last few decades of mining, the time they actually spent there lengthened. 
This arose because more skills were entailed in labouring jobs (e.g., because machinery replaced pickaxes and 
shovels), and so in order, for example, to save on training costs, the British Phosphate Commission renewed 
contracts as much as possible, especially to retain the most efficient and reliable workers. Thus, a family might 
be absent from Nikunau for as long as 10 years in a few cases. Children attended the British Phosphate 
Commission-sponsored schools, which, although no doubt well meant, did not provide learning relevant to 
living on Nikunau, and, as there was very little need or opportunity for families to engage in even a modicum of 
subsistence activity life (e.g., because they were supplied with rations, they did not own any land)—a few men 
would occasionally go fishing out of a yearning to eat fresh fish—neither boys nor girls learnt knowledge and 
skills associated with this life. 
41 The report to the British Parliament refers to not only Manra (also known as Hull) and Abariringa (or Canton) 
in the Phoenix Group—Orona (or Sydney) and Nikumaroro (or Gardner) are omitted—but also to Christmas 
(now spelt Kiritimati) Atoll in the Line Islands (see House of Commons, 1940). However, it was not until the 
1980s that some I-Nikunau were resettled on Kiritimati. Most of this resettlement was 20 years or more after its 
use ceased as a military base, including for testing nuclear bombs; indeed, some settlers were involved in its 
eventual decontamination clean up (Steadman, 2006).  
42 The names of kawa on Ghizo Island are Titiana and New Manra; on Wagina Island, they are Kukutin, Arariki 
and Nikumaroro; and on Alu Island, they are Kamaleai and Harapa.  
43 The first official census was in 1931, when the atoll’s population is recorded as 1,674 (National Statistics 
Office, 2013; Pusinelli, 1947). The most reliable numbers before that appear to be those calculated by Bedford 
et al. (1980).  
44 Further to Note 21, except for rare visits by Japanese patrols looking for Allied coast watchers and a visit(s) 
by Allied troops searching out any remaining Japanese troops, World War II passed Nikunau by at a distance. 
However, some activities in the vicinity were halted, notably the shipping vital to the copra trade and workers 
going away to Banaba. Indeed, it was I-Nikunau on Banaba when the Japanese invaded who were embroiled in 
the violence, notably as told by Karongoa and recorded in Maude (1991). 
45 Private customary rights over marine areas used to be vested in te I-Nikunau in the same way as aba. 
However, these private rights seem to have been eroded or have ceased altogether according to Hockings 
(1984). This appears to have followed on from steps the Colony Government took in the 1940s to curtail the 
rights to marine areas to fish traps only, leaving the rest as commons (Roniti 1988; Thomas, 2003). 
46 Hockings (1984) includes an account of how linkages arose through the travels of Taburitongoun (see S3.1) 





47 In relating that mwenga comprising te kainga could and would be of a few different utu, Hockings (1984) 
points out that this was more often because any consanguinity between mwenga was so many generations ago 
that it was forgotten than because of absence of any consanguinity at all. 
48 Kawa in the sense of settlements outside the ancestral kainga were a pre-1820s phenomenon but then were 
more piecemeal than those discussed here and were a result of overcrowding of established kainga (Hockings, 
1984). 
49 Regarding the significances of land as ancestral, as well material or use-related, similar traditions apply 
elsewhere in the Pacific, including among Aboriginal Australians, as analysed by Gibson (2000) and Greer and 
Patel (2000); and Māori, as analysed by Kearins and Hooper (2002). These three analyses include the native 
people being blatantly dispossessed of land, among other things, in furtherance of European interests of one sort 
or another. 
50 The clear up resulted in scrap abandoned by the Japanese forces of occupation (1942–1943) and their 
American military expulsers being sold and the proceeds of a few hundred thousand dollars used to establish a 
now sovereign fund, the Revenue Equalisation Reserve Fund, usually referred to as the RERF (GEIC, 1957). 
The Colony Government added some of the phosphate royalties it received in the 1960s and 1970s to this fund. 
However, the fund, now valued at AU$871m (Kiribati Government, 2016), really prospered when the Republic 
Government began making substantial surpluses because of tuna fishery licence fees, and through investment 
income—the fund is invested in London and other stock market securities (but not in Kiribati businesses!)—
being retained in the fund (Pretes & Gibson, 2008; Pretes & Petersen, 2004). Remarkably, neither when the fund 
was created or when it was added to did the Colony Government and others have any inkling about the great 
potential of Kiribati’s tuna fishery, particularly as a source of licensing revenue; this is evident in, for example, 
GEIC (1970), Government of Kiribati (1983) and Bertram and Watters (1984). 
51 Even as recently as the 1980s, from personal experience, the way in which copra was taken to a trade store 
and exchanged immediately for goods meant that copra was cash as far as most I-Nikunau were concerned. 
Today, as per Note 19, the notes and coins that I-Nikunau receive from depositing copra with a trade store cum 
copra buying agency may only be in their possession for short periods before being used to make purchases or to 
pay other extant obligations—incidentally, Nikunau still has no bank branches, let alone automatic teller 
machines and debit or credit card facilities. 
52 These women were generally unwanted as marriage partners by I-Nikunau men, their preference being for 
virgins, with consequences for young women being closely supervised before marriage by their utu (Grimble, 
1921; McCreary & Boardman, 1968). 
53 For over a decade up to 1908, Tarawa had been the Colony Government headquarters. These headquarters 
were then relocated to Banaba because, at the behest of its principals in London, facilitating the mining of 
phosphate became ascendant in its official’s priorities. Although I-Kiribati labour was still vital once mining on 
Banaba resumed after the war, the British Phosphate Commission, now very much Australian-oriented, was less 
keen on the presence on Banaba of the Colony Government’s mostly British officials, and so was more than 
happy for the headquarters to be located on Tarawa rather than Banaba (Macdonald, 1982a; Williams & 





Kiribati Islands were administered and as a commercial centre—Sabatier (1939/1977) describes Betio in 
particular as a “mini-capital” (p. 285). 
54 Perhaps strange at this distance in time is that the prospect of expenditure on economic and social 
development, or funding same, had not been part of the equation when the Kiribati Islands were annexed: such 
activities were seen as outside the remit of colonial activities in the 19th and early 20th Centuries (Morgan, 
1980). This view only began changing during the Great Depression, particularly when it was realised that 
providing aid-in-kind to a colony would boost manufacturing industry in Britain and perhaps help a colony 
develop, hence the timing of the Colonial Development Act 1929 and the dual rationale for establishing the 
Colonial Development and Welfare Fund (see Abbot, 1971). 
55 As alluded to in S4.1, attempts to implement the original plan (i.e., GEIC, 1946), which was based on 
devolved development, rather than centralisation, turned out to be far from smooth (Macdonald, 1982a). Not 
only was the post-war period in the Pacific region characterised by shortages of personnel and physical 
resources but also, since its evacuation to Fiji in 1941, the Colony Government had been entirely dependent on 
subventions from the British Government, which was itself in dire financial straits following the war (Morgan, 
1980). This dependence reduced as trade in the Colony was restored and as phosphate mining was resumed—the 
Colony Government facilitated a resumption in the supply of I-Kiribati and Tuvaluan labour to Banaba and the 
supply of same to Nauru grew in importance (Shlomowitz & Munro, 1992). By 1952, local revenue once again 
more than covered the Colony Government’s recurrent expenditures, as it had from 1895 to 1941, but as the 
possibility of subventions continued (until 1955), so did the conditions that accompanied them, including tight 
oversight of budgets, etc. from the Treasury in London, which Colony Government officials (and their 
counterparts in other parts of the Empire – see Morgan, 1980) found difficulty coping with administratively. 
Subsequently, during the 1960s and 1970s, local revenue was further boosted by the Colony Government 
persuading and coercing the British Phosphate Commission on Banaba to increase its per-tonne-of-ore 
contributions (Macdonald, 1982a; Weeramantry, 1992; Williams & Macdonald, 1985). 
56 The first fleet to pay such fees was from Japan in an agreement negotiated by the first-ever Republic 
Government led by Ieremia Tabai (Macdonald, 1982a). However, vessels from some other countries would not 
recognise any obligation to pay licence fees. This changed during the controversy following the Republic 
Government entering into an agreement for vessels from the Soviet Union to fish under licence (see “Cold War: 
Fishing,” 1986; Van Trease, 1993b). Part of resolving the matter to the satisfaction of the former colonial power 
and its minions and allies was that they persuaded the countries who had refused to pay to change their minds 
and agree to pay—for a historical and current list, see Williams et al. (2017).  
57 Whereas the amount of grants from the Colonial Development and Welfare Fund and similar totalled just over 
AU$2m annually (equivalent to AU$12m at 2017 prices) in the mid-1970s (GEIC, 1976), the budget for 2017 
(Kiribati Government, 2016) indicates that the annual value of development projects is estimated at over 
AU$153m. This includes AU$22m from the Republic Government’s own resources, with the rest mainly 
comprising the total of values put on aid-in-kind by the 30 or so external donors involved in projects. Each 
donor keeps accounts for their projects locally or at a distance, classifying them as grants for Kiribati, or 
occasionally as soft loans to the Republic Government, despite most of the money going to people in places 





58 In 2009, I visited this junior secondary school at Rungata and one of the many on Tarawa, and so was able to 
compare them. While neither was resourced particularly well compared, say, to the New Zealand schools I am 
familiar with, the one on Nikunau lacked for things that on Tarawa were possibly taken for granted (e.g., 
teaching supplies, learning materials, mains electricity and lighting) and was in much greater need of repair.  
59 These operating grants are an extension of specific and general grants and subventions introduced by the 
Colony Government in the late 1960s around minor development projects. They entailed financially restrictive 
conditions, including in matters of process, reporting and audit, all of which meant a continuing lack of financial 
autonomy for the Nikunau and other island councils of the time (Macdonald, 1972, 1982a). While some 
conditions continue in form, their substance seems weaker. 
60 According to Macdonald (1982a), pregnancies arising from casual relationships with foreigners, commercial 
ones on board whaling ships, for example, were invariably aborted, and so mixed race children were not as 
common on Nikunau as they might have been before traders took up residence. 
61 Nikunau is also reputed to have had a custom of marriage by rape (see Grimble, 1989), perhaps mostly 
symbolic and being equivalent to elopement.  
62 Preparing food in pans for frying, boiling, etc. did not arise until after the 1820s. Before, food was cooked in 
earth ovens or on open fires, sometimes wrapped in leaves (Lewis, 1988; Di Piazza, 1999). 
63 Important differences between staff employed by the Colony Government, including teachers, doctors, etc., 
and aid staff, consultants and other workers arise from the latter usually only staying on Tarawa or elsewhere in 
Kiribati for shorter periods than the former, and increasingly so, and their families being unlikely to accompany 
them, for lack of accommodation, suitable schools, etc. This particularly applies to those proffering policy 
advice; they are apt to treat Kiribati as just another developing country, on which they can write reports about 
topics and situations they have struggled to evaluate adequately, especially from a local perspective, before 
moving onto their next assignment. Their perceptions of so-called problems and lists of recommendations can 
give impressions of being as concerned to tick various boxes on their contracts as to be effective in more 
magnanimous ways (cf. Bantekas, Kypraios & Isaac, 2013). These shorter stays also apply to operational 
trainers, installers of systems, construction staff and volunteer workers, and are for reasons such as containing 
costs and how air travel has made moving in and out of Tarawa much easier than even two decades ago. One 
consequence of these differences is the reduced number of mixed marriages occurring compared with the period 
from the 1950s to the 1990s, which led to the incidence of mixed couples in diasporic communities in 
metropolitan countries (see S3.3). 
64 Further to a reference in S3.1 to the Nikunau Island Council going under the title, te kabowi n abamakoro, as 
the title in question is still associated in many I-Nikunau minds with the KPC/KUC, I have been reluctant to 
apply this title to the Nikunau Island Council, and so have used the English title.  
65 This insistence was possible because of provisions in the aforementioned Declaration between the 
Governments of 1886. The Germans believed British annexation would guarantee the extant supply of labour 
from Nikunau and the other Kiribati islands to German plantations in Samoa. However, little over a decade 
later, this backfired on German interests: following the British Government acceding to requests from the 





curtail such as I-Nikunau from travelling outside the Colony for purposes of work and, in effect, directing them 
to Banaba (see Note 28). The Germans, meanwhile, turned to Bougainville (or North Solomons) for their labour 
(Meleisea, 1976). 
66 The annexation was done reluctantly on the part of the British Government, there being great concerns among 
politicians and others in London about the Kiribati Archipelago in particular, and potential colonial territories in 
general, needing either subventions from London or taxes, etc. from British commercial interests in a territory, 
for purposes of funding a colonial administration (see Bush & Maltby, 2004; Davis, 1892; Macdonald, 1982a; 
Morgan, 1980; Morrell, 1960; Munro & Firth, 1986, 1987, 1990; Ward, 1946). Besides, there were concerns 
about the lack of competent governors and administrators to administer more colonies, and a view that Britain 
“already had black subjects enough” (the Earl of Derby cited by Tate & Foy, 1965). Incidentally, the prospect of 
expenditure on development was not even contemplated at this time (see Note 51). 
67 In practice, the tax copra making up these taxes of individuals and mwenga was probably collected 
communally. The collection would follow elaborate negotiations in each te mwaneaba about how much 
Nikunau could afford, given climatic conditions that affected copra yields, and how the burden should be 
distributed among kawa and mwenga (Grimble, 1952, 1957; Macdonald, 1971; Maude, 1963, 1977). 
68 The British Government was persuaded to annex Banaba by the principals of the Pacific Islands Company, 
which had wide commercial and political interests in the Pacific; this was soon after its representatives had 
discovered that it and neighbouring Nauru were rich in phosphate—the Company acquired rights on Nauru from 
the German authorities (see Shlomowitz & Munro, 1992). As the extent and importance of the phosphate 
deposits emerged, the company was able to exert even more pressure in London over the administration of the 
Colony, including having the Colony headquarters relocated to Banaba (see Note 50). Thereafter, London 
expected the Colony Government to facilitate the mining of Banaba’s phosphate initially by these private British 
capitalists (1900–19) and then by the British Phosphate Commission (1919–42, 1946–79). 
69 Economy, containing costs and being financially self-sufficient had been concerns for the Colony 
Government since the appointment of the first resident commissioner in 1894 (Morgan, 1980)—see Note 63 for 
the reasons behind this. It had successfully struggled to achieve and maintain self-sufficiency (i.e., local 
revenues were enough to cover its expenditures without subventions from London) from 1895 until the 
evacuation of the Colony Government in 1941 (see Note 52). It resumed this self-sufficiency in 1952 and 
maintained it thereafter; this self-sufficiency was maintained without the British Phosphate Commission 
contributing very much, at least not until 1967.  
70 With the establishment of the District Office on Beru, the status of the Nikunau Native Government seemed to 
change from merely de jure to de facto as well, taking over from the LMS-controlled te kabowi n abamakoro, a 
state that prevailed (except from 1941–48) until the change of English name to the Nikunau Island Council and 
change of responsibilities, etc., as per the Local Government Ordinance 1966 (Macdonald, 1971, 1982a). 
71 The amounts of money spent from Colony Government revenues on Nikunau was never great, even after the 
idea of Outer Island social development gained some traction in the 1960s. Thus, a significant proportion of the 





which would have been mainly on Banaba and, later, Tarawa. At best, the benefit of this expenditure for I-
Nikunau or their atoll was indirect and incidental. 
72 Up to this time, the native governments of all the islands in the Colony had been separate accounting entities 
from the Colony Government; in particular, they had accounted for their revenues and expenditures and from 
these calculated their retained surpluses, which had thus accumulated as the Nikunau Island Fund, Beru Island 
Fund, Onotoa Island Fund, etc. By 1917, the total of these island funds amounted to some £17,000 (≈ AU$1.4m 
at 2017 prices) and the cash representing them was in the supposedly safekeeping of the Colony Government. 
The Colony Government now sequestrated this cash, using the pretext that over recent years the taxes it had 
raised from the Kiribati Islands and Tuvalu (as distinct from Banaba) had yielded insufficient revenues to meet 
the expenditures it had incurred on these islands—the sequestration followed representations made in London 
by the principals of the phosphateers in furtherance of their considerable interests on Banaba.  
73 This loss of autonomy vis-à-vis the Colony Government affected the native governments of all the islands in 
the Colony. Further to being deprived of their island funds, Native Laws 1917 and associated regulations 
provided for native governments to be accounted as a subsidiary of the Colony Government. This meant that all 
revenues collected by native governments belonged to the Colony Government and were to be handed over to its 
district officers intact, and that all expenditures incurred by native governments had to be authorised by the 
Colony Government, in effect through the resident commissioner, on the advice of the relevant district officer, 
approving each native government’s annual estimates. 
74 This use of Te Bobotin Nikunau as a political instrument was despite how it was constituted by the Colony 
Government and so differed from pre-war boboti, whose grassroots, or I-Nikunau native, qualities were 
potentially stronger for lack of central control (see Hempenstall & Rutherford, 1984; Roniti, 1985). This central 
control features of Te Bobotin Nikunau arose from it being subject to legislation (i.e., Co-operative Societies 
Ordinance 1952), and to governance, operating, accounting and auditing rules that provided, among other 
things, for I-Matang registrars and other Colony Government officials to oversee its workings (e.g., approving 
annual estimates, performing audits and helping decide about distributing profits and appointing managers) 
(Couper, 1967, Macdonald, 1971, 1982a; Maude, 1949, 1950). These various rules were devised, codified and 
updated by the I-Matang commercial managers of organisations whom the Colony Government’s senior 
officials had put in charge of importing, wholesaling and shipping between the 1940s and 1980s (see S4.3), in 
conjunction with said senior Colony Government officials; inputs from members, etc. of Te Bobotin Nikunau 
and its equivalents seem not to have been accorded much notice. 
75 Accounting is one technology of government in which I took particular interest, including as an accounting 
educator (see Dixon, 2004b). Accountings of one sort or another figure in the roles of I-Nikunau as politicians, 
public servants, citizens and people affected by government activities, sometimes acting more as barriers to 
participation in consensual governance than as part of pathways to greater involvement. Indeed, some 
accountings present in Kiribati today might be frustrating efforts of I-Nikunau and other I-Kiribati to rule 
themselves as much as they might be helping such efforts. Examples of how accounting technologies do this 
include that for the most part they continue to use a foreign language, English. How they are applied, including 
what is calculated and how, barely reflects I-Nikunau or similar I-Kiribati values. The accountings have 





secrecy and preclusion. They favour external organisations and their officials and principals, and disadvantage I-
Nikunau, I-Kiribati and the organisations they are supposed to be running, including by making many of these 
organisations impossible for I-Nikunau and I-Kiribati to understand (Dixon & Gaffikin, 2014). 
76 I have not been able to locate copies of either “Green, L. P., Bukhari, M. S., & Lawrence, R. (1979). 
Decentralisation in the Gilbert Islands. London: Development Planning Unit, University College London.” or 
“Pitchford, J. (1981). Decentralisation in Kiribati. Tarawa.” The two studies seem related and may be versions 
of the same study. 
77 Educational attainment was a major consideration in how the Colony Government appointed clerks and 
recruited labourers for itself and the British Phosphate Commission. However, in addition, a system of “home 
island” quotas persisted, to try to achieve some sort of fairness or equality in the distribution of paid work 
positions across the islands constituting the Colony. Even so, the Colony Government came in for criticism for 
seeming to favour Tuvaluans over I-Kiribati in administrative posts (Macdonald, 1982a). 
78 Nokise (1983, pp. 305–328) lists the following men as serving as pastors: Elia, Iakopo, Iopu, Iosefatu (also 
known as Lilo), Iosia, Iosua, Laofie, Lemuelu, Liuvao, Matafanua, Peni, Ta’ita’I, Uele, Kaisala and Kitiona. 
The names of their wives are not recorded, although they were active and influential (see Rose, 2014). 
79 Some I-Nikunau were converted to Christianity, both RC and Protestant, while away working in places under 
French, English and German influence. They returned with stories of their new religion(s) and wished to 
practice them at home, giving rise to clashes with longstanding traditional beliefs among I-Nikunau and, in the 
case of RCs, with the LMS missionaries still just getting established on Nikunau (Macdonald, 1982a; Sabatier, 
1939/1977). 
80 It was somewhat ironic for me to visit a church on Nikunau in 2009 and be shown the relics of an early-
arriving Christian clergyman. 
81 There was also much some loss of skills through not building or maintaining mwaneaba using traditional 
materials and methods. 
82 For photographs of Emmeline Goward conducting a class at the women’s school and other facilities at 
Rongorongo, see Alaima et al. (1979, between pp. 50 and 51) and University of Southern California Digital 
Library (2017). 
83 The translations were begun by Hiram Bingham on Abaiang Atoll in the 1860s. He worked for the Boston-
based American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions. Its mission was performed in the northern 
Kiribati Islands until 1917, when the LMS took over its work, carrying it on until the 1960s, when the 
organisation now known as KPC/KUC became independent. 
84 Although infanticide is sometimes mentioned in this regard, Carr-Saunders, writing in 1922 (cited by 
Veltman, 1982) suggests that use of this method was very rare in the Kiribati Islands, let alone Nikunau. 
85 The University of the South Pacific was established in 1968 to serve the region whose name it bears. The 
Republic Government is now one of its principals, making an annual grant. As well as its main campus in Fiji, it 
has various subsidiary campuses, including the one on Tarawa, where I staged a few courses in 1989 and 1997 





86 I worked at this institution in the late 1990s, staging courses in accounting, finance and administration (see 
Dixon, 2004b). However, most of its courses are focused on trades, including carpentry, mechanics, 
construction, etc., and on information technology. 
87 This institution was established in 1967 by Hamburg Sud in conjunction with the British and German 
Governments and the United Nations (Couper, 2009); it trains aspiring seafarers, who have long been associated 
with remittances (Borovnik, 2006). 
88 The one exception to primary schools using te taetae ni Kiribati as the main language of tuition is a small 
school on Tarawa that was originally established for children of I-Matang colonial staff and has over the years 
increasingly accepted locally-born children, perhaps of mixed race or whose home language is English, or 
whose I-Kiribati parents have opted for an English language education. However, the teachers there are usually 
I-Kiribati and the playground language is a mix of te taetae ni Kiribati and English (confidential personal 
communication from some students, 1997) 
89 Students were expected to use English everywhere on the campus, and so, as many were boarders, this meant 
day and night, although some broke the rules when there were no staff or prefects around (confidential personal 
communication from a student of the 1970s). 
90 This studying on Tarawa has proved advantageous for various reasons. These include the greater exposure 
students have to the English language, including because in the past some teachers were I-Matang and now 
because of the incidence of the Internet; the better physical resources available in schools there; the wider 
experiences of life on Tarawa in general; and the learning materials and similar available there about life outside 
the country, including though the national and other libraries, films, the Internet and broadcast television 
(Burnett, 2005). 
91 Said authorities largely reflect the educated professionals among the dominant Pākehā people and culture(s), 
although Māori are acknowledged because of a recently found formal respect among increasing numbers of 
Pākehā for certain provisions in the 1840 Treaty of Waitangi (see Bennion, 2004).  
92 During my stays on Nikunau in the 1980s, a film arrived each week via the internal air service and was 
screened on successive nights in the six kawa along the atoll: the seventh night was te Tabati, which was still 
observed strictly. The screenings were organised under the auspices of Te Bobotin Nikunau and had been 
initiated in the 1950s, when arrival of the reels of film was subject to the vagaries of shipping—the air service 
started in the 1970s. The social, cultural and other significances of these films should not be underestimated. For 
many I-Nikunau, they were the first opportunity to observe the world beyond Nikunau, neighbouring islands, 
Banaba or Nauru, albeit as slanted by Hollywood and other English-language filmmakers. Although few seemed 
to follow the dialogue or felt an inclination to relate to the plot, I-Nikunau attended enthusiastically at these 
screenings, and wondered at a world only a few of them had had chance to observe in person. 
93 The change to the legal system accounts for the prison adjacent to the Island Council area (see S3.1). First 
built about 1900, the prison reflected that serious criminal acts resulted in perpetrators suffering terms of 
imprisonment or, in the case of murder, execution. Formerly, under te katei, most of these acts had been civil 
matters and offended private parties had been entitled to compensation in the form of aba or, after 1870, copra, 





offenders adrift, lashed to a log or in a canoe, was another punishment for certain sexual offences, including 
karikira (Grimble, 1921). 
94 I have not found out about any wars that may have occurred on Nikunau.  
95 Uering (1979) comprises a transcription by his niece, Aeren Tiare, of Uering’s oral records; her purpose was 
to complete a school project. Uering, who resided on Nikunau all his life, visited his sister on Tarawa in 1979. 
While there, he recited to his niece his lineage back 17 generations (c. 1500), with numerous elaborations, such 
as the place names of their kainga and whence partners came. He could also have recited details of rights to aba, 
reef areas and areas beyond the reef (e.g. location and history of ownership), and skills and rituals (e.g. location 
and history of ownership) but these were not transcribed. I thank Aeren Tiare for allowing me to read through 
her transcription.  
96 Since their inception in the early 1970s, scheduled air services have been beyond the means of most I-
Nikunau resident on Nikunau, if they were travelling privately. Most I-Nikunau travelling to Tarawa do so by 
ship, whose main function is to carry freight. These carriers work to what, at best, may be described as a 
changeable schedule, and so are unreliable to anyone wanting to travel privately from A to B within specified 
time limits. However, they do call on Nikunau as part of landing and collecting organised groups, such as 
children coming from and going to Tarawa between the end of one school year and the beginning of the next. I-
Nikunau are used to fitting in with their erratic schedules, and seem to think nothing of “delays”, 
“inconvenience”, etc., things which do not seem to faze them on Tarawa or in New Zealand either. 
97 At first, projects were proposed mostly according to I-Matang ideas and designs, and so I-Nikunau often 
regarded them as being for Te Tautaeka. Because of this, their approval often did not proceed smoothly—
unimane were reluctant to agree to the tax increases needed to provide local contributions towards a project’s 
costs—and few actually went ahead. Besides, had they done so, they would have depended a great deal on I-
Matang project management assistance, which was in short supply. Realising its approach was not working, the 
Colony Government associated subsequent projects with the Island Council and consulted unimane and other 
residents of each te kawa about them. These projects did proceed, being seen as having community benefits: 
indeed, unimane proved adept at devising creative arrangements for raising funds for them under the auspices of 
kawa and churches. Gradually, the number of projects increased, giving rise to several new or revamped 
facilities (Macdonald, 1972, 1982a). 
98 This disproportionality is exemplified at different times as follows. In the 1920s, the annual expenditure on 
Nikunau was less than ₤400 (< AU$32,000 at 2016 prices) (Nikunau Native Government Cash Book 1915–33), 
compared with the Colony Government’s revenue and expenditure of about ₤55,000 (≈ AU$4.4m at 2016 
prices) (Macdonald, 1982a). In the 1950s, the Nikunau Native Government was still incurring expenditure of 
less than AU₤1,000 (< AU$35,000 at 2016 prices) annually (Island Fund Estimates – Nikunau, 1957-67), 
whereas the Colony Government’s annual recurrent expenditures were about AU₤450,000 (≈ AU$14m at 2016 
prices) and it was administering a further AU₤35,000 (≈ AU$1.2m at 2016 prices) annually of capital grants 
from the British Government for economic and social development projects (GEIC, 1957). In the 2000s, the 
Nikunau Island Council’s annual expenditure is reported as around AU$112,000 (Hassall & Tipu, 2008), 
compared with the Republic Government’s annual expenditure of AU$85m (Government of Kiribati, 2009). In 





development expenditure is about the same (Kiribati Government, 2016). Of that, less than 3% of the recurrent 
expenditure and only about 10% of the development expenditure is planned for all 15 Outer Kiribati Islands, of 
which Nikunau is only one.  
99 As indicated in Figure 10, this title was used to refer to the chair and chief official of the Nikunau Native 
Government. However, the English translation was magistrate (see Native Laws Ordinance 1917), indicating a 
quite different executive and judicial role from that actually found in te mwaneaba, and perhaps signifying how 
some I-Matang observers interpreted traditional mwaneaba proceedings as following their experience of 
monarchy, ruler, chieftainship, etc. 
100 This kamama is quite different from that recognised by outsiders, using such words as reckoning, 
accountability, answerability and stewardship. Two sources of these outside ideas are referred to above in 
discussing non-traditional organisations. The one source was nominally Iehova and his Earthly representatives, 
in distant Malua, Beru, London, and later Sydney and the Vatican City, which in practice meant pastors, priests 
and nuns residing on Nikunau. The second source was nominally the sovereign of Great Britain, and her or his 
high and resident commissioners, which in practice meant the district officer on his intermittent visits to 
Nikunau. That second source has been superseded by tenets of transparency and accountability, foisted on I-
Kiribati through neo-liberal policies advocated by the more influential aid organisations (see Dixon & Gaffikin, 
2014) 
101 Most of the commercial organisations owned by the Republic Government, and the Colony Government 
before that, can trace their origins to the post-war restoration of importing, copra exporting and shipping by the 
Colony Government, and to its development project and other activities (e.g., around procurement, and building 
and vehicle maintenance). They have gone through various name changes and legal forms, including statutory 
boards, corporations, companies and enterprises (e.g., GEIC Copra Board, Colony Wholesale Society, the 
Gilbert and Ellice Islands Development Authority, Kiribati Cooperative Wholesale Society, Bobotin Kiribati 
Limited, Kiribati Shipping Corporation, Kiribati Shipping Services Limited)—in the 2000s, the Republic 
Government let some close down through being insolvent, but the rest are still present one way or another, 
including one or two that have been privatised. However, I-Nikunau and other I-Kiribati seem never to have 
associated the organisations in question with other than Te Tautaeka, be it in reference to the Republic 
Government or, before, to the Colony Government (Couper, 1967; Dixon, 2004a; Duncan, 2014; Macdonald, 
1982a; Roniti, 1985).  
102 This desire to afford protection to natives should not be confused with extending jurisdiction over British 
citizens through the creation of protectorates, as distinct from colonies (see Munro & Firth, 1986), although, in 
the Colony’s case, the two did fuse de facto well before the Colony was proclaimed by his imperial majesty in 
London (see S4). 
103 For example, Williams and Macdonald (1985, pp. 38-39), in providing a facsimile of the written lease 
agreement of 1900 between the “king” of Banaba on behalf of the natives of the island and Arthur Ellis on the 
part of the Pacific Islands Company (see between pp. 38 and 39), allude to such agreements with indigenous 
landholders being unusual for the times. In the 80 years that elapsed before the phosphate deposits were 






104 These wrongs include dispossession and exploitation of, and banishment from, their land, and their 
deportation to and continuing exile on Rabi (e.g., see Edwards, 2014; Hindmarsh, 2002; Kempf, 2003; King & 
Sigrah, 2004; Macdonald, 1982b; McAdam, 2014; Sigrah & King, 2001; Silverman, 1971; Teaiwa, 2005, 2015). 
These wrongs were hardly made good when, under International Law and similar changes, indigenous 
landowners obtained rights to royalties and similar, or when the English courts found in favour of the cases 
brought by I-Banaba against the British Government (i.e., Rotan Tito and Others v. Attorney- General 1971 R. 
No. 3670; Rotan Tito and Others v. Waddell and Others (No. 2) 1973 R. No. 2013). The royalties were not only 
meagre (see Weeramantry, 1992) but also were shared between the Banaban Royalties Trust Fund (and its 
predecessors – see Tabucanon, 2012) and the Colony Government, whose share was in lieu of all taxes on 
profits, employees’ remuneration, import duties, store sales, etc., as well as, eventually, for development of the 
Colony—it used some to increase the investments held in the Revenue Equalisation Reserve Fund, as per Note 
49). Although the court’s judgement (see Megarry, 1977) included monetary compensation, this was arguably 
not enough in the circumstances. What is more, the court chose not to order that any restoration work should be 
carried out on Banaba (Tabucanon, 2012).  
